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     The end of military conscription and the rise of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
in 1973 forced the armed forces to compete in the civilian labor market with other 
employers and colleges for desirable young workers.  As a consequence, the 
Department of Defense and the individual services began large-scale programs of 
market research designed to monitor the quantity and quality of personnel in the 
civilian labor force who might be eligible and inclined to volunteer for military 
service.  One element of these research programs has been microdata analysis 
based upon large-scale longitudinal surveys of America’s youth.  The University 
of Michigan’s Monitoring the Future (MTF) project is one particular program that 
has been surveying high school seniors since 1975 and tracking their subsequent 
life-course trajectories up to the age of thirty-five.  Although originally intended 
for use as a drug and alcohol use study, there are numerous demographic and 
 
attitudinal questions on various forms of the MTF study that have been previously 
used by scholars and military practitioners to describe trends and predict factors 
associated with the propensity to serve in the armed forces.  However, scholars 
have not extended this research since 9/11.  My research bridges this gap in 
knowledge by employing cross-sectional data from MTF to examine the various 
macro-social and social-psychological factors associated with military propensity 
during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013)- a period marked by sustained war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  At the macro-social level, I find that the propensity to 
serve in the military is negatively related to public support for war and U.S. 
casualties, but is positively related to a rise in unemployment.  Black youth 
continue to have a higher propensity to serve compared to Hispanic and white 
youth, although their propensity is relatively lower compared to years prior to 
9/11.  Further, the gap in propensity between race and ethnic groups disappears 
after controlling for socioeconomic factors.  Significant attitudinal differences are 
observed between youth with and without propensity and between racial and ethic 
groups who have the propensity to serve.  Youth with propensity are more likely 
to affiliate with the Republican Party and to possess a conservative political 
ideology.  Youth with propensity are more likely to have greater institutional 
orientations toward work, although occupational orientations also exist among 
youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  Youth with propensity are likely 
to possess more traditional attitudes toward gender roles and are no less 
egalitarian in their attitudes toward race relations compared to youth without 
propensity.  Women continue to have lower propensity than men, but women’s 
 
overall propensity levels do not significantly decrease during the post-9/11 era 
compared to years earlier.  Findings have important implications for life course 
studies of the post-9/11 era, recruitment and retention in the military, for research 
on the integration of women into combat positions, and for research on civil-
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List of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a: Military propensity will decline in periods of war as compared to 
periods marked by no war.    
 
Hypothesis 1b: There will be a positive relationship between military propensity 
and public support for war during wartime.   
 
Hypothesis 1c: There will be a negative relationship between military propensity 
and U.S. casualties during wartime.     
 
Hypothesis 1d: There will be no significant relationship between propensity and 
unemployment during wartime. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Black and Hispanic men will have a greater propensity to serve in 
the military as compared to white men during the post-9/11 era. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Youth who are socioeconomically disadvantaged are likely to have 
a higher propensity to serve in the military as compared to those who are more 
advantaged. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The gap between white and black propensity to serve in the 
military will decrease during the post-9/11 era as compared to earlier years.   
 
Hypothesis 4b: As casualties increase, black propensity will decrease more than 
white or Hispanic propensity. 
 
Hypothesis 4c: As unemployment rates increase, black propensity will increase 
more than white or Hispanic propensity. 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Military propensity will be negatively related to the expectation to 
graduate from a four-year college. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Military propensity will be positively related to the expectation to 
graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational or technical school. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: Women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era is likely to 
be less than men’s propensity to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era will be 
greater compared to earlier years. 
 
Hypothesis 6c: There will be a positive relationship between women’s propensity 
and public support for war during wartime.   
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Hypothesis 6d: There will be a negative relationship between women’s propensity 
and U.S. casualties during wartime. 
 
Hypothesis 6e: There will be no significant relationship between women’s 
propensity and unemployment during wartime. 
 
Hypothesis 6f: Black and Hispanic women will have a greater propensity to serve 
in the military during the post- 9/11 era as compared to their white counterparts.  
 
Hypothesis 6g: The predictors for women’s propensity to serve (i.e. SES, 
educational goals and attainment, urbanicity, and place of residence) will be 
similar in direction as the predictors for men’s propensity during the post-9/11 
era.   
 
Hypothesis 7a: Youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-
9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party than other party 
affiliations. 
 
Hypothesis 7b: White youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the 
post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to 
black or Hispanic youth who expect to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 7c: Young men who are likely to serve in the armed forces during the 
post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to 
their women counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 7d: Youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-
9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a conservative political ideology 
than other ideological orientations. 
 
Hypothesis 7e: White youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the 
post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a conservative political 
ideology compared to black or Hispanic youth who expect to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 7f: Young men who expect to serve in the armed forces during the 
post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a conservative political 
ideology compared to their women counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 8a: There will be a positive relationship between youth with 
propensity and institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era.  
 
Hypothesis 8b: Youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will display both 




Hypothesis 8c: Youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have greater 
institutional orientations compared to youth with propensity during the pre-9/11 
era. 
 
Hypothesis 8d: There will be a positive relationship between casualties and 
institutional orientations for those youth with the propensity to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 8e: There will be a negative relationship between unemployment and 
institutional orientations for those youth with the propensity to serve.   
 
Hypothesis 8f:  White youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have 
greater institutional orientations compared to their black youth counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 8g: Hispanic youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have 
similar institutional/occupational orientations as their white youth counterparts.   
 
Hypothesis 8h: Youth with high propensity during the post-9/11 era are likely to 
have greater institutional orientations compared to youth with low propensity. 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Men’s propensity will be negatively related to greater egalitarian 
attitudes toward gender roles during the post-9/11 era.  
 
Hypothesis 9b: Black and Hispanic men with propensity will have greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 9c: Women with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes 
toward gender roles compared to men with propensity during the post-9/11 era.    
 
Hypothesis 9d: Women’s propensity will be positively related to greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles during the post-9/11 era. 
 
Hypothesis 9e: Black and Hispanic women with propensity will have greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 10a: There will be no significant relationship between men’s 
propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era.  
 
Hypothesis 10b: Men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era will be more 
positively related to egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to years 
prior to 9/11.  
 
Hypothesis 10c: Black and Hispanic men with propensity will have greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 10d: There will be no significant relationship between women’s 
propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era.  
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Hypothesis 10e: Black and Hispanic women with propensity will have greater 






     The end of military conscription and the rise of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
in 1973 forced the armed forces to compete in the civilian labor market with other 
employers and colleges for desirable young workers.  As a consequence, the 
Department of Defense and the individual services began large-scale programs of 
market research designed to monitor the quantity and quality of personnel in the 
civilian labor force who might be eligible and inclined to volunteer for military 
service.  One element of these research programs has been microdata analysis 
based upon large-scale longitudinal surveys of America’s youth.  The University 
of Michigan’s Monitoring the Future (MTF) project is one particular program that 
has been surveying high school seniors since 1975 and tracking their subsequent 
life-course trajectories up to the age of thirty-five.  The MTF project is an 
ongoing national study of youth and young adults conducted by the Institute for 
Social Research at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor under a series of 
grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse.  MTF employs a cohort-
sequential research design that includes nationally representative samples of 
seniors in U.S. high schools beginning in 1975 continuing each year thereafter 
(average response rates of 83% yield approximately 17,000 respondents 
annually).  Although originally intended for use as a drug and alcohol use study, 
there are numerous demographic and attitudinal questions on various forms of the 
MTF study that have been previously used by scholars and military practitioners 
to describe trends and predict factors associated with the propensity to serve in the 
armed forces.  However, scholars have not extended this research since the 
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terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11).  My research bridges this gap in 
knowledge by employing cross-sectional data from MTF to examine the various 
macro-social and social-psychological factors associated with military propensity 
during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013)- a period marked by sustained war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.     
     Research on civil-military relations over the past half-century has focused 
primarily on two separate streams of research.  Those in Samuel Huntington’s 
corner believe that the military should be separate and distinct from the society it 
serves to increase military effectiveness.  However, those in Morris Janowitz’s 
corner believe that the military should be woven into the fabric of society, arguing 
that the military should be representative in demographics, attitudes, and values of 
the people it serves.  Since the end of conscription and the birth of the AVF, 
researchers have been particularly interested in analyzing whether or not one of 
the unintended consequences of the AVF would be to create a “civil-military gap” 
in demographic representation, attitudes, and values.  Is the military becoming an 
“ideological caste” of its own as Janowitz inquired?  Most recently, scholars have 
cautioned that the length of the post-9/11 wars could potentially increase the gap 
between civilians and the military.  My research contributes to this body of 
literature by examining a potential civil-military gap through the analysis of 
various demographic and attitudinal factors associated with those most likely to 
enter the military.            
     Extensive research has also been conducted to examine the different reasons 
that people enter, stay in, and leave the military.  Much of this research has 
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employed Charles Moskos’ formulation of the “Institutional” and “Occupational” 
models of military service and organization to analyze different attitudes toward 
service.  Researchers have considered institutionally motivated individuals to be 
driven by values such as duty, honor, and country with more of an emphasis on 
the military organization as opposed to the individual.  In contrast, researchers 
have considered occupationally motivated individuals to be driven by more 
individualistic desires such as pay and benefits to service.  Some researchers have 
shown that service members could exhibit a mixture of both orientations toward 
service.  My research incorporates the Institutional and Occupational model to 
assist with uncovering why youth have the propensity to serve during the post-
9/11 era.     
     My overall research focus examines four major questions during the post-9/11 
era: 1) What is our youth’s propensity to serve in the armed forces during this era 
and how does it compare to earlier times throughout the AVF?  2) What are the 
macro-social, individual, and social-psychological factors that influence youth 
propensity?  3) What are youth motivations to serve- are they more institutionally 
or occupationally motivated?  4) What are the potential impacts to civil-military 
relations- has the “civil-military gap” increased or decreased?   
Propensity to Serve 
     Propensity to serve, as defined in the MTF study as the percent of youth (i.e. 
high school seniors) who say they expect that they “Definitely Will” or “Probably 
Will” enter the armed forces, has gradually declined from the 1970s through the 
1990s, but has remained relatively stable during the post-9/11 era.  This 
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propensity measure has been shown to be a valid indicator of actual enlistment 
behavior.  For most youth, propensity for military service is general and not tied 
to one specific military service.   
     Men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era was as high as during the 1990s, 
although it was generally lower than the 1980s.  Similar trends hold for women’s 
propensity.  Interestingly, women’s propensity reached its second highest 
percentage in 2013.  Since 9/11, young men’s propensity initially increased after 
the 9/11 attacks, then dropped significantly after the invasion of Iraq from 2004-
2007 during a period marked by high U.S. casualties, and then rose again after the 
economic recession of 2008 during a period of economic instability.  For the most 
part, these trends hold for women, although there was not a significant spike in 
women’s propensity immediately following 9/11. 
     Propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era is related to several demographic 
characteristics.  Generally:  
• Propensity remains higher for men than women, although women’s 
propensity remains relatively stable compared to years prior to 
9/11. 
• Propensity is highest among Black youth, followed by Hispanic 
youth, and lowest among white youth. 
• Propensity decreases with higher levels of socioeconomic status.  
• Propensity decreases with increasing educational attainment and 
goals (i.e. G.P.A. and expectation to go to a 4-year college). 
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• Propensity varies by region such that it is highest in the South, 
followed by the West, Northeast, and the North Central region.  
These trends hold true for women. 
• Propensity is lowest where youth grow up in the suburbs of a large 
or very large city and highest in the country.  These trends hold 
true for women. 
• Propensity increases with the expectation to attend a 2-year college 
or vocational training. 
     In addition to demographic influences, there are also various macro-social and 
social-psychological influences that influence propensity to serve during the post-
9/11 era.  Macro-social influences include public support for war, U.S. combat 
casualties, and the economy.  Social-psychological influences include attitudes 
toward politics, work, gender roles, and race relations.   
Public Support for War Influences 
     Unexpectedly, propensity has declined despite increased levels of public 
support for war.  For every five percent increase in overall public support for the 
wars, there is a significant decrease (OR=0.98***) in the propensity to serve.  
This translates to approximately two-thirds a percent decrease in a youth’s 
probability to expect to serve for every five percent increase in public support for 
war.  It appears that other factors, such as casualties and the economy, may have 
more influence on a youth’s propensity to serve in the military during the post-
9/11 era.  Of note, military propensity increases with greater nationalistic 
attitudes.    
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Casualty Influences 
     There is a significant negative relationship between propensity and combat 
casualties from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  Results indicate that for every 
increase in combat casualties by one hundred deaths, there is a significant 
decrease (OR=0.95***) in the propensity to serve.  This translates to 
approximately three-quarters of a percentage decrease in a youth’s predicted 
probability to expect to serve for every one hundred increase in deaths.  For every 
increase in casualties by 500, there is nearly a four percent decrease in a youth’s 
probability to expect to serve.  The decrease in propensity in relation to casualties 
is greater for women than for men.  It appears that the benefits of military service 
do not outweigh the costs marked by casualties in war for America’s youth.    
Economic Influences 
     There is a significant positive relationship between men’s propensity and 
unemployment.  For every percent increase in the overall unemployment rate, 
there is a significant increase (OR=1.04***) in the propensity to serve.  This 
translates to approximately one half a percentage increase in a youth’s probability 
to expect to serve for every one percent increase in unemployment.  It appears 
that the benefits of military service outweigh the costs of service during wartime 
when the labor market is constrained and when the military may be viewed as a 
viable job opportunity.  For purposes of comparison, military propensity was less 
positively influenced by the negative impacts of the economy during the other 
time period of war since the AVF- the Gulf War period (1990-1991).  During this 
time, for every one percent increase in the overall unemployment rate, there was 
 xxix 
actually a decrease in the propensity to serve, albeit at insignificant levels 
(OR=0.96).  Nevertheless, recent data suggests that the expectation to serve 
remains significantly influenced by economic factors during wartime.  There is no 
significant relationship between women’s propensity and unemployment.   
Race/Ethnicity 
     Scholars and military practitioners conducting propensity research in the past 
have been interested in examining distinct racial trends in enlistment propensity.  
Additionally, research has been informed by the analysis of racial differences in 
the various factors influencing propensity.  Black propensity continues to decline 
compared to earlier years of the AVF.  Black men’s propensity is generally the 
lowest during the post-9/11 era compared to their propensity during the years 
prior to 9/11.  Even still, propensity to serve by race/ethnicity reveals that blacks 
and Hispanics are about one and half times more likely than whites to expect to 
serve during the post-9/11 era.  However, after controlling for SES factors, the 
“race effect” for black youth no longer applies- black propensity is about the same 
as white propensity.  On the other hand, Hispanic youth remain significantly more 
likely (OR=1.12*) than white youth to expect to serve, after controlling for SES.  
Among women, black propensity is the highest, followed by Hispanics, then 
whites regardless of controls.  
     It appears that black youth are the most negatively influenced by the effects of 
casualties compared to white and Hispanic youth.  For every one hundred increase 
in casualties, black youth propensity declines by nearly one percent, while white 
youth propensity declines by about one half of a percent.  It appears that Hispanic 
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youth propensity is the least negatively influenced by the effects of casualties.  
For every one hundred increase in casualties, Hispanic youth propensity declines 
about one third of a percent.   
     It also appears that black youth propensity is the most positively influenced by 
the negative effects of the economy.  For every one percent increase in 
unemployment, black youth propensity increases by nearly one percent.  Hispanic 
youth propensity increases about one half a percent for every one percent increase 
in the unemployment rate.  It appears that white youth propensity is the least 
impacted by negative economic effects.  For every one percent increase in the 
unemployment rate, white youth propensity only increases about one third of a 
percent.  There are no significant differences in propensity between race/ethnicity 
from the effects of public support for war.   
Political Attitudes 
     Propensity to serve is influenced by various political attitudes such as political 
party and ideology.  It appears that youth who expect to serve are becoming 
increasingly Republican in party affiliation and conservative in political ideology, 
especially among men.  Compared to those youth who identify with the 
Republican Party, youth who identify with the Democratic Party are about half as 
likely (OR=0.56***) to have the propensity to serve.  Similarly, those youth who 
identify as having a liberal political ideology are about half as likely 
(OR=0.54***) to have the propensity to serve compared to those who identify as 
having a conservative political ideology.  Independents are a quarter less likely to 
have the propensity to serve compared to Republicans.  Youth who either “don’t 
 xxxi 
know” or have “no preference” in a political party affiliation are about one third 
less likely to have the propensity to serve compared to Republican youth.  
Similarly, youth who identify as having a moderate ideology are a quarter less 
likely to expect to serve compared to conservative youth.  Youth who “don’t 
know,” have “no preference” in political ideology, or did not respond are also 
about one third less likely to expect to serve compared to conservatives.  It 
appears that Republican and conservative youth are significantly more likely to 
expect to serve- about twice as likely compared to Democratic and liberal youth.     
     Youth who have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era are 
significantly more Republican than earlier years.  During the pre-9/11 era, youth 
who identified as Democrats were about a quarter less likely (OR=.78***) than 
Republicans to have the propensity to serve.  Contrast that with Democratic youth 
during the post-9/11 era, who are about half as likely (OR=0.56***) than 
Republicans to have the propensity to serve.  
     Similarly, youth who have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era are 
significantly more conservative than earlier years.  During the pre-9/11 era, youth 
who identified as having a liberal ideology, were only about a quarter less likely 
(OR=0.77***) to have the propensity to serve compared to conservative youth.  
Contrast that with liberal youth during the post-9/11 era who are nearly half as 
likely (OR=0.54***) to have the propensity to serve compared to conservatives.  
Overall, data suggests that the military may be becoming increasingly Republican 
and conservative in nature, which has important implications on civil-military 
relations.     
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Institutional/Occupational Orientations 
     There are various motivations for young men and women to serve.  Some 
factors effecting the decision of youth to expect to join the military are at least 
partially controllable such as high school grades, graduation, and various health 
standards like height/weight and overall physical fitness.  Other factors such as 
the job market are not as controllable.  Thus, individual reasons to join the 
military are dynamic in nature.  Over the past four decades, many scholars and 
military practitioners have used Charles Moskos’ Institutional/Occupational (I/O) 
thesis as a framework to determine individual motivations to enter and remain in 
military service.  Economic factors such as unemployment, along with operational 
environmental factors such as casualties, fall along the occupational side of the 
I/O framework of analysis.  Patriotism is considered an institutional motivation to 
serve.     
     Unfortunately, the MTF study does not directly ask youth why they expect to 
enter the military.  However, there are numerous questions that ask about youth 
attitudes toward work.  Creating an index measure combining attitudes toward 
work along an institutional/occupational spectrum allows for the analysis of youth 
motivations to serve.  Some youth may be more institutionally motivated to join 
the military while others may be more occupationally motivated.   
     Findings reveal that youth who expect to serve are significantly more likely 
(OR=0.98***) to have institutional orientations toward work compared to youth 
who do not expect to serve.  Youth who do not expect to serve have significantly 
greater occupational orientations toward a job.  Further, by an additional measure 
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of analysis, youth who expect to serve are nine times more likely than their 
civilian counterparts to say they would volunteer to serve during a time that is 
“necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future war”- an inclination that clearly 
leans toward institutional motivations to serve.   
     Among youth with propensity, there are also significant I/O differences in job 
related attitudes between race and ethnicity.  White youth who expect to serve 
have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work compared to 
black youth.  There are no significant differences between white and Hispanic 
youth with propensity with respect to I/O orientations toward a job.  Further, it 
appears that white youth who expect to serve are more institutional than their 
black counterparts by additional measures.  There are significant differences 
between white and black youth who have the propensity to serve concerning their 
likelihood to volunteer during a time that is “necessary for the U.S. to fight in 
some future war.”  For this measure, black youth are more than three times less 
likely (OR=0.21***) than white youth to say they would volunteer to serve in 
some future war.  In other words, for white youth who expect to serve, there is an 
85% probability that they would likely volunteer for a future war that is 
necessary.  In contrast, for black youth who expect to serve, there is about a 55% 
probability that they would likely volunteer.  There are no significant differences 
between white and Hispanic youth for this institutional measure.  
     Taken as a whole, it appears that youth who expect to serve have more 
institutional and less occupational orientations than youth who do not expect to 
serve.  However, both institutional and occupational orientations continue to exist 
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for youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era.  For example, there is 
little difference between youth with and without propensity in the importance of 
having a job in which you can “earn a lot of money”- clearly an occupational 
orientation.    
Gender Role Attitudes 
     Youth propensity is also influenced by attitudes toward gender roles and 
attitudes regarding gender discrimination.  Overall trends in youth attitudes 
indicate a large spike in liberal attitudes toward gender roles during the 70s and 
80s.  However, these trends flatten out by the mid-90s and remain relatively 
stable.  Findings reveal that young men who expect to serve are significantly more 
traditional (OR=0.96***) than their civilian counterparts with respect to attitudes 
toward gender roles.  Young men’s propensity to serve declines by about one half 
percent for every one-point increase on the gender roles index scale.  Data also 
suggests that men with the propensity are becoming increasingly more traditional 
compared to young men with propensity during the decade prior to 9/11.  
     Among youth who expect to serve, there are significant differences in gender 
role attitudes between race and ethnicity.  White youth with propensity have more 
traditional orientations toward gender roles compared to black and Hispanic 
youth.  There are no significant gender role attitudinal differences between black 
and Hispanic youth.  On average, black and Hispanic youth score almost two 
points higher in the liberal direction on the gender roles index scale.   
     Not surprisingly, women with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian 
attitudes toward gender roles than men.  Interestingly, young women who expect 
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to serve are also significantly more traditional (OR=0.97*) with respect to their 
attitudes toward gender roles compared to their civilian counterparts.  Young 
black women who expect to serve are significantly more traditional than their 
white counterparts.  There are no significant differences in gender role attitudes 
between white and Hispanic women who expect to serve.   
Race Relations Attitudes 
      The U.S. military led the charge in society for racial desegregation by more 
than a decade with the integration of black soldiers into white units during the 
Korean War.  Since then, the military has traditionally been viewed as possessing 
an egalitarian workplace environment that promotes racial equity more than the 
civilian labor market.  However, some scholars have recently challenged this 
assumption by arguing that racial discrimination still exists within the military 
citing evidence that white veterans express more negative views of blacks relative 
to white civilians and that white veterans in the AVF generation exhibit the most 
negative views toward blacks.  
     Findings reveal that young men who expect to serve are no different 
(OR=1.00) than their civilian counterparts with respect to racial attitudes.  In fact, 
findings reveal that those young men who definitely expect to serve (i.e. “high 
propensity”) express even more positive racial attitudes (OR=1.03***) compared 
to young men who definitely do not expect to serve (i.e. “low propensity”).  This 
equates to a one percent increase in a youth’s expected probability to serve for 
every four-point increase on the racial attitudes index scale.  
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     Among youth with propensity there are significant differences in racial 
attitudes between race and ethnicity.  White youth who expect to serve have less 
positive racial attitudes compared to black and Hispanic youth.  There are no 
significant differences in racial attitudes between black and Hispanic youth.  On 
average, black and Hispanic youth score almost four points higher than their 
white counterparts in the positive direction on the racial attitudes index scale.  
Among white men only, propensity is negatively related (OR=0.99*) to an 
increase in egalitarian attitudes toward race relations prior to controlling for SES.  
After controls, there are no significant relationship between white men’s 
propensity and attitudes toward race relations attitudes.   
     Results also reveal that young women who expect to serve are no different 
(OR=0.99) with respect to their racial attitudes compared to their civilian 
counterparts.  Young black and Hispanic women who expect to serve have 
significantly more positive racial attitudes than their white counterparts.  Young 
Hispanic women who expect to serve exhibit the most positive racial attitudes.  
On average, Black and Hispanic young women who expect to serve score about 
two or three points higher, respectively, than white women in the positive 
direction on the racial index scale.  Men and women with propensity during the 
post-9/11 era have increasing egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared 
to years prior to 9/11.   
Gender 
     Women in the military have not been previously analyzed in most MTF 
studies.  The rationale for excluding women from the analysis is sometimes that 
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men constitute the prime recruiting market, that women’s propensity is too low to 
bother studying, or that the low overall amount of women enlistees for follow-up 
samples would produce unreliable statistical analysis.   
As women have steadily increased their participation over the years and achieved 
success in combat, it is especially important to examine women’s propensity 
during the post-9/11 era.  My research adds to the existing literature concerning 
women in the military.  Results reveal that women’s propensity continues to be 
much lower than men’s propensity.  However, women’s propensity remains 
relatively stable and does not decline during the post-9/11 era.  The Department of 
Defense’s recent removal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and the combat 
exclusion ban, which has made all combat positions available to women, provides 
a rich opportunity for researchers to continue to examine women’s propensity into 
the future.  Continued research on women’s propensity will provide invaluable 
insight on the influence of these institutional changes.   
Summary 
     Results from my research during the post-9/11 era add to the literature on Life 
Course theory as youth lives are shaped and embedded in the historical time and 
place that they experience.  The post-9/11 era has been marked by a period of 
sustained war, the attacks of 9/11, high casualties, and an economic recession- all 
of which have had influence on youth decisions to expect to serve in the armed 
forces.  The post-9/11 era is certain to have influence on various outcomes in 
other academic fields of study and warrants continued examination.  
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     From a practitioner standpoint, results from my research will assist with 
recruitment and retention efforts as the military attempts to attract the best and 
brightest candidates who are representative of the population at large.  
Understanding individual motivations and attitudes of youth will assist with this 
endeavor.  My findings suggest that institutional recruiting themes should attract 
new recruits during an era of sustained war.  Previous research suggests that 
individuals who are attracted to these types of institutional recruitment appeals 
will be more committed to the institution overall, more likely to fulfill their initial 
enlistment obligations, and more likely to reenlist.  Attracting youth who already 
have a fair amount of institutional orientations will certainly reduce the culture 
shock from the institutional socialization that occurs within the military itself after 
initial enlistment.  To the extent that organizational functioning is affected by the 
goodness of fit between the values of the organization and those of its work force, 
it appears that military effectiveness during the post-9/11 era will be strengthened 
as a result of the institutional orientations of youth who are likely to enlist.   
     Despite evidence revealing strong institutional orientations among youth with 
propensity, youth still exhibit a mixture of institutional and occupational 
motivations to serve (the hybrid model) during the post-9/11 era.  The military 
must ensure that incentive packages remain attractive to the “college-bound” 
youth amidst looming budget cuts to maintain the overall quality and readiness of 
the force.  Young men and women are likely to be attracted to educational 
benefits as well as monetary incentives, especially during periods of economic 
stability in the labor market.    
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     Results regarding racial and ethnic group differences in I/O orientations will 
further assist recruiters in focusing on various target audiences with appropriate 
recruitment techniques.  Data suggests that recruitment techniques that focus on 
more tangible, occupational incentives such as pay and benefits may better attract 
black youth into the military.  Conversely, those techniques that focus on more 
intangible, institutional incentives may better attract white and Hispanic youth.  In 
accordance with one of the tenets of Life Course theory- human agency- it 
appears that minority men who are disadvantaged have agency when considering 
their options after high school.  In particular, results suggest that the military 
remains viewed as a potential environment for one to make a “turning point” in 
the life course- an opportunity to increase ones socioeconomic position.      
     Results also contribute to the extensive body of literature on civil-military 
relations, which covers the political science, history, and military sociology 
domains.  Gaps between those who expect to serve (i.e. the military) and those 
who do not (i.e. civilians) in such areas as family background, demographics, 
educational attainment, values and attitudes could have important implications for 
policy makers and for the overall relationship between the armed forces and 
society.   
     Is the military becoming a warrior-class with its own distinctive values and 
attitudes?  Anecdotally, many believe that the military has become more separated 
from the society it serves after a decade and a half of war.  My research suggests 
that there are different value orientations between those with and without 
propensity.  Results show that youth with propensity have greater institutional 
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orientations, are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and identify as 
having a conservative ideology, and are more traditional in attitudes toward 
gender roles.  Of note, there are no differences in attitudes toward race relations 
between youth with and without propensity.  Results also show that black 
propensity has decreased during this period compared to earlier periods, which 
has potential to add to issues with diversity in the military. The fact that those 
who expect to serve in the armed forces have different attitudes from the society it 
protects is not surprising in and of itself.  Indeed, many organizations adopt a 
culture of their own that attracts individuals with unique personalities and 
attitudes that may be different than those outside the organization.  From this 
point of view, the military is no different than any other organization.  In fact, 
those in Huntington’s corner would argue that this is a necessary condition for 
military effectiveness.  However, insofar as one believes that the military should 
be a microcosm of the society it serves and protects, as Morris Janowitz did, these 
differences may bring cause for alarm.  Perhaps the most worrisome differences 
are in the political attitudes of youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  My 
findings suggest that the civil-military gap has widened to some extent during the 
post-9/11 era.  Further analysis is necessary to determine the extent of this gap 
and the potential impacts to civil-military relations. 
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Chapter 1: Project Description 
 
     The end of military conscription and the rise of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) 
in 1973 marked the first time that the United States assumed the task of 
maintaining a large peacetime force based solely on voluntary enlistment.  The 
nation relied upon marketplace philosophies as opposed to institutional-based 
notions of citizen obligations to attract new recruits into the military (Moskos 
1977).  The armed forces were now forced into the civilian labor market in direct 
competition with other employers and colleges for desirable young workers.  As a 
consequence of competing in the civilian labor market, the Department of 
Defense and the individual services began large-scale programs of market 
research designed at monitoring the quantity and quality of personnel in the 
civilian labor force who might be eligible for voluntary military service.  One 
element of these research programs has been microdata analysis based upon large-
scale longitudinal surveys of America’s youth (Bachman et al. 1998).  The 
University of Michigan’s Monitoring the Future (MTF) project is one particular 
program that has been surveying high school seniors since 1975 and tracking their 
subsequent life-course trajectories up to the age of thirty-five.  I utilize portions of 
this data for my analysis to examine what factors are associated with a youth’s 
propensity to serve in the military and compare that to other available options 
(e.g. going to a 4- or 2-year college, or vocational education) as one makes the 
transition into adulthood.  Specifically, I examine the relationship between 
propensity to serve in the military and various macro-social factors such as public 
support for war, casualties, and unemployment rates.  I also examine various 
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individual-level demographic and attitudinal factors such as race and ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, gender, educational attainment, urbanicity, region of the 
country, and various attitudes toward politics, work, gender-roles, and race 
relations.   
     Since September 11, 2001 (9/11) U.S. forces have been engaged in combat, 
either in Afghanistan or Iraq, for longer than any other period throughout our 
history.  Debate about whether to return to a draft to mitigate the negative 
consequences of the protracted wars was at the forefront of decision makers 
within the military as well as civilian leadership (Korb and Segal 2011).  Indeed, 
the military has endured significant strains on both the active and reserve forces 
for over a decade of persistent conflict (Clever and Segal 2012).  A recent study 
conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed that 83% of the public surveyed 
believed military personnel and their families have had to make the majority of 
the sacrifices since the attacks on 9/11 (Pew 2011a).  Over a third of veterans of 
the post-9/11 era reported having experienced some form of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) and about one half of them have also reported problems with 
reentering civilian life (Pew 2011a).  These burdens of war do not come without 
potential costs to the future force.  Technology and 24-hour media coverage have 
placed these burdens and the realities of war on the front pages, firmly imprinted 
within the consciousness of America’s youth.  It is conceivable that the recent 
burdens of military service could have negative impacts on future recruits for 
quite some time.  Interestingly, when asked whether they would advise a young 
person to join the military, only about half of the public said they would, whereas 
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82 percent of post-9/11 veterans say they would advise a young person to join.  
Despite the hardships encountered during war, almost all (98 percent) veterans 
reported feeling proud that they had served and over three-quarters appreciated 
life more (Pew 2011a).  In a period where less than one percent of our society 
currently serves in the armed forces, lower than any other time in the past century 
(Segal and Segal 2004), the gap between the public and the military’s perception 
of service could negatively impact recruitment even further.   
     While the U.S. has concluded major combat operations in Afghanistan 
recently, a small contingency force of nearly 10,000 soldiers remains indefinitely 
to advise, assist, and train the Afghan National Security Forces.  Meanwhile the 
military is currently undergoing significant budget cuts and reductions in force 
levels.  The Obama administration recently proposed a defense budget that cuts 
spending by more than $450 million over the next ten years (Dreazen 2012).  
Estimates of the impacts show that the Army would lose about 14 percent of its 
troop strength, or about 80,000 active duty personnel (Taylor et al. 2015).  
Further, a Congressional proposal to reduce the military retirement package is 
likely to negatively influence potential recruits to enlist (Tilghman 2015).  Yet, 
the current status of the global security environment remains as turbulent and 
unpredictable as before (National Security Strategy 2013).  With the recent 
Russian expansion developments into eastern Ukraine and combat troops in Syria, 
artillery “show of force” exchanges between North and South Korea, and the 
emerging global threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the security 
environment is, perhaps, more unstable than before.  It is absolutely imperative 
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for the U.S as a global superpower to preserve the health, status, and overall 
readiness of its military so that it can meet the challenges that lie ahead both 
domestically and abroad.  Obtaining quality new recruits will be vital in 
maintaining our superior force and to remain prepared to operate in future 
complex environments.  Analysis from my research will shed some light into the 
expected quantity and quality of potential recruits to tackle these challenges.  
      Life course theory and research focuses on how people work out paths of 
development over time.  Throughout the life course, individuals encounter 
multiple developmental periods and transitions that shape their trajectories.  The 
transition to adulthood is a particularly critical time impacting one’s development 
over the life course.  During this transition, there are a few options that one has to 
consider upon completion of high school.  Going to college, joining the military, 
attending vocational technical training or doing something else (e.g. going to 
work, traveling) are the primary options.  The reasons one chooses a particular 
pathway vary and an examination into what factors are associated with the 
expectation to join the military compared to other pathways to adulthood will 
shed light into our youth’s decision-making processes during a critical time in our 
nation’s history- the post-9/11 era.   
     My research specifically targets the population of young adults who expect to 
join the military to determine what factors might predict this outcome.  There are 
many reasons for joining the military.  Previous research (e.g. Kleykamp 2006; 
Segal et al. 1998) has attributed educational goals and attainment, the institutional 
presence of the military in nearby communities, and race and socioeconomic 
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status as key factors associated with military enlistment and propensity.  
Additionally, researchers have found that the benefits of military service (e.g. the 
Montgomery G.I. and Post-9/11 Bills, acquisition of job skills and training), 
especially for less advantaged individuals, have also been a key factor in 
attracting young adults into military service (Kleykamp 2009; Elder et al. 2010).   
     Research on civil-military relations covers an extensive body of literature in 
the political science, history, and military sociology domains.  Scholars who study 
in this arena examine the relationship between the armed forces and society, the 
impacts of the relationship, and how the relationship has changed over time.  Two 
prominent researchers in the field, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, are 
credited for formulating two separate yet similar streams of research paving the 
way for continued research over the past half century.  Those in Huntington’s 
(1957) corner believe that the military should be separate and distinct from 
society to increase the military’s overall effectiveness.  On the other hand, those 
in Janowitz’s (1960) corner believe that the military should be more convergent 
with the society it protects with respect to attitudes, values, and demographic 
representation.   
     As a result of the shift in career-orientation of those in the military during the 
early years of the AVF, Janowitz (1975) suggested that the professional military 
was increasingly emphasizing distinctive military values; that its linkages with 
society had become weakened and tied to limited segments of the social structure; 
that changes in the recruitment base were making the officer corps and the 
enlisted less representative of society; and that such processes might create an 
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“ideological caste” in the military and be a source of political division from 
civilian society.  Thus, the military culture might become decoupled from civilian 
culture.  Essentially, what Huntington viewed as necessary for military 
effectiveness, Janowitz viewed as problematic for civil-military relations (Segal et 
al. 2001).  Perhaps worse yet, “there has been widespread agreement that over the 
past few decades American society has become fragmented, more individualistic, 
and less disciplined” (Ricks 1997b: 10).  These changes put society at odds with 
the traditional military values of sacrifice, team, self-discipline, and putting the 
interests of others above oneself.  Couple the military’s organizational changes 
with an increased individualistic, “Me” attitude among members of society and 
the potential for a cleavage, or “gap,” between civilians and the military were 
thought by some to be wide and alarming (e.g. Ricks 1997b).  This potential gap 
has been commonly referred to as the “civil-military gap.” 
     Extensive research has also been conducted to examine different reasons that 
people enter, stay in, and leave the military.  Much of this research has employed 
Charles Moskos’ (1977) formulation of the Institutional and Occupational models 
of military service and organization to analyze different attitudes toward service.  
Researchers have considered institutionally motivated individuals to be driven by 
values such as duty, honor, and country with more of an emphasis on the military 
organization as opposed to the individual.  In contrast, researchers have 
considered occupationally motivated individuals to be driven by more 
individualistic desires such as pay and benefits to service.  Some researchers (e.g. 
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Segal 1986) have shown that service members could exhibit a mixture of both 
orientations toward service. 
     Utilizing the Life Course model as an overarching theoretical framework, the 
purpose of my research is to extend previous studies (e.g. Bachman et al. 1998; 
Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1999; Segal et al. 2001; Kleykamp 2006; Elder et al. 
2010) to examine youth propensity to serve in the armed forces and to determine 
what factors are associated with military propensity versus other options available 
during a time of extended war since 9/11.  Utilizing the body of literature 
covering civil-military relations as an equally important overarching theoretical 
framework of reference throughout this project will assist with uncovering 
whether there is may be a “civil-military gap” in demographic representation, 
attitudes, and values between those who are most likely (i.e. the military) and 
least likely (i.e. civilians) to enter the military during the post-9/11 era.  Utilizing 
the Institutional/Occupational (I/O) model of military service as a more detailed 
theoretical framework will assist with determining the motivations of young men 
and women who expect to serve during this era.  It will also facilitate determining 
what youth value in job-related preferences.   
     My overall research focus examines four major questions during the post-9/11 
era: 1) What is our youth’s propensity to serve in the armed forces during this era 
and how does it compare to earlier times throughout the AVF?  2) What are the 
macro-social, individual, and social-psychological factors that influence youth 
propensity?  3) What are youth motivations to serve- are they more institutionally 
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or occupationally motivated?  4) What are the potential impacts to civil-military 
relations- has the “civil-military gap” increased or decreased?   
 
     Previous studies using data from the MTF project have included large-scale 
longitudinal surveys aimed at examining youth military propensity between 1976-
1997.  Research has demonstrated a significant relationship between propensity 
and actual enlistment (Bachman et al. 1998).  These studies have also revealed 
variations in propensity over time and between racial and ethnic subgroups (Segal 
et al. 1999).  The single MTF study of women’s propensity (e.g. Segal et al. 1998) 
showed that women’s propensity was significantly less than men’s propensity, 
and, similar to men, the predictors of their propensity correlated most with actual 
enlistment.  The MTF study of various youth attitudes related to propensity (e.g. 
Segal et al. 2001) showed that youth were no more conservative than their college 
peers, and that they were not as Republican in party affiliation as some other 
research has suggested.    
     My research employs cross-sectional, representative survey data collected 
annually available from the MTF project beginning in 1976 through 2013.  
Consistent with earlier research, I run two separate analyses to determine young 
men and women’s propensity to serve in the armed forces.  Women currently 
make-up about 15 percent of the military population and their representation 
continues to increase as barriers are removed (Clever and Segal 2013).  For both 
men and women separately, I address the following interrelated questions 
primarily focused on the time period following the attacks on 9/11 between 2002-
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2013, “the post-9/11 era,” which has yet to be analyzed thoroughly: 1) What is the 
youth population’s propensity to serve in the armed forces?  Are there any 
significant differences in youth propensity after 9/11 compared to the previous 
quarter of a century of study (i.e. 1976-2001)?  Are there any significant 
differences in propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era?  How have societal 
and institutional influences contributed to these potential differences?  2) What 
factors are associated with a youth’s propensity to serve?  In particular, I focus on 
both macro and micro-level influences.  At the macro-level, I examine the 
relationship between propensity and public support for war, U.S. casualties, and 
unemployment.  How have these factors influenced military propensity since 
9/11?  On the micro-level, I examine individual demographic influences on 
military propensity such as race and ethnicity (i.e. whites, blacks, and Hispanics), 
socioeconomic status, educational attainment and aspirations, urbanicity (i.e. 
urban, suburban, or farm where a respondent grew up), and region of country.  3) 
How does one’s propensity to serve in the armed forces compare to other 
available options after high school (i.e. attending a 4- or 2-year college, or 
vocational training)?   
     My primary analysis begins in Chapter 2 with a literature review of the 
theories I incorporate into my analyses, relevant background information, and my 
predictions of the relationship between various factors associated with men’s 
propensity.  In Chapter 3, I explain my research design and methodology.  In 
Chapter 4, I report the results of my analysis of the relationship between men’s 
propensity and various macro-social and individual factors.  I provide a discussion 
 10 
of my results and summarize my findings in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 includes my 
primary analysis of women’s propensity, which parallels my analysis for men and 
includes relevant background information, predictions, analysis and results.   
     In the chapters that follow, I examine various attitudes and values that are 
related to propensity for both men and women focusing on the post-9/11 era.  It 
should be noted that my follow-on chapters (i.e. Chapters 7-10) of analysis are 
supplementary, stand-alone chapters.  These chapters are intended to be separate, 
distinct, and extensions from previous chapters to examine the relationships 
between propensity and various youth attitudes toward politics, work, gender 
roles, and race relations.  As such, I largely keep the applicable literature review, 
hypotheses, methods, analysis, and discussion in its own respective chapter for 
organizational purposes so not to confuse the reader.   
     In Chapter 7, I examine the relationship between propensity and political 
attitudes such as political party affiliation and ideology.  An examination into 
these potential differences will add to the literature on civil-military relations by 
identifying any possible gaps between the attitudes of those youth who expect to 
serve in the armed forces (i.e. the military) versus those who do not (i.e. 
civilians).  For both men and women, separately, I address the following related 
questions: 1) Are there differences in political party affiliation between the 
military and civilians during the post-9/11 era?  2) What are youth overall trends 
in Republican Party affiliation over time?   
3) Are there differences in political ideology between the military and civilians 
during the post-9/11 era?  4) What are youth overall trends in political ideology 
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over time? 5) Are there racial/ethnic and gender differences in political party and 
political ideology identification?   
6) How do potential differences in political attitudes impact civil-military 
relations?  
     In Chapter 8, I analyze the relationship between propensity and differences in 
attitudes toward job preferences as a proxy measure for determining youth 
motivations to serve.  An analysis of these attitudes will assist me in determining 
whether youth attitudes are more institutional (i.e. selfless/organizational) or 
occupational (i.e. self-interested/individualistic) in orientation (Moskos 1977).  
Specifically, I address the following related questions: 1) Are youth who expect to 
serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era more institutionally or 
occupationally (I/O) orientated?  2) Are there racial/ethnic or gender differences 
in I/O orientations? 3) Have there been differences in I/O orientations to serve 
over time?  4) Are there differences in I/O orientations between those who expect 
to serve in the armed forces compared to those who do not (i.e. military vs. 
civilians)?  Have these differences changed over time?  5) What are the impacts of 
I/O differences to civil-military relations?  
     Finally, in Chapters 9 and 10, I examine the relationship between propensity 
and various attitudes toward gender roles and race relations respectively.  Similar 
to earlier analyses, I examine differences in my key analysis groups.  Results from 
these chapters also add to the literature on civil-military relations and have 
important policy implications for military practitioners.  I conclude my work in 
Chapter 11 with a summary of my overall findings and a brief discussion of the 
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contributions of my research, a recommended future research agenda, limitations 
to my study, and overall implications to civil-military relations.    
     Results from my research are beneficial to the field of sociology overall by 
examining the influence of the 9/11 era on the expected military population.  
Other disciplines of sociological research will undoubtedly benefit from analysis 
of various outcomes that may be influenced by the historical moment and time of 
the post-9/11 era.  Results will provide better insight on what factors help predict 
a youth’s decision to choose a particular pathway to adulthood during the 
historical moment of prolonged war since 9/11.  Specifically in the military 
sociology domain, results provide insight on what sub-group of our nation’s youth 
and why they desire to serve in the military since 9/11, which will have 
implications on recruitment and retention within the armed forces.  This is crucial 
given that the All-Volunteer Force must continually replenish its ranks as most 
military personnel depart service within a decade of entering (Segal and Segal 
2004).  Similarly, results reveal differences in the propensity of various subgroups 
that should assist in the efficiency and effectiveness of recruitment efforts to 
ensure that we continue to target the most qualified individuals possible, who are 
diverse and representative of society at large.  Additionally, analysis provides 
invaluable insight to military and civilian leadership, human resource managers, 
and policy makers to ensure that the future force is adequately manned and 
prepared to tackle future challenges that lie in the complex environment ahead.  
Finally, results contribute significantly to the extensive body of literature on civil-
military relations.  Potential “gaps” between those who expect to serve (i.e. the 
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military) and those who do not (i.e. civilians) in such areas as family background, 
demographics, educational attainment, values, and attitudes could have important 
implications for policy makers and for the overall relationship between the armed 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks, Background,  
Literature Review and Predictions   
Propensity to Serve 
     Before examining the structural and social-psychological influences that 
predict the likelihood of the youth population to serve in the armed forces, I must 
first define the concept of “propensity” which has multiple meanings, including 
“tendency,” “inclination,” and “disposition.”  However, common usage of the 
term “military propensity” or “enlistment propensity” can broaden the meaning to 
include not only an individuals’ interests and desires, but also their plans and 
expectations to serve in the military (Bachman et al. 1998).  Indeed, the term 
“propensity” covers a broad range of meanings from wishes or preferences, to 
firm plans. 
     For the purposes of this study, I define “military propensity” as the likelihood 
or expectation that an individual will serve in the military.  That is, unless 
otherwise specified throughout, military propensity refers to youth who say that 
they “definitely” or “probably will” serve in the armed forces.  Due to the 
limitation of the dataset, I am unable to delineate between the various branches of 
service (e.g. Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps) of which a respondent 
expects to enter.  From this point forward, I generally refer to the term military 
propensity as simply “propensity” (e.g. “youth propensity”, “white propensity”, 
“black propensity”).   
     In this study, I do not compare actual military enlistment with the propensity to 
serve.  Previous research on the MTF project has revealed that propensity is 
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strongly correlated with actual enlistment in the armed forces since most high 
school seniors by this time have had ample opportunity to consider and explore 
their options in detail.  Indeed, among high school senior men who say they 
“definitely” expect to enlist, 70 percent actually do so within five years of high 
school graduation (Bachman et al. 1998).  Prior MTF studies have also revealed 
that propensity is the dominant factor contributing to actual enlistment as 
compared with other factors such as family background, demographics, 
educational attainment, educational plans, attitudes, values, and behaviors.  In 
other words, the various factors noted above directly influence propensity, which 
has the greatest influence on actual enlistment (Bachman et al. 2000b).   
     Throughout the study, I assume that the factors associated with “high” 
propensity equate to the factors associated with actual military service, especially 
when making comparisons between the military (i.e. youth with “high” 
propensity) versus civilians (i.e. youth with “low” propensity).  During these 
analyses, I specifically delineate between “propensity” and “high” or “low” 
propensity.  Youth with “high propensity” indicates that they “definitely will” 
serve, whereas youth with “low propensity” indicates that they “definitely won’t” 
serve.    
    It should be noted that the sample size for the “high” vs. “low” propensity 
analyses represent roughly 65 percent of the total sample size.  Most important to 
note, is that these response groups are the best proxies of the actual military 
population and the civilian population to examine key differences in attitudes and 
values between groups.  This analysis technique enables me to draw better 
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conclusions on the differences between civilians and military members, which 
allows for the best contribution to the extensive body of literature covering civil-
military relations.  Furthermore, this technique enables me to better assess the 
nature and extent of a civil-military gap in attitudes and values during the post-
9/11 era.    
Life Course Theory as a Theoretical Framework 
     Life course theory and research focuses on how people work out paths of 
development over time.  Research examines “how lives are socially organized in 
biological and historical time, and how the resulting social pattern affects the way 
we think, feel, and act…human development is embedded in the life course and 
historical time” (Elder 1998).  The importance of the social context on individual 
development is key to the evolution of the life structure.  According to Daniel J. 
Levinson and his colleagues: 
 “The life structure requires us to consider both self and world, and 
the relationships between them.  Through it one may examine how 
the self is in the world, and how the world is in the self….We try 
to determine how various aspects of self and the world influence 
the formation of a life structure and shape its change over time” 
(Levinson et al. 1978:42).    
 
Throughout the life course, individuals encounter multiple developmental periods 
and transitions that shape their trajectories.  The paradigmatic model of human 
development depicts the following periods with associated transitions: Childhood 
and Adolescence; Early Adult Transition-Early Adulthood; Mid-Life Transition-
Middle Adulthood; and Late Adult Transition-Late Adulthood (Dannefer 1984).  
Both individual as well as societal factors influence how one develops throughout 
these periods and transitions.  For my research purposes, I am interested in 
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examining what factors influence individuals during the early adult transition, 
which normally occurs between the ages of 17-22 (Dannefer 1984).  During this 
transition, a young adult generally has the options to enlist in the military, attend 
vocational training, go to a 2- or 4-year college, or do something else (e.g. go to 
work or travel).  Specifically, I am concerned with what individual and societal 
factors are associated with a young adult’s expectation to serve in the military as 
compared to various other pathways to adulthood.  
     Life course research employs five major tenets of theory as described by Glen 
Elder: 1) Historical time and place; 2) Timing of lives; 3) Linked lives; 4) Human 
agency; and 5) Life course as a constant process and development (1998).  For the 
purposes of my research, I am particularly interested in the life course theory 
tenets of “historical time and place” and “human agency.”  The first principle 
describes the life course of individuals as "embedded in and shaped by the 
historical times and places they experience over their lifetime" (1998:3).  For 
example, children who grew up during the Great Depression era had different 
impacts to their development compared with those who grew up during the World 
War II era.  It is reasonable that decisions made associated with the transition to 
adulthood would be influenced by the historical time of the post-9/11 era, which 
encompasses particularly noteworthy events such as the wars of Afghanistan and 
Iraq and an economic recession.  This principle serves as the foundation for the 
preponderance of my research focusing on examining the various factors related 
to youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era such as demographics, 
family background (SES), educational goals and attainment, attitudes, and values.  
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     The principle of human agency states that, "individuals construct their own life 
course through the choices and actions they take within the opportunities and 
constraints of history and social circumstances" (Elder 1998:4).  For example, as 
people experienced the turbulence of the Great Depression, some managed to 
work through it to overcome the negative consequences such as mothers who 
found jobs and children who assumed more responsibilities at home and within 
the community (1998).  The tenet of human agency emphasizes that people have 
freedom to decide on what they want to do given the opportunities and constraints 
associated with their historical, social, and individual circumstances.  Indeed, 
since the rise of the AVF in 1973, people have had free will to decide on whether 
or not they enter the military.  This decision is typically made during the 
transition to adulthood period with the preponderance of enlistees occurring at 
this time (Bachman et al. 2000b).  Thus, examining a high school senior’s 
propensity to serve in the military is the best time to determine what factors are 
associated with this decision-making process.   
     The tenet of “linked lives” is also relevant to my research as prior research 
(e.g. Faris 1981, 1984; Segal and Segal 2004) has shown that those who enlist in 
the military are more likely to have close relatives (i.e. parents or grandparents) 
who served in the military, or have other direct exposure to military influences 
such as living within a community that has a large military institutional presence 
(e.g. Kleykamp 2006).  Unfortunately, the MTF dataset does not capture whether 
or not an individual’s parents or relatives previously served.  The dataset does 
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capture in what region and what type of environment (i.e. urban or farm) an 
individual grows up.      
Civil-Military Relations and the Rise of Military Professionalism 
 
     Equally important as an overarching theoretical framework to my project as 
Life Course theory is the literature extensive body of literature on civil-military 
relations.  Thus, I must proceed with a discussion of the relationship between the 
armed forces and society and the concept of military professionalism.  The post-
World War II period provided a new and unique relationship between the military 
and society that sparked scholars to take notice of the changing dynamics.  Bi-
polar tensions between post-WWII powers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, along with the threat of mutually assured destruction from nuclear 
technology, produced strong enough pressure for the U.S. military to maintain a 
mass standing army that was largely comprised of conscripted forces.  Whereas in 
earlier military conflicts, beginning with the Revolutionary War, America had 
demobilized its forces after the end of war, this was not the case after World War 
II (Segal and Segal 2004).  The nation no longer had the advantage of time and 
distance from the battlefield.  For the first time in American history, the military 
became a significant continuing institutional peacetime presence (Burk 2001).  
Indeed, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning for Americans to beware of 
the military industrial complex during his farewell address in 1961 represented 
the pervasiveness of the military in American society.  It also cautioned some to 
worry about the nature of the military profession and its impact on civil-military 
relations.  
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     Due to the military’s increasing influence in society, sociologists became 
interested in conducting more macro-sociological analysis as opposed to the 
micro-social focus that marked research during World War II.  To describe the 
structural relationships between the military and its host society, researchers 
began to examine the nature of civilian-military relations.  C. Wright Mills’ 
(1956) influential piece, The Power Elite, argued that the military is one of the 
three major elite institutions, including politics and business, which hold 
significant power, prestige, and influence to shape society.  This piece of work 
became a foundation for social psychological researchers interested in major 
concepts such as power and status.  It also confirmed the increasing influence of 
the military on society.  Harold D. Lasswell’s (1941) developmental model of 
“the garrison state” also cautioned that the trend of the time was moving away 
from the dominance of the businessman toward the supremacy of the military 
soldier- a world in which the specialists in violence were the most powerful group 
in society.      
     Influenced by the military’s continual institutional presence within society, 
researchers began to analyze the nature of the military profession and its 
relationship with the government and the people.  Samuel Huntington (1957), a 
political scientist at Harvard University, and Morris Janowitz (1960), a sociologist 
at the University of Chicago, both published influential books on the topics.  
Huntington’s, The Soldier and the State, focused on the relationship between the 
military profession and the government, whereas Janowitz’s, The Professional 
Soldier, examined the relationship between the profession and the society it 
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protects.  Their research focused primarily on the professionalism of the officer 
corps instead of focusing on the enlisted ranks.  Indeed, professionalism was 
referred to as “officership.” 
     Huntington’s work attributed the rise of military professionalism in western 
societies to the professionalism of the Prussian military after its reforms during 
the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century, which he used to help model 
his notion of American military professionalism.  Huntington defined the military 
profession as a special type of vocation marked by the distinguishing 
characteristics of “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness” (1957).  Expertise 
was acquired only by prolonged experience and education, where education 
consisted of a broad, liberal, cultural background, as well as specialized training 
on technical skills and knowledge of the profession (1957).  The central skill most 
officers had, which distinguished them from civilians, was best summed up in 
Harold Lasswell’s phrase “the management of violence” or “successful armed 
combat” (1957).  Responsibility was conceptualized as a professional man who 
worked in a social context to perform a service that was essential to the 
functioning of society.  Huntington explained that the “skill of the officer is the 
management of violence” and that his responsibility was the “military security of 
his client, society” (1957:15).  Corporateness was the idea of esprit de corps in 
that members of the profession had a common bond that kept them together based 
on shared professional expertise and shared professional responsibility (1957).   
     It must be noted that it was the famous Prussian General and military theorist, 
Carl Von Clausewitz (1976), who theorized On War providing advances in 
 22 
military professionalism and stressing the moral and political components of 
warfare (Kestnbaum 2009).  He may be most remembered for his notion that war 
is a delicate balance of a “trinity” of relationships between the military (i.e. war), 
and the government (i.e. state), and the people (i.e. society).  Clausewitz famously 
remarked, “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means” (1976:87).  
“Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent 
nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them” (1976:87).  
Theorizing in the first book of On War, he created the first theoretical rationale 
for the military profession, thereby contributing the first theoretical justification 
for civilian control (Huntington 1957).  Indeed, Clausewitz remarked that  
“The subordination of the political point of view to the military 
would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the 
intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse.  
The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, 
therefore, the only thing which is possible” (Huntington 1957:58).   
 
In other words, the soldier must always be subordinate to the statesman.   
 
     Janowitz essentially accepted Huntington’s definition of professionalism with 
a few modifications.  Both scholars believed that the soldier should be 
subordinate to civilian authority. Where the two differed most was in their 
viewpoint on the closeness of the relationship between the military and society.  
Huntington (1957) argued that it was most beneficial for the military to be 
separate and distinct from the government to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness, whereas Janowitz (1960) argued that the relationship between the 
military and society should be more convergent, similar in values, attitudes, and 
composition.  Huntington saw an incompatibility between the professional ethic 
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of the military and societal liberalism, with its emphasis on individualism, 
hostility toward standing armies, and denial of the importance of power.  He 
viewed the professional military ethic to be more compatible with conservative 
ideologies, and believed that the armed forces should be insulated from the liberal 
trends in society to remain effective.  Janowitz, on the other hand, proposed a 
different model of civil-military relations.  For him, informal social networks 
were more important constraints on social behavior than formal mechanisms of 
social control (Segal et al. 2001).  Thus, he believed that in a democratic state, 
civilian control of the military would best be achieved when the military was 
woven into the fabric of society.  He foresaw a military in which some identified 
first as citizens, then as soldiers, some of whose officers attended civilian 
universities (i.e. ROTC), and some of who lived with their families in civilian 
communities.  Of course, he recognized that the military would have its own 
unique organizational culture similar to many civilian occupations and 
professional groups.  However, he felt that citizen-soldiers and structural linkages 
would help coordinate the military culture with American society (Segal et al. 
2001).    
     The rise of the AVF changed the mix of short-term enlistees and career-
oriented military personnel, altering the balance achieved by the conscription era 
soldiers.  The increases in technology created conditions for the lengthening of 
initial military enlistments to account for the additional training and costs required 
to train new recruits for technical specialties.  Indeed, the short-term enlistment 
contracts during the days of the conscription were no longer available to 
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volunteers.  As a result, the military became increasingly career-oriented, 
sparking Charles Moskos (1977) to posit that the military was transforming from 
a “calling” to an “occupation”- the essence of his Institutional/Occupational 
thesis, which will be discussed in greater detail below.  If we regard the 
percentage of the military forces that has served for more than five years as 
career-oriented, then from the beginning of the AVF until the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, the career-oriented enlisted force increased from about 20 
percent to about 50 percent (Segal et al. 2001).     
     As a result of the shift in career-orientation during the early years of the AVF, 
Janowitz (1975) suggested that the professional military was increasingly 
emphasizing distinctive military values; that its linkages with society had become 
weakened and tied to limited segments of the social structure; that changes in the 
recruitment base were making the officer corps and the enlisted less 
representative of society; and that such processes might create an “ideological 
caste” in the military and be a source of political division from civilian society.  
Thus, the military culture might become decoupled from civilian culture.  
Essentially, what Huntington viewed as necessary for military effectiveness, 
Janowitz viewed as problematic for civil-military relations (Segal et al. 2001).     
     The discourse between Huntington and Janowitz about military 
professionalism and the relationships between the military, the state, and society 
raised the debate on civil-military relations to another level.  Their work set the 
foundation for a continued interest among researchers, the military, and the 
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political elite on the nature of these relations, establishing it as part of the research 
agenda for decades to come.   
The Post-Cold War Period- A Renewed Interest in Civil-Military Relations 
     With the Cold War threat no longer present, the debate emerged on whether a 
large peacetime force was still needed in the United States.  Additionally, the U.S. 
military’s overwhelming success during the Gulf War in 1990-1991, highlighted 
by a minimum amount of casualties, caused some to believe that our superior 
technology in air power, precision weaponry, and communications no longer 
necessitated a large ground force to protect our national interests (Ricks 1997b).  
Indeed, after the swift and decisive victory during Operation Desert Storm, 
Congress became only minimally interested with training, personnel issues, or 
ground forces in general (Ricks 1997b).  During the Clinton administration (1992-
2000), the military underwent significant cuts to the budget and personnel.  As a 
result, the military adopted a strategy of downsizing, a strategy used in the 
corporate world to manage operations during economic downturns, which 
produced problems for victims and survivors of the process much like it had in the 
corporate world (Wong and McNally 1994).  Those who volunteered for service 
were now being pushed out or offered incentives to leave.     
     While downsizing occurred, overall military missions increased.  Now the 
military was asked to do more with fewer resources available (Segal et al. 1999).  
Changes in military missions resulted as well (e.g. Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia), 
with a primary focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations as 
opposed to waging large-scale war.  Many members of the military were not in 
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agreement with their involvement in these types of operations.  This caused 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to actively speak out 
against military intervention in Bosnia, which was in direct contrast to Bill 
Clinton’s proposal- a significant political move given that it was during the 1992 
Presidential election campaign (Ricks 1997b).  As a result, research revealed that 
there were negative impacts to morale and retention in the military highlighting 
important leadership issues to address (Reed and Segal 2000).   
     To meet mission requirements amidst military downsizing, the army 
experimented for the first time with the deployment of reserve forces to support 
overseas contingency operations.  American reserve forces served as part of the 
Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert in support of the Camp 
David Accords between Israel and Egypt.  The army experienced great success, 
which led to the expanded use of reserve forces for contingency operations, 
usually in small numbers for six-month deployments (Phelps and Farr 1996).   
     Another way to accomplish more missions with fewer people was to employ 
civilians in jobs to fill the gaps.  Uniformed service members performed those 
jobs most clearly requiring military expertise and status, while relying on civilian 
DoD employees to perform other jobs (e.g. logistical and support jobs) that were 
previously performed by military personnel (e.g. Kelty 2008).  An additional 
management strategy employed to offset personnel shortages included adopting 
yet another corporate strategy- outsourcing.  Instead of having government 
employees perform tasks previously performed by military personnel, the military 
contracted out support (e.g. Brown & Root), and in some cases core functions 
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such as private security tasks (e.g. Blackwater) to civilian companies.  Indeed, the 
costs for contractors are much less than the cost of a standard military recruit, 
especially since civilian contracts can be terminated upon the completion of the 
mission (Clever and Segal 2012).  Civilian contractors have always played a part 
in the military, but their participation has continued to increase in the 
contemporary force as a result of an increased reliance on technical systems and 
manpower shortages.  The proportion of contractor to military personnel in U.S. 
military conflicts reveals an even greater reliance on civilians since the end of the 
Cold War.  The first Gulf War marked a turning point in the use of civilians by 
the United States as the military transitioned from a historic pattern of using a 
relatively small number of civilians for support jobs, to a reliance on contractors 
in significant numbers across a growing range of jobs (Kelty and Bierman 2013).  
Just under 50 percent of personnel in the Balkans and Iraq have been civilian 
contractors- a dramatic increase considering there were only about 10 percent of 
civilians working during WWII (Clever and Segal 2012). 
     As forces were downsized, some military bases were closed (i.e. the BRAC 
Policy- Base Realignment and Closure), which produced negative economic 
effects on nearby communities that hosted those bases.  Relationships between 
military bases and their host civilian communities became a focus of some 
sociological research (e.g. Hicks and Raney 2003; Thanner 2006), extending 
research on civil-military relations.  Research showed that communities with a 
nearby military presence have less racial segregation in housing and less racial 
inequality in employment than other communities (Booth et al. 2000).  This 
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supported the assertion that a military presence is generally beneficial to the 
community.  However, research also showed that gender discrimination was 
higher for women in terms of higher unemployment, lower wages, and lower 
returns to human capital in communities with a high military presence (Booth et 
al. 2000).  Of note, research showed that those likely to enlist in the armed forces 
were more likely to live in a community with a military institutional presence 
(Kleykamp 2006).  
     Another significant change impacting civil-military relations was the closure 
of many ROTC programs throughout the country, especially in the Northeast, 
after the Vietnam War.  As a result of anti-war protests that broke out on college 
campuses across the Northeast, many schools decided to sever ties with the 
military, including the elite universities of the Ivy League, which have been the 
source of commissions for some of the most highly decorated officers in the 
military (Melia 2011).  Ever since, military recruiters have not made as much of 
an effort to recruit in the area (Daileda 2012).  The lack of military exposure 
among our civilian college population without ROTC programs throughout the 
Northeast continues today.  For example, New York City is home to nearly 
600,000 students and 80 colleges.  The city’s population of 8 million is about the 
same as the state of Virginia, yet it only has four ROTC programs on college 
campuses, compared to Virginia’s eleven.  Even the City University of New 
York, the third-largest public university system in America and the one that 
commissioned General Colin Powell, no longer has an ROTC program (Daileda 
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2012).  The overall lack of military exposure among the college population has 
generated discussions concerning the impacts to civil-military relations.            
     As a result of these changes since the end of the Cold War, there has been a 
renewed interest among journalists, scholars, military leadership and policy 
makers on the social-psychological (i.e. attitudes) and social-structural (i.e. 
demographics) implications on members of the military, as well as the impacts to 
civil-military relations.  Indeed, an increase in civilian jobs within the military, 
especially technical and support specialties, means that military members are 
more likely to specialize in general military skills that may be less transferrable to 
the civilian sector and less understood by civilians.  Additionally, the effects of 
the military’s BRAC policy may cause the military to become even more isolated 
from its host society than before, as many installations have been closed and the 
preponderance of those remaining are consolidated in the South and West.  
Couple that with the dwindling number of ROTC programs throughout the 
Northeast and the lack of military exposure is exacerbated.  Further, members of 
the civilian elite serving in government positions are becoming increasingly 
unaware of military affairs, as the veteran population in government has declined.  
In contrast to the Vietnam era, where over two-thirds of the members of Congress 
were veterans, the veteran population of Congress shrank to about one-third in the 
1990s.  This has caused some to wonder if the military is becoming even more 
estranged from the American public.  Undoubtedly, the media’s negative 
influence on the perception of the military highlighted by sexual harassment 
scandals, such as the Navy’s Tailhook incident and among new Army soldiers in 
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training at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, has created a greater disconnect between 
the two (Ricks 1997b).   
     There is another dimension of the media that must be mentioned.  The way the 
military has been depicted in popular culture more recently has created an 
increasing concern for those in the military and has contributed to a greater 
misunderstanding between both sides.  A cursory review of recent movies is quite 
telling of the media’s negative influence.  Movies such as The Rock (1996) had a 
maverick Marine general hold San Francisco hostage by threatening to use poison 
gas.  Broken Arrow (1996) portrayed a passed-over Air Force major who planned 
to steal nuclear bombs and hold the city of Denver for ransom.  The Siege (1998) 
had an evil Army general oversee martial law in New York City.  In Snake Eyes 
(1998) a Navy commander plotted the successful assassination of the Secretary of 
Defense.  The General’s Daughter (1999) painted a picture of the Army and West 
Point that condones gross sexual misbehavior and covers up rape.  It is 
particularly noteworthy that the two 1998 box office hits that had positive 
portrayals of the military, Saving Private Ryan and The Thin Red Line, were both 
set in WWII, in direct contrast to the negative images depicted in movies of the 
contemporary armed forces (Moskos 2001).  Certainly it is conceivable that these 
images have created some sort of disconnect between the military and society.   
     Perhaps worse yet, “there has been widespread agreement that over the past 
few decades American society has become fragmented, more individualistic, and 
less disciplined” (Ricks 1997b:10).  These changes put society at odds with the 
traditional military values of sacrifice, team, self-discipline, and putting the 
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interests of others above oneself.  Couple the military’s organizational changes 
with an increased individualistic, “Me” attitude among members of society and 
the potential for a cleavage, or “gap,” between civilians and the military were 
thought by some to be wide and alarming (e.g. Ricks 1997b).  
     The Civil-Military Gap Literature Overview 
     Sociological theory and research suggest that there are linkages between 
occupations and the values and attitudes held by those who practice them.  For 
example, Rosenberg (1957) suggests that people tend to differ in attitudes and 
values in ways that are compatible with the characteristics of the type of 
occupation they desire to enter.  Thus, the transition to a career-oriented 
professional military would be expected to produce a more attitudinally distinct 
military.  However, the important point with respect to civil-military relations is 
not the existence of these occupational attitudes, but rather the compatibility 
between the attitudes of the military profession and the attitudes of civilian 
society (Segal et al. 2001).        
     Attitudinal differences based on the end of conscription, the increasingly 
career-oriented force, and the increasing professionalization of the military have 
caused some analysts to see a problem with civil-military relations in the 1990s 
(Segal et al. 2001).  Initially, a “gap” was viewed as emerging between senior 
military leaders and the civilian leadership who exert constitutional control over 
the military (e.g. Kohn 1994).  Later, the gap was viewed as a broader cultural 
divide between the American armed forces, including enlisted personnel, and the 
civilian society they protect.  The primary focus of research has been on whether 
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or not the distinctive attitudes within the military either converge or diverge with 
society at large as well as with civilian leadership.     
     In 1997, Thomas Ricks, a distinguished Pentagon correspondent for the Wall 
Street Journal, and later, the Washington Post, published a widely circulated and 
debated article in the Atlantic Monthly, about a growing civilian-military gap.  
Ricks suggested that, “U.S. military personnel of all ranks are feeling increasingly 
alienated from their own country, and are becoming more conservative and more 
politically active than ever before” (1997b:1).  James Kitfield agreed, suggesting 
that, “soldiers [are] increasingly estranged from society, and vice-versa” (1998).  
Ricks referred to the fact that society has increasingly become a “what’s in it for 
me” type of attitude among young people and that has increased a gap between 
those in the military and the rest of society.  Given Ricks’ stature, “his diagnosis 
of potentially serious problems in relations between the military and civilian 
society could hardly be dismissed as the ill-considered ravings of an antimilitary 
ideologue” (Collins and Holsti 1999:204).  Although Ricks’ analysis was largely 
anecdotal and restricted primarily to the attitudes of a platoon of new Marine 
recruits coming home after basic training, it sparked many scholars to take notice, 
renewing discussions about civil-military relations.   
     Just prior to 9/11, a large group of researchers interested in the topic conducted 
an extensive research project to determine the nature and extent of a civilian-
military “gap” (e.g. Fever and Kohn 2001).  The Triangle Institute for Security 
Studies (TISS) conducted the comprehensive study in 1998 and 1999 attempting 
to assess whether an attitudinal gap existed between the military and civilian 
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populations (Holsti 2001).  The study was the most comprehensive analysis of 
attitudes of military leaders to date, with 723 active-duty service members 
included in their surveys.  Unfortunately, the timing of its publication coinciding 
near the events of 9/11 resulted in little attention to this important project.  The 
renewed interest in civil-military relations and the nature and extent of a civil-
military gap in recent times serves as an overarching framework for discussion 
throughout my research project with respect to the expected military population’s 
demographics, attitudes, and values.    
The Contemporary Operational Environment of the Post-9/11 Era 
      Figure 2.1 below depicts significant historical and socioeconomic events that 
occurred between 2001-2013.  In accordance with Life Course theory’s tenet of 
“historical time and place,” these events are likely to influence a youth’s 
propensity to serve in the armed forces.  The preponderance of major events took 
place in foreign areas, but nonetheless had lasting impacts at home.  I briefly 







     Following the attacks on 9/11, U.S. and coalition forces invaded Afghanistan 
initiating Operation Enduring Freedom.  In 2003, the U.S. military shifted its 
focus to the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom with the invasion of Iraq in 
March.  Major combat operations in Iraq ended in May of 2003 and Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein was captured later that year.  Of note, the beginning of 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were marked by high public support (Berinsky 
2009).  However, a major insurgency soon ignited that significantly prolonged the 
operation in Iraq, while shifting most of the attention away from Afghanistan.  
The height of the Iraqi insurgency lasted between 2004-2007 and was marked by 
relatively high U.S. casualties.  In 2008, President George W. Bush authorized 
General David Petraeus, commander of coalition forces in Iraq, to execute a major 
counterinsurgency campaign by “surging” more forces back into Iraq to regain the 
initiative.  Barack Obama was elected president in 2008 as the first African-
American president and Commander-in-Chief.  Under his administration, the U.S. 
transitioned responsibility and authority to Iraqi military and security forces 
beginning in 2010 and withdrew all forces by the end of 2011.  At the same time, 
U.S. forces remained engaged in Afghanistan throughout, albeit as an economy of 
force with only about 20,000 troops in Afghanistan compared to approximately 
150,000 troops in Iraq in 2006 (Belasco 2009).  To regain the initiative in 
Afghanistan in 2010, President Obama authorized a surge of U.S. troop levels to 
over 100,000, which lasted until 2012.  Soon after, troop levels returned to 
previous levels in Afghanistan.  On a direct action raid in Pakistan, U.S. forces 
killed Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011.  U.S. forces have recently transitioned 
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responsibility and authority to Afghan military and security forces at the end of 
2014 and there are approximately 10,000 troops still remaining in a “train, advise, 
and assist” role.  Currently, ISIS has emerged as a new global terrorist threat 
primarily basing its operations in Syria and parts of Iraq.  There are approximately 
3,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and Kuwait assisting with coalition partners to defeat 
ISIS.       
     A particularly noteworthy change to the military operational environment 
during the post-9/11 era not highlighted by Figure 2.1 is that there are no clearly 
defined “front” and “rear” lines of battle as in previous wars.  Today’s non-linear, 
asymmetrical battlefield is essentially penetrable by the enemy from all 
directions.  Combat units routinely mesh with logistical units throughout the 
entire area of operations while the enemy intermingles with civilians beyond the 
normal front lines of battle.  Formerly “protected” units, such as administrative 
and logistical support units, are no longer free from the risk of asymmetrical 
threats (e.g. suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, small arms attacks) 
in recent wars.        
     Significant socioeconomic events at home are also likely to have an influence 
on a youth’s propensity to serve in the military.  The “Great Recession” of 2008 
changed the environment at home significantly.  Overall unemployment rates, 
depicted along the bottom row of Figure 2.1, dramatically spiked from 
approximately 5 percent to over 9 percent in 2009 and have remained relatively 
high ever since.  Furthermore, youth unemployment rates, between the ages of 16-
24, are even higher than the national average ranging from 10.8 percent in July of 
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2008 to 18.1 percent in July of 2011, with men about two percent higher in 
unemployment than women each year.  Unemployment rates for blacks and 
Hispanics are even higher than for whites, which may influence propensity by 
racial and ethnic backgrounds differently (Department of Labor 2012).  
Additionally, the average cost of college (not depicted) continues to increase 
during this decade (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 
2011).  Additional social factors, such as the repeal of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy in 2010 and the lifting of the combat exclusion ban for women in 
2012, are events that could also influence propensity in the years to come.   
     For the purposes of this study, I focus on three time periods during the post-
9/11 era that I predict will significantly influence propensity: the period following 
the 9/11 attacks (2003) marked by patriotism and high public support for war; the 
period of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2007) marked by high U.S. casualties; and 
the period of the recession (2008-2013) marked by economic instability and high 
unemployment.  Specifically, I examine the direct relationships between 
propensity and public support for war, casualties, and unemployment rates to 
explore how these macro-social factors may influence propensity during the post-
9/11 era.      
Institutional/Occupational Model of Military Service 
     For decades of the AVF, researchers have been interested in what motivates an 
individual to volunteer for military service.  Many have employed Charles 
Moskos’ (1977) “Institutional” and “Occupational” (I/O) models of military 
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organization and service as a method to tap into the underlying motivations of 
individuals who enter the military.   
     Charles Moskos introduced the concepts of “Institutional” and “Occupational” 
models to describe alternative conceptions of military social organization and to 
analyze expected organizational outcomes based on both models.  His basic 
hypothesis was that “the American military was moving from an institutional 
format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation” (1977:42).  
Moskos defined an institution as “legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a 
purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good” 
(1977:42).  Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling, 
with notions of self-sacrifice and dedication, and usually enjoy esteem from the 
public (1977).   
     Moskos defined an occupation as “legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., 
prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies” (1977:43).  The 
occupational model implies a sense of individualism with a priority on self-
interest rather than for the employing organization; service is less of a “calling” 
and more of “just a job.”  For Moskos, the rise of the AVF in the U.S. served as 
the major thrust to move the military toward the occupational model of 
organization since recruiting focused more on monetary inducements guided by 
marketplace standards (1977).  If Moskos’ formulation were correct, one would 
expect to see more occupational orientations of service during the post-9/11 era.  
An occupational orientation would manifest itself as a decline in youth propensity 
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to serve during a period of war because the risks of service during this time do not 
outweigh the individual benefits of service.     
     David Segal (1986) posed the idea of a hybrid between the institutional and 
occupational models of military organization.  Through his analysis of survey 
questions to American soldiers, he found that both models could exist at any point 
in time, with a mixture of orientations from a soldier- a form he referred to as 
“pragmatic professionalism.”  Segal hypothesized that future armed forces would:  
“Show a pattern of pragmatic professionalism—a combination of 
economic and mission-oriented concerns—with short-term 
fluctuations in mission-oriented directions during the early stages 
of military engagements or during periods when America’s 
position in the international system is being challenged by 
terrorists or foreign powers” (1986:370).    
 
If Segal’s hypothesis is correct, then both institutional motivations (e.g. service as 
a calling and patriotism) as well as occupational motivations (e.g. monetary 
rewards and incentives) could influence a youth’s propensity to serve.  In other 
words, social factors such as the timing of a conflict (e.g. in its initial versus later 
stages) and overall public support, along with current military entitlements and 
benefits, would all influence youth propensity.    
Literature Review and Men’s Propensity Predictions 
     Enlistment in the military has been a relatively rare phenomenon among 
women, and previous work analyzing the classes of 1976-1995 has primarily 
excluded women from the analysis because the numbers of military women in 
follow-up samples were too low for statistical reliability (for exception see Segal 
et al. 1998).  Additionally, earlier analyses revealed a variety of gender 
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differences in correlates of propensity (Bachman et al. 2000b).  For my initial 
analysis (i.e. Chapters 4-5), I exclude women from the dataset.  However, in my 
follow-up analysis (i.e. Chapter 6) I examine trends in women’s propensity during 
the post-9/11 era since the overall number of female enlistees has continued to 
increase and women’s success and opportunities in combat roles are expanding.  
     My study asks the primary question: What is the likelihood that young adults 
expect to enlist in the armed forces during the period following 9/11?  Utilizing 
survey data taken from the MTF project, I assess the propensity of high school 
seniors.  In accordance with the occupational model of military organization 
described by Moskos (1977), I predict that overall propensity levels will decline 
during a period of war since the costs associated with wartime service outweigh 
the benefits associated with the military service as an occupation.  Thus, I expect 
to see propensity levels decline during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier time 
periods of relative stability and peace.  
Hypothesis 1a: Military propensity will decline in periods of war 
as compared to periods marked by no war.    
 
     Macro-Social Influences on Propensity  
     A related sub-question is to what extent and why propensity levels may 
fluctuate during the post-9/11 era.  Structural changes within the military, as well 
as within society and the economy overall, will likely contribute to these 
fluctuations.  In accordance with Segal’s (1986) hypothesized hybrid model of 
military organization, “pragmatic professionalism,” I expect to see variations in 
propensity throughout the post-9/11 era as a result of varying underlying 
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individual motivations.  Specifically, I expect that public support for war, U.S. 
casualties, and the economy will have significant influences on youth propensity.         
           Public Support for War and Propensity 
     People responded to the attacks on 9/11 in various ways.  One popular reaction 
was to display the American flag on one’s home, car, or person.  A recent study 
was conducted (Skitka 2005) to understand the underlying motivations that led to 
this behavior.  Specifically, the study examined to what extent flag-display 
behavior was motivated by patriotism, nationalism, or a combination of both.  I 
provide a discussion of the definitions of patriotism and nationalism below.  The 
study demonstrated that post-9/11 flag-display behavior (approximately 5 months 
after 9/11) was an expression of patriotism, and not nationalism.  The study also 
noted that national polls indicated a drop in flag-display behavior from 82 percent 
immediately after 9/11 to about 56 percent since the Iraq War began.  The author 
noted, “One can speculate that what it means to display the flag since the Iraq 
War began may have shifted more toward the nationalistic end of the spectrum, a 
sentiment that fewer Americans may be prepared to endorse unequivocally” 
(Skitka 2005:2008).        
     A related behavior to displaying American flags after 9/11 could be an 
increase in the amount of recruits volunteering for military service as a form of 
patriotism.  Similarly, a corresponding increase in youth propensity could also 
occur.  Indeed, displaying the flag on one’s uniform in service to his or her 
country could be construed as one of the highest displays of patriotism, especially 
during wartime.  Anecdotally, portrayals in the media of voluntary service in 
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response to the attacks of 9/11, such as the NFL’s Pat Tillman, certainly depict 
patriotic sentiments.  Similar lesser-known stories of patriotic calls to service, 
where people “rallied around the flag,” also occurred throughout the U.S.  The 
story of SGT James Regan is one of those cases.     
     SGT “Jimmy” Regan was an exceptional scholar-athlete as a college lacrosse 
player at Duke University.  As a Long Island, NY native, Jimmy felt the shock 
from the events of 9/11 hit close to home while he was in college.  Immediately 
following his collegiate career, Jimmy decided to bypass law school to satisfy his 
personal calling to serve in the military so he enlisted in the Army in 2004.  While 
serving with the elite Army Rangers, he served two tours in Afghanistan and two 
in Iraq.  SGT James Regan was killed in Iraq in 2007 while serving with the 
Rangers.  The “Lead the Way Fund” was founded by his parents in honor of 
Jimmy “to raise funds in support of disabled U.S. Army Rangers and the families 
of Rangers who have died, who have been injured, or are currently serving in 
harm’s way around the world” (Lead the Way Fund 2013).  It is possible that 
Jimmy’s legacy, highlighted by his foundation, could influence some individuals 
to serve in similar fashion.   
     The Pat Tillman story is more widely known and celebrated within the public, 
but is very similar in nature to Jimmy’s story.  A day after 9/11, Tillman remarked 
to a reporter, “At times like this you stop and think about just how good we have 
it, what kind of system we live in, and the freedoms we are allowed.  A lot of my 
family has gone and fought in wars and I really haven’t done a damn thing” (Pat 
Tillman Foundation 2004).  Pat Tillman also felt the call to serve in the wake of 
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9/11 so he decided to postpone his distinguished football career with the Arizona 
Cardinals and enlist in the Army alongside his brother, Kevin, after the 2001 
football season.  Like Jimmy, Pat also enlisted in the Army Rangers where he 
served combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While serving in Afghanistan, Pat 
was killed in action.  Senator John McCain from Arizona lauded Tillman as “the 
quintessential definition of a patriot” (Garber 2004). 
     Despite the hardships and risks associated with combat, it is possible that many 
felt the patriotic calling to “rally ‘round the flag” like SGT James Regan and 
Corporal Pat Tillman volunteering to serve during an international crisis.  
Certainly, patriotic sentiments flared throughout the U.S. after 9/11.  One can 
recall the impact of elite rhetoric such as when President Bush echoed Todd 
Beamer’s words, “Let’s Roll,” in a speech to his fellow Americans aimed at 
rallying public support for the war in Afghanistan (Reaves 2001; Gershkoff and 
Kushner 2005).  Indeed, American pride was displayed in many ways as 
Americans “rallied around the flag,” showing support for President Bush by 
extraordinarily high levels of public support for the war after it began through 
2003 (Mueller 1970; Berinsky 2009).   
     Research has yet to show a link between public support for war and 
propensity, although research has demonstrated a fairly strong relationship 
between patriotism and public support for war (Federico et al. 2005).  Inasmuch 
as one views the propensity to serve during wartime as a form of patriotism, then 
one would expect public support for war and propensity to be positively related.  
However, it must be noted that an extensive amount of literature in social 
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psychology has distinguished between two manifestations of national 
identification - the psychological concepts of “patriotism” and “nationalism.”  
Therefore, I present a brief review of the literature covering these concepts.    
     Patriotism generally connotes pride and love for country, whereas nationalism 
refers to chauvinistic arrogance and desire for dominance in international relations 
(Li and Brewer 2004).  Patriotism has generally been referred to as a healthy self-
concept of national identification associated with a positive love of one’s country 
(Bar-Tal 1993; Bar-Tal and Staub 1997; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) that can 
be independent of out-group derogation (Brewer 1999).  Nationalism, on the other 
hand, is related to intergroup differentiation, including the view that one’s own 
country is superior to others and therefore should be dominant (Kosterman and 
Feshbach 1989; Feshbach 1994; Mummendey et al. 2001).  However, research 
has also shown that both patriotism and nationalism can coexist since they share 
the feature of a positive in-group evaluation and pride, and they are positively 
correlated both conceptually and empirically (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; 
Sidanius et al. 1997; Li and Brewer 2004; Skitka 2005).   
     As two different sides of the same coin, research (e.g. Worchel and Coutant 
1997; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003) has shown that it is certainly possible that a 
“love of nation” can be associated with patriotic attitudes in some cases or with 
more nationalistic attitudes in other cases, within the same individual.  Research 
has also shown (e.g. Li and Brewer 2004) that groups who identify based on the 
virtue of sharing a common heritage (i.e. the “essence” definition of American 
unity), patriotism can be associated with derogatory attitudes toward other 
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nations, whereas groups who identify based on the virtue of facing a common 
problem or having a common purpose (i.e. the “common goal” definition of 
American unity), patriotism is less associated with nationalistic attitudes.  
     As forms of social identification, patriotism and nationalism both increase in 
response to an outside threat.  The attacks on 9/11 resulted in immediate increases 
in expressions of national identification and unity throughout the United States.  
Whether by the visible displays of flags or the public’s support for the war against 
terror, Americans appeared to be strongly united by a patriotic identity, perhaps 
under the common purpose of defeating terrorism.  Indeed, public support for war 
in Afghanistan was at an astonishing high, between 80 and 90 percent following 
the attacks (Berinsky 2009).  As the military and the public’s attention shifted 
away from Afghanistan to the war in Iraq in 2003, support remained high as 
President Bush successfully framed the war as part of the larger war against terror 
and persuaded many people to believe that Iraq posed an immediate threat to U.S. 
security by possessing weapons of mass destruction (Gershkoff and Kushner 
2005).          
     There is no shortage of theories to explain support for war or military 
operations, including work that places importance on various variables to include 
but not limited to: the amount of casualties (e.g. Mueller 1973); the belief of 
success (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2006; Berinsky and Druckman 2007); the belief that the 
war is just; (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2006); international support (e.g. Kull and Destler 
1999); elite rhetoric (e.g. Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2009); the influence of media 
(e.g. Iyengar 1991; Zaller 1992); and various individual-level variables such as 
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sophistication, political awareness (e.g. Zaller 1992), and attitudes and values 
(e.g. Iyengar 1991; Druckman 2001; Sniderman and Theriault 2004).  
Additionally, research has also shown that individual national attachments (e.g. 
Federico et al. 2005), such as patriotism and nationalism, have also been strongly 
related to public support for war.   
     Federico and his colleagues (2005) recently conducted a study examining the 
relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against 
Iraq.  Previous studies have suggested that a high need for closure- that is, “a 
desire for knowledge that is clear, stable, and unambiguous as opposed to 
confusing or uncertain” - may be associated with greater hostility toward relevant 
out-groups (2005:621).  The authors examined how this relationship may be 
moderated by identification with the national in-group.  As noted earlier, the 
literature has largely broken down the concept of national in-group identification 
into two primary groups - nationalism (i.e. an aggressive form of identification 
based on a desire for national dominance) and patriotism (i.e. a more neutral love 
of one’s country).  The authors found that the relationship between the need for 
closure and support for the use of force in Iraq was moderated by nationalism, but 
not by patriotism.  In other words, among those with a high need for closure, the 
highly nationalistic were more likely to support the use of force in Iraq compared 
to the highly patriotic.  The authors also found that both nationalism and 
patriotism were highly related to public support for war, with correlations of .69 
and .56 respectively.  Further, they found that nationalism and patriotism were 
also highly correlated with each other (r=.60).   
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     Taken as a whole, intuition, anecdotal evidence, and prior research would lead 
one to expect that patriotism following the attacks of 9/11 would be positively 
associated with youth propensity to serve.  Patriotism is, indeed, a tough concept 
to measure.  Some research has examined behaviors (e.g. flag-displaying 
behavior), while other research has used survey questions from the Kosterman 
and Feshbach (1989) patriotism scale to assess this aspect of national 
identification.  Unfortunately, there are not any questions in the MTF study 
related to this scale to directly compare the concept of patriotism to propensity.  
Previous research on propensity has not examined the relationship between public 
support for war and propensity, largely due to lack of opportunity throughout the 
AVF.  However, as highlighted above, research has demonstrated that patriotism 
is moderately related to public support for war.  Thus, it is reasonable to predict 
that propensity is positively related to public support for war.  Consistent with 
institutional orientations of service as a calling, I expect that public support for 
war will be positively associated with youth propensity following 9/11.  Despite 
the hardships and risks associated with combat, it is reasonable to believe that 
many young men and women would feel the patriotic calling to serve after 9/11, 
just as Pat Tillman and Jimmy Regan.  Similarly, it is reasonable that the public’s 
support for war would impact a youth’s likelihood to serve.             
   Hypothesis 1b: There will be a positive relationship between 
military propensity and public support for war during wartime.   
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   Casualties and Propensity    
     The relationship between propensity and casualties has not yet been fully 
explored.  Primarily, this is the result of a lack of major wars during the AVF 
prior to 9/11, when the preponderance of propensity research was conducted.  
While the military has been engaged in combat operations at various times 
throughout the AVF (e.g. Haiti, Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia), most operations 
were limited in both scale and duration with only 147 deaths during the Gulf War, 
and a total of 37 during the various other operations.  As a result, it has not been 
feasible for researchers to examine the relationship between propensity and 
casualties during the AVF.  Limited related research has only found that the 
“threat to life” was listed as an important reason for some youth not to join the 
military, which varied significantly between racial and ethnic groups (DoD 2000).  
Political science and public administration researchers have been much more 
interested in the relationship between casualties and public opinion (i.e. support 
for war), which can be used as a platform for discussion on propensity.      
     Mueller’s (1973) study of public opinion concerning the Korean and Vietnam 
wars is a common starting point for discussions about the relationship between 
casualties and public support for war.  Mueller argued that public support for 
military action declined as a function of American casualties.  This contention has 
become better known as the “casualty hypothesis”- i.e., that the American public 
is casualty phobic- a conclusion that holds weight with both policymakers and 
academics (Berinsky and Druckman 2007).  A distinction between casualty 
phobia and casualty sensitivity should be made.  Casualty phobia is a reflexive 
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opposition to any casualties.  Casualty sensitivity recognizes the human toll as a 
cost of war.  Certainly the public would like to assume less of this cost, but a 
nonzero human cost does not necessarily mean that it will oppose war.  Scholars 
have noted “a continuum of casualty sensitivity ranging from the minimally 
sensitive – those who view casualties as a necessary cost of war and not a 
determining factor in shaping support- to the maximally sensitive - those who 
support only military missions that guarantee virtually no casualties” (Gelpi et al. 
2006:10).  Casualty phobia represents one end of this continuum.     
     Indeed, the proposition that the U.S. public is casualty-averse or phobic has 
become an entrenched part of the post-Cold War conventional wisdom.  Among 
some, there is belief that Western nations are becoming increasingly risk and 
casualty averse with their troops.  A special issue of Armed Forces & Society was 
devoted to the casualty aversion phenomenon (Van der Meulen and Soeters 
2005).  Dubbed the “body bag syndrome” or “casualty hypothesis,” many 
researchers believe that the American public will not tolerate large numbers of 
U.S. casualties in military operations (Holsti 2001).  
     Despite its popularity, many scholars have debated the casualty hypothesis 
arguing that it is more complex than often depicted in Mueller’s original form.  
Among these scholars, there have been two distinct strands of research.  The first 
strand of research follows Mueller and is concerned with whether the number of 
casualties affects public support for war according to a fixed pattern of 
unavoidable decline or whether the public views casualties and the use of force 
through a cost-benefit calculus (Gelpi et al. 2006).  Scholars among the latter 
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viewpoint paint a picture of a “rational public,” that is capable of responding to 
political debate and weighing the complexities of foreign policy.  Under this 
approach, Larson (1996) found, contrary to Mueller, that a complex cost-benefit 
calculation fits the data better than a reflexive response to casualties.  In other 
words, the public could be flexible in accepting the price of casualties depending 
on the overall benefit of the military mission.  Larson’s argument came to be 
known as the “rational cost-benefit” model.   
     Under this model, researchers have explored the elasticity of the public’s 
“demand” for war.  Some researchers argue that the public sees so little benefit in 
the majority of military missions that, in effect, the cost-benefit calculation is 
essentially the same as the casualty-phobic stance (e.g. Mueller 2000).  Similarly, 
others argue that, for certain key categories of missions (e.g. peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance, etc.), the public’s sensitivity to casualties is so high that 
even a very small number of casualties can produce what is known as the 
“Somalia syndrome,” which refers to the precipitous drop of public support for 
U.S. intervention in Somalia after eighteen special operations soldiers were killed 
in 1993 (e.g. Klarevas 2000).   
     However, most scholars who have examined public opinion polls closely have 
favored the other side of the debate, concluding that the public’s demand (i.e. 
support) for military operations, while not completely inelastic, is not as cost 
sensitive to approximate casualty phobia.  These scholars make up the second 
strand of research, which takes the issue of elasticity a step farther: What factors 
shape the elasticity of demand for military missions?  In other words, under what 
 51 
conditions would the number of casualties cause public support for a particular 
mission to decline more rapidly or more slowly?  There is wide scholarly 
consensus that multiple factors may be working simultaneously.  What 
distinguishes between each argument is the importance placed on various factors 
that influence more or less public support for military missions (Gelpi et al. 
2006).   
     Jentleson (1992) argues that the “pretty prudent” public bases its tolerance for 
casualties on the principle policy objective of the military operation.  He contends 
that the public will accept casualties during missions that include traditional 
military tasks of using force to coerce an adversary engaged in aggressive action 
against the U.S. or its allies.  On the other hand, he contends that the public will 
only support “humanitarian intervention” missions if the costs are relatively low.  
Larson (1996) argues that public casualty tolerance follows domestic elite 
casualty tolerance.  That is, when domestic elites line up in a consensus behind 
the mission, public support will be strong despite mounting costs.  However, 
when elites are divided, even a small amount of casualties will cause public 
support to diminish quickly.  Kull and Destler (1999) argue that casualty phobia is 
essentially a case of political elites misreading the public.  They argue that public 
support for a military mission will be more robust if the public sees that other 
countries support the mission likewise, and thus the United States is not obligated 
to bear all the burden of the costs.  Thus, the priority of importance for the 
public’s casualty tolerance is based on multilateralism- i.e., gaining allied support 
for U.S. military operations.  Finally, Feaver and Gelpi (2004) emphasize 
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expectations of success as the critical factor in explaining the public’s tolerance 
for casualties.  When the public believes the mission will succeed, it continues to 
support the mission, even amidst mounting costs.  On the contrary, when the 
public thinks success is unlikely, small costs will cause support to plunge.  Of 
note, the critical belief specified is the expectation of eventual future success, not 
necessarily assessments of how the war is currently going or has recently been 
going.          
     Most recently, Gelpi, Fever, and Reifler (2006) conducted a study during the 
first few years of the Iraq war (2003-2004) to test the casualty hypothesis and to 
assess the relative importance of the various factors related to casualty tolerance 
noted above.  They argue that the public will tolerate significant numbers of U.S. 
combat casualties (i.e. at least 1500 U.S. deaths) under certain circumstances.  
They found that the U.S. public’s tolerance for the human costs of war was 
primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: beliefs about the 
rightness or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about a war’s likely success.  The 
impact of each attitude depended upon the other.  However, ultimately, they 
found that beliefs about the likelihood of success mattered most in determining 
the public’s willingness to tolerate U.S. military deaths in combat.  Of note, they 
also found support for the arguments made by Jentleson (1992), Larson (1996), 
and Kull and Destler (1999) as well, albeit there was less importance placed on 
their factors of the principle policy objective, perceived domestic elite consensus, 
and multilateralism respectively.     
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     Contrary to Mueller (1973), their findings suggest that the U.S. public makes 
reasoned and reasonable judgments about emotionally charged and politically 
polarizing issues such as fighting a war.  In other words, the public forms its 
attitudes regarding support for war by weighing the costs and benefits associated 
with that war.  While U.S. military casualties are a cost of war, they are a cost that 
the public is willing to pay if it thinks the initial decision to launch the war was 
correct, and if it thinks that the United States will prevail.  Again, between the two 
public opinions, it is the belief that the United States will be successful that 
matters most for supporting a war amidst high casualties.          
     Intuition as well as prior related research (e.g. DoD 2000) would lead one to 
believe that propensity would decrease as U.S. casualties increase due to the 
increased risk of personal harm associated with service during war.  However, the 
relationship between propensity and casualties may not be as clear-cut as intuition 
would suggest.  If one is willing to accept the assumption that public support for 
war is similarly related to the propensity to serve, then one could use either 
Mueller’s (1973) or Gelpi and his colleagues’ (2006) recent argument to predict 
the relationship between casualties and propensity.  Indeed, it is reasonable that 
casualties may not negatively influence propensity based on other mediating 
factors in the same manner as prior research on public support for war has shown.  
Perhaps, propensity would not decline as casualties increase if Gelpi and his 
colleagues’ two conditions were met: 1) the public’s belief that the U.S. is likely 
to succeed in war and, 2) the belief that the war being fought is just.  
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     Although casualties from Afghanistan and Iraq have been far less than 
previous wars such as Vietnam, Korea, and WWII, the effects may be heightened 
due to the rise in media technology.  Certainly, images of U.S. casualties are 
much more pervasive in today’s media environment than during World War II 
(Berinsky 2009).  It doesn’t take much to recall the lasting images on television 
and print of an American soldier being dragged across the streets of Mogadishu 
by Somalis in 1993.  More recently, it is hard not to find images of our wounded 
that have returned home from the battlefield and are coping with their injuries 
depicted on daily television advertisements for organizations such as the 
Wounded Warrior Project.  With 24-hour media and Internet coverage in today’s 
environment, the “flash to bang” of direct combat images has made war more of a 
reality for the average citizen.  These images of the direct costs of war are likely 
to be imprinted on America’s youth as they make a decision to join the military.          
     I expect that as U.S. casualties increase during war, the negative impressions 
left on the minds of the youth population will cause a decrease in the propensity 
to serve in the military.  This prediction is in line with the occupational model of 
military service, as the benefits of service do not necessarily outweigh the actual 
costs associated with wartime sacrifices, which are exacerbated during periods of 
high casualties.  Further, this prediction is consistent with related research 
(Mueller 1973) on the casualty hypothesis.  Empirically, I expect that casualties 
will be negatively related to military propensity during the post-9/11 era- i.e., 
propensity will decline as casualties increase.   
Hypothesis 1c: There will be a negative relationship between 
military propensity and U.S. casualties during wartime.     
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          Unemployment and Propensity  
     To date there has been limited research that has examined the direct 
relationship between military propensity and unemployment (Lawrence and 
Degree 1996).  Most this research was conducted by the Department of Defense 
using the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey between 1976-1989, which found a 
fairly strong correlation between unemployment and propensity (Bray et al. 
1990).  Related research exists indicating that youth with propensity intend to join 
the military for reasons such as pay, educational funding, job training and 
security, and that propensity is higher for unemployed than employed youth (DoD 
2000).  Segal and his colleagues (1999) also conducted related research 
examining the relationship between the conditions of the recruiting climate and 
military propensity during six phases of the AVF separated by years between 
1973-1997.  They measured the recruiting climate by each phase examining the 
conditions of entry-level pay (compared to civilian compensation), recruiting 
resources available, educational benefits, recruit quality, and the recruiting 
environment.  They measured the recruiting environment primarily by youth 
unemployment rates and cohort size.  The authors found that a “poor” recruiting 
environment, indicated in part by low youth unemployment, was related to a 
decline in propensity.         
     Despite relatively limited prior research on the relationship between propensity 
and the economy, there has been an extensive body of literature examining the 
economic determinants of actual military enlistment since the rise of the AVF and 
the ensuing competition between the Department of Defense and the civilian labor 
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market for potential recruits.  Various macroeconomic factors such as 
unemployment rates, military compensation relative to civilian earnings, and 
educational benefits have been shown to be important determinants of military 
enlistment during peacetime (e.g. Dale and Gilroy 1984; Horne 1985).  Indeed, 
conventional wisdom would suggest that military enlistment is impacted by the 
conditions of the economy such that as economic conditions worsen, military 
enlistment increases.  This is in keeping with the occupational model of service 
that Moskos (1977) predicted.   
     What has yet to be fully explored is the direct relationship between 
unemployment and propensity.  Perhaps, more importantly, is examining this 
relationship during wartime, where the costs of military service are much higher, 
potentially changing the relationship that conventional wisdom would suggest.  
The post-9/11 era allows for the unique opportunity to conduct this type of 
research, which has essentially been infeasible to fully explore throughout the 
AVF until now, except for during the short period of the Gulf War (e.g. Segal et 
al. 1999).  Further, the dramatic changes in economic conditions marked by the 
economic recession of 2008 provide an even richer opportunity to examine this 
relationship.  Thus, I take advantage of these unique opportunities to examine the 
relationship between unemployment and propensity during the longest period of 
sustained war in history.   
     The occupational model of military service places most emphasis on self-
interest as opposed to interest for the employing organization (Moskos 1977).  
These self-interests are manifested in the form of monetary rewards and financial 
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benefits expected for services rendered.  A desire for stability in the work place is 
another factor that represents the occupational model of military service.  
Certainly, intuition as well as prior research would lead one to expect that as 
conditions in the economy become worse and jobs become more scarce, the 
military could be viewed as a more viable job opportunity, thereby increasing a 
youth’s likelihood of serving in the armed forces.  This expectation is consistent 
with prior related research on unemployment and actual enlistment as noted 
above.  Since prior research has already shown that propensity is highly related to 
actual enlistment (e.g. Bachman et al. 1998), it is reasonable to predict that a 
similar positive relationship would occur between unemployment and propensity.  
This is also in keeping with Moskos’ occupational model of service.       
     However, the main difference between earlier research and mine is the 
examination of this relationship during wartime as opposed to peacetime.  In other 
words, how have the dynamics of war- considered to be institutionally related- 
changed the relationship between propensity and unemployment, which is 
considered to be an occupationally related factor?  It is reasonable that the 
benefits of the military, such as good pay and job security compared to other job 
opportunities during declining economic conditions, may not outweigh the 
potentially higher costs associated with military service during wartime.   
     Certainly, one might expect that the risks associated with war could outweigh 
the benefits associated with military enlistment.  While one may consider the 
military a viable job opportunity compared with other alternatives in the civilian 
labor market, especially during declining economic conditions, the dynamics are 
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much different when the military is at war.  On top of the obvious risks of 
personal harm, the hardships endured by military personnel while deployed away 
from their families during war, certainly present a much different military than 
during peace.  Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the military is “just another 
job” during wartime as some (e.g. Moskos 1988) have suggested during 
peacetime.  I expect that the dynamics of wartime will change the previously 
associated positive relationship between propensity and unemployment such that 
there will not be a significant boost in propensity as unemployment increases.  
Simply put, I expect that the risks associated with war will outweigh the benefits 
of service, even amidst poor economic conditions, resulting in youth seeking 
other pathways of lesser resistance to adulthood.  Empirically, I expect that there 
will not be a significant positive relationship between unemployment and 
propensity during the post-9/11 era.   
Hypothesis 1d: There will be no significant relationship between 
propensity and unemployment during wartime.   
 
     Individual and Demographic Influences on Propensity 
     There are certain individual factors such as family background and 
demographics that may assist in explaining differences in propensity trends of the 
youth population.  Diversity in the military has increased significantly since the 
beginning of the AVF in 1973.  Bolstered by research (e.g. Bogart 1969) showing 
that racially integrated units performed better than segregated units, along with 
the high number of black recruits, the Army began integrating units in 1950 
during the Korean War and officially abolished racially segregated units in 1954 
(Clever and Segal 2012).  It is particularly noteworthy that the Army led the way 
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for racial integration over a decade before the rest of American society caught up 
marked by the establishment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  These 
developments attracted more African Americans to the force, as racial tensions 
and discrimination were more pervasive in the civilian labor market.  The 
composition of the military at the beginning of the AVF became more diverse as a 
result, but the military did not become an overwhelmingly minority force.  As of 
2013, minorities (i.e. Black and Hispanics) only make up about a third of all 
active-duty personnel (DoD 2013).     
     Contrary to the architects’ predictions, the AVF is more demographically 
representative of American society than the draft-era force (Clever and Segal 
2012).  Black enlisted personnel in the Army increased from 23 percent in 1973 to 
nearly 30 percent in 2009.  Increasing Hispanic representation has also reflected 
the growth of this subgroup in society overall.  In 1973, Hispanic enlisted 
personnel encompassed less than 5 percent of the military population, whereas 
they increased to 16 percent in 2009 (Clever and Segal 2012).  There are still 
more strides to be made, especially within the officer corps, as racial and ethnic 
diversity has lagged behind that of the enlisted force.  Yet, minority representation 
has improved in recent years increasing from 9 percent of all officers in 1990 to 
22 percent in 2009, which is comparable to the civilian population where 
minorities comprise 20 percent of college graduates aged 21-49 (Clever and Segal 
2012).   
     The “bridging hypothesis” suggests that military service functions as a 
mechanism for those with less-advantaged backgrounds to acquire the attributes 
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and attitudes that will enable them to succeed in civilian society and increase their 
overall socioeconomic status (Kleykamp 2009).  The hypothesis applies to racial 
and ethnic minorities as well as to whites with lower socioeconomic backgrounds.  
Through the rigors of military discipline and training, military service is expected 
to provide human, social, and cultural training that will allow lower-advantaged 
individuals to “bridge” the gap to mainstream society. 
          Blacks in the Military 
     Analysts have proposed numerous reasons for black overrepresentation within 
the military compared to the general population.  Blacks have fewer educational 
and job opportunities than whites (Binkin and Eitelberg 1986; Hosek and Peterson 
1985; Phillips et al. 1992), and the military is perceived to be more of an 
egalitarian, meritocratic environment with less racial discrimination than the 
civilian labor force and educational system (Moskos and Butler 1996; Segal 
1989).  After controlling for a myriad of demographic, socioeconomic, attitudinal, 
and other factors, almost all studies have concluded that blacks are more likely 
than whites to join the military (Bachman et al. 1998, 2000b; Dale and Gilroy 
1984; Hosek and Peterson 1985; Kilburn 1992; Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Mare 
and Winship 1984; Murray and McDonald 1999; Teachman et al. 1993).  
     Some argue that there is still a fair amount of racial “segregation” within the 
military.  Blacks are overrepresented in administrative and logistical military 
occupational specialties and underrepresented in combat specialties.  These trends 
may be in part from self-selection into jobs with a high degree of civilian 
transferability or due, in part, to institutional racism where barriers to success in 
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some specialties, such as elite combat units like Special Forces, may dissuade 
minority representation (Kleykamp 2009).  The overall increase in combat units in 
the military during the post-9/11 era at the expense of less-needed administrative 
and logistical specialties may be a contributing factor that could cause a decrease 
in black propensity, as recruiters may not be targeting this population as much 
during this period.  Further, the increased risk to soldiers in administrative and 
logistical specialties resulting from the changes to the contemporary operational 
environment may also cause a decrease in black propensity in accordance with the 
occupational model of service. 
          Hispanics in the Military 
     Given Hispanics’ disadvantaged positioning in the labor market and education 
system (Bean and Tienda 1987; Hoffman et al. 2003; Llagas 2003), one would 
expect them to migrate to the military as much as blacks.  However, this is not the 
case.  Hispanics remain underrepresented in the military, comprising just over 11 
percent of the active-duty force, and about 15 percent of the civilian work force 
(Department of Defense 2012; U.S. Department of Labor 2012).  The few studies 
that examine Hispanics find that they are less likely to enlist than whites or blacks 
(Hosek and Peterson 1985; Kilburn and Klerman 1999).  This is especially 
puzzling given the fact that Hispanics have shown the high levels of interest in 
military service (Segal et al. 1999).  It is possible that they are being screened out 
by the military for various reasons, most likely due to a lack of completing high 
school (Kleykamp 2006).   
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     There has been a fair amount of racial segregation of Hispanics within the 
military as well.  Studies have shown that Hispanics have been overrepresented in 
the combat arms specialties, such as the infantry, and underrepresented in more 
technical specialties, such as electronics and communications (Pew Hispanic 
Center 2003; DoD 2006).  Overrepresentation in the combat arms specialties 
would put Hispanics more at risk of harm, especially in times of war.  Gifford 
(2005) confirmed this when he examined casualty data from the Iraq war between 
May 19, 2003 and April 8, 2004 by race/ethnicity and military occupational 
specialty (MOS).  Overall Gifford found that “the casualty rate among Hispanics 
during the war was 49 percent higher than their representation in the ground 
forces would suggest (p=.002), and 85 percent higher than [the percent of] 
Hispanics on active duty (p=.044)” (2005:215).  In accordance with the 
occupational model of service, one could argue that the increased risk of 
becoming a casualty, especially for Hispanics, would contribute to an overall 
decrease in their propensity to serve.      
     However, there are other factors that may influence Hispanic propensity in the 
positive direction.  During the post-9/11 era, the issue of illegal immigration has 
been at the forefront of political debate resulting in a considerable amount of 
media attention.  Hispanics migrating from the Mexican border have been a large 
source of immigrants during this period.  A recent study by Dempsey and Shapiro 
found that a rather large proportion (60 percent) of the Hispanic population in the 
Army is comprised of immigrants or the children of immigrants (Segal et al. 
2007).  Just as blacks desired to participate during WWII as a way to prove their 
 63 
citizenship, Hispanics may desire to serve during this era to validate their 
citizenship (Armor 1996; De Angelis 2012; Clever and Segal 2012).  The 
potential for Hispanics to acculturate to the U.S. may also be a contributing factor 
for their expectation to serve.  Recent research finds greater acculturation among 
Latino veterans, including having better friendships with Anglos and speaking 
more English at home (Leal 2003).  Research also shows that there is greater 
support within the Hispanic community for military service.  Leal finds that 
“Latinos are more likely than Anglos to encourage young people to enlist” 
(2005:123).  Additionally, the Army has specifically targeted Latino youth by 
increasing Hispanic recruiters and placing ads in Spanish-language media, 
including magazines, radio, and television (Segal et al. 2007).  All rationale taken 
into consideration, it is likely that Hispanic propensity during the post- 9/11 era 
will not mirror that of blacks, despite their similar disadvantaged backgrounds.  
Indeed, Hispanics may have a stronger propensity compared to their white and 
black counterparts based on recent structural changes within the military 
recruiting environment and other more institutional reasons such as a desire to 
“serve my country” (Segal et al. 2007).      
     It appears that the racial composition of the military is changing during the 
post-9/11 era.  Black representation in the active duty military has declined since 
2001, while Hispanic representation is increasing (DoD 2002; 2012; Segal and 
Segal 2004).  Similarly, the propensity to serve among blacks has been declining 
faster than among white youth, while Hispanic propensity has slightly increased 
compared to whites in the 1990s (Segal et al. 1999).  A primary question my 
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research addresses is whether various youth sub-groups differ in propensity 
during the post-9/11 era.  Previous research examining the two decades between 
1976-1997 has already shown that black men had higher propensity than Hispanic 
men, and that both groups had higher propensity than white men (Bachman et 
al.1998).  Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, and the view that the military 
is more of an egalitarian environment for minorities compared to the civilian labor 
force, I expect to see similar racial and ethnic trends during the post-9/11 period.  
However, the fact that black and Hispanic men will encounter more combat 
situations in the current operational environment makes it likely that their overall 
propensity will decline as well (Segal and Segal 2004).     
Hypothesis 2: Black and Hispanic men will have a greater 
propensity to serve in the military as compared to white men 
during the post-9/11 era. 
 
          SES and Propensity 
     Socioeconomic status, independent of race, also influences an individual’s 
actual enlistment in the military.  Prior studies have shown that those who have 
lower family incomes, larger family sizes (which result in more sharing of scarce 
resources), and less-educated parents are more likely to join the military (Asch et 
al. 1999; Kilburn and Asch 2003; Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Kleykamp 2006).  
     Although the socioeconomically disadvantaged are more likely to join the 
military, the military has increasingly become more competitive in its selection of 
high quality recruits.  Contrary to popular belief, the military does not simply 
select from the lower classes of society.  Prior studies have also shown that 
individuals with high abilities, measured by the Armed Forces Qualifications Test 
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(AFQT), other test scores, G.P.A., or high school rank, are less likely to join the 
military than attend college, but are more likely to enlist than work or perform 
some other activity (Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Kleykamp 2006).  Consistent 
with the bridging hypothesis, I expect the previously observed association 
between socioeconomic status and enlistment to be similar for predicting military 
propensity as well.   
Hypothesis 3: Youth who are socioeconomically disadvantaged 
are likely to have a higher propensity to serve in the military as 
compared to those who are more advantaged. 
 
          Race During the Post-9/11 Era and the Operational Environment 
     Social and institutional factors during the post-9/11 era such as changes in the 
contemporary operational environment abroad and the economic environment at 
home may impact one’s propensity to serve by subgroup differently.  A simple 
test of this hypothesis implies an interaction between race and ethnicity and the 
various macro-social factors (e.g. casualties and unemployment).  Today’s 
operational environment abroad is as unpredictable and dangerous as ever before.  
Guerrilla warfare tactics have blurred the front lines on the battlefields of 
Afghanistan and Iraq placing formerly “protected” units and individuals, who 
have “softer” military occupational specialties, directly into harm’s way.  This has 
had the biggest impact on minorities, especially blacks, in the military since they 
predominately occupy administrative and logistical MOSs as opposed to combat 
specialties (Kleykamp 2009; Segal and Segal 2004; Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  
Indeed, the costs of service during this era of continuous conflict have created a 
“fog of war,” perhaps obscuring the benefits of military service.  Earlier research 
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(Segal et al. 1999) has already shown that black propensity dropped dramatically 
from over 47 percent to about 28 percent during the Gulf War period (1990-
1991), and has yet to recover above 30 percent.   
     I expect to see similar downward trends in black propensity during the post-
9/11 era, especially amidst high U.S. casualties.  I also expect the large gap 
between white and black propensity, which decreased in the 1990s, to continue to 
decrease after 9/11 due to a change in the operational environment.  Consistent 
with the occupational model of service, the benefits associated with military 
service simply do not outweigh the risks associated with the current wartime and 
operational environment.  I do not expect to see similar trends between white and 
Hispanic propensity given that prior research did not show a significant decrease 
in either white or Hispanic propensity during the Gulf War period.  Further, 
additional factors such as increased recruiting efforts, more support for military 
service among the Latino community, and greater institutional motivations to 
serve for a “calling,” possibly to prove one’s citizenship, could be considered an 
added benefit of service for Hispanics during this era.  Using the same 
occupational motivation logic, I also expect that black youth will be more 
positively influenced by a dwindling economy, resulting in a higher propensity to 
serve compared to their white or Hispanic counterparts.   
Hypothesis 4a: The gap between white and black propensity to 
serve in the military will decrease during the post-9/11 era as 
compared to earlier years.   
 
Hypothesis 4b: As casualties increase, black propensity will 
decrease more than white or Hispanic propensity. 
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Hypothesis 4c: As unemployment rates increase, black propensity 
will increase more than white or Hispanic propensity. 
 
          Educational Attainment and Plans/Alternate Pathways to Adulthood 
     The Life Course theory tenet of “human agency” emphasizes that people have 
a choice on what pathway and trajectory they take as they develop over time.  
When deciding what to do after high school, the primary choice one has is to 
continue schooling, join the military, or do something else (e.g. go to work or 
travel).  Recent studies (Kilburn and Asch 2003; Bachman et al. 2001) have 
shown that roughly 50 percent more youth say they definitely will graduate from 
a four-year college today than at the inception of the AVF in 1973.  The fraction 
of high school students attending college within two years after graduation has 
grown from about half to about two-thirds, reflecting the large labor market 
returns associated with a college degree relative to just a high school diploma.  
Further, the overall size of the youth population has declined since 1980 from 
about 2.2 million to 1.9 million, depleting the supply of youth to the military’s 
traditional recruiting market- the non-college-bound market (Kilburn and Asch 
2003). 
     Studies on educational aspirations have shown that a large proportion of high 
school students plan to attend college, and an even larger proportion aspire to do 
so.  Increased access to higher education for minorities, along with the increasing 
returns to investment for a college education, have contributed to military 
recruiting difficulties in the 1990s by attracting a large share of the sought after 
“high-quality” recruits more towards both two- and four-year colleges versus 
military enlistment (Bachman et al. 2001).   
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     Studies reveal that there is a strong correlation between success in high school 
and college aspirations.  Those with higher grades have lower propensity and 
lower rates of enlistment.  Specifically, high school students with “C” grade 
averages are about twice as likely to enter service as compared to those with “A” 
averages.  Those with the lowest grades (C- or D) show the highest levels of 
propensity, although they do not have the highest rates of enlistment due to 
military entrance requirements for cognitive aptitude (Bachman et al. 2000b).  Of 
course the relationship between grades and military propensity overlaps 
significantly with college expectations and high school curriculum (i.e. college 
preparatory vs. all others).  Nevertheless, studies show that the dominant pattern 
of causation is that students who consistently get good grades are, partly due to 
their success in high school, more likely to plan to go to college and that planning 
to enter college makes individuals less likely to plan on entering military service.  
     Though college enrollments have been increasing, the cost of college has risen 
dramatically.  In the past decade, median family income, adjusted for inflation, 
has declined, while at the same time, tuition at two-and four-year colleges has 
increased at a rate faster than inflation or family income.  To further exacerbate 
the problem, student financial assistance has not kept pace with college costs 
which means students are likely to assume greater debts for higher education 
(National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011).   
     Although studies (Bachman et al. 2001) have shown that students with high 
educational aspirations are more likely to go to college than to serve in the 
military after high school graduation, it is possible that college goals may also 
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influence decisions between traditional four-year college alternatives.  Concerns 
about college affordability may dissuade some students from taking on higher 
debt loads in fear of the inability to pay back college loans regardless of their 
college aspirations.  These students may seek out alternative pathways to higher 
education such as through the military.  Indeed, since WWII, the military has 
provided soldiers with additional educational benefits through the G.I. Bill, 
Montgomery G.I. Bill, and, most recently, the Post-9/11 Bill.  In direct 
competition with colleges for “high-quality” recruits, especially right out of high 
school, the military may serve for some as an alternative pathway to college 
(Kleykamp 2006).  Certainly, the educational benefits provided by civilian 
employers in the labor force pale in comparison to those offered by the military.  
Additionally, those who enlist in the military earn money, develop job-related 
technical skills, and, in some cases, earn credit toward a college degree for their 
military training (Kleykamp 2006).   
     Two-year community college enrollment rates have also increased 
significantly during the past decade as a result of the rising costs associated with 
four-year college programs.  However, two-year institutions have also outpaced 
median family income in the majority of states, and in all states where community 
colleges are the most critical for access to higher education and a bachelor’s 
degree.  Additionally, state transfer policies designed to enable students to move 
from two-year colleges to baccalaureate-granting institutions lack efficiency and 
full credit transferability (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 
2011).  Students who enroll in community college exhibit military enlistment 
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potential in that they are more likely to be low-income (less than $25,000 per 
year), the first in their families to attend college, and from minority groups 
(National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011; Kilburn and Asch 
2003).   
     Since two-year colleges have increased costs, issues with transferability, and 
low returns to investment, I predict that plans for higher education will increase 
youth propensity to serve in the military when they expect to graduate from a two-
year college or attend a vocational or technical school.  Indeed, some young 
people may exercise their agency and make a rational decision to enter military 
service to assist with achieving their educational aspirations.  Consistent with 
earlier research, I predict that plans for graduating from a four-year college will 
decrease youth propensity.      
Hypothesis 5a: Military propensity will be negatively related to 
the expectation to graduate from a four-year college. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Military propensity will be positively related to the 
expectation to graduate from a two-year college or attend a 




Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
Data 
     My research employs secondary-data quantitative analysis utilizing data 
collected from the Monitoring the Future project, an ongoing national study of 
youth and young adults conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor under a series of grants from the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse.  MTF employs a cohort-sequential research design that 
includes: 1) nationally representative samples of seniors in U.S. high schools 
beginning in 1975 continuing each year thereafter (average response rates of 83% 
yield approximately 17,000 respondents annually), and 2) annual follow-up 
surveys mailed each year to subsamples from each high school senior class 
sample in the years following graduation (approximately 2,400 are selected from 
each class for follow-up with an initial response rate of 80%).  For my research 
purposes, I only examine the initial surveys measuring high school seniors.  Of 
note, during the post-9/11 era, response rates for follow-up surveys have been too 
low to obtain reliable results for examining the propensity to enlistment 
relationship.  These low response rates are likely due to the high operational 
tempo for individuals who have joined the military after high school and have had 
multiple deployments and change of duty assignments (D. Segal conversation 
2016).    
     First, I focus my analysis on responses from male high school seniors between 
the classes of 1976-2013.  Later, in Chapter 6 and follow-on chapters, I examine 
responses from female seniors as well.  The predominant focus of my research is 
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during the post-9/11 era so I use all available MTF datasets between 2002-2013.  I 
do not consider 2001 in my analysis of the post-9/11 era because seniors are 
surveyed in the spring (i.e. March through May) of their senior year and the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 had not occurred yet.   
     The basic research design involves annual data collections from nationally 
representative high school seniors during the spring of each academic year, 
beginning with the class of 1975.  Data collection takes place in approximately 
130 public and private high schools selected to provide an accurate cross section 
of high school seniors throughout the United States.  The overall sample is 
representative of schools in the United States with respect to geographic area, 
urbanicity (i.e. urban vs. rural areas), school type, and school size.  Bachman, 
Johnston, and O’Malley (1996) have described this study design extensively.  
     One limitation to the dataset worth mentioning is that it excludes the 
population of high school dropouts (i.e. those who drop out before the last few 
months of the senior year).  This results in excluding between 11 and 20 percent 
of each year group.  This group is not unimportant since certain behaviors, such as 
illicit drug use and delinquency, tend to be higher than average for high school 
dropouts.  However, for purposes of my research, members of this group would 
not likely expect to serve in the military due to strict military entrance 
requirements.  For the purposes of estimating potential changes from one year-
group of high school seniors to another, the omission of dropouts only presents a 
problem if there is a considerable difference in the number of dropouts from each 
cohort.  There is no reason to expect dramatic changes in those rates in the future, 
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and government statistics indicate only a slight decrease in high school dropouts 
since 1970 (Johnston et al. 2011).   
Measures 
     There are six different questionnaire forms used in the MTF project surveys of 
high school seniors (five prior to 1989), each administered to a random one-sixth 
(or one-fifth) of the total sample.  During follow-up surveys, individuals receive 
questionnaire forms similar to those they completed as seniors (e.g. a respondent 
who completed Form 2 as a senior would receive Form 2 in the follow-up- This is 
relevant for prior MTF research that I cite throughout; it does not pertain 
specifically to my current analysis).  Most demographic and drug use questions 
(i.e. “core” variables) appear on all MTF questionnaire forms (Bachman et al. 
2000b).  Other items of interest (e.g. attitudes, behaviors) only appear on single 
forms.  Given the breadth of content, the study is not presented to students as a 
“drug use study,” nor do they tend to view it in this fashion (Johnston et al. 2011).  
To increase the overall statistical power of my study, I primarily utilize the dataset 
that includes all core variables, which has merged core responses from all forms 
(i.e. Form 1 through Form 6).  After controlling for all the variables in my 
analysis, my overall sample size for the entire dataset (1976-2103) is 128,992 and 
for the post-9/11 era (2002-2013) is 49,259.  For various portions of my analyses, 
I use single MTF forms that pertain to questions relevant to my area of focus.  In 
these instances, I highlight which form is used during my analysis and the sample 
size is annotated in the corresponding tables relevant to the analysis. 
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     Primary Dependent Variables- Propensity vs. High and Low Propensity 
     The primary dependent variable for my research is the propensity to serve in 
the armed forces- simply referred to as “propensity” largely throughout my 
project.  This variable is measured in all base year questionnaires, which include a 
question asking: How likely is it that you will do each of the following things after 
high school?  Serve in the armed forces is one of the activities listed, and all 
respondents are asked to choose among the following alternatives: definitely 
won’t; probably won’t; probably will; and definitely will.  For my primary 
analysis, I code this measure of propensity into a categorical variable (0/1) where 
“no” includes the respondent’s answers to “definitely won’t” and “probably 
won’t,” and “yes” includes the respondent’s answers “probably will” and 
“definitely will”- a “yes” indicates a respondent is “Likely to Enter” the armed 
forces.  Unless otherwise noted throughout, propensity indicates that a respondent 
says they are “Likely to Enter” the military.   
     It must be noted that I gave careful consideration in determining the measure 
of propensity as a two-way measure by combining those who say they “definitely 
will” and “probably will” as “likely to enter” and those who say they “definitely 
won’t” and “probably won’t” as not likely to enter.  First, this convention is 
consistent with a significant amount of prior research on propensity using MTF 
data (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1999) and using the Youth Attitude 
Tracking Study (e.g. DoD 2000), which serves well for comparison purposes.  
Second, combining the “probably will” and “definitely will” responses increases 
my military propensity group, thereby increasing my statistical power and overall 
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validity of estimates.  This is vital to analyze differences in propensity between 
various subgroups (i.e. race/ethnicity and gender).  Further, the various attitudinal 
items (e.g. nationalism, political party, political ideology, job preferences, gender 
role and race relations) I measure now and in later chapters only appear on one 
MTF survey form, thereby reducing my sample sizes available for detailed 
analysis even more.  Third, as highlighted earlier, studies (e.g. Bachman et al. 
2000b) show a strong correlation between propensity to serve and actual 
enlistment, and studies show that the predictors of propensity are the strongest 
predictors of actual enlistment.  Indeed, those MTF respondents who say they 
“probably will” and “definitely will” serve in the armed forces have been shown 
to make up about 70 percent of those who actually go onto enlist.  In contrast, 
those who say they “definitely will” serve have been shown to only comprise 47 
percent of those youth who actually enlist (Bachman et al. 1997).  Thus, it makes 
more sense to combine both response categories to gather information on almost 
three quarters of the likely military population versus less than half.  Fourth, 
results are easiest to interpret and discuss using this measure of propensity.   
     Last, in some cases of my analysis, I compare youth with “high propensity” 
(i.e. those who respond that they “Definitely Will” enter the military) versus 
youth with “low propensity” (i.e. those who respond that they “Definitely Won’t” 
enter).  In these cases, I specify the groups of analysis as “high” or “low” 
propensity youth.  It should be noted that prior research has shown that only about 
5 percent of youth with “low” propensity actually go onto enlist, whereas about 
70 percent of “high” propensity youth enlist within 5-6 years after graduation 
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(Bachman et al. 1997).  For my analyses in Chapter 7 through Chapter 10, results 
and figures of “high” versus “low” propensity youth are located in their respective 
chapters or in Appendix A.  For these analyses, I code those who respond as 
“Definitely Will” enter the military as a “yes” = 1, and those who say they 
“Definitely Won’t” enter as a “no” = 0.  This analysis represents only the two 
most extreme categories of propensity.  All other response categories (i.e. 
“probably will” and “probably won’t”) are omitted during these analyses.  The 
sample size for these analyses represent approximately 65 percent of the total 
sample size.  Most importantly, these response groups are the best proxies of the 
actual military population and the civilian population to examine key differences 
in attitudes and values between groups.  This analysis technique enables me to 
draw better conclusions on differences between civilians and military members to 
contribute to the extensive body of literature covering civil-military relations.  
Furthermore, this technique enables me to better assess the nature and extent of a 
civil-military gap in attitudes and values during the post-9/11 era.            
     In some cases, I change the dependent variable of my analysis to examine 
particular differences (e.g. attitudes) between racial and ethnic groups among 
youth with the propensity to serve.  In these instances, I highlight the dependent 
variable utilized in the corresponding results and discussion sections, including all 
relevant tables and figures.  I employ this analysis technique throughout the 
project.    
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     Macro-Social Measures 
     The independent variables in my initial analysis are the macro-social 
influences: public support for war, casualties, and unemployment.  The first set of 
macro-social measures corresponds to hypotheses 1a-1d.  Additionally, I examine 
various individual individual-level variables such as race and ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, educational attainment, and educational goals to be 
discussed later.   
Public Support for War 
     Data for public support for the wars was fairly complex to derive.  Similar to 
the concept of patriotism, public support for war can be been measured in various 
ways.  Mostly, researchers have relied upon public opinion polls to capture 
support for war.  The question of how to exactly measure support for war is 
certainly a perplexing one, as Mueller (1973) identified, due in large part to the 
well-known existence of question wording effects (i.e. seemingly subtle 
differences in the way survey questions are phrased can lead to large differences 
in the responses and in the shape of aggregate public opinion).  What can be 
difficult to capture is the same question that is routinely repeated on various polls 
to compare attitudes over time.  This is especially the case with public support for 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  As mentioned earlier, there were numerous 
public opinion polls conducted immediately following 9/11 focused on support 
for the war in Afghanistan.  However, those polls quickly ceased once attention 
shifted toward Iraq in 2003.  At that time, the preponderance of poll questions 
focused on the Iraq War. 
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     Researchers have used various types of questions to most accurately measure 
public support ranging from presidential approval ratings during times of war 
(e.g. Mueller 1970) to directly asking whether or not someone supports a 
particular war.  I scanned numerous American public opinion surveys (e.g. 
Polling Report 2015a and Polling Report 2015b) for the best questions that could 
be conceptualized as public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  For the 
war in Afghanistan, Gallup consistently asked the question between the years 
2001-2014 (with the exception of 2003, 2005, and 2006): “Thinking now about 
U.S. military action in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, do you think the 
United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not” 
(Gallup 2015a)?  Similarly, for the war in Iraq, Gallup consistently asked the 
question between the years 2003-2014 (with the exception of 2011 and 2012): “In 
view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Iraq, do you think the 
United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not” (Gallup 2015b).  
For both of these questions, the public was oftentimes polled more than once 
during the same year.  For these instances, I averaged responses between the 
various months surveyed for a particular year to derive an average estimate of 
annual support for war.  Of note, there was not a single polling question that 
asked for public opinion considering both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars together.  
Nor did any single question ask for specific support for a war (e.g. “do you 
support the war in Iraq”) on a regular basis.  Taken together, I deemed the two 
questions above to be the best measures available with the greatest frequency of 
annual polling data to measure public support for the wars in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq annually.  Similar “mistake-related” questions were also used in related 
research on public support for war (e.g. Mueller 1973; Burk 1999; Gelpi et al. 
2006).   
     Since the war in Iraq began in 2003 and had the preponderance of U.S. forces 
along with the associated media attention between 2003-2010, the Iraq War was 
likely to be the most salient in the minds of youth.  Therefore, I only use public 
opinion data from the Iraq question, instead of averaging the public opinion 
surveys for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars together, to measure public support for 
war during the post-9/11 era.  Of note, the correlation between the Gallup data for 
Iraq only and the combined average Gallup data for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars 
by year was 0.98.  Since there was no data prior to 2003 for the Iraq war (which 
had yet to begin), I use public opinion data from the Afghanistan war in 2001 and 
2002.  It should be mentioned that overall public support for the Afghanistan war 
was higher than support for the Iraq war, so my public support estimates are more 
conservative.  However, public opinion trends by year for both wars generally 
declined in the same manner, as revealed by a correlation of .70 for public support 
of each war.  To determine support for the Iraq war in 2011 and 2012 since the 
question was not asked, I interpolated between public support in 2010 (44 
percent) and 2013 (42 percent) to provide an average measure of support (43 
percent) for both years.  It is important to note that my single measure for public 
support for war is consistent with existing research on public opinion concerning 
the Iraq War, which utilized multiple related survey questions to capture the latent 
construct of war support (Berinsky 2009).  Descriptive statistics of the raw data 
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     To analyze the relationship between public support for war and propensity 
further, I constructed an index measure of nationalistic attitudes.  As noted earlier 
in Chapter 2, a large amount of research has shown that patriotism has a 
significantly positive relationship with nationalism.  I use this measure later in 
Chapters 4 and 5 to assist with the discussion of the relationship between 
propensity and public support for war.       
      Both theory and empirical tests are used to determine whether items in a scale 
measure the same construct or concept.  I utilized the Cronbach’s alpha (1951) 
estimate to test the reliability that the survey items used for my I/O index scale 
consistently measure the same construct.  In other words, do the survey items in 
my scale hang together and accurately measure the same concept?  Rosenberg’s 
(1989) self-esteem scale is a good example of multiple survey items that tap into 
the same underlying construct and provide an accurate measure of self-esteem.  
Cronbach’s alpha is a function “of the extent to which items in a test have high 
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communalities and thus low uniquenesses…It is also a function of 
interrelatedness” (Cortina 1993:100).  The interrelatedness of a set of items as a 
group has often been referred to as “internal consistency.”  Additionally, alpha is 
very much a “function of the number of items in a scale, and although alpha is 
also a function of item intercorrelation, it must be interpreted with number of 
items in mind” (Cortina 1993:102).   
     Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient normally ranges between 0 and 1, 
although there is actually no lower limit to the coefficient (Gliem and Gliem 
2003).  The closer the Cronbach’s alpha is to 1, the greater the internal 
consistency of the items in the scale.  The size of alpha is determined by the 
number of items in the scale and the mean inter-item correlations utilizing the 
following formula: α = rk/[1+(k-1)r], where k is the number of items in the scale 
and r is the mean of the inter-item correlations.  George and Mallery (2003) 
provide the following rules of thumb or standards in research for interpreting 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient: α > 0.90 is Excellent; α > 0.80 is Good; α > 0.70 is 
Acceptable; α  > 0.60 is Questionable; α  > 0.50 is Poor; and α  < 0.50 is 
Unacceptable.  If a test has a large alpha, then it can be concluded that a large 
proportion of the variance in the test is attributable to general and group factors.  
This is important because it implies that there is very little item-specific variance 
(Cortina 1993).  Put another way, if α = 0.70, that means that 70 percent of the 
variance in the test is reliable variance, while 30 percent is variance due to error.   
     A series of questions on Form 2 of the MTF survey ask respondents how much 
they agree or disagree with each of the following statements related to 
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nationalistic attitudes.  Response categories range between 1= “Disagree”; 2= 
“Mostly Disagree”; 3= “Neither”; 4= “Mostly Agree”; 5= “Agree.”  Responses 
are scored in such a manner that higher numbered responses indicate more 
nationalistic attitudes.  My nationalism index measure consists of the six 
following questions: 1) The U.S. should begin a gradual program of disarming 
whether other countries do or not (reverse coded); 2) The U.S. should be willing 
to go to war to protect its own economic interests; 3) The U.S. does not need to 
have greater military power than Russia (reverse coded); 4) The U.S. ought to 
have much more military power than any other nation in the world;  
5) There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of 
other countries;  
6) The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on 
our own country (reverse coded).  
     Questions used for my nationalism index were selected based on theory and 
prior research (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Bachman et al. 2000; Federico 
et al. 2005).  Additionally, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
confirm that the variables used for my nationalism index measure the same things 
conceptually and to confirm the number of dimensions that the variables measure 
in my index (Torres-Reyna 2010).  The extraction method was principal 
components analysis, with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi 
2003).  Results of initial CFA revealed two distinct factors with eigenvalues 
above 1.0- 2.14 and 1.19 respectively.  Following CFA, Factors 1 and 2 fit as 
theorized into two groups which I categorized as: 1) a perceived need for U.S. 
 83 
supremacy; and 2) acceptable conditions for U.S. military intervention.  Both 
groups of analysis represent the overarching concept of nationalism and have 
been used previously in related MTF studies (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000).  Results 
from my final CFA are reported in Table 3.2 below.  Items with a factor loading 
greater than .46 were retained in each factor, “U.S. Supremacy” and “Acceptable 
Conditions to Go to War.”    
   
     After constructing a separate scale from the “go to war” measures noted above, 
Cronbach’s alpha was only equal to 0.44, which falls into the “unacceptable” 
category for most social science research according to George and Mallory 
(2003).  After constructing a separate scale from the “U.S. Supremacy” measures 
above, Cronbach’s alpha was equal to 0.66.  After combining both indexes into a 
single nationalism scale, the mean inter-item correlation was 0.34 and the 
reliability (Cronbach’s coefficient alpha with unstandardized items) was 0.61, 
which is “acceptable” for social science research (Cronbach 1951; George and 
Mallory 2003).  I chose to combine both factors into one multi-item nationalism 
index measure since both factors are related to nationalistic attitudes and to 
improve overall scale reliability.  Response values were summed, yielding a scale 
with a minimum response score of 6 and a maximum response of 30, with a 
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midpoint of 18.  Higher number responses are considered to be greater 
nationalistic attitudes.  
Casualties 
     I measure the casualties variable by annual U.S. deaths in the military resulting 
from hostile action as reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
between 1980-2010 (DMDC 2015a).  For casualty data between 2011-2014, I use 
monthly data from the DMDC reported on casualties from Operation Enduring 
Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn (DMDC 2015b; 
DMDC 2015c; DMDC 2015d).  Of course the preponderance of U.S. casualties 
were during the post-9/11 era, except for during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  Of 
note, consideration was given to analyzing all U.S. casualties, to include those 
service members wounded from hostile action.  After all, the number of wounded 
veterans has increased due to advances in treatment and medical evacuation 
compared to earlier wars.  Additionally, television advertisements from 
organizations such as the Wounded Warrior Project have undoubtedly left a 
lasting impression of the scars of combat on the minds of people watching from 
their living rooms.  Although “casualties” refers to combat deaths and wounded in 
action in military parlance, in more popular usage, the word “casualties” has 
generally meant those who die while performing their mission (Gelpi et al. 2006).  
Additionally, defining “wounded” can be a bit of a challenge since many service 
members could be considered psychologically wounded from their service.  The 
DoD sometimes tracks these individuals, but not as easily since many do not 
officially report these types of incidents for various reasons.  Further, the 
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correlation between U.S. deaths and the number wounded in action was 0.95.  
Thus, there was no significant difference in the relationship between casualties 
and propensity when measuring casualties by deaths, wounded, or a combination 
of both.  For simplicity and better accuracy, I measure casualties by the number of 
U.S. deaths due to hostile action each year.  Descriptive statistics of the raw data 
for casualties by year during the post-9/11 era are reported in Table 3.1 above.  
 Unemployment      
     I measure the unemployment variable by using unemployment data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1974-2014 for the ages of 16 years and 
older (Department of Labor 2015).  Results from the CPS are reported monthly, 
so I average the results by year to capture annual overall unemployment rates to 
coincide with youth propensity by year.  Since my analysis is on youth, I 
considered using youth unemployment rates between the ages of 16-24.  
However, the correlation between the overall unemployment rate and the youth 
unemployment rate was 0.93.  Additionally, it is likely that the preponderance of 
media reports focused mostly on the overall unemployment rate during the post-
9/11 era rather than on youth unemployment rates.  Thus, it is reasonable that the 
overall unemployment rate was the most salient in the minds of youth.  For these 
reasons, I measure unemployment based on the overall unemployment rate 
between 1976-2014.  Descriptive statistics of the raw data for unemployment rates 
by year during the post-9/11 era are reported in Table 3.1 above.    
     Public support, casualty, and unemployment data are measured annually by 
calendar year beginning in January.  Since the MTF survey is conducted annually 
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in the Spring of a respondent’s senior year (i.e. March or April timeframe), I 
determined that the most likely influence of these data would be felt a year later 
by the next senior class, especially since seniors usually decide whether to go to 
school, join the military, or go into the work force by the beginning (i.e. Fall) of 
their senior year.  Thus, I employ a one-year lag (depicted in Table 3.1) to all 
three macro-social variables: casualties, unemployment, and public support.  
     It is important to note that I gave careful consideration to using a fixed-year 
effects model in my analysis to control for unobserved factors in each year.  
However, after my initial analysis using the macro-social variables above in my 
model, I determined that there were collinearity issues between the year variable 
and the macro-social variables (i.e. public support for war, casualties, and 
unemployment), causing certain random variables to be omitted in the analysis by 
STATA.  In other words, the year variable was highly correlated with each 
macro-social variable.  As a result of collinearity, I could not predict the 
probabilities of propensity.  Analysis revealed that the variables for public support 
for war, casualties, and unemployment explained more than 90 percent of the 
variation in the year variable (r-squared=0.91).  Since the three macro-social 
variables almost perfectly predicted year, I determined that there was no need to 
keep the year variable in the analysis.  Additionally, after comparing results on 
the coefficients of all the control variables used for my analysis, by using year in 
the model versus excluding year from the analysis, there were essentially no 
changes in the magnitude or direction of the coefficients for all control variables.  
This indicates that using year as a variable in the model or, instead, using the 
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three macro-social variables (i.e. public support for war, casualties, 
unemployment) in the model for analysis are basically the same models.  
Therefore, I excluded the year variable from my model altogether throughout my 
entire analysis and replaced it with the macro-social variables: public support for 
war, casualties, and unemployment.  
     Individual-Level Measures 
     The additional independent individual-level variables in my analysis are race 
and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, educational attainment, and educational 
goals.  The second cluster of measures in my analysis focuses on hypotheses 2 
and 3, which are related to disadvantage.  Race is measured by whether 
respondents report that they are white, black, or Hispanic.  Notably, only white 
and black respondents were measured in this dataset until 2005 since other ethnic 
categories (e.g. Native Americans, Asian Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto 
Rican Americans, etc.) only comprised a small proportion of the sample each year 
and would yield unreliable estimates.  Due to the rising number of those who 
identify themselves as one of the Hispanic groups, this group was introduced into 
the dataset for analysis as of 2005 (Johnston et al. 2011).  To measure 
socioeconomic status, I use proxy measures such as father’s education level, 
mother’s education level, family structure (i.e. number of parents in the 
household), and family size (i.e. an increase in number of siblings means more 
sharing of scarce resources).  Those respondents whose father or mother has a 
college degree, who have two parents in the household, and have fewer siblings 
are considered advantaged.  I use fathers and mother’s education level less than 
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high school as the reference group, compared to high school completion through 
graduate school.  I use a four-category variable to measure family structure- two 
parents (father or male guardian and mother or female guardian) as the reference 
group, single mother or female guardian, single father or male guardian, and no 
parents.  For number of siblings, I use three or more as the reference group and 
decrease by one down to no siblings.  Of note, the family income of respondents 
was not measured in this dataset.   
     The next set of conceptually relevant influences includes educational 
attainment and goals that test hypotheses 5a and 5b.  I measure educational 
attainment by high school G.P.A. reported by respondents on a scale from D/C- 
through A, which I collapse into a continuous variable on a standard GPA scale 
(e.g. A=4.0), and high school curriculum of the respondent reported as college 
preparatory or other (reference group).  I measure educational goals based on a 
respondent’s likelihood to go to college.  Likelihood to graduate from a four-year 
college is measured on the same scale as the likelihood to serve in the military 
(i.e. propensity) where “Definitely Will” and “Probably Will” are coded as a 
1=Yes.   
     For my “additional pathways” to adulthood variables, I examine respondents 
who expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational or technical 
school.  These variables are also measured in all base year core questionnaires, 
which include the question: “How likely is it that you will do each of the 
following things after high school?”  “Graduate from a two-year college program” 
or “attend a technical or vocational school” are some of the activities listed, and 
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all respondents are asked to choose among the following alternatives: “definitely 
won’t”; “probably won’t”; “probably will”; and “definitely will”.  Similar to 
above, I combine “Definitely Will” and “Probably Will” responses to indicate the 
likelihood of youth who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend a 
vocational or technical school.   
     Additional controls for my model include past/current residence (i.e. 
urbanicity) and region of the country (e.g. Northeast, North Central, South, and 
West).  Residence is measured by whether a respondent resides in a farm, city, or 
suburb of a city and is based on the size of the city in which a respondent grew up 
which includes populations less than 50,000; 50,000-100,000; 100,000-500,000; 
and greater than 500,000.  
     To test for hypotheses 4b, and 4c, I interact race and ethnicity with the macro-
social variables (public support for war, casualties, and unemployment), using 
whites as the reference group.  I also conduct an interaction between casualties 
and unemployment on propensity.  Table 3.3 below presents descriptive statistics 








     Analysis Plan 
     It should be highlighted again that my follow-on chapters (i.e. Chapters 6-10) 
of analysis are stand-alone chapters.  In other words, these chapters are meant to 
be separate, distinct, and extensions from previous chapters to examine the 
relationships between propensity and various attitudes (i.e. political, job-related, 
gender-role, and race relations).  As such, I keep the literature review, hypotheses, 
methods, analysis, and discussion in its own corresponding chapter.  This is for 
organizational and continuity purposes so not to confuse the reader.         
     For the most part, military propensity has previously been modeled as a two-
way choice of either the expectation to serve or not.  In certain cases, I analyze 
differences between high (i.e. those who “Definitely Will” serve) and low (i.e. 
those who “Definitely Will Not” serve) propensity.  The results of these analyses 
are located in corresponding chapters and in Appendix A.   
     To determine the factors associated with military propensity, I use binomial 
logistic regression to model the probability of the propensity to serve in the 
military and analyze differences by various macro-social and individual level 
influences.  I also use binomial logistic regression to model the probability of the 
propensity to serve in the military as compared with other options such as 
attending a four- or two-year college or vocational training.  I present the odds 
ratios in my results, which indicate the ratios of odds of propensity to serve as 
predicted by the independent variables.  Ratios higher than 1.00 represent a 
positive association between the independent variable and the propensity to serve, 
while ratios less than 1.00 represent a negative association.   
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     In certain cases, I employ linear regression analysis to examine differences in 
my key analysis groups among youth with propensity utilizing additional control 
factors.  Additionally, I employ difference of means techniques in some cases to 
highlight differences between groups without additional controls.  For all these 
instances, I specify the analysis technique in the results.  
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Chapter 4: Primary Analysis: Men’s Propensity Results 
     Unless otherwise specified, results reported for propensity are for those youth 
who are “likely to serve”- that is, those youth who say that they “definitely will” 
or “probably will” expect to serve in the armed forces.  Figure 4.1 below depicts 
the overall average trends of propensity to serve by year of those young men who 
are likely to enter the military between 1976-2013.  Results reveal a general 
decline in propensity since the mid-1980s, but a reversal after 2005. 
 
     Figure 4.2 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average military 
propensity of young men between 2002-2013.  Interestingly, results indicate a 
reversal of trends generally in the positive direction during the post-9/11 era, 
which does not support hypothesis 1a.  However, results also indicate that 
propensity to serve has fluctuated at three critical time periods: immediately 
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following 9/11 (2003); during the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2008); and 
following the economic recession of 2008 (2009-2011).  These periods 
correspond to various macro-social influences such as public support for war 
immediately following the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a rise in 
U.S. casualties, and a rise in unemployment respectively.  Of note, propensity 
during the post-9/11 era reached its all-time low between 2005-2007, but 
increased back to levels of the early 1990s.   
 
     To examine the relationship between propensity and the macro-social 
influences (public support for war, casualties, and unemployment), I employ 
binomial logistic regression analysis.  I also examine the relationship between 
propensity to serve and various other individual micro-influences such as 
demographics, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type 
of residence, and the expectation to do something else (i.e. go to a 4- or 2-year 
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college or vocational education) after high school.  Results are reported in Table 
4.1 below.  I begin with a report of the results revealing the relationship between 
propensity and the three macro-social factors.  Then I report results of the 
relationship between propensity and the various other individual factors.  Model 6 
of Table 4.1 is highlighted to emphasize that it is my full model with all relevant 






Public Support for War 
     Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 4.1 
above indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as 
predicted by the independent variables for men only.  The primary predictor 
variables in Table 4.1 are the macro-social influences- public support for war, 
casualties, and unemployment.  Surprisingly, findings indicate that there is a 
negative relationship between public support for war and the propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era.  These results do not support hypothesis 1b.  As public 
support for war increases, youth are significantly less likely to expect to serve 
(OR=0.98***), after controlling for various factors highlighted in Model 6 of 
Table 4.1.  Figure 4.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to 
serve by public support for war after controlling for all factors.  On average, the 
predicted probability of serving decreases by about one fifth of a percent for every 
five percent increase in public support for war.  Indeed, these results seem 
counterintuitive.  However, it should be noted that overall public support for the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dropped precipitously after initially high levels, and 
they did not increase again (see Table 4.1).  It appears that other influences, such 
as casualties and unemployment, may be influencing propensity more than public 
support for war.  Thus, these results do not support my prediction.  It should be 
noted, however, that the year immediately following the attacks of 9/11 (felt in 
the 2003 MTF survey) did see a significant spike in propensity that was also 
related to high public support for war (93%), which was more in line with 
expectations.  Indeed, this could have been a direct patriotic reaction among 
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youth.              
  
     Nationalism 
     To examine the relationship between nationalistic attitudes and propensity, I 
conducted binomial logistic regression analysis similar to my previous analyses.  
Figure 4.4 below indicates overall nationalistic trends of men during the post-9/11 
era, prior to additional controls.  Interestingly, results indicate a general decline in 
the nationalistic attitudes of youth following the attacks of 9/11 similar to the 
decline in public support for war as depicted in Figure 4.3 above, albeit less 
dramatic.  This suggests that nationalistic attitudes may have been, in part, driving 
public support for war.   
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     Figure 4.5 below depicts the nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity 
during the post-9/11 era, prior to adding control variables.  Overall, the 
nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity are significantly higher than all 
youth surveyed in the dataset.  Further, the nationalistic attitudes of youth with 
propensity appear to remain relatively stable throughout the 9/11 period, with the 
exception of a significant decline between 2009-2012.  Interestingly, this decline 
corresponds with the recession period suggesting that occupational orientations 
may exist within youth with propensity, especially during this timeframe.    
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      Results from logistic regression are reported in Table 4.2 below.  Model 6 of 
Table 4.2 indicate that as nationalistic attitudes increase, youth are significantly 
more likely (OR=1.09***) to have the propensity to serve, after controlling for 
various factors (e.g. race, SES, education) used in earlier analyses.  
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     Figure 4.6 below depicts the predicted probabilities of expecting to serve by 
nationalistic attitudes, after full controls.  On average, for every unit increase on 
the nationalism scale between 6-30, it is predicted that there will be a one percent 
increase in youth propensity.  This suggests that youth with propensity are more 
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nationalistic than their civilian peer counterparts- a finding that is not surprising in 
and of itself and one that is consistent with earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al. 
2000; Segal et al. 2000).      
 
Casualties 
     Consistent with hypothesis 1c, findings indicate that there is a significant 
negative relationship between U.S. casualties and propensity during the post-9/11 
era.  As casualties increase, youth are significantly less likely to expect to serve 
(OR=0.95***), after controlling for various other factors such as race, SES, 
educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence.  Figure 
4.7 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by U.S. 
casualties after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 4.1.  On 
average, the predicted probability of serving decreases by about two-thirds of a 
percent for every increase of one hundred U.S. casualties.  This is substantial 
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considering that between 2003-2011, there were no less than three hundred U.S. 
casualties per year resulting from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as highlighted 
earlier in Table 4.1.  This equates to approximately a 2 percent decrease in the 
probability of youth expecting to serve for each of the years.  A two percent 
decrease in the predicted probability to serve is a substantial difference since it 
equates to about a loss of 44,000 possible male recruits the age of 18 years 
according to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).        
 
Unemployment 
     Inconsistent with hypothesis 1d, findings indicate that there is a significant 
positive relationship between unemployment and the propensity to serve during 
the post-9/11 era.  As overall unemployment rates increase, youth are 
significantly more likely to expect to serve (OR=1.04***), after controlling for 
various other factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 4.1.  Figure 4.8 below 
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depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by unemployment after 
controlling for all factors.  On average, the predicted probability of serving 
increases by about one half of a percent for every percent increase in the overall 
unemployment rate.  To put this into context, for the period following the 
economic recession of 2008, this equates to approximately a 2 percent increase in 
propensity during the years of 2009 and 2010, as unemployment rates nearly 
doubled.    
  
     An interaction between casualties and unemployment depicted in Model 10 of 
Table 4.1 also yields significant results (OR=0.97***).  Figure 4.9 below depicts 
the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by the interaction of 
unemployment and casualties after controlling for all factors in Model 10 of Table 
4.1.  Figure 4.9 below indicates that, on average, as unemployment increases, 
higher casualties have a greater negative influence on propensity.  On the other 
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hand, as unemployment increases, lower casualties have a greater positive 
influence on propensity.  Put another way, the greater the unemployment rates 
are, the greater the effect of casualties on propensity (Williams 2015).  On 
average, an unemployment rate of nine percent when casualties are approximately 
900 would yield a predicted probability of serving of about 12 percent lower 
compared to the same unemployment rate with approximately 200 casualties.  
These results suggest occupational orientations of service as the benefits of 
service, especially during periods of economic instability, may outweigh the costs 
of service when those costs (i.e. casualties) are low.  However, when the costs are 
high, it does not appear that propensity increases even though unemployment is 





Racial and Ethnic Group Differences  
      There are also significant differences in propensity between racial and ethnic 
groups.  Figure 4.10 below depict actual differences in propensity between white, 
black, and Hispanic young men.  Generally speaking, Hispanic propensity is the 
highest overall during the post-9/11 era, followed closely by black propensity, and 
then white propensity.  This supports hypothesis 2.  Of note, Hispanic designation 
did not occur in the MTF study until after 2004.  Figure 4.11 depicts the actual 
propensity of white and black young men for all the years in the dataset (1976-
2013).  Results show support for hypothesis 4a, showing that white propensity 
has remained relatively stable over time.  However, black propensity has declined 
significantly following the Gulf War period (1990-1991) and has continued to 




     Utilizing logistic regression, prior to controlling for various factors, results 
reported in Model 2 of Table 4.1 above reveal that both black (OR=1.42***) and 
Hispanic youth (OR=1.44***) have significantly greater propensity to serve 
compared to their white youth counterparts.  However, after controlling for SES 
as depicted in Model 3 of Table 4.1, results reveal that racial differences between 
white and black youth (OR=1.06) diminish to insignificant levels.  Significant 
differences in propensity between white and Hispanic youth still remain.  After 
full controls, Model 6 of Table 4.1 reveals that Hispanic men are significantly 
more likely (OR=1.12*) to have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era 
compared to white men.  There is no difference in propensity between white and 
black men (OR=0.98).            
       Results reported in Model 7 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between racial 
and ethnic groups and public support for war.  Results do not indicate significant 
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differences between racial and ethnic groups.  Data suggests that there is a similar 
negative relationship between propensity and public support for war between all 
racial and ethnic backgrounds.   
     Results reported in Model 8 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between racial 
and ethnic groups and casualties.  Figure 4.12 below depicts propensity 
differences between racial and ethnic groups by casualties during the post-9/11 
era, after full controls.  Results support hypothesis 4b, revealing that casualties 
are significantly more negatively related to black propensity compared to whites 
and Hispanics.  In other words, as casualties increase during the post-9/11 era, 
black youth propensity declines significantly greater than white or Hispanic youth 
propensity.  However, there is still a significant negative relationship between 
casualties and the propensity to serve for all racial and ethnic groups.    
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     Results reported in Model 9 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between racial 
and ethnic groups and unemployment.  Figure 4.13 below depicts propensity 
differences between racial and ethnic groups by unemployment during the post-
9/11 era, after full controls.  Results support hypothesis 4c, revealing that 
unemployment is significantly more positively related to black youth propensity 
compared to white and Hispanic youth.  In other words, as unemployment 
increases during the post-9/11 era, black propensity increases significantly greater 
than white or Hispanic propensity.  However, there is still a significant positive 
relationship between unemployment and the propensity to serve for all racial and 




     As noted earlier, results suggest that there are significant differences in the 
propensity to serve by SES during the post-9/11 era.  Model 3 of Table 4.1 reveals 
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that those with higher SES, as measured by father’s and mother’s education, 
family structure (i.e. number of parents in household), and the number of siblings 
in a household, are significantly less likely to have the propensity to serve.  
Young men with a father who has a college degree are roughly half as likely 
(OR=0.56***) to expect to serve in the military compared to men who have a 
father with less than a high school education.  The odds of propensity to serve for 
those men who grow up in a household with only a mother or female guardian are 
1.28 compared to those with two parents or guardians.  The odds of propensity to 
serve increase further with those who only have a father or no parents at all.  
Additionally, young men who have no siblings are about half as likely 
(OR=0.58***) to serve in the military than those with 3 or more siblings, most 
likely due to the lack of resources in the household to allocate towards college 
enrollment.  In summary, as predicted by hypothesis 3, disadvantaged men are 
more likely to expect to serve in the military.  As noted, the odds of the propensity 
to serve for blacks dropped from 1.42 to 1.06 compared to whites, after 
controlling for SES.  This suggests that blacks may expect to serve as a result of 
their lower overall socioeconomic status.  On the other hand, Hispanics continue 
to have a higher propensity than whites (OR=1.15*), after controlling for SES, 
suggesting that other factors besides socioeconomic reasons may be contributing 
to their propensity. 
Educational Goals and Attainment 
     Model 4 of Table 4.1 includes the additional cluster of control variables 
pertaining to educational attainment and goals.  Results reported in Model 4 
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support hypothesis 5a.  These findings are consistent with previous research 
suggesting that educational attainment and aspirations also exert a significant 
influence on the propensity to serve in the military.  As a young man’s grade point 
average increases (approximate increase of .3 on a G.P.A. scale from 1.7 to 4), he 
is about a third less likely (OR=0.71***) to expect to serve.  Young men who are 
enrolled in college preparatory classes are about a quarter less likely 
(OR=0.73***) to have the propensity to serve compared to those enrolled in non-
college preparatory classes.    
Region of Country and Urbanicity 
     Model 5 of Table 4.1 adds a few additional control variables such as where the 
respondent grew up and the school region of the respondent.  Results from this 
model indicate that the odds of having the propensity to serve from those who 
grew up in the southern region of the country is about one and a half times greater 
(OR=1.43***) than those in other regions of the country, which is statistically 
significant.  Additional significance is indicated for those youth who grow up in a 
suburb of a large city or very large city.  Youth who grow up in these areas are 
about one quarter less likely (OR=0.81**) to have the propensity to serve 
compared to those growing up on a farm or in the country.  These results are 
consistent with earlier research suggesting that more advantaged youth who are 





Additional Pathways to Adulthood 
     Results from Model 6 of Table 4.1 reveal differences between those who 
expect to serve in the military compared to other alternatives a young man can 
choose from when deciding among the various pathways to adulthood.  As 
predicted in hypothesis 5a, those who expect to graduate from a 4-year college 
are about a third less likely (OR=0.68***) to expect to serve in the military.  
Interestingly, those expecting to graduate from a 2-year college or attend a 
vocational/technical school are significantly more likely (OR=1.15*** and 
OR=1.08* respectively) to have the propensity to serve in the military, which 
supports hypothesis 5b.  Consistent with earlier research (Bachman et al., 2001), 
these findings suggest that the military may be an attractive alternative for those 
who still desire to pursue higher levels of education after high school.   
     Results reported in Models 11 and 12 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction 
between race and ethnic groups and the expectation to graduate from a two-year 
college or attend a vocational/technical school.  Results reveal significant group 
differences in propensity between white and black men (OR=1.39***) and white 
and Hispanic men (OR=1.21*).  Figure 4.14 below reveals that both black and 
Hispanic men who expect to graduate from a two-year college are more likely to 
expect to serve than their white counterparts.  Similarly, Figure 4.15 below 
reveals that both black (OR=1.75***) and Hispanic men (OR=1.26*) who expect 
to attend vocational education are also more likely to expect to serve than their 






Chapter 5: Primary Analysis Discussion 
 
     My research on propensity is important in a few notable ways.  First, 
researchers have not conducted propensity research using MTF data since 1999 
(e.g. Segal et al. 1999).  Further, the last Youth Attitude Tracking Survey 
(YATS), which also measures enlistment propensity, was conducted in 1999.  As 
of yet, no additional research has been published on military propensity.  This is 
particularly noteworthy since enlistment propensity is likely to have changed as a 
result of the attacks on 9/11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Second, previous research on propensity has examined individual factors such as 
race, gender, SES, educational attainment and goals, region and type of residence, 
and various attitudes.  Some research has examined temporal trends based on the 
recruiting climate (e.g. Segal et al. 1999).  However, most propensity researchers 
have been unable to directly examine the relationship between propensity and 
various macro-social influences such as public support for war, casualties, and 
unemployment.  The post-9/11 era has served as a good natural experiment to 
examine how these particular macro influences may be related to individual levels 
of military propensity.  Third, by deeming these macro influences as proxy 
measures of motivations to serve, along with using prior research on individual 
attitudes, I am able to draw temporary conclusions about an individual’s 
motivation to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era without directly 
asking these questions.  Later in Chapter 8, I am able to test my temporary 
conclusions by creating an institutional/occupational index out of job-related 
attitudinal questions to examine the relationship between propensity and attitudes 
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toward work.  Last, my research compares military propensity with various other 
pathways to adulthood (e.g. 4- or 2-year college or vocational education), which 
will provide recruiters insight as to which avenues of higher education are more 
likely to be attractive to possible enlistees.            
     The overall decline in propensity to serve during the 1980s and 90s as depicted 
in Figure 4.1 may be a result of ideological and structural influences.  
Increasingly individualistic attitudes since the end of the draft era, increased 
desire and access to higher education, increased opportunities in the civilian labor 
force for minorities, reductions in the size of the military at the end of the Cold 
War, and changes within the military from executing traditional to nontraditional 
missions (e.g. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief) have undoubtedly 
contributed to this phenomenon (Segal et al., 1999).  Yet, the attacks on 9/11 may 
serve as a historical moment in time that could feasibly reverse this trend based on 
patriotic support for the cause.  Additional factors may also be influencing 
propensity after 9/11 such as U.S. casualties, especially during the height of the 
Iraqi insurgency (2004-2007), and unemployment rates, especially after the 
recession of 2008.  Indeed, Figure 4.1 reveals a reversal of the downward trend of 
military propensity from the previous two decades that is inconsistent with 
hypothesis 1a.  The institutional model of military service best explains the 
possible reasons for this reversal since service during wartime is considered to be 
a greater “calling” as Moskos (1977) defined the institutional military.  However, 
other more occupational motivations could also be at play during this era as a 
result of the influence of casualties and unemployment.  Since propensity declines 
 118 
as casualties increase, this suggests that more occupational motivations are at 
play.  Additionally, since propensity increases as unemployment increases, this 
also suggests that more occupational motivations may be influencing youth 
propensity. 
Public Support for War       
     Results indicate different impacts on military propensity based on the changing 
social, economic, and military operational context during the post-9/11 era.  The 
period immediately following the attacks on 9/11 (2003) was marked by high 
patriotic feelings and public support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  
Numerous public opinion surveys revealed that public support for the first year of 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars averaged approximately 85 and 75 percent 
respectively (Berinsky 2009).  The significant spike in propensity immediately 
following 9/11 (see Figure 4.1) suggests that institutional, “patriotic callings” to 
serve may have motivated more men to expect to serve during this time period.  
Surprisingly, findings do not support my prediction (hypothesis 1b) that 
propensity increases with an increase in public support for war throughout the 
entire duration of the post-9/11 era.  In fact, results indicate an overall negative 
relationship between propensity and public support for war.   
     There are a few possible explanations for findings contrary to my prediction.  
First, the fact that overall public support steadily declined shortly after the 
beginning of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and remained consistently low 
(below 40 percent after 2006), as depicted in Figure 5.1 below, may contribute to 
the results.  My measure of public support for war may not have enough variation 
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to accurately predict a true relationship with propensity over the entire period of 
analysis.  Second, it is possible that other sub-factors of casualties and the 
economy (as highlighted in the literature review), which are not specifically 
measured in my analysis, may have greater influence on propensity than public 
support for war, especially as war continues over an extended period of time.  
Nonetheless, it is particularly noteworthy to highlight the significant spike in 
propensity, which corresponds to high public support for war, immediately 
following the beginning of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  This result 
supports the notion that youth may have been motivated to serve in a similar 
“rally ‘round the flag,” patriotic fashion as Corporal Pat Tillman and Sergeant 
Jimmy Regan.       
 
     Third, propensity may not have a positive relationship with public support for 
war as predicted because the factors associated with propensity during wartime 
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may not correspond in the same direction or with the same magnitude as the 
factors associated with the public supporting war.  As noted earlier, scholars have 
argued for decades over the various factors associated with public support for 
war, yielding different results for the importance placed on these factors (Gelpi et 
al. 2006).  For example, it is possible that the most important factor associated 
with the public’s support for war in Iraq could have been the consensus among 
political elites, which initially was united, but then became strongly divided as the 
war continued (Berinsky 2009).  It is reasonable that elite differences in opinion 
may not have influenced propensity in the same manner as it would public 
support for war.  Similarly, it is possible that the public may have been most 
concerned with building a multinational coalition for supporting the war in Iraq, 
and thus, support dwindled after the U.S. conducted its unilateral invasion 
(Gershkoff and Kushner 2005).  However, youth may not have been as concerned 
with this particular factor when weighing the option of joining the military.  
Perhaps a combination of factors, to include those noted above and/or other 
factors such as an increase in casualties or the disagreement with the war’s 
objective, may have caused public support to decline, while propensity may not 
have responded to these factors in the same manner.  Unfortunately, my analysis 
is limited since I cannot fully tease out the actual reasons driving public support 
for war or the reasons driving youth propensity in great detail.  I can only examine 
the general relationship between public support for war and propensity, and from 
my analysis, that relationship appears to be negative during the post-9/11 era.   
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     My original assumption based on both prior research and intuition was that 
patriotism would be positively related to public support for war and public 
support for war would be positively related to propensity under the same patriotic 
rationale.  As noted, researchers have shown that other factors besides patriotism 
have been related to public support for war.  Indeed, at any given time, it may be 
the case that one factor is more important than others in driving public support for 
war.  Since results did not support my prediction throughout the duration of the 
post-9/11 era, it appears that other factors besides patriotism may have greater 
influence on public support for war at different times.  Thus, further analysis is 
warranted.   
     As mentioned earlier, public support for war may have initially tapped into the 
patriotic sentiments of Americans immediately following the 9/11 attacks.  This 
was certainly evidenced by the remarkably high display of flags after 9/11, 
considered by some as an expression of patriotism, and not nationalism (Skitka 
2005).  However, displaying the flag can have different meanings.  National polls 
indicated that the number of people who displayed flags dropped from about 80 
percent immediately after 9/11 to about 55 percent since the Iraq war began 
(Moore 2003).  One could speculate that what it meant to display the flag after the 
Iraq war began “may have shifted more toward the nationalistic end of the 
spectrum” (Skitka 2005:2008).  Similarly, public support for war may have 
initially been an expression of patriotic sentiments immediately following 9/11, 
but may have shifted toward more nationalistic sentiments as focus shifted from 
Afghanistan to Iraq and the public’s perception that Iraq was part of the “War on 
 122 
Terror” declined.  Indeed, no direct link between Iraq and terrorism was 
effectively established by the Bush administration as the Iraq war continued 
(Gershkoff and Kushner 2005).  Making things worse, the argument that Iraq was 
harboring weapons of mass destruction never came to fruition.  It is possible that 
the decline of public support for the Iraq War approximately a year after it began 
may have evidenced a shift from patriotic to nationalistic sentiment, a sentiment 
that fewer Americans were prepared to endorse unequivocally.  Thus, it is 
possible that nationalistic sentiments, more so than patriotism, drove public 
support for war soon after the Iraq War began.  It is also possible that public 
support for war was influenced by factors other than national attachment such as 
the war’s objective, elite consensus, or multilateralism.  Hence, public support for 
war may not be the best measure for tapping into the patriotic construct, 
especially throughout the entire post-9/11 era.    
     To examine this possible explanation further, I created an index of questions 
measuring nationalistic attitudes of youth that were only asked on Form 2 of the 
MTF survey.  While there is not a measure within the MTF dataset that directly 
taps into the patriotism construct that other researchers have conceptualized, there 
are questions examining attitudes on military values that are related to the concept 
of nationalism similar to those used in the scales developed by Kosterman and 
Feshbach (1989).  Using this index, I am able to directly examine the relationship 
between propensity and nationalism.  I am also able to indirectly examine the 
relationship between propensity and patriotism, as researchers have routinely 
shown a moderate correlation between patriotism and nationalism (e.g. 
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Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al. 1997; Skitka 2005; Federico et al. 
2005).      
     Although some researchers have argued that nationalism and patriotism are 
separate constructs of national attachment, research has also shown that they are 
moderately correlated (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al. 1997; 
Skitka 2005; Federico et al. 2005).  Since propensity is positively correlated with 
greater nationalistic attitudes, this suggests that propensity would also be 
positively correlated with patriotic attitudes.  The fact that my results indicate an 
overall negative relationship between public support for war and propensity 
suggests that public support for war may have been tapping into other attitudes 
besides nationalism or patriotism.  Indeed, if more patriotic sentiments of war 
support remained high throughout, it is likely that public support for war would 
have been positively correlated with youth propensity.  The overall decline in the 
nationalistic attitudes of all youth depicted in Figure 4.4 above supports the notion 
of a decline in public support for war resulting from a decline in either 
nationalistic or patriotic sentiment, or a decline in both.  
     It should be noted that this is not to imply that the public was any less patriotic 
because they did not support the war in Iraq soon after it began.  Indeed, some 
would argue that standing up for the beliefs that the war was unjust, too unilateral, 
or not worth the costs by not supporting the war could be considered patriotic in 
nature.  Certainly, this does not mean that people with these beliefs did not 
support our men and women in uniform any less.  The point is that propensity 
may not have been positively related to public support for war as I predicted 
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because the public’s originally patriotic support likely declined, and, thus, was not 
related to a youth’s patriotic calling to serve.  Indeed, Figure 4.14 above reveals 
that the nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity remained relatively 
steadfast throughout the post-9/11 era.  One could infer by this that the patriotic 
attitudes of youth with propensity also remained equally steadfast throughout, 
despite the decline in the public’s support for war.      
     Future research should continue to examine the various factors associated with 
public support for war, and how they relate to propensity as well as military 
enlistment.  In particular, researchers should examine the relationship between 
public support for war and patriotism, nationalism, or both.  Further, researchers 
should examine the relationship between propensity and patriotism, nationalism, 
or both.  Indeed, a great deal of research has already shown that one of the main 
reasons people join the military has been for patriotism and a desire to serve one’s 
country, which clearly lies within the institutional model of military service that 
Moskos (1977) formulated (to be discussed in greater detail later in Chapter 7).  
Some research (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000) has also shown a positive relationship 
between propensity and various nationalistic attitudes, although those attitudes 
were not framed under the “nationalism” concept.  My own research addresses 
these relationships (i.e. propensity, nationalism, and patriotism) in part.  Future 
researchers could also examine how the various forms and frequency of patriotic 
behavior are related to propensity.  For instance, how is flag-displaying behavior, 
various pop culture events (e.g. country music songs like “I’m Proud to be an 
American” or “American Soldier;” Hollywood movies like “United 93” or “Zero 
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Dark Thirty;” spotlights on the military by professional sports teams; or memorial 
tributes such as the “Tunnel to Towers” run and the “Lead the Way” run), as well 
as the media’s attention (positive or negative) on the military related to 
propensity? 
     It may be that public support for war is only positively related to propensity 
during certain periods marked by high patriotic sentiment, like during what 
Mueller (1970) described as “rally points” in which people ‘rally ‘round the flag” 
showing spontaneous support for the President in times of crisis.  Mueller used 
the term “rally ‘round the flag” in his research to help explain the phenomenon in 
which presidents tend to experience short-term boosts in popularity after 
international crises, or “rally points.”  As Kenneth Waltz has observed, “In the 
face of such an event, the people rally behind their chief executive” (1967:272).  
According to Mueller, the concept of a rally point generally must be associated 
with an event which 1) is international; 2) involves the United States and the 
President directly; and 3) must be specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.  
Researchers should examine the relationship between presidential approval 
ratings and propensity, using Mueller’s methods described in his  “rally ‘round 
the flag” concept.  My own preliminary research, using Gallup Poll data, reveals a 
positive relationship between presidential approval ratings and propensity during 
the post-9/11 era, although results are only significant at the p=.10 level (Gallup 
2015c).  Although my analysis does not address the various “rally points” 
throughout the entire period, the period immediately following 9/11 does show 
support for the “rally ‘round the flag” concept.   
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     After additional analysis, my revised hypothesis is that propensity and public 
support for war will be positively related to each other during periods of high 
patriotic sentiment when public support for war is highly related to patriotism.  
These periods are likely to occur immediately following an attack on our own 
soil, immediately entering a war that is deemed morally just, or during other 
“rally ‘round the flag” points such as significant changes in military missions (e.g. 
surge of troops in Iraq or Afghanistan), amidst significant threats (e.g. the ISIS 
attacks on Paris), or significant successes (e.g. the killing of Osama Bin Laden).  
To the extent that these rally points relate to propensity for a particular class of 
high school seniors, may be difficult to fine-tune since they are often fleeting 
moments that may not leave a lasting impression on youth as they decide on a 
pathway to adulthood.  Of course, various factors such as media coverage, elite 
rhetoric, and political consensus are likely to influence these moments as well.  
Nevertheless, I believe that when public support is most importantly related to 
patriotism, propensity will be positively related to public support for war.  On the 
other hand, when public support is not as related to patriotism (or nationalism for 
that matter) as other factors, propensity may be negatively related to public 
support for war. 
     In sum, there are a few things to reinforce from my analysis on the relationship 
between public support for war and propensity.  First, propensity and public 
support for war are positively related to each other immediately following the 
attacks of 9/11 (2002-2003).  This finding supports Mueller’s “rally ‘round-the-
flag” concept.  Second, throughout the entire post-9/11 era, propensity is 
 127 
negatively related to public support for war.  This suggests that various other 
factors associated with public support for war may not influence propensity in the 
same manner.  My original prediction was fairly simple, but public support for 
war may be more complex.  Thus, its relationship with propensity would be 
expected to be more complex as well.  If public support for war is associated with 
patriotic fervor, it is likely that propensity will be positively associated with 
public support, as my results clearly show following the attacks of 9/11.  If public 
support for war is based on other factors of importance (e.g. the war’s objective, 
multilateralism, elite consensus, or casualties), propensity may not be positively 
related.  Future research should examine these hypotheses further.  Third, my 
research suggests that youth with greater nationalistic attitudes are more likely to 
have the propensity to serve.  Since nationalistic attitudes are positively related to 
patriotic attitudes, it is reasonable that patriotic attitudes are also positively 
associated with propensity, which is consistent with prior research examining 
motivations to serve.  Certainly, volunteering to serve during wartime could be 
considered to be the ultimate display of “love of one’s country-” a common 
definition of patriotism.  
     It follows that institutional orientations appear to be relatively high among 
youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era, given their strong sense of 
national attachment (i.e. patriotic, nationalistic, or some form of both).  In his 
address to the American Legion while running for President against Dwight 
Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson’s (1952) conceptualization of patriotism after the 
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World War II period seems to endure during the post-9/11 era for youth with the 
propensity to serve:  
“What do we mean by patriotism in the context of our times?  I 
venture to suggest that what we mean is a sense of national 
responsibility…a patriotism that puts country ahead of self; a 
patriotism which is not short, frenzied outburst of emotion, but the 
tranquil and steady dedication of a lifetime.  The dedication of a 
lifetime- these are words that are easy to utter, but this is a mighty 
assignment.  Men who have offered their lives for their country 
know that patriotism is not the fear of something; it is the love of 
something.”   
 
It appears that youth with propensity remain steadfast and loyal to their nation 
with a patriotic fervor and desire to serve for a greater cause (i.e. “national 
responsibility”) during the difficult times of the post-9/11 era.  As war continues 
amidst new threats, it is important that we continue to try to tap into the 
underlying motivations of youth who expect to serve.  It is my belief that 
patriotism will remain a major factor of influence.  
Casualties 
     The period at the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2007), marked by an 
increase in U.S. combat deaths, appears to have had a negative influence on 
propensity.  Casualties in Iraq at this time were about 75% higher than during 
other years of the war (see Figure 5.2 below).  Portrayals by the media during this 
period conveyed a message to the public that the U.S. military was losing the war 
in Iraq and support quickly dropped (Berinsky 2009).  This negative attention, 
highlighted by an increase in combat deaths, is likely to have significantly 
influenced propensity in the negative direction during this period.  Indeed, results 
indicate that casualties are negatively related to military propensity during the 
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post-9/11 era, which supports hypothesis 1c.  This is consistent with more 
occupational motivations of service among potential recruits, as the benefits of 
service may no longer outweigh the costs associated with combat for some 
individuals.  The decline in propensity in relation to higher casualties suggests 
that youth with more occupational orientations toward service may have been 
dissuaded from military service.  Put another way, those youth with propensity 
during the post-9/11 era may have more institutional callings to serve amidst 
higher casualties.   
  
     These results are not surprising considering the extensive amount of research 
conducted on the casualty phenomenon since the Vietnam War, the last major war 
period during the AVF.  Certainly it is reasonable to accept that propensity could 
be negatively influenced by an increase in casualties.  However, as noted earlier, 
related research on public support and casualties suggests that the relationship 
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between the two is mediated by additional factors.  Inasmuch as one is willing to 
accept that public support and propensity are related, the same could hold true for 
the relationship between propensity and casualties.  This is worthy of additional 
analysis below.  
     Gelpi and his colleagues (2006) found that the public’s tolerance toward 
increased casualties is higher when two factors are present: 1) the belief that the 
war is waged for a just cause, and 2) the belief that the U.S. will be successful in 
the future conduct of the war.  If both conditions are met, with primary 
importance placed on the latter, public support for war will remain high despite an 
increase in U.S. casualties.  Taking their argument into consideration since it is 
most recent in the literature, and perhaps, a more interesting debate, Table 5.1 
below depicts the public’s belief in the United States’ eventual success during the 
Iraq War- the most important factor in their argument.  The table reveals that the 
public’s perception of future success considerably declined between 2004-2007.  
Scanning numerous public opinion polls using “Polling Report.com,” I 
determined which polls most accurately and routinely assessed public opinion 
toward success in Iraq, which was the primary war on the minds of most 
Americans and produced the largest amount of casualties.  Table 5.1 below 
depicts four public opinion polls regarding the public’s perception that the U.S. 
would be successful in Iraq (Polling Report 2015a; 2015b).  Most polls were 
conducted multiple times throughout a year, so I took the average to determine the 
public’s perception of success for a particular year.  An example poll question 
from the USA Today/Gallup Poll routinely asked the question between 2005-
 131 
2007: “Which comes closer to your view about the war in Iraq?  You think the 
U.S. will definitely win the war in Iraq.  You think the U.S. will probably win the 
war in Iraq.  You think the U.S. can win in Iraq, but you don’t think it will win.  
OR, You do not think the U.S. can win the war in Iraq.”  Similar questions were 
asked routinely for the additional three polls I selected.  The last “total” column in 
Table 5.1 is an overall average of the four polls for each year.  
     Generally speaking, the table reveals that the public had fairly optimistic 
attitudes toward future success in Iraq (54 percent) about a year after the invasion.  
Soon thereafter, however, polls indicate that the public’s belief of future success 
in Iraq reversed trends.  From 2004 to 2007, the public’s overall belief in future 
success dropped from 54.3 percent to 35.8 percent, while the belief that the U.S. 
would not be successful in Iraq increased from 27.7 to 56.2 percent.  Additionally, 
a CBS News Poll conducted routinely between 2003-2007 (not included in Table 
5.1) revealed that the majority of respondents did not believe that “the United 
States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq” (Polling Report 
2015b).  These trends in opinion continued to increase as the Iraq War continued.  
Of note, this was the other factor that Gelpi and his colleagues’ (2006) identified 
as key to contributing to the public’s ability to tolerate casualties.  
Source: Polling Report 2015a; 2015b      
     Together, both the public’s belief that the United States did the right thing in 
taking military action against Iraq and the likelihood that the U.S. would succeed 
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in Iraq in the future dropped after the initial stages of the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars.  Taking Gelpi and his colleagues’ most recent argument into consideration, 
it follows that public support for war would drop in response to an increase in 
casualties.  Indeed, public support for war dropped precipitously after initially 
high levels, especially for the Iraq war as the Iraqi insurgency grew and U.S. 
casualties mounted (Berinsky 2009; Gallup 2015a; 2015b).  Insomuch as 
propensity and public support are related, it follows that propensity would 
similarly decline as casualties increased.  Indeed, results from my research reveal 
a corresponding decline in propensity as casualties increase.        
     The analysis above supports the notion that military propensity may be related 
to casualties in a similar fashion as public support for war is related to casualties.  
Unfortunately, available poll questions only primarily captured public opinion 
about the expectation of future success in Iraq between 2004-2007.  Due to the 
limited polling data available, I am unable to fully examine the unique 
relationship between propensity and casualties in the same nuanced manner as 
Gelpi and his colleagues.  Indeed, their analysis was more precise using monthly 
polling data and casualty reports whereas I am limited to examining aggregate 
data to determine the impacts to propensity annually.  Although their research 
methods do not fully match up with mine, the logic remains the same and serves 
well for comparison sake. 
     My research contributes indirectly to the considerable amount of research on 
the casualty hypothesis, including Gelpi and colleagues’ recent study, showing 
that propensity declines as casualties increase.  Further, it extends research on 
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propensity by examining the relationship to casualties as one of the primary 
independent variables.  In this particular analysis, it also indirectly examines the 
relationship between propensity and public support for war.  From my results, one 
could certainly make the leap that propensity and public support for war are 
related.  However, it must be noted that propensity and public support are not 
entirely the same.  Indeed, the willingness to actively serve during war is more 
costly than supporting war.  It is reasonable to accept that propensity would be 
less elastic to an increase in casualties compared to public support.  Future 
research should examine these potential differences.  Nevertheless, data from my 
research suggests that casualties have a similar influence on propensity as have 
been shown on public support for war.   
     While propensity and public support for war are not one and the same (as has 
been shown earlier by my own research), their relationship to casualties appears 
to be similar.  At least with respect to how the public’s belief in the future success 
of war and that the war is just are related to casualties.  Future research should 
examine those factors of high importance with respect to public support for war 
and casualties and determine how they influence the relationship between 
propensity and casualties.  For example, the belief that terrorism was the principle 
policy objective of the Iraq war (Jentleson 1992), the perceived domestic elite 
consensus of support for war (Larson 1996), and the belief that U.N. support and 
a coalition was needed to fight the wars (Kull and Destler 1999) may all mediate 
the influence of casualties on propensity.  Unfortunately, MTF data does not ask 
these types of questions.  Most poll questions do not routinely ask these types of 
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questions either.  However, it is well known that support for the Iraq war was 
politically divided between elites soon after the initial invasion (Berinsky 2009).  
It is reasonable that this lack of consensus between political elites could also 
contribute to a decline in propensity in response to greater casualties.  
Additionally, there certainly are a good number of people who believe that we 
should not have invaded Iraq unilaterally.  Future researchers should examine 
these factors with respect to the relationship between casualties and propensity, 
especially as we vary our missions from combat to train, advise, and assist in 
Afghanistan, and we consider increasing our combat mission against ISIS in Iraq 
and Syria.  It will be interesting to examine how these changes in missions 
influence propensity amidst possible U.S. casualties.    
Unemployment 
     The period following the great economic recession of 2008 (2009-2012) 
marked a significant spike in overall youth propensity to serve in the military (See 
Figure 4.2).  This period was marked by significant instability in the economy and 
the labor force.  Overall unemployment rates rose from about 5% to over 9% 
during this period and never fully recovered (See Figure 5.3 below).  
Additionally, the unemployment rate of young adults ages 16-24 years also rose 
substantially during this period (Department of Labor 2015).  Even those with a 
college degree found it harder to find a job after graduation.  Further, the 
unemployment rate for young minorities was higher than for white youth.  
Overall, results indicate that unemployment is positively related to propensity 
during the post-9/11 era.  In other words, the propensity to serve increases as the 
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unemployment rates increase.  This suggests that the military may have been 
viewed as a more viable work environment, in the true occupational sense, for 
economic and stability reasons.  These are particularly noteworthy findings, as 
they do not support my hypothesis 1d, suggesting that youth may perceive the 
benefits of military service to be great enough during periods of economic 
instability despite the costs associated with wartime.   
     Findings support earlier related research on the relationship between 
propensity and unemployment (e.g. Segal et al. 1999; DoD 2000) and between 
actual enlistment and unemployment (e.g. Dale and Gilroy 1984).  However, it is 
noteworthy that previous studies could not fully take into consideration the impact 
of unemployment on propensity during wartime.  Surprisingly, it appears that the 
negative aspects of war do not dissuade youth from the benefits of service during 
a bad economy so that propensity remains positively related to higher 
unemployment rates.  This also suggests that soldiers exhibit some occupational 
orientations during the post-9/11 era.   
     The National Priorities Project conducted a recent study in 2010 analyzing the 
correlation between unemployment and military recruitment.  Although the 
researchers did not find a strong statistical connection between unemployment 
and recruitment rates across counties throughout the U.S., they did note that other 
factors support recruiters’ assertions that the poor economy after the recession of 
2008 has driven many candidates to seek out the armed forces as a career choice 
(National Priorities Project 2011).  For example, in FY 2008, the Army only 
exceeded its recruiting goal by one percent.  During FY 2009, however, the Army 
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exceeded its recruitment goal by 8 percent, signing about 5,000 more recruits than 
its 65,000 benchmark (Moore 2012).  Interestingly, as a result of the influx of 
recruits, the Army was able to be more stringent in its recruit selection thereby 
increasing the overall quality of recruits.  This suggests that a bad economy may 
be related to higher quality youth with the propensity to serve.  Indeed, some of 
these recruits have been college graduates who have found it increasingly more 
difficult to find a job after graduation and repay student loans (National Priorities 
2011; Moore 2012).   
     Of course it must be noted that this period also encompassed greater success in 
Iraq and Afghanistan with the surge of U.S. forces in 2008 and 2010 respectively.  
During this time, U.S. casualties significantly decreased relative to earlier years of 
the wars (See Figure 5.2).  These factors could also be contributing to an increase 
in youth propensity, as youth may have become less concerned about the risks 
associated with the wars and more concerned about finding a job amidst a 
stagnant economy.  Indeed, an interaction between casualties and unemployment 
highlighted earlier in Figure 4.9 supports this notion, indicating that as casualties 
increase, unemployment has a greater negative effect on propensity.  In contrast, 
as casualties decrease, unemployment has a greater positive effect on propensity.  
On average, the predicted probability of serving is about 12 percent lower when 
the unemployment rate is nine percent and casualties are about 900 compared to 
the same unemployment rate when there are 200 casualties.  A recent study 
conducted by RAND Corporation examining insights from Army recruits also 
supports this assertion, finding that recruits report becoming less concerned with 
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the risks of war and more concerned with poor civilian job opportunities (Rostker 
et al. 2014).  This is also consistent with occupational orientations of service, as 
the benefits of service, especially during periods of high economic instability, 
appear to only outweigh the costs of service when those costs are low.  My results 
suggest that casualties may be the primary factor of importance influencing 
propensity as opposed to unemployment.         
     Particularly interesting for comparison sake is the fact that there was a 
significant negative correlation between unemployment and propensity during the 
other period marked by sustained war during the AVF- the Gulf War period 
(between MTF surveys 1991-1993).  During this timeframe, overall 
unemployment rates rose from 5.6 percent to 7.5 percent, yet propensity 
significantly declined (Department of Labor 2015).  These results appear to 
contradict my findings during the post-9/11 era, suggesting that the negative 
aspects of the economy reflected by higher unemployment rates were less 
influential on propensity compared to the negative aspects of the threat of going 
to war.  Of course, this analysis is during a very short period of war, where 
unemployment only rose about half as much as it did during the post-9/11 era.  
Perhaps other factors, such as the unpopularity of the Gulf war or the downsizing 
of the military that occurred afterwards, during President Clinton’s 
administration, negatively influenced propensity despite rising unemployment 
rates (Segal et al. 1999).  Although casualties were relatively low during the Gulf 
War, it is possible that the risk of high casualties during a major conventional type 
of war, with the possibility of the use of biological weapons by Saddam’s regime, 
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may have also negatively influenced propensity.  Nevertheless, this period serves 
as the best way to directly compare the relationship between unemployment and 
propensity during wartime since the AVF began.  My data suggests that 
unemployment is positively related to propensity, yet that relationship may be 
mediated by the impact of casualties.     
     Further research should continue to examine the relationship between 
propensity and unemployment, especially during wartime.  As the military 
continues its “train, advise, and assist” combat mission in Afghanistan, and 
perhaps expands its mission against ISIS, it is likely that continued research on 
the impacts of war will be fruitful in the near future.  Additionally, unemployment 
rates have started to decline back to pre-recession levels in 2014 and 2015 
(Department of Labor 2015).  It would be interesting to see how propensity has 
responded to these recent changes and into the future.         
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Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status 
     Researchers have long been interested in the relationships between propensity 
and race, ethnicity, and class.  I set out to examine how these relationships might 
have changed as a result of war and an unstable economy during the post-9/11 
era.  Consistent with earlier research, results from the analysis of the MTF dataset 
during the post-9/11 era indicate that black and Hispanic men still have a 
proportionately significantly higher propensity to serve compared to their white 
counterparts.  These findings suggest that the military may still be perceived as a 
“bridging” environment in this era for less-advantaged individuals to acquire 
human, social, and cultural capital from training and experiences during military 
service.  The occupational model of military service best explains these 
motivations for service.  Indeed, minorities still have less advantage overall 
compared to their white counterparts with respect to status, earnings, 
opportunities for education, and family structure (Kleykamp 2009). 
     After controlling for socioeconomic status, however, results indicate that black 
men are actually no more likely than white men to have the propensity to serve 
during this era.  Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, it appears that SES is the 
significant factor related to propensity, as opposed to race.  Interestingly, these 
findings are not consistent with earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al. 1998, 2000; 
Dale and Gilroy, 1984; Hosek and Peterson, 1985; Kilburn, 1992; Kilburn and 
Klerman, 1999; Mare and Winship, 1984; Murray and McDonald, 1999; 
Teachman et al. 1993) which found that, after controlling for a host of other 
factors (e.g. demographic, economic, and attitudinal), blacks still had a higher 
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propensity to serve compared to whites.  The fact that SES is a significant 
predictor of propensity is consistent with recent research (e.g. Lutz 2008), but 
does not completely tell the story since Hispanics still have a higher propensity 
than whites even after controlling for SES.  Possible reasons for Hispanics having 
greater propensity even after controlling for SES will be discussed later in the 
discussion.     
     Although black propensity remains higher than whites or Hispanics during the 
post-9/11 era, the gap between black and white propensity has decreased 
compared to earlier years as predicted in hypothesis 4a (see Figure 4.11).  This 
suggests that youth with more occupational motivations to serve may no longer 
expect to do so during wartime.  Results of the relationship between black 
propensity and various factors such as casualties and unemployment support this 
notion as well.          
     The interaction between racial and ethnic groups and casualties during the 
post-9/11 era reflects a significant difference in the negative relationship between 
casualties and black propensity compared to white and Hispanic youth.  As 
casualties increase, black propensity declines at a significantly greater rate than 
white or Hispanic propensity as depicted in Figure 4.7.  This suggests that 
casualties may have more of a negative influence for black men compared to 
others, which is more in accord with occupational orientations of service.  This 
finding is consistent with findings from the Youth Attitude Tracking Study which 
found that black youth are more likely to mention “threat to life” or to say that 
“killing is against their beliefs” as reasons for not joining the military (DoD 
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2000).  Indeed, my research suggests that some black youth may be dissuaded 
from service as a result of higher casualties during war.  
     An interaction between racial and ethnic groups and unemployment during the 
post-9/11 era reflects a significant increase in the positive relationship between 
unemployment and black propensity compared to white and Hispanic youth.  As 
unemployment increases, black propensity increases at a significantly greater rate 
than white or Hispanic propensity as depicted in Figure 4.8.  This suggests that 
some black men may be more positively influenced to serve by a reduction of 
available opportunities in the labor market, which is consistent with occupational 
motivations of service.  As highlighted earlier, black youth unemployment rates 
between the ages of 16-24 years was approximately 10-15 percent higher than for 
white youth during this era, perhaps exacerbating the relationship between 
unemployment and propensity for black youth (Ramos-Chapman 2010; 
Department of Labor 2012).  Black youth had the highest unemployment rates, 
followed closely by Hispanics, then whites.  Since I used the overall 
unemployment rate as my measure for analysis, it is likely that unemployment 
influenced minority youth more than my estimates predict, as the conditions in the 
labor market were markedly worse for minorities compared to their white youth 
counterparts.   
     The fact that black youth may be more occupationally motivated does not 
necessarily mean that something is wrong.  That a young man is concerned about 
pay, benefits, and the well being of his family does not mean that he is a bad 
soldier.  It appears that minorities, especially blacks, are active agents who are in 
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control of determining their best pathway to adulthood.  Indeed, the military’s 
ability to increase human capital through job training, pay and benefits, and 
education assistance, which might not otherwise be available, may still present an 
attractive option for minorities despite it being a time of increased risk due to war.  
Military service during the post-9/11 era could certainly be viewed as a way for 
youth from disadvantaged circumstances to make a “turning point” in their career 
trajectories (Elder 1986; Sampson and Laub 1996).                  
     The fact that black propensity has declined during the post-9/11 era at a 
significantly steeper rate than whites suggests a few other possible influences.  
Increased opportunities for blacks continue to emerge in the civilian labor force as 
a result of equal opportunity and affirmative action programs.  These structural 
changes have likely contributed to the overall decline in black youth propensity to 
serve as more opportunities for mobility are offered elsewhere.  However, the 
effects of combat and changes in the operational environment may have also 
influenced blacks more than whites compared to earlier years.  In other words, the 
pros versus cons of military service during the post-9/11 era may have altered the 
“battlefield” for some individuals more than others.  For instance, blacks who are 
predominantly in administrative and logistical roles are now in direct combat 
situations more than ever before.  The increased risk of harm could dissuade those 
youth who seek to join the military for occupational reasons versus institutional 
reasons.  Results from the interaction between race and casualty data support this 
notion.  I must reemphasize that black youth still continue to have a 
proportionately higher average propensity compared to whites during this period 
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of increased risk, although it appears that may be due to SES differences.  The 
sharper decline in black propensity during this era warrants further discussion on 
occupational motivations.  Since the “battlefield” has changed, the pros of 
military service may no longer outweigh the cons.  Those who serve for more 
occupational reasons may seek to find opportunities elsewhere, besides the 
military, especially during combat situations.   
     Another possible influence contributing to the decline in black propensity 
during this era compared to earlier years is the increase in combat jobs (e.g. 
infantry, armor, aviation, and special forces).  In 2004, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld approved an increase in the number of active Brigade Combat Teams 
from 33 to 43 as part of the “Army Transformation” plan that was implemented as 
a result of the war on terror (Global Security 2015).  Brigade Combat Teams 
(approximately 3000 soldiers) are primarily composed of combat specialties.  As 
more combat jobs have been made available during this era, potential black 
candidates may not have been as attracted to these specialties as much as white or 
Hispanic recruits, who typically volunteer for these types of jobs (Segal and Segal 
2004; Kleykamp 2009).  Given the expansion of combat jobs, it is possible that 
recruiters may have targeted more non-black audiences.  There also could be the 
possibility of discrimination among the ranks of these combat jobs, which 
dissuades blacks from joining these specialties.  Further analysis of these 
particular dynamics is needed to determine additional structural constraints within 
the military organization that could be influencing the propensity to serve among 
various racial and ethnic groups.   
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     It should be highlighted that there was not as significant a decline in black 
propensity during the post-9/11 era compared to the Gulf War period (1990-1991) 
as depicted in Figure 4.11.  Previous findings (Segal et al. 1999) noted that black 
propensity declined precipitously about 20% during the Gulf War period and 
never recovered.  In contrast, black propensity essentially remained the same as 
earlier years immediately following 9/11 and only declined about 8% at its lowest 
point in 2007, and then quickly recovered during the recession period.  These 
findings suggest that there may have been more support within the black 
community for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq compared to the Gulf War.  Of 
note, there was no Hispanic designation within the MTF dataset until 2005 
(restricted access only), so I am unable to directly compare Hispanic propensity 
during the Gulf War timeframe with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  
However, Segal and his colleagues (1999) noted a slight increase in Hispanic 
propensity during this period.        
     A potential explanation for the differences in black propensity between the 
Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could be the perceived unfair 
treatment of black soldiers during Vietnam.  One should remember that some 
made allegations that black soldiers were used as “cannon fodder” during the 
Vietnam era (Armor 1996).  That is, they believed that the draft during the 
Vietnam War was essentially a “poor man’s draft” where black and poor soldiers 
made up a large portion of the troops since they could not defer military service 
because of college enrollment.  Further, soldiers with lower Armed Forces 
Qualification Test scores did not have much of a choice on which military 
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occupational specialty to choose (Gimbel and Booth 1996).  Thus, some argued 
that black soldiers, with lower scores, were placed into combat positions on the 
front lines, in more harms way than white soldiers.  As a result, black soldiers 
made up a large and disproportionate amount of the casualties during the war 
(Armor 1996; Lucks 2014), although there is still debate on the point of the 
disproportionality of black casualties compared to whites (D. Segal conversation 
2016).  Regardless, it is possible that these sentiments would still resonate within 
the black community, resulting in a reduction of black recruits during wartime 
because of the perceived unfair treatment during Vietnam a generation earlier.  
Indeed, the civil rights movement was closely linked to the anti-war movement 
(D. Segal conversation 2016).  However, data from my research does not support 
this notion since black propensity does not decline nearly as much during the 
post-9/11 era.  Indeed, soldiers of this generation are volunteers who willingly 
enlist to serve in harms way during wartime.  Further, it is likely that black youth, 
and all youth for that matter, “rallied around the flag” more from the attacks of 
9/11 than they did during the Gulf War. 
     Hispanic men have a significantly higher propensity to serve compared to their 
white counterparts, even after controlling for SES and additional factors.  This 
suggests that there may be more institutional motivations to serve among this 
group.  Factors such as increased recruiting efforts toward the Hispanic 
population and greater communal support for the military may be influencing 
Hispanic propensity as well.  Additionally, it is possible that Hispanics have a 
strong desire to serve their country during this critical time of war as a way to 
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fulfill their sense of citizenship, regardless of their actual legal status.  This is 
certainly plausible given the increased political and social debate concerning 
border security and illegal immigration issues since the attacks of 9/11.  A recent 
study by Dempsey and Shapiro supports this notion finding that a rather large 
proportion (60 percent) of the Hispanic population in the Army is comprised of 
immigrants or the children of immigrants.  Of note, there were 1188 respondents 
of all ranks (excluding E-9 and O-7 and above) in the overall sample with 397 
Hispanic respondents.  Indeed, in 2002, President Bush used his authority under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act to expedite the citizenship of non-citizens 
who had been serving honorably in the military since 9/11 (Lutz 2008).  This 
could have been motivation for Hispanics to serve.  Overall initiatives have 
proven successful and popular among service members.  Between September 
2002 and June 2013, 89,095 noncitizen members of the U.S. armed forces have 
become citizens.  Interestingly, 10,719 of these naturalizations occurred at U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration naturalization ceremonies in 28 different countries, 
including Afghanistan and Iraq (Barry 2013).  
     Dempsey and Shapiro also found that the main reasons Hispanics gave for 
joining the Army were not primarily economic.  In fact, they cited “Desire to 
serve my country” (23%) as the highest reason (Dempsey and Shapiro 2009).  
Additional research has shown that one of the reasons Hispanics have been 
overrepresented in the Marine Corps is a result of how well the institutional 
nature of the service has intermeshed with the individual values of Hispanics (De 
Angelis 2012).  Findings from my research also suggest that something other than 
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economic reasons may be motivating more Hispanics to serve during the post-
9/11 era.  Unfortunately, the MTF dataset does not specify the various Hispanic 
ethnicities (e.g. Mexican, Puerto Rican, Dominican, etc.).  Thus, I am unable to 
discern differences in propensity and motivations between various Latino 
ethnicities unlike recent researchers (e.g. Lutz 2008).  More research must be 
done to better determine motivations to serve among all young men, regardless of 
race and ethnic background.  I attempt to tease out these motivations later in 
Chapter 7. 
Additional Pathways to Adulthood 
     Ruling out the college-bound as potential recruits for the military should not 
necessarily be the standard.  Research has shown that when a young man says he 
expects “definitely” to do both (i.e. graduate college and join the military), the 
odds are that he will (Bachman et al. 2001).  In particular, the features of two-year 
students suggest that this population of the college market may have significant 
enlistment potential.  Nearly half of the increase in college enrollment between 
1980 and 1994 was attributable to the increase in attendance at two-year colleges.  
Although two-year colleges were thought by some to prepare students to transfer 
to a four-year institution to obtain a bachelor’s degree, less than 15 percent of 
two-year entrants actually receive bachelor’s degrees.  Additionally, dropout rates 
are high among two-year students and only about half of these students ever attain 
a postsecondary degree at all (Kilburn and Asch 2003).  The high dropout rate, 
part-time enrollment rate, and the low transfer rate to four-year colleges suggest 
that these students may be more ambivalent to postsecondary school activity, and 
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that they may be “trying out” school to determine if they are actually “college 
material” (Kilburn and Asch 2003).  These types of young men may be lucrative 
targets for military recruiters who are competing for the best and brightest in the 
civilian market.    
     My research finds that those who say they are likely to graduate from a two-
year college also have positive military intentions, which is consistent with earlier 
research (Kilburn and Asch 2003).  In other words, those with interest in the 
military see themselves primarily as two-year college material.  However, those 
who plan to graduate from a 4-year college are about a third less likely to expect 
to join the military.  These findings suggest that recruiting policies that allow 
youth to combine college- especially two-year college- and military service are 
likely to be attractive to those with the propensity to serve in the armed forces.  
Given the interest in college among those who are also interested in the military, 
it is assuring to know that the current educational benefits, provided from the 
Post-9/11 Bill and the College Fund, already provide veterans with the ability to 
cover tuition costs at public institutions (Kilburn and Asch 2003).  The Post-9/11 
Bill has also included extended benefits that enable transferring to a spouse or 
child- an even better incentive package for potential military recruits.  With 
increased discussions of continuing defense budget cuts, my research suggests 
that policy makers should strongly consider retaining the benefits of the Post-9/11 
Bill to continue to attract high quality recruits.    
     My research also finds a significant positive relationship between those who 
expect to attend vocational training and those who expect to enlist.  This could 
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further enhance recruitment practices, especially as the military becomes more 
technically advanced.  Those who desire to gain a specific skillset or trade may 
find better opportunities through on-the-job training in the military with direct pay 
benefits and other opportunities to enhance their resumes.  
     Not surprisingly, there are significant racial and ethnic group differences with 
respect to those youth with propensity who also expect to graduate from a two-
year college or attend vocational training as depicted earlier in Figures 4.13 and 
4.14 respectively.  This is particularly important for recruiters who target minority 
recruits.  Indeed, data suggests that recruiters could be effective at targeting two-
year colleges or vocational schools to attract young minority men into the 
military.       
Summary 
     My initial analysis examines various macro-social and individual factors that 
are associated with men’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era.  These are 
particularly unique findings as research has yet to fully uncover the various 
influences on youth propensity during wartime.      At the macro-social level, 
findings suggest that propensity is negatively related to public support for war, 
positively related to casualties, and positively related to unemployment.  An 
interaction between the influence of casualties and unemployment on propensity 
suggests that as unemployment increases, higher casualties have a greater 
negative effect on propensity.  On the other hand, as unemployment increases, 
lower casualties have a greater positive effect on propensity.  
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     Various individual and demographic influences are also related to youth 
propensity.  Findings indicate differences in propensity by racial and ethnic 
groups.  Black youth have the highest propensity, followed closely by Hispanic 
youth, then white youth.  After controlling for socioeconomic status, however, 
black and white youth are no different in their propensity to serve.  Hispanics 
continue to have a significantly higher propensity compared to their white 
counterparts after full controls.  Consistent with earlier research, youth with lower 
SES continue to have a greater propensity to serve.   
     Findings also suggest that there are racial and ethnic group differences in the 
relationship between various macro-social factors and propensity.  It appears that 
black youth propensity is more negatively influenced by an increase in casualties 
than white or Hispanic propensity.  Data suggests that Hispanic youth propensity 
is the least negatively impacted by a rise in casualties.  It also appears that black 
youth propensity is more positively influenced by an increase in unemployment 
compared to white or Hispanic propensity.  There are no significant racial 
differences in the relationship between public support for war and propensity.      
     Youth who have a higher G.P.A. or who are enrolled in college preparatory 
classes are significantly less likely to expect to serve.  Youth who expect to 
graduate from a 4-year college program are also significantly less likely to expect 
to serve.  On the other hand, youth who expect to graduate from a 2-year college 
or attend vocational education are significantly more likely to expect to serve.  
Additionally, Black and Hispanics are more likely than their white counterparts to 
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have propensity and expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend 
vocational schooling.   
     Similar to previous studies, youth who grow up in the South are significantly 
more likely to have the propensity to serve.  Additionally, youth who grow up in 
the suburbs of a large or very large city are significantly less likely to have 
propensity.   
     My initial research suggests that young men during the post-9/11 era appear to 
be institutionally oriented as a result of fairly high expectations to serve during 
wartime compared to previous decades of peace.  However, data also suggests 
that youth with propensity have a mixture of both institutional and occupational 
orientations as revealed by an increase in propensity after 9/11, a decrease in 
relation to increasing casualties, and an increase in relation to increasing 
unemployment.  These findings suggest that youth who expect to serve exhibit a 
form Segal (1986) referred to as “pragmatic professionalism”- where both 
institutional and occupational motivations coexist.  Additionally, it appears that 
young black men are more occupationally oriented than their white and Hispanic 
counterparts.  This is not necessarily surprising given the disadvantaged history of 
blacks in American society.  As mentioned earlier, I seek to further explore racial 
and ethnic group differences in motivations to serve later in Chapter 7.  There, I 
create an I/O index measure and employ additional institutional and occupational 
measures to compare group differences among those youth with the propensity to 
serve. 
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     In the following chapters, I explore additional factors that are associated with 
youth propensity during the post-9/11 era.  In Chapter 6, I examine the 
relationship between women’s propensity and the same factors analyzed for men 
in the previous chapters.  In Chapter 7, I examine the relationship between various 
political attitudes and propensity.  In Chapter 8, I explore institutional and 
occupational differences in youth propensity.  In chapters 9 and 10, I examine the 
relationship between propensity and gender role and racial attitudes respectively.  
I conclude my dissertation with a summary and final discussion in Chapter 11.       
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Chapter 6: Women’s Propensity to Serve  
During the Post-9/11 Era 
Background Information on Women’s Military Service 
     Women have participated in every American war throughout history, although 
official military roles for women were not established until after World War II in 
1948 (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  Despite being barred from service, some 
women disguised themselves as men and fought during the American Revolution, 
the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the U.S. Civil War.  Some served in 
noncombat positions such as nurses and spies, while others performed various 
other supporting roles such as cooking and laundry.  At the time, social norms in 
society regarded combat tasks as masculine in nature, whereas support tasks were 
viewed as more feminine.   
     The first official military role for women was as nurses during the Civil War.  
After these successful experiences, Congress formed the Army Nurse Corps in 
1901, providing a normative model for the incorporation of women’s labor into 
military operations (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  Although women were excluded 
from combat based on social norms and military policy, the feminine role as 
nurses became entrenched within the traditional masculine culture of war and 
combat.   
     Responding to the personnel needs during World War I, the U.S. employed 
more women in the military in nursing as well as additional support capacities.  
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps established women’s units in 1917 and 1918, 
respectively.  Uniformed women were granted military status and were employed 
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in support jobs that women normally occupied in civilian society, such as 
telephone operator and administrative clerk (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  Women 
were demobilized after the war, since there was no longer a requirement for 
additional support personnel.    
     World War II saw a significant shift in the nature of women’s military 
involvement as their roles expanded and participation increased.  Congress 
created separate women’s organizations in the military, even though their status 
was originally intended to be temporary in nature (e.g. Women’s Army Auxiliary 
Corps, later changed to Women’s Army Corps).  Notwithstanding the fact that 
most women were assigned to more traditional occupational specialties such as 
health care, administration, and communications, small numbers served in almost 
every capacity (e.g. airplane mechanics, parachute riggers, and weapons 
instructors) excluding direct combat specialties (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).   
      Despite negative stereotypes and some civilian opposition, women’s 
successful performance in military service during WWII paved the way for their 
permanent official acceptance in the military.  In 1948, the Women’s Armed 
Services Integration Act officially created a permanent place for women in the 
U.S. military.  However, women’s roles remained tightly constrained.  They could 
constitute no more than two percent of the force, they could not be permanently 
promoted above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (O-5), and they were 
barred from service aboard navy vessels (not including hospital ships and 
transports) and from service in aircraft on combat missions (Sandhoff and Segal 
2013).   
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     In 1967, Congress removed the two percent ceiling and the limits on women’s 
opportunities for promotion.  However, limits on their job opportunities remained.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, members of society challenged gender roles and 
norms with the emergence of a new feminist movement that broke down more 
barriers for women.  Women increasingly entered higher education and 
employment, including fields that men traditionally occupied, such as law 
enforcement, coal mining, science, medicine, and law (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  
In addition, women now had contraception to give them control over 
reproduction.  Women delayed marriage and childbearing, while dual-earning 
households became more common.  These changes in social norms were a prelude 
to more changes within the military structure during the 1970s.   
     The end of conscription in 1973, coupled with changes in social norms and 
gender roles, sparked women’s participation in the military to dramatically 
increase.  Facing personnel shortfalls with the end of the draft, the military 
opened more roles for women to fill the gaps.  In the wake of Congressional 
approval of the Equal Rights Amendment, the military began equalizing service 
opportunities.  Between 1974 and 1976, women became aviators in the Navy, 
Army, and Air Force.  In 1976, Congress also opened service academies to 
women, with the first female academy graduates in 1980.  Command positions 
also became available to women and automatic discharges for pregnancy ended.  
In 1978, women were allowed permanent assignment to noncombatant ships, and 
the navy initiated the “Women in Ships” program opening up additional positions 
for women (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  
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     Between 1971 and 1981, women’s participation in the military jumped from 
1.6 percent of the force to 8.9 percent.  Women have fluctuated between 10 and 
15 percent of military personnel throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Sandhoff and 
Segal 2013).  In 2011, women comprised 14.5 percent of the U.S. military, 7.3 
percent of general/flag officers, and 10.9 percent of the senior enlisted force.  That 
year, U.S. military policy removed almost all barriers for women to serve in 
positions except enlisted submarine jobs and offensive ground combat positions 
below the brigade level.  Almost 80 percent of active component positions were 
available to women, though with substantial variation by branch.  For purposes of 
comparison, in 1972, only 35 percent of all military enlisted jobs were open to 
women (Segal et al. 1998).  Currently, the Air Force is the most accessible for 
women with 99 percent of positions open for women and women compose 19 
percent of the Air Force.  The Marine Corps has remained most restrictive 
primarily due to its emphasis on ground combat and its reliance on the Navy for 
support services, to which women gravitate.  Only 68 percent of positions in the 
Marines are available to women, and women compose just 7 percent of the 
Marine Corps.  The Navy has 16.4 percent of women while the Army has 13.5 
percent women in the force (DoD 2012).  On February 9, 2012, the Department of 
Defense announced changes to its force structure that opened over fourteen 
thousand additional positions to women (e.g. women assigned to select positions 
in ground combat units at the battalion level), increasing positions open to women 
to 81 percent (DoD News Release No. 037-13).   
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     In January 2013, the Department of Defense officially rescinded the direct 
combat exclusion in place since 1994.  According to DoD, guidance was that the 
process of integration would follow “guiding principles developed by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff,” including “preserving unit readiness” and “validating 
occupational performance standards, both physical and mental, for all 
occupational specialties, specifically those that remain closed to women.”  For 
those “specialties open to women, the occupational performance standards must 
be gender-neutral” (DoD News Release No. 037-13).  After a thorough review of 
the services’ implementation plans for integration, in December of 2015, 
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter officially opened all combat jobs for women in 
all services, despite notable resistance within the Marine Corps (Seck 2015). 
     In sum, women’s roles and participation levels in the military have continued 
to increase over time as a result of various social and institutional factors to 
include but not limited to: manpower shortages within the military; an increase in 
women’s participation in the overall labor force; the overall delay of marriage and 
childbearing in society; a continual increase in the military’s occupational 
specialties available to women; and a widening acceptance and appreciation for 
women’s performances in the military (Segal 1995; Sandhoff and Segal 2013).   
Prior Research on Women’s Propensity to Serve  
     Women in the military have not been previously analyzed in most Monitoring 
the Future studies.  The rationale for excluding women from the analysis is 
sometimes that men constitute the prime recruiting market, that women’s 
propensity is too low to bother studying, or that the low overall amount of women 
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enlistees for follow-up samples would produce unreliable statistical analysis 
(Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 2000).  However, it is unlikely that the armed 
services would have been able to meet their recruitment goals in the All-
Volunteer Force without the increased enlistment of women (Binkin and Bach 
1977; Segal 1989; Segal and Segal 1991).      
     Previous research on women’s propensity to serve (Segal et al. 1998) was 
conducted after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  Utilizing initial and follow-up 
MTF surveys between 1976-1995, the authors split the sample into two groups 
(1976-1983 and 1984-1991) for analysis.  For both desires and expectations, men 
were considerably more likely to indicate high propensity for military service.  
Interestingly, women were more likely to indicate that they desired to serve rather 
than they expected to serve.  Additionally, of those high school senior women 
who indicated that they definitely expected to enlist, only 40 percent actually did 
so.  This is quite different than their male counterparts where 70 percent of those 
with high propensity actually enlisted.  In contrast to the findings for men, the 
majority of all accessions among women consisted of those in high school who 
expected that they would not serve.  Of note, having children did not explain the 
discrepancy between expectations to serve and actual enlistment.  Those women 
who expected to serve actually found themselves in college full-time or working 
full-time.   
     Previous research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; DoD 2000) examining predictors for 
women’s propensity to serve has focused on similar factors as for men such as 
social background, educational performance, and place of residence.  Propensity 
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was shown to be highest among black women, lowest among white women, and 
Hispanic women in between.  Similar to men, women from intact families were 
least likely to expect to serve in the military, as were women whose parents had a 
higher level of education.  Women from cities or suburban areas of metropolitan 
cities were less likely to expect to serve than those from rural areas or from 
nonmetropolitan cities and suburbs.  Like men, women from the northeast had the 
lowest military propensity.  However, among other regions, differences were not 
as marked as they were for men.  Those women with high grade point averages 
were less likely to expect to serve in the military as well.  In sum, the predictors 
for women’s propensity to serve were in the same direction as men, but with 
smaller magnitude, and propensity to serve remained the strongest predictor to 
actual enlistment, as was the case with men (Segal et al. 1998).   
Women’s Propensity to Serve During the Post-9/11 era  
     Research has yet to uncover the changing patterns of women’s propensity 
during the post-9/11 era.  My research seeks to determine what factors influence a 
young woman’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era.  I explore the same 
factors that I analyzed for men’s propensity earlier, and compare results against 
the results for men.  Although many factors should influence women’s propensity 
in the same manner as they do for men, there are still some gender-specific factors 
that are likely to only have influence on women.  
     There are many factors that could influence a woman’s propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era.  The following are factors that could positively influence 
women’s propensity:  
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1) Feelings of patriotism after the terrorist attacks on 9/11; 2) Recruiting efforts to 
fill personnel shortages has increased women’s participation and roles; 3) The 
contemporary operating environment and women’s success in combat; 4) The 
removal of institutional barriers such as the repeal of DADT and the lifting of the 
combat exclusion ban of women; 5) The media’s increasingly positive depiction 
of women in the military; 6) Continuing trends of women breaking down barriers 
in society; and 7) A lack of opportunities within the civilian labor market.  
     There are also factors that could negatively influence women’s propensity to 
include: 1) A threat to one’s life as a result of serving during combat; 2) 
Discrimination and harassment against women in the military; and 3) A lack of 
positive veteran outcomes for women after military service.  Below, I briefly 
discuss the rationale of how these factors could influence a woman’s propensity to 
serve in the armed forces.   
     Likely Positive Influences  
     First, the patriotic desire to serve during this critical time in our nation’s 
history could influence women as much as men.  Although war has generally been 
considered a man’s responsibility to shoulder, it is reasonable that women were as 
motivated to serve as men in response to the attacks of 9/11.  As discussed earlier 
in Chapter 4, there was a significant flux in patriotism during this time as all 
people, regardless of gender, “rallied ‘round the flag’ immediately after 9/11.    
     Second, to fill manpower requirements to support the wars after 9/11, women’s 
roles have continued to expand, causing an increased representation of women in 
the ranks as noted earlier (Clever and Segal 2013).  It is no coincidence that the 
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“Army Strong” recruiting campaign in 2006 highlighted several women in 
uniform (“Army Strong” 2006) to influence women to join the Army.  In contrast, 
the Marine Corps, which has traditionally been the most masculine service culture 
where women have been most underrepresented, did not depict any women in its 
recruiting commercial (“Best of the 21st Century! Marine Corps Recruiting 
Commercial” 2014).  Women have even served as Female Engagement Teams 
alongside Special Operations Forces in combat.  Undoubtedly, an increase in 
women’s participation and roles is likely to have positive influence on women’s 
propensity.   
     Third, the contemporary operational environment since 9/11, highlighted in 
Chapter 2, has blurred the traditional lines of battle more than during previous 
wars, placing women onto the “front lines” in direct harm’s way.  As a result of 
their increased participation and the nature of the current wars, women have been 
forced into combat situations more than any other conflict in our nation’s history 
and they have performed extremely well during these demanding situations.  As 
of February 2012, women composed about 12 percent of the troops who have 
served in operations in Afghanistan and have accounted for 144 deaths and 865 
wounded in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).   
     Fourth, due to women’s success in combat and the continuing need to sustain 
personnel requirements, the Department of Defense officially rescinded the direct 
combat exclusion ban that has been in place since 1994 (Bowman 2013).  Public 
opinion of women in combat roles seems to overwhelmingly support the DoD’s 
decision to lift the ban.  According to a poll from the Washington Post in 2011, 73 
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percent of the respondents supported giving women direct combat roles (Sandhoff 
and Segal 2013).  The recent wars could be a motivating factor for young women 
to desire to serve given the expansive nature of women’s roles and their success in 
combat.  Further, the lifting of the combat exclusion ban could have even more 
positive influence on woman’s propensity into the future, especially given that 
combat jobs make-up a large number of actual positions in the military (i.e. in the 
Army and Marine Corps) and are the most valued, providing greater potential for 
career advancement (Kleykamp 2013).  The removal of additional institutional 
barriers such as the military’s DADT policy should also positively influence 
women’s propensity.    
     On the home front, attitudes and value changes within society, such as the 
increased tolerance for homosexuals and gay marriage, have also influenced 
structural changes within the military.  The military profession has traditionally 
excluded gays from serving openly, mostly on the basis of the cohesion argument- 
that is, that a reduction in cohesion leads to a reduction in military effectiveness 
and the belief that gay service members breakdown unit cohesion (e.g. Segal and 
Kestnbaum 2002).  Indeed, the cohesion arguments used by military leadership 
and some members of Congress in the past have minimized the participation of 
both women and homosexuals in the military.  However, as a result of societal 
pressures, manpower constraints, and a lack of clear evidence that cohesion would 
be reduced (e.g. MacCount 1993), the military agreed to support Congress’ repeal 
of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy on September 20, 2011.   
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     Comparative analysis of foreign militaries revealed that the inclusion of gays 
openly serving in the military has not had any significant negative impacts to unit 
cohesion and readiness.  Further, the single study (Belkin et al. 2013) conducted 
since the repeal of DADT in the U.S. also showed that the issue has been a “non-
event.”  Indeed, negative stereotypes have led many to believe that the inclusion 
of gays serving openly would have detrimental impacts to the organization, but 
the facts simply do not support the arguments as of yet.  I expect that women’s 
propensity will be positively influenced by the repeal of DADT, as a previously 
excluded group is now gaining more public and institutional acceptance. 
     Fifth, the media’s attention to women’s participation and their success in 
combat is likely to increase the salience of women in the military and the extent to 
which women see the military as a viable job opportunity and potential career.  
Further, the traditional masculine images typically depicted in pop culture 
filmmaking such as movies like Patton (1970) and the Rambo series (1982, 1985, 
1988, 2008), have begun to be replaced by films highlighting women warriors 
such as Private Benjamin (1980), Courage Under Fire (1996), G.I. Jane (1997), 
Zero Dark Thirty (2012), and Camp X-Ray (2014).  Indeed, the image of the 
modern single woman who achieves fitness and self-assurance by joining the 
military in spite of discrimination is sure to positively influence some young 
women to serve (Enloe 1993).  As institutional changes continue throughout the 
military, such as the inclusion of women in combat roles and more promotions of 
women into command and leadership positions, it is possible that women could 
gain as much influence as white men which could reduce the amount of resistance 
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they have faced (Lucas and Segal 2011).  As a result, women’s propensity could 
increase as they witness their role models occupying high positions within the 
ranks and achieving success in combat-related tasks such as Ranger School.   
     Sixth, women have continued to break barriers during the post-9/11 era, 
especially within male-dominated occupations and positions.  Although women 
still continue to strive for equality in the civilian work force, Fortune 500 CEOs 
such as Mary Barra (General Motors), Meg Whitman (Hewlett Packard), Virginia 
Rometty (IBM), Indra Nooyi (PepsiCo, Inc.), and Marillyn Hewson (Lockheed 
Martin) have continued to set the example for young women who aspire to climb 
the corporate ladder in America.  More recognizable women such as Sheryl 
Sandberg, COO of Facebook, are trying to advance women in leadership roles 
through her writings in books like “Lean In,” or in newspaper and magazine 
columns, and by giving inspirational talks (e.g. TED Talks) that are more 
accessible today than ever before.  Women, such as Danica Patrick (NASCAR 
driver), or women participating in traditionally male-dominated sports such as 
basketball (e.g. WNBA), ice hockey (e.g. NWHL), or boxing (e.g. 2012 Olympic 
Games in London), highlight society’s trend of women continuing to break down 
barriers.  These “trail-blazing” trends should increase women’s propensity to 
serve.  Indeed, in an era of persistent conflict, the environment has been ripe for 
women who want to continue to break barriers and prove themselves during 
combat situations.  Indeed, the recent first female graduates of Ranger School in 
2015 are a great example of women continuing to break down barriers.  It is likely 
that these role models will positively influence women’s propensity.  
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     Lastly, women’s propensity to serve is likely to be influenced by factors in the 
civilian labor market.  The U.S. Department of Labor reports only a slight 
increase in the number of women in the labor force during the post-9/11 era.  
Women’s participation has increased from 38 percent of the overall labor force in 
the 1970s to about 47 percent in the 2000s (Department of Labor 2013).  
However, women’s participation has remained steady at 47 percent of the work 
force between 2000 and 2012.  Further, women between the ages of 16-24 have 
decreased in labor force participation from about 18 percent in 1990 to just 14 
percent in 2012.  The labor force participation rate is the proportion of the 
population that is working or looking for work. Women’s overall participation in 
the labor force has increased from 43 percent in 1972 to about 60 percent in 2000.  
However, women’s participation has slightly decreased since 2000 to just fewer 
than 58 percent in 2012, perhaps reflecting the overall negative impacts of the 
recession.  Particularly noteworthy, women’s earnings have steadily increased to 
that of men’s reaching about 80 percent of men’s total earnings in the 2000s.  
Black and Hispanic women’s earnings are even higher reaching about 90 percent 
of their male counterparts in the 2000s.  For comparison sake, white women 
earned about 70 percent of what white men earned in 1990.  These data reflect an 
increase in income equality between men and women in the civilian labor force 
during the post-9/11 era.      
     Women’s unemployment rates have generally declined over time.  However, 
during the post-9/11 era, women’s unemployment has increased with its most 
dramatic surges occurring after the Great Recession of 2008, jumping from 4.6 
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percent in 2006 to 8.6 percent in 2010, and then slightly declining to 7.9 percent 
by 2012.  A comparison by age reveals that those women between 16-24 are most 
likely to be unemployed in 2012, with more than 12 percent unemployment 
compared to less than 8 percent for all other age groups.  A comparison by race 
shows that white women (7 percent) are less likely to be unemployed than black 
(13 percent) and Hispanic women (11 percent) in 2012.  Similar racial trends 
appeared in 2002 as well.  Although women’s unemployment rates have been on 
the rise, it is worth mention that they have been consistently lower than men’s 
since 2000.         
     Women’s opportunities in the labor force have continued to increase over time, 
as marked by their overall participation and increased earnings.  Increased 
opportunities have been even greater among racial minorities.  However, since 
9/11 these trends have generally decreased or have remained stagnant, as is the 
case with earnings.  Most strikingly, the increase in unemployment trends for 
women, especially among minorities, has created less opportunity in the civilian 
labor force during this era, especially after the Great Recession of 2008.  
Although it is reasonable to believe that high unemployment could positively 
influence women’s propensity as prior research on propensity has suggested (DoD 
2000), the current state of war and the corresponding risk to one’s life could 
change these dynamics.  Indeed, those interested in service for more occupational 
reasons, such as better job opportunities, may be dissuaded from service when the 
risks outweigh the benefits.  Further, research has shown that women are less 
concerned with tangible benefits such as job pay compared to men (e.g. Beutel 
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and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011).  Thus, I do not expect that 
unemployment will be a significant positive influence on women’s propensity.     
     Likely Negative Influences 
     Despite all the influences noted above that could have positive influence on 
women’s propensity, there are also legitimate influences that could cause the 
opposite to occur.  First, the obvious threat to life could be a significant factor for 
women’s propensity.  Indeed, prior research has suggested that a threat to one’s 
life is the second highest reason not to join the military among women (DoD 
2000).  It is reasonable to believe that the persistence of war coupled with the 
increased risk among all military occupational specialties in the contemporary 
operating environment, especially within the predominantly ground forces of the 
Army and Marine corps, could cause some women to shy away from military 
service after 9/11.  Indeed, during the Gulf War period (1990-1991), there was a 
significant decline in women’s propensity from about 7.5 percent in 1990 to about 
5 percent in 1992 through 1995, suggesting that war was a negative influence on 
women’s propensity (Segal et al. 1998).  Additionally, women could potentially 
be apprehensive about serving during wartime until they see other women role 
models succeeding in combat.  Therefore, it could take some time for women to 
successfully prove themselves on the battlefield before positively influencing 
other women to serve.   
     Although advancements have been made in technology, causing some to argue 
that the horrors of war are more removed from soldiers than during earlier wars, 
the nature of warfare remains as brutal as the days described by Clausewitz 
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(1976) during the Napoleonic wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.  
Indeed, our enemy today fights without limitations and without parallel in 
morality compared to the Western professional fighter.  One can simply turn on 
the television or peruse the Internet to see these harsh realities (e.g. beheadings, 
burnings, etc.) come to life in their living rooms.  These horrors of war could 
certainly have a negative effect on the psyche of all youth, regardless of gender.  
     Second, while considering to volunteer to fight a war abroad against an enemy 
of this ruthless nature, women also have to confront the challenge of fighting what 
some refer to as The Invisible War (2012) of harassment within their own ranks.  
Sexual harassment of women in the workplace has been a problem in society that 
has received considerable media, academic, and legal attention as women’s 
participation in the workplace has increased.  Similarly, sexual harassment has 
been a problem within the military’s traditionally hyper-masculine culture, as 
women’s participation has increased (Firestone and Harris 1994).  The military’s 
Tailhook and Aberdeen Proving Ground harassment scandals initially brought this 
issue to the public’s attention (Enloe 1993).  The military has made adjustments to 
its policies to address these problems and change its environment.  More recently, 
issues at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 2003 and a study at the U.S. Naval 
Academy, suggest that harassment remains a problem today even among our 
nation’s future military leaders (Pershing 2003).  Sexual harassment is not the 
only form of harassment that women face in the military.  More often, many 
women in the military report experiencing “gender harassment.”  Gender 
harassment is not sexual; it is used to enforce traditional gender roles or occurs in 
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response to the violation of those roles (Miller 1997).  Regardless of the type, 
harassment has been a challenge that women have had to face in the military.    
     Most recently, the military has placed a great deal of emphasis toward 
preventing sexual assault within its ranks.  In 2005, the DoD enacted the Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program to encourage increased 
reporting of the crime, facilitate improved access to victim care, better organize 
response resources, and promote prevention (DoD 2010).  
Reports of sexual assault crimes are the most within the Army and the least within 
the Marine Corps, with 2.6 per thousand and 1.3 per thousand respectively.  The 
majority of these reports are service member on service member (53%) or service 
member on non-service member (30%).  Of the 2,279 sexual assault cases 
handled in FY09, there was enough evidence to take disciplinary action against 
983 subjects.  Of these, 58% of subjects received some form of punishment, such 
as nonjudicial punishment, administrative discharge, or other adverse 
administrative action.  The vast majority of sexual assault victims were women, 
under the age of 25, and among the junior enlisted population.  The majority of 
the subjects of assault charges were male, under the age of 35, and from junior 
enlisted ranks (DoD 2010).  Although there has been some success from the 
program by encouraging increased reporting, identifying more culprits, and 
administering swift punishments, the DoD still has strides to make to fix its 
culture.   
     The recent debate in Congress as to who should have jurisdiction over the 
military’s sexual assault cases has drawn significant media attention on the topic.  
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It is possible that the media’s attention on these issues could negatively influence 
a woman’s attitude toward the military as a viable job opportunity.  Indeed, it is 
reasonable that parents would discourage military service for their daughters as a 
result of the military’s issues with harassment.  However, media attention has also 
increased the salience of women’s military service to the public.  Further, the 
military has made strong efforts to mitigate the negative consequences of these 
incidents through equal opportunity and sexual assault prevention and response 
training (DoD 2013).  The DoD’s SAPR program continues to ensure that the 
military is a safe environment for all to serve- free of sexual assault and 
harassment.  Therefore, I expect that sexual harassment and assault will not have 
a significant negative influence on women’s propensity to serve as long as the 
military continues to place emphasis on preventing future crimes. 
     Third, research on the consequences of military service (i.e. veteran’s 
outcomes) among women has been scant, but those few studies have applied the 
aforementioned “bridging hypothesis” to study the post-service outcomes of 
female veterans.  Most research has shown that female veterans are less 
advantaged than their civilian counterparts.  Using 1990 Census data, Prokos and 
Padavic (2000) found that female veterans earned less than their non-veteran 
peers after controlling for demographic and human capital differences.  The 
authors found support for a veteran premium among older, pre-AVF veterans, 
which suggests that military service for pioneering women was relatively 
advantageous during a time when women did not work in large numbers in the 
civilian work force, especially in male-dominated occupations.  Using 1990 
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Census data again, Cooney and colleagues (2003) also found no advantage to 
military service among black women with respect to income compared to their 
non-veteran peers.  White women appeared to be disadvantaged compared to their 
non-veteran peers.  The author’s reasoned that these effects were more of a 
reflection of the available opportunities for black and white women within the 
civilian labor force and not of the effect of military service.  In other words, if the 
civilian opportunities for black women are more limited than for white women, 
then black veterans may appear more advantaged relative to black non-veterans 
than white veterans are compared to white non-veterans.  Another study among 
women reservists (Mehay and Hirsch 1996) found a 9 percent wage penalty 
among all female veterans, with a 12 percent penalty among whites and a 2 
percent penalty among black female veterans relative to their non-veteran peers.   
     In sum, the three studies above focused on the earnings of female veterans, 
generally finding that female veterans received an earnings penalty for their time 
in service, after controlling for demographic and other controls.  It appears that 
only women serving before the AVF have benefitted from their military service in 
terms of earnings.  These findings confirm the racial aspect of the bridging 
hypothesis, in that women of color were more advantaged by their military 
service, but the theory did not appear to extend to all women as a group 
(Kleykamp 2013).     
     Kleykamp (2013) conducted the most recent study of veteran outcomes during 
the post-9/11 era.  Using the Current Population Survey from 2005 to 2011, the 
author analyzed differences by sex, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment to 
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determine whether diverse veterans experienced diverse consequences of service.  
Interestingly, the study contradicted findings from earlier research noted above 
revealing that veterans of the post-9/11 era had higher earnings (nearly $1/hour 
more) than their civilian counterparts.  Perhaps most striking, was the finding that 
the effects of military service on unemployment, which has been recently 
highlighted in the media, appear to be understated since veterans have other 
characteristics associated with higher employment rates.  Indeed, post-9/11 
veterans have a higher rate of unemployment than their civilian peers, despite 
possessing high job-quality characteristics.  The unemployment rate is 
significantly worse for female veterans who may be less attractive to civilian 
employers.  Female veterans experience unemployment at nearly twice the rate of 
their civilian counterparts (13.7 vs. 7.3) and experience higher unemployment 
than men (13.7 vs. 11.6).  However, black veterans (male and female) appear to 
suffer less of an employment penalty than white veterans.  It does appear that 
veterans of this era are more likely to enroll in college at higher rates than their 
civilian peers, suggesting the positive effects of the Post-9/11 GI Bill.  Additional 
research using a sample of respondents between 1968-2003 examined the effects 
of combat exposure among men only, revealing that combat veterans suffer more 
disability and unemployment than non-combat veterans and non-veterans 
(Maclean 2010).  It is reasonable to believe that these findings would hold true for 
female combat veterans, as Kleykamp (2013) already showed with respect to 
unemployment.  Interestingly, a recent audit study conducted by Kleykamp 
(2010) showed that there were no negative consequences with respect to civilian 
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hiring of female veterans after 9/11.  This seems to contradict earlier research on 
women’s employment opportunities and also gives some credence for the 
bridging hypothesis extending to women as a group.   
     Also of interest is the amount of stigma that may be associated with veterans 
from this era as a result of prolonged combat exposure.  A recent study by 
Maclean and Kleykamp (2014) showed that despite being stereotyped with mental 
disorders such as PTSD, recent veterans were not stigmatized.  Veterans actually 
benefited from the symbolic capital (i.e. honor and prestige) they obtained from 
combat service that outweighed the effects of negative stereotypes.  They found 
that people actually want to be socially closer to, and support more help for, the 
veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars compared to other veterans and non-
veterans.  It should be noted that this study was limited to men only.  However, it 
is reasonable to believe that findings would generalize in the same manner to 
women combat veterans, especially given the “support the troops” narrative that 
exists among society today.  
     In sum, recent research suggests that there are more benefits to service among 
women veterans during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years, such as 
increased earnings and college enrollment.  Consistent with the bridging 
hypothesis, these benefits appear to be even greater for racial minorities.  
However, research has shown that female veterans do not benefit as much as male 
veterans with respect to earnings, employment, and status.  Further, it appears that 
women veterans still suffer a significant employment penalty compared to their 
civilian counterparts.  Taken together, women’s outcomes from military service 
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are not as beneficial as they are for men.  Thus, they are not likely to have a 
significant positive influence on women’s propensity.   
     Women’s Propensity Predictions  
     Although there are many factors noted above that are likely to have some 
influence on women’s propensity during the post-9/11 era, I am unable to directly 
analyze the influence of most of them.  For my research purposes, I directly 
analyze the influence of patriotism, the threat to one’s life, and a lack of 
opportunity in the civilian labor market on women’s propensity.  Similar to men, I 
measure patriotism by public support for war, threat to life by casualties, and a 
lack of opportunity in the labor market by unemployment rates.  It is possible that 
there are different relationships between these macro-social variables and 
women’s propensity compared to their relationship with men’s propensity.  I also 
analyze the individual and demographic factors that I analyzed for men’s 
propensity.     
     Overall, I predict that women’s propensity to serve in the armed forces during 
the post-9/11 era will increase compared to earlier years for both institutional and 
occupational reasons.  Institutionally, I expect that a rise in patriotism after the 
attacks of 9/11, as measured by public support for war, will positively influence 
women’s propensity.  Further, the gradual increase in the acceptance of women’s 
participation in the military, their success in combat, and the reduction of 
institutional barriers within the military (e.g. removal of combat exclusion ban 
and the DADT policy) should positively influence propensity.  Additionally, I 
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believe that women will be motivated to serve during an era of combat to continue 
to prove their merit and break down barriers in a predominantly male institution.  
     Although there are many positive influences for women to serve during this 
era, there are some negative influences as well.  Indeed, the threat to one’s life 
due to the nature of military service has been a top reason for women not to join 
the military (DoD 2000).  These threats are likely to be heightened during a state 
of war.  Similar to men, I expect women’s propensity to decline during the height 
of the Iraqi insurgency period (2004-2007) due to the significant increase in 
casualties.  Thus, I expect to see a significantly negative relationship between 
women’s propensity and casualties.     
     Occupationally, it is reasonable to expect that the decrease in women’s 
opportunities in the labor market, marked by fairly high unemployment rates after 
the recession of 2008, would have a positive influence on women’s propensity.  
However, I expect that those women who are motivated by more economic 
factors may not be as likely to serve during wartime due to the risks of combat 
outweighing the benefits of service.  Further, research has shown that women are 
less concerned about tangible benefits of work compared to men (e.g. Beutel and 
Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011).  Thus, I do not expect to see a significantly 
positive relationship between unemployment and women’s propensity.         
     Although roles for women continue to increase and barriers become removed, 
the military still remains a highly masculine organization as viewed from both 
within and outside of the military.  Indeed, strides still need to be made to attract 
more women into military service.  Thus, I expect women’s overall propensity to 
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continue to be significantly less than men’s propensity to serve during the post-
9/11 era.   
Hypothesis 6a: Women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 
era is likely to be less than men’s propensity to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 
era will be greater compared to earlier years. 
 
Hypothesis 6c: There will be a positive relationship between 
women’s propensity and public support for war during wartime.   
 
Hypothesis 6d: There will be a negative relationship between 
women’s propensity and U.S. casualties during wartime. 
 
Hypothesis 6e: There will be no significant relationship between 
women’s propensity and unemployment during wartime. 
 
     We already know that black women continue to be overrepresented in the 
military, even more than black men (Segal et al. 1998; Segal and Segal 2004).  
Hispanic representation, both within the labor force as well as the military, 
continues to rise as well.  We know that the Hispanic population in the Army is 
composed of a greater proportion of women than the Army’s white population.  I 
expect Black and Hispanic propensity to be positively influenced by the removal 
of the combat exclusion ban even more than for white women.  Consistent with 
the bridging hypothesis and earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; DoD 2000), I 
expect that racial and ethnic differences in propensity as noted earlier for men will 
remain similar among women, such that black and Hispanic women will continue 
to have higher propensity than their white counterparts.    
Hypothesis 6f: Black and Hispanic women will have a greater 
propensity to serve in the military during the post- 9/11 era as 
compared to their white counterparts.  
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     Prior research on men’s propensity leads one to expect a higher propensity and 
enlistment among young men who are black, from families without two parents, 
have parents with lower education, and are from rural residences in the south 
(Bachman et al. 2000b; Segal et al. 1999; Teachman et al. 1993).  Prior research 
on women (e.g. Segal et al. 1998) has also shown that the predictors for women’s 
propensity have been in the same direction as men, but with smaller magnitude, 
and propensity to serve has remained the strongest predictor to actual enlistment, 
as was the case with men.  During the post-9/11 era, I expect to see similar trends 
as men for women’s predictors of propensity with respect to socioeconomic 
status, educational attainment and goals, and place of residence.  
Hypothesis 6g: The predictors for women’s propensity to serve 
(i.e. SES, educational goals and attainment, urbanicity, and 
place of residence) will be similar in direction as the predictors 
for men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era.   
 
Women’s Propensity Analysis and Results 
     Below, I present the results for women’s propensity during the post-9/11 era.  
Consistent with earlier research, I focus my presentation on comparing women 
and men’s propensity, highlighting the similarities and differences by gender.  In 
general, I utilize the same analysis techniques and variables I used for the men’s 
analysis in Chapter 4, and I present similar tables and figures for comparison 
purposes.  However, unlike for men, which I split into separate chapters, I include 
the analysis for all the variables influencing women’s propensity in this stand-
alone chapter.  This is for ease of comparison and since most of the literature and 
logic related to the macro-social variables (e.g. public support for war, casualties, 
and unemployment) is the same regardless of gender.  When necessary, I state the 
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pertinent differences.  Later, in subsequent chapters, I include the analysis of the 
relationship between women’s propensity and various other variables (e.g. 
political attitudes, I/O orientations, and attitudes toward gender-roles and race-
relations) in the same chapters as I do for the men’s analysis.  I report results for 
women’s propensity- that is, those young women who say that they “definitely 
will” or “probably will” expect to serve in the armed forces.  The low sample size 
of women with high propensity (especially by race/ethnicity) would yield 
unreliable estimates.  Therefore, I do not analyze differences between high and 
low propensity women as I do for men in the following Chapters 7-10.  Table 6.1 
below presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analysis of 
women’s propensity.  My total sample size for women is 52,356 (2002-2013) and 
139,284 (1976-2013).  During the post-9/11 era, 2,398 women have the 
propensity to serve.  Among women with propensity, there are 1423 white 







     Figure 6.1 below depicts the overall average trends of women’s propensity to 
serve by year between 1976-2013.  Similar to men, results reveal a general 
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decline in women’s propensity since the mid-1980s.  However, women’s 
propensity did rise again during the mid-1990s through 2001.  Figure 6.2 below 
zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average military propensity of 
women between 2002-2013.  Consistent with hypothesis 6a, women’s overall 
propensity is significantly less than men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era.  
Consistent with prior research, men’s propensity averages about fifteen percent 
higher than women’s.  However, annual trends in women’s propensity during the 
post-9/11 era generally follow the patterns of men’s propensity (see Figures 4.1 
and 4.2).  Somewhat surprisingly, results indicate an initial decline in propensity 
during the first few years of the post-9/11 era.  However, women’s propensity 
increases after 2005, and reaches levels higher than the 1990s between 2010 and 
2013, providing some support for hypothesis 6b.   
     Results indicate that women’s propensity has fluctuated at three critical time 
periods: a decline immediately following 9/11 (2003); a steep decline during the 
height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2008); and an incline following the economic 
recession of 2008 (2009-2011).  As noted earlier, these periods correspond to 
various macro-social influences such as public support for war immediately 
following the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a rise in U.S. 
casualties, and a rise in unemployment.  There are a few things to highlight from 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2.  First, women’s propensity does not increase immediately 
following 9/11 as it did for men.  Second, women’s propensity during the post-
9/11 era reached its all-time low between 2005-2006 (similar to men), 
corresponding to the highest amount of U.S. casualties.  However, women’s 
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propensity increased back to its highest levels, which occurred throughout the 
1980s.  Third, although trends in propensity generally appear to be similar 
between men and women (aside from immediately following the 9/11 attacks), 
propensity changes for women are relatively small compared to men during the 
post-9/11 era.  For example, women’s propensity reaches its peak in 2013 at about 
8 percent, while its low point was in 2005 at about 4 percent, netting its largest 
difference of 4 percent.  In contrast, for men, the largest difference in propensity 
was 9 percent, ranging from 22 percent in 2013 to about 13 percent in 2005.  
Proportionately speaking, women and men’s propensity fluctuated in a similar 
manner (except following the attacks immediately after 9/11 in 2003).  However, 
data reveals that men are about three times more likely to have the propensity to 





     Women’s Propensity and Macro-Social Influences  
     Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 6.2 
below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as 
predicted by the independent variables for women only.  Model 6 of Table 6.2 is 
highlighted in a similar fashion as it is for my men’s analysis earlier since this is 
the full model for analysis, excluding interactions.  The primary predictor 
variables in Table 6.2 are the macro-social influences- public support for war, 
casualties, and unemployment.  Somewhat surprisingly, findings indicate that 
there is a negative relationship between public support for war and women’s 
propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era.  Similar to the results for men’s 
propensity, these results do not support hypothesis 6c.  As public support for war 
increases, women are significantly less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.97**), 






          Public Support for War      
     Figure 6.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by public support for war after controlling for all factors.  On average, the 
predicted probability of serving decreases by about one eighth of a percent for 
every five percent increase in public support for war.  Indeed, these results seem 
counterintuitive.  However, it should be noted that overall public support for the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dropped precipitously after initial high levels, and 
they did not increase again (see Table 4.1).  It appears that other influences, such 
as casualties and unemployment, may be influencing women’s propensity more 
than public support for war.  Thus, results do not support my prediction.  
 
     As a potential explanation for the results that contradict my hypothesis, I 
analyze women’s nationalistic attitudes using the nationalism index measure I 
created in Chapter 4.  Figure 6.4 below depicts the predicted probability of 
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serving for women by nationalistic attitudes after all controls.  Similar to men, 
results indicate that for every unit increase on the nationalistic scale, women’s 
expectation to serve is predicted to increase by one percent during the post-9/11 
era.  Given that prior research has shown that nationalism has a fairly strong 
correlation with patriotism, these results suggest that women with propensity are 
likely to be patriotic during the post-9/11 era.  Thus, it is possible that my 
measure of public support for war is not tapping into the patriotic construct as 
well as I predicted.     
 
          Casualties 
     Consistent with hypothesis 6d, findings indicate that there is a significant 
negative relationship between U.S. casualties and women’s propensity during the 
post-9/11 era.  As casualties increase, women are significantly less likely to 
expect to serve (OR=0.92***), after controlling for various other factors such as 
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race, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of 
residence.  These results are similar in direction but greater in magnitude than the 
results for men.   
     Figure 6.5 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by U.S. casualties after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of 
Table 6.2.  On average, women’s predicted probability of serving decreases by 
about one-third of a percent for every increase of one hundred U.S. casualties.  
This is substantial considering that between 2003-2011, there were no less than 
three hundred U.S. casualties per year resulting from the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq as highlighted earlier in Table 4.1.  This equates to approximately a 1 percent 
decrease in the predicted probability of women expecting to serve for each of the 
years.  A one percent decrease in women’s predicted probability of serving is a 
substantial difference since it equates to a loss of about 21,000 eligible female 
recruits the age of 18 years according to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 
2015).        
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          Unemployment 
     Consistent with hypothesis 6e, findings indicate that there is no significant 
relationship between unemployment and women’s propensity to serve during the 
post-9/11 era.  As overall unemployment rates increase, women are not more 
likely to expect to serve (OR=1.02), after controlling for various other factors 
highlighted in Model 6 of Table 6.2.  As noted earlier, I use the overall 
unemployment rate as my measure for analysis instead of using the youth 
unemployment rate for women, since I think overall unemployment rates would 
be the most salient in the media and in the minds of youth.  Regardless, the 
correlation between overall unemployment and the unemployment rate for young 
women is 0.98.  
     Figure 6.6 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
unemployment after controlling for all factors.  On average, women’s predicted 
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probability of serving only increases by about one tenth of a percent for every 
percent increase in the overall unemployment rate.  It must be noted that these 
results are not consistent with the results for men.  It appears that women are not 
as positively influenced by economic factors as men. 
 
     An interaction between casualties and unemployment depicted in Model 10 of 
Table 6.2 does not yield significant results (OR=1.00).  Figure 6.7 below depicts 
the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by the interaction of 
unemployment and casualties after controlling for all factors in Model 10 of Table 
6.2.  Results indicate that, on average, as unemployment increases, lower 
casualties do not have a significantly lower negative effect on women’s 
propensity.  Put another way, the greater the unemployment rate, there is no 
significant change in the negative effect of casualties on propensity (Williams 
2015).  These results suggest that casualties have a significant negative influence 
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on women’s propensity regardless of the unemployment rate.  This suggests that 
women with more occupational orientations do not expect to serve amidst high 
casualties.  This finding is also noteworthy as it differs from the finding for men’s 
propensity.    
 
     Racial and Ethnic Group Differences  
      There are significant differences in women’s propensity between racial and 
ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era.  Figure 6.8 below depicts the actual 
propensity of white, black, and Hispanic women respectively.  Consistent with 
hypothesis 6f, black women’s propensity is the highest overall during the post-
9/11 era, followed by Hispanic women’s propensity, and then white propensity.  
Of note, Hispanic designation did not occur in the MTF study until after 2004.  
Figure 6.9 below depicts the actual propensity of white and black women for all 
years in the dataset (1976-2013).  Results show that white women’s propensity 
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has remained relatively stable over time, hovering at almost 5 percent throughout 
the AVF.  On the other hand, black women’s propensity has been about three to 
four times higher than white women’s.  Of note, black women’s propensity 
significantly declined by about ten percent during the Gulf War period (1990-
1991) from approximately 23 percent to 13 percent.  Black women’s propensity 
has since recovered averaging between 12 and 15 percent.  These results are 




     Utilizing logistic regression, prior to controlling for various factors, results 
reported in Model 2 of Table 6.2 above reveal that black (OR=3.88***) and 
Hispanic women (OR=2.24***) have significantly greater propensity to serve 
compared to their white counterparts.  After controlling for SES in Model 3 of 
Table 6.2, results reveal that black and Hispanic women’s propensity to serve 
decreases somewhat.  However, black (OR=2.54***) and Hispanic women 
(OR=1.64***) continue to have significantly greater propensity to serve than their 
white counterparts after all controls, which is consistent with the bridging 
hypothesis.  These results are different than the results for men, which show that 
there are no differences in propensity between black and white men after 
controlling for SES.  Hispanic men continue to have higher propensity than white 
men after all controls.   
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     Results reported in Model 7 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction between racial 
and ethnic groups and public support for war.  Similar to men, results do not 
indicate significant differences between racial and ethnic groups.  Data suggests 
that there is a similar negative relationship between women’s propensity and 
public support for war among all racial and ethnic backgrounds.   
     Similarly, results reported in Model 8 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction 
between racial and ethnic groups and casualties.  Results indicate that there are no 
significant racial/ethnic differences in the relationship between women’s 
propensity and casualties.  These findings are different from the findings for men, 
where casualties negatively influence black men’s propensity significantly more 
than white men.  Figure 6.10 below depicts differences in the relationship 
between women’s propensity and casualties by racial and ethnic groups during the 
post-9/11 era.  Of note, results do indicate significant differences at the p<.10 
level in the relationship between casualties and black women’s propensity 
compared to white women.  This is consistent with findings from YATS 
conducted in 1999, which suggested that black women were more likely than 
white or Hispanic women to state that “threat to life” was a main reason for not 
joining the military (DoD 2000).   
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     Results reported in Model 9 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction between racial 
and ethnic groups and unemployment.  Results suggest that there are no 
significant racial/ethnic differences in the relationship between women’s 
propensity and unemployment.  Figure 6.11 below depicts differences in the 
relationship between women’s propensity and unemployment by racial and ethnic 
groups during the post-9/11 era.  Although there is a slightly higher rise in black 
women’s propensity compared to white or Hispanic women’s propensity as 
unemployment increases, results are not significant.  These findings are also 
different from the findings for men’s propensity, where unemployment positively 
influences black men’s propensity significantly more than white men. 
 196 
 
     Socioeconomic Status 
     Model 3 of Table 6.2 reveals that women with a higher socioeconomic status, 
as measured by father’s and mother’s education, family structure (i.e. number of 
parents in household), and the number of siblings in a household, are significantly 
less likely to have the propensity to serve.  These findings are similar to the 
findings for men and consistent with earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; DoD 
2000).  Women with a father who has a college degree are roughly half as likely 
(OR=0.48***) to expect to serve in the military compared to women who have a 
father with less than a high school education.  The odds of propensity to serve for 
women who grow up in a household with only a mother or female guardian are 
1.16 compared to those with two parents or guardians.  The odds of propensity to 
serve increase further for women who only have a father or no parents at all.  
Additionally, women who have no siblings are about half as likely (OR=0.56***) 
 197 
to serve in the military than those with 3 or more siblings, most likely due to the 
lack of resources in the household to allocate towards college enrollment.   
     In summary, disadvantaged women are more likely to expect to serve in the 
military, which is consistent with the bridging hypothesis, hypothesis 6g, and the 
results for men.  Although SES is a significant predictor for women’s propensity, 
it does not appear to be as significant a predictor as it is for men’s propensity.  As 
noted earlier, after controlling for SES, black and Hispanic women continue to 
have significantly higher propensity (OR=2.91*** and 1.77***) compared to 
their white counterparts.  In contrast, there are no significant differences between 
black and white men’s propensity after controlling for SES.  This suggests that 
minority women may be more attracted to military service for other reasons than 
economic.     
     Educational Goals and Attainment 
     Model 4 of Table 6.2 includes the additional cluster of control variables 
pertaining to educational attainment and goals.  Results reported in Model 4 also 
support hypothesis 6g and are consistent with previous research, suggesting that 
educational attainment and aspirations exert a significant negative influence on 
women’s propensity to serve in the military during the post-9/11 era.  As a 
woman’s grade point average increases (approximate increase of .3 on a G.P.A. 
scale from 1.7 to 4), she is about a third less likely (OR=0.71***) to expect to 
serve.  Women who are enrolled in college preparatory classes are about a quarter 
less likely (OR=0.73***) to have the propensity to serve compared to those 
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enrolled in non-college preparatory classes.  These results are similar to the 
results for men’s propensity.      
     Region of Country and Urbanicity 
     Model 5 of Table 6.2 adds a few additional control variables such as where the 
respondent grew up and his or her region of school.  Similar to men, results from 
this model indicate that women who grow up in the southern region of the country 
are greater than one and a half times more likely to have the propensity to serve 
(OR=1.72***) compared to those who grow up in other regions of the country.  
Additional significance is indicated for women who grow up in the suburb of a 
medium, large, or very large city.  Women who grow up in these areas are about 
one third less likely (OR=0.65**) to have propensity compared to those growing 
up on a farm or in the country.  These results are also consistent with hypothesis 
6g and earlier research suggesting that more advantaged women who grow up in 
the suburban areas of cities are less likely to expect to serve.  Results also lend 
support to Kleykamp’s (2009) finding that a military institutional presence is a 
key predictor for military enlistment.  Indeed, the preponderance of military 
installations and ROTC programs are in the south and western regions of the 
country.   
     Additional Pathways to Adulthood 
     Results from Model 6 of Table 6.2 reveal differences between women who 
expect to serve in the military compared to other alternatives a woman can choose 
from when deciding among the various pathways to adulthood.  As predicted in 
hypothesis 6g, women who expect to graduate from a 4-year college are about a 
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quarter less likely (OR=0.80***) to expect to serve in the military.  Interestingly, 
women expecting to graduate from a 2-year college or attend a 
vocational/technical school are significantly more likely (OR=1.21*** and 
OR=1.24*** respectively) to have the propensity to serve in the military.  These 
findings are similar to the findings for men.  Consistent with earlier research (e.g. 
Bachman et al. 2001), findings suggest that the military may be an attractive 
alternative for women who still desire to pursue higher levels of education after 
high school.   
     Results reported in Models 11 and 12 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction 
between race and ethnic groups and a woman’s expectation to graduate from a 
two-year college or attend a vocational/technical school.  Similar to men, results 
reveal significant group differences in propensity between black (OR=1.45***) 
and Hispanic women (OR=1.39*) compared to their white counterparts.  Figure 
6.12 below reveals that black and Hispanic women who expect to graduate from a 
two-year college are more likely to expect to serve than their white counterparts.  
Similarly, Figure 6.13 below reveals that black (OR=1.33*) and Hispanic women 
(OR=1.51***) who expect to attend vocational education are more likely to 
expect to serve than their white counterparts.  Interestingly, white women who 
expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend vocational school are no 
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Women’s Perception of Discrimination Against Women in Military 
     In a separate but related analysis, I analyze women’s attitudes toward the 
perception of discrimination of women in the military.  This is of particular 
interest during the post-9/11 era given the media’s recent attention to an increase 
in sexual harassment and assault incidents in the military, and the military’s 
corresponding implementation of SHARP to address the problems.  A question on 
Form 4 of the MTF survey asks a respondent: “To what extent do you think there 
is any discrimination against women who are in the armed services?”  Response 
categories include: 1="To a Very Little Extent" 2="To a Little Extent" 3="To 
Some Extent" 4="To a Great Extent" 5="To a Very Great Extent."   
     Table 5.3 below reports results from a difference of means test using the 
question above as the dependent variable on a scale from 1 to 5.  Results reveal 
that on average, women (mean=3.00) believe that there is a degree of 
discrimination against women in the military “to some extent” during the post-
9/11 era.  Not surprisingly, women with propensity believe that there is 
significantly less (p<.01) discrimination (mean=2.89) than women without 
propensity (mean= 3.00).  Perhaps more telling, is that the perception of 
discrimination in the military has significantly increased (p<.001) during the post-
9/11 era compared to earlier years.  Between 1976-2002, all women averaged 
2.92 on the scale from 1 to 5, indicating less perceptions of discrimination against 
women in the military.  Among women with propensity there are significant 
differences (p<.001) between eras as well.  Before 9/11, women with propensity 
score an average of 2.72 compared to an average score of 2.89 post-9/11.  
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     Results in Table 6.3 also reveal differences between racial and ethnic groups.  
Interestingly, black women with propensity have significantly (p<.05) less 
perceptions that there is discrimination against women in the military compared to 
white women.  Black women with propensity score an average of 2.70, whereas 
white women have an average score of 2.92.  Perhaps these perceptions 
contributes to the fact that black women have greater propensity to serve 
compared to Hispanic or white women.    
     Not surprisingly, men with propensity have significantly less (p<.001) 
perceptions that there is discrimination against women in the military compared to 
women with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  Additionally, men with 
propensity have less perceptions (p<.001) of the discrimination of women in the 




     My research on women’s propensity is important in a few notable ways.  First, 
the majority of propensity research excludes women from the analysis.  The 
rationale for excluding women from analysis includes that men are the primary 
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recruiting target or that women’s propensity is simply too low to produce reliable 
results.  The last research on women’s propensity using MTF data was conducted 
between 1976-1996 (Segal et al. 1998).  Additionally, the last time the 
Department of Defense conducted research on women’s propensity using the 
Youth Attitude Tracking Survey was between 1996-1999 (DoD 2000).  My 
research bridges the gap from the last research on women’s propensity- almost a 
decade and a half void in knowledge.            
     Second, due to the general lack of war throughout the first three decades of the 
AVF, this is the first time that the impact of war can be analyzed on women’s 
propensity.  This is important, as combat has largely been a reason to exclude 
women from service in general, and more recently, a reason to exclude women 
from various combat roles.  Not only does the post-9/11 era serve as a natural 
experiment to analyze how war may influence women’s propensity, but there are 
also other changes that should have significant influence on women’s propensity 
as well.  As mentioned, the removal of institutional barriers such as the Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell Policy in 2010 and the combat exclusion ban in 2012 are likely to 
positively influence women’s propensity to serve in the future as more 
opportunities become available and greater acceptance of women in the ranks 
occurs, including the combat ranks.          
     Lastly, this is the first time that research has been conducted directly 
examining the relationship between women’s propensity and various macro-social 
factors such as public support for war, casualties, and unemployment.  
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Undoubtedly, findings on these relationships will contribute to the extensive 
amount of literature in the political science, economic, and sociological domains.   
     In general, results during the post-9/11 era are consistent with earlier trends 
revealing that women are less likely than men to expect to serve.  Military service 
remains less typical for women than for men, at least in the statistical sense.  
Some may have expected women’s propensity to significantly decrease during a 
period of war.  However, this was not the case, as women’s propensity reached 
levels as high as the 1980s during a period of relative peace and stability.  Despite 
lower percentages relative to men, proportionately, women’s propensity has 
remained as high as men’s during the post-9/11 era.  Indeed, in 2013, women’s 
propensity reached its second highest mark during the AVF, suggesting that 
positive trends may continue into the future as more opportunities become 
available and greater acceptance continues for women in the military.  
     Public Support for War 
     Equally as surprising as the results for men, it appears that women’s propensity 
is negatively related to public support for war.  I suspect that the possible 
explanations for a decrease in men’s propensity in relation to an increase in public 
support for war may be operating in the same manner for women as well.  Indeed, 
a similar analysis of the relationship between propensity and nationalism, 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, reveals that women with greater 
nationalistic attitudes are more likely to expect to serve.  Under the same logic 
used for men, this suggests that women with propensity may be more patriotic 
than those without propensity.  Thus, it appears that public support for war may 
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not be tapping into the patriotic construct that I originally intended.  See the 
“discussion section” of public support for war in Chapter 4 for a more complete 
explanation of results that are contrary to my expectation for women’s propensity.  
     It is noteworthy that women’s propensity did not spike as it did for men 
following the attacks of 9/11 (see Figure 5.1).  This suggests that men may have 
“rallied around the flag” more so than women.  This isn’t necessarily surprising 
given the long tradition that fighting wars has generally been considered a man’s 
duty and responsibility as evidenced by our past and current draft system.  Despite 
a few highlighted stories in the media and pop culture of women’s successful 
performance during the Persian Gulf War, in large part, women have not had the 
opportunity to prove themselves in combat situations.  Thus, it is reasonable that 
women may have been more apprehensive toward volunteering for military 
service immediately following 9/11.  It is more likely that stories of women’s 
success in combat over the first few years of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars had a 
greater influence on women’s propensity as the wars continued.         
     Casualties 
     Similar to men, results show that women’s propensity is negatively related to 
casualties during the post-9/11 era.  However, it appears that casualties may more 
negatively influence women’s propensity compared to men’s.  Again, it isn’t 
necessarily surprising that women appear to be more concerned than men about 
the risks associated with combat.  Indeed, the danger associated with military 
service has previously been identified as a main reason for women not to enlist 
(DoD 2000).  Interestingly, results reveal that there are no racial and ethnic group 
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differences in the relationship between women’s propensity and casualties.  These 
findings may be considered contrary to the findings from the YATS, which 
indicated that black women were more concerned than white or Hispanic women 
about a threat to one’s life as a reason not to enlist.  These findings are also 
different than my findings for men, where casualties negatively influenced black 
men significantly more than white or Hispanic men.  Overall, these results 
contribute to the extensive amount of literature on the casualty hypothesis.  See 
Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on the relationship between casualties 
and propensity overall.       
     Unemployment 
     Results show that women’s propensity is positively related to high 
unemployment during the post-9/11 era, although results are not significant.  
These findings are contrary to the findings for men’s propensity as noted earlier, 
which showed a significant positive relationship between unemployment and 
men’s propensity.  Interestingly, results reveal that there are no racial and ethnic 
group differences in the relationship between women’s propensity and 
unemployment.  Again, this is different than the findings for men, where 
unemployment positively influenced black men significantly more than white 
men.  Results suggest that women with propensity, regardless of race or ethnicity, 
have less economic motivations compared to men.  It appears that for women, the 
economic benefits of military service do not outweigh the associated costs during 
wartime as they do for men.  This is in keeping with the line of research 
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suggesting women are less concerned with tangible benefits of a job (e.g. Beutel 
and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011).      
     Race, SES, Education and Region 
     Among individual and demographic predictors, results show that the predictors 
for women’s propensity are generally similar in direction and magnitude as the 
predictors for men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era.  Consistent with earlier 
research, black and Hispanic women, respectively, continue to have a 
significantly greater propensity to serve compared to their white counterparts, 
even after controlling for all factors.  These results are different than results for 
men, as black men are no more likely to expect to serve than white men after 
controlling for SES.  Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, results suggest that 
black and Hispanic women may perceive the military as a better opportunity than 
white women despite being a time of war.  Further, results suggest that black and 
Hispanic women may have greater institutional orientations than their white 
counterparts, since they have greater expectations to serve during war after 
controlling for SES.   
     Of note, black women’s propensity does not decline during the post-9/11 era 
nearly as much as it did during the Gulf War period (see Figure 5.8.2.1).  Results 
show that there was about a ten percent decline in propensity during the Gulf 
War, compared to only about a six percent decrease at any point during the post-
9/11 era.  These results are similar to the results from the men’s analysis.  During 
the Gulf War period, some black leaders suggested that blacks would suffer heavy 
casualties in the event of a ground war (DoD 2000).  Findings suggests that there 
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was greater support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars among the entire black 
community, regardless of gender, compared to the Gulf War period.  Indeed, it 
appears that the “cannon fodder” argument may not be as pervasive within the 
black community as years earlier (Armor 1996).     
     Women’s propensity is positively associated with lower SES, lower 
educational attainment and goals, growing up in rural areas and growing up in the 
southern or western regions of the country.  Of note, data suggests that women 
who grow up in the west are more likely to serve than men.  While a father’s level 
of education is a significant predictor among the cluster of variables used to 
measure SES, it appears that a mother’s education level is a more significant 
predictor for women than it is for men.  That is, the higher a mother’s education 
level, the less likely women have the propensity to serve.  
     Additional Pathways 
     Results suggest that women who expect to graduate from a two-year college or 
attend vocational school are more likely to have the propensity to serve during the 
post-9/11 era.  These results are greater in magnitude than results for men.  It 
appears that women who are attracted to military service are also somewhat 
attracted to higher education.  Thus, it is likely that educational benefits to 
military service will be an attractive incentive for women.  This is consistent with 
earlier research from YATS, which found that women cite educational benefits as 
a reason to join the military somewhat more than men (DoD 2000).   
     Also similar to men, black or Hispanic women who expect to graduate from a 
two-year college or attend vocational training have greater propensity than their 
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white counterparts.  This suggests that minority women who are interested in 
pursuing higher levels of education may be more attracted to the military’s 
educational benefits than their white counterparts.   
     Women’s Perception of Discrimination Against Women in Military 
     In a separate but related analysis, findings suggest that women’s perception of 
the discrimination of women in the military has increased during the post-9/11 
era.  This is of particular interest given the media’s recent attention to an increase 
in sexual harassment and assault incidents in the military, and the military’s 
corresponding implementation of SHARP to address the problems.  Although 
women with propensity believe there is less discrimination compared to women 
without propensity, findings suggest that there has been an increase in these 
perceptions during the post-9/11 era among women with propensity.  These 
perceptions are important for military practitioners and recruiters to understand 
since they may be negatively influencing women’s propensity during this era.  
Indeed, the military has been aggressively addressing the problem to eliminate 
instances of assault within the ranks.  Results suggest that the military must 
continue to keep after the problem of sexual assault and harassment and possibly 
advertise significant improvements in this arena to the media to increase public 
awareness.  This is likely to reassure the public and young women who are 
considering the military as a viable option.             
    Prior research on women (Segal et al. 1998) has shown that the predictors for 
women’s propensity to serve has been in the same direction as men, but with 
smaller magnitude, and that the propensity to serve was the strongest predictor to 
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actual enlistment, as was the case with men.  My research does not specifically 
examine how propensity relates to actual enlistment during the post-9/11 era.  The 
last examination of this type was conducted in 1991.  At that time, data showed 
that among women with high propensity (i.e. “definitely will” serve), only about 
40 percent actually enlisted in the military within 5-6 years after high school.  In 
contrast, data showed that 70 percent of men with high propensity enlisted after 
high school.  Despite the relatively low number for women, it is reasonable to 
believe that the percentage of women with the propensity to serve who actually go 
on to enlist after high school has increased over the past two decades given the 
expansion of women’s job opportunities in the military in the mid-1990s, their 
successes during war after 9/11, and the most recent removal of institutional 
barriers (i.e. combat exclusion ban and DADT policy).  Future research should 
examine how current propensity relates to actual enlistment for women.  My 
expectation is that it will follow more closely to the trends for men, showing that 
propensity is more strongly related to actual enlistment.   
     The results from my analysis suggest that there are various motivations to 
serve among women.  The fact that women’s propensity has increased during the 
post-9/11 era, especially after 2010, suggests that women with propensity have 
fairly high institutional orientations.  Although women’s propensity was at an all-
time low between 2005-2006, propensity did bounce back to levels as high as in 
the early 1980s.  Indeed, the spike in women’s propensity to 8 percent in 2013 
was the second highest percentage (1983 was 8.5 percent) overall throughout the 
entire AVF era.  This may be somewhat surprising as some might expect that 
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women would not be as likely to serve during a combat era.  However, the 
removal of barriers such as the DADT policy and the combat exclusion ban are 
likely to have influenced women with greater institutional orientations to serve.  
Indeed, volunteering to serve during wartime is considered to be a noble calling.       
     Since the Department of Defense recently announced its decision to open all 
combat jobs to women in all branches of service, it is likely that more female 
recruits will be attracted to military service.  As more women role models, such as 
recent Ranger School graduates, Captain Kristen Griest, First Lieutenant Shaye 
Haver, and Major Lisa Jaster, continue to break down stereotypes and succeed in 
combat-related scenarios, women’s propensity is likely to continue to increase 
even further.  As the era of combat proceeds indefinitely, further research on 
women’s propensity must continue to assess how the expansion of combat jobs 
available to women will influence their propensity to serve.  It is my expectation 
that propensity will increase and more women will be institutionally motivated to 
serve as a result. 
     The fact that women’s propensity is not significantly positively related to 
unemployment suggests that women may be less occupationally motivated to 
serve.  These results differ from results for men, but that is not necessarily 
surprising.  As mentioned, men are generally more concerned with economic and 
tangible benefits than women (e.g. Beutel and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 
2011).  However, the fact that women’s propensity is negatively related to higher 
casualties suggests that women may have occupational motivations as well.  
Indeed, the benefits of military service may not outweigh the costs, especially 
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when those costs are high.  Further, the fact that women’s propensity is positively 
related to lower SES also suggests that women may have occupational 
orientations.  
     Taken as a whole, and similar to men, it appears that women may have a 
mixture of institutional and occupational orientations during the post-9/11 era (i.e. 
“pragmatic professionalism).  More research is needed to uncover women’s 
underlying motivations to serve.  In chapter 7, I analyze women’s motivations 
further by analyzing their attitudes toward work using the I/O spectrum of 
analysis.   
Summary 
     Women’s propensity during the post-9/11 era is related to several macro-social 
factors.  In general, the relationships between these factors and women’s 
propensity are similar in magnitude and direction as for men.  Below, I highlight 
the differences between men and women’s propensity.   
• Propensity is lower for women than for men. 
• Propensity during the post-9/11 era is as high as other years during the 
AVF without war; propensity levels reached its second highest percentage 
in 2013; men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era was as high as in the 
1990s, although it was lower than the 1980s.  
• Propensity declines with increasing public support for war; propensity 
increases with greater nationalistic attitudes; the same trends hold for men.  
• Propensity decreases as casualties increase; the decrease in propensity is 
greater for women than for men. 
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• Propensity does not significantly increase as unemployment rates increase; 
propensity significantly increases for men as unemployment increases. 
     Women’s propensity during the post-9/11 era is also related to several 
individual and demographic factors.  In general, the relationship between 
women’s propensity and these factors are similar in magnitude and direction as 
for men.  
• Propensity levels differ by racial and ethnic background.  Propensity is 
highest among black women, followed by Hispanic women; white women 
show the lowest propensity of race/ethnic groups.  These relationships 
hold true even after controlling for all factors, including SES.  This is 
different than for men, where Hispanic men have the highest propensity 
after controlling for SES.  Black men have the lowest propensity after all 
controls.    
• Propensity declines with parents’ education; women of college-educated 
mothers and fathers have a lower propensity than women whose parents 
did not attend college.  Mother’s education level is not a significant 
predictor for men’s propensity.   
• Propensity declines with educational achievement during high school; the 
same trend holds for men. 
• Propensity varies by region: propensity is higher in the South and West, 
lowest in the Northeast; the same trend holds for men.   
• Propensity declines in suburban and urban areas of the country; the same 
trend holds for men.   
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• Propensity declines with expectations to graduate from a 4-year college; 
women who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational 
education have higher propensity.  Minority women have greater 
propensity than white women when they expect to graduate from a 2-year 
college or attend vocational school; the same trends hold for men.   
• Perceptions of discrimination against women in the military among 
women with propensity have increased during the post-9/11 era, although 
these perceptions are less than women without propensity.  Men have 




Chapter 7: Political Attitudes of Youth  
During the Post-9/11 Era 
 
Civil-Military Relations and the Civil-Military Gap  
 
     Prior to a discussion of political attitudes, I must proceed with a brief review of 
the relationship between the armed forces and society and the civil-military gap 
literature as highlighted earlier in Chapter 2.  Influenced by the military’s 
continual institutional presence within society, researchers began to analyze the 
nature of the military profession and its relationship with the government and the 
people.  Samuel Huntington (1957) argued that it was most beneficial for the 
military to be separate and distinct from the government to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness, whereas Moris Janowitz (1960) argued that the relationship 
between the military and society should be more convergent, similar in values, 
attitudes, and composition.  Huntington saw an incompatibility between the 
professional ethic of the military and societal liberalism, with its emphasis on 
individualism, hostility toward standing armies, and denial of the importance of 
power.  He viewed the professional military ethic to be more compatible with 
conservative ideologies, and believed that the armed forces should be insulated 
from the liberal trends in society to remain effective.  Janowitz, on the other hand, 
proposed a different model of civil-military relations.  For him, informal social 
networks were more important constraints on social behavior than formal 
mechanisms of social control (Segal et al. 2001).  Thus, he believed that in a 
democratic state, civilian control of the military would best be achieved when the 
military was woven into the fabric of society.  He foresaw a military in which 
some identified first as citizens, then as soldiers, some of whose officers attended 
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civilian universities (i.e. ROTC), and some of who lived with their families in 
civilian communities.  Of course, he recognized that the military would have its 
own unique organizational culture similar to many civilian occupations and 
professional groups.  However, he felt that citizen-soldiers and structural linkages 
would help coordinate the military culture with American society (Segal et al. 
2001).    
     As a result of the shift in career-orientation during the early years of the AVF, 
Janowitz (1975) suggested that the professional military was increasingly 
emphasizing distinctive military values; that its linkages with society had become 
weakened and tied to limited segments of the social structure; that changes in the 
recruitment base were making the officer corps and the enlisted less 
representative of society; and that such processes might create an “ideological 
caste” in the military and be a source of political division from civilian society.  
Thus, the military culture might become decoupled from civilian culture.  
Essentially, what Huntington viewed as necessary for military effectiveness, 
Janowitz viewed as problematic for civil-military relations (Segal et al. 2001).        
     The discourse between Huntington and Janowitz about military 
professionalism and the relationships between the military, the state, and society 
raised the debate on civil-military relations to another level.  Their work set the 
foundation for a continued interest among researchers, the military, and the 
political elite on the nature of these relations, establishing civil-military relations 
as part of the research agenda for decades to come.   
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     Due to changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War, there has been a 
renewed interest among journalists, scholars, military leadership and policy 
makers on the social-psychological (i.e. attitudes) and social-structural (i.e. 
demographics) implications on members of the military, as well as the impacts to 
civil-military relations.  Indeed, an increase in civilian jobs within the military, 
especially technical and support specialties, means that military members are 
more likely to specialize in general military skills that may be less transferrable to 
the civilian sector and less understood by civilians.  Additionally, the effects of 
the military’s BRAC policy may cause the military to become even more isolated 
from its host society than before, as many installations have been closed and the 
preponderance of those remaining are consolidated in the South and West.  
Couple that with the dwindling number of ROTC programs throughout the 
Northeast and the lack of military exposure is exacerbated.  Further, members of 
the civilian elite serving in government positions are becoming increasingly 
unaware of military affairs, as the veteran population in government has declined.  
In contrast to the Vietnam era, where over two-thirds of the members of Congress 
were veterans, the veteran population of Congress shrank to about one-third in the 
1990s.  This has caused some to wonder if the military is becoming even more 
estranged from the American public.  Undoubtedly, the media’s negative 
influence on the perception of the military highlighted by sexual harassment 
scandals, such as the Navy’s Tailhook incident and among new Army soldiers in 
training at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, has created a greater disconnect between 
the two (Ricks 1997b).   
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     There is another dimension of the media that must be mentioned.  The way the 
military has been depicted in popular culture more recently has created an 
increasing concern for those in the military and has contributed to a greater 
misunderstanding between both sides.  A cursory review of recent movies is quite 
telling of the media’s negative influence.  Movies such as The Rock (1996) had a 
maverick Marine general hold San Francisco hostage by threatening to use poison 
gas.  Broken Arrow (1996) portrayed a passed-over Air Force major who planned 
to steal nuclear bombs and hold the city of Denver for ransom.  The Siege (1998) 
had an evil Army general oversee martial law in New York City.  In Snake Eyes 
(1998) a Navy commander plotted the successful assassination of the Secretary of 
Defense.  The General’s Daughter (1999) painted a picture of the Army and West 
Point that condones gross sexual misbehavior and covers up rape.  It is 
particularly noteworthy that the two 1998 box office hits that had positive 
portrayals of the military, Saving Private Ryan and The Thin Red Line, were both 
set in WWII, in direct contrast to the negative images depicted in movies of the 
contemporary armed forces (Moskos 2001).  Certainly it is conceivable that these 
images have created some sort of disconnect between the military and society.   
     Perhaps worse yet, “there has been widespread agreement that over the past 
few decades American society has become fragmented, more individualistic, and 
less disciplined” (Ricks 1997b:10).  These changes put society at odds with the 
traditional military values of sacrifice, team, self-discipline, and putting the 
interests of others above oneself.  Couple the military’s organizational changes 
with an increased individualistic, “Me” attitude among members of society and 
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the potential for a cleavage, or “gap,” between civilians and the military were 
thought by some to be wide and alarming (e.g., Ricks 1997b).  
The Civil-Military Gap Literature Review 
     Sociological theory and research suggest that there are linkages between 
occupations and the values and attitudes held by those who practice them.  For 
example, Rosenberg (1957) suggests that people tend to differ in attitudes and 
values in ways that are compatible with the characteristics of the type of 
occupation they desire to enter.  Thus, the transition to a career-oriented 
professional military would be expected to produce a more attitudinally distinct 
military.  However, the important point with respect to civil-military relations is 
not the existence of these occupational attitudes, but rather the compatibility 
between the attitudes of the military profession and the attitudes of civilian 
society (Segal et al. 2001).        
     Attitudinal differences based on the end of conscription, the increasingly 
career-oriented force, and the increasing professionalization of the military have 
caused some analysts to see a problem with civil-military relations in the 1990s 
(Segal et al. 2001).  Initially, a “gap” was viewed as emerging between senior 
military leaders and the civilian leadership who exert constitutional control over 
the military (e.g., Kohn 1994).  Later, the gap was viewed as a broader cultural 
divide between the American armed forces, including enlisted personnel, and the 
civilian society they protect.  The primary focus of research has been on whether 
or not the distinctive attitudes within the military either converge or diverge with 
society at large as well as with civilian leadership.  In particular, researchers who 
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see the “culture gap” as problematic view the military as becoming strongly 
Republican in political party preference, increasingly conservative in ideology, 
and distrustful and disrespectful of the civilian government (Segal et al. 2001). 
     In 1997, Thomas Ricks, a distinguished Pentagon correspondent for the Wall 
Street Journal, and later, the Washington Post, published a widely circulated and 
debated article in the Atlantic Monthly, about a growing civilian-military gap.  
Ricks suggested that, “U.S. military personnel of all ranks are feeling increasingly 
alienated from their own country, and are becoming more conservative and more 
politically active than ever before” (1997b:1).  James Kitfield agreed, suggesting 
that, “soldiers [are] increasingly estranged from society, and vice-versa” (1998).  
Ricks referred to the fact that society has increasingly become a “what’s in it for 
me” type of attitude among young people and that has increased a gap between 
those in the military and the rest of society.  Given Ricks’ stature, “his diagnosis 
of potentially serious problems in relations between the military and civilian 
society could hardly be dismissed as the ill-considered ravings of an antimilitary 
ideologue” (Collins and Holsti 1999:204).  Although Ricks’ analysis was largely 
anecdotal and restricted primarily to the attitudes of a platoon of new Marine 
recruits coming home after basic training, it sparked many scholars to take notice, 
renewing discussions about civil-military relations.  This prompted Ole Holsti, a 
political scientist at Duke, to put Ricks’ hypothesis to empirical test to determine 
the nature and extent of any political, social, and cultural gap that Ricks predicted.    
     Holsti (1998) identified the gap as between military and civilian elites more 
generally.  He described changes over time while drawing on surveys of leaders 
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from 1976-1996.  This was the first major attempt to assess attitudes between the 
military and civilians over a long period of time.  Holsti discovered a growth in 
the proportion of military officers who identified themselves as Republicans and 
who regarded themselves as overwhelmingly conservative in political orientation.  
Further, he provided tentative support for the hypothesis, which he attributed to 
Ricks (1997b), that “younger members of the military are even more pronounced 
in their embrace of hard-core Republican conservatism” (Holsti 1998:12).  
However, he noted that his analysis did not include junior officer or enlisted 
personnel.  Holsti’s (1999) follow-up analysis continued to show support of a gap 
between the military and civilians with respect to political partisanship and 
ideological orientations, with the military being more Republican and 
conservative than civilians.      
     Just prior to 9/11, a large group of researchers interested in the topic conducted 
an extensive research project to determine the nature and extent of a civilian-
military “gap” (e.g., Fever and Kohn 2001).  The Triangle Institute for Security 
Studies (TISS) conducted the comprehensive study in 1998 and 1999 attempting 
to assess whether an attitudinal gap existed between the military and civilian 
populations (Holsti 2001).  The study was the most comprehensive analysis of 
attitudes of military leaders to date, with 723 active-duty service members 
included in their surveys.  Unfortunately, the timing of its publication coinciding 
near the events of 9/11 resulted in little attention to this important project.  The 
TISS study was limited to the attitudes of military elites (i.e. middle to senior-
level officers) who were attending professional military schooling.  The surveys 
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did not include junior officers or the enlisted ranks.  This is particularly 
noteworthy because these ranks only comprise about six percent of the total 
military population (Dempsey 2010).   
     To fill the void in knowledge, Dempsey (2010) conducted a survey focusing 
on the attitudes of enlisted soldiers and junior officers within the Army, who 
comprise the vast majority of the Army population.  His analysis also examined 
racial and ethnic differences, as well as gender differences in attitudes, where 
Holsti’s (1998) analysis did not.  The Citizenship and Service (C&S) study was a 
survey of Army personnel conducted in 2004.  The sample size for analysis was a 
total of 1188 respondents, including 563 enlisted men and women, 90 warrant 
officers, and 535 officers.  Excluded from analysis were junior soldiers (i.e. E-1 
and E-2) along with very senior soldiers such as Sergeant Majors and Generals, 
which left about 90 percent of the army population for analysis.  Attitudes 
measured covered a broad range of topics including: 1) General attitudes toward 
the army, including morale, career intentions, and opinions about army 
leadership; 2) Reasons for joining; 3) Personal attitudes toward social and 
political issues; and 4) Experiences of discrimination and opinions concerning 
gender and racial relations in the army and civilian society.   
     Political Party Affiliation 
     One of the concerns in the debate on military culture was whether the military 
has become disproportionately Republican with respect to party affiliation.  
Political partisanship has been regarded as a long-lasting identification, rooted in 
one’s location in the social structure (e.g. Janowitz and Segal 1967).  Although 
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the Republican and Democratic parties essentially switched platforms between the 
1860s and the 1930s, before the end of conscription and the AVF, the Republican 
Party has maintained consistency with its political stance of supporting a basic 
ideology of less federal government involvement.  Thus, what was meant by 
identifying as a Republican in 1976 (when the MTF studies began) still has the 
same connotation today.  Political party affiliation has direct implications for 
perceptions of the military among the American public, for the role of active and 
retired members of the military in political campaigns, and for the interactions 
between senior military leaders and civilian elites (Dempsey 2010).           
     Findings from the TISS project confirmed widespread anecdotal evidence that 
the military has become overwhelmingly Republican in party affiliation, with 64 
percent of officers in the survey identifying with that party.  On the other hand, 
only 8 percent identified themselves as Democrats.  This was in stark contrast 
with civilian non-veterans where only 29 percent identified as Republican and 33 
percent as Democrats (Holsti 2001).   
     Findings from the C&S study reveal differences from the TISS project with 
respect to political party affiliation.  Results from the C&S survey reveal an army 
that is, overall, less likely to identify with a political party than conventional 
wisdom suggests.  However, results do show some similarities with the TISS 
project among army officers of comparable rank.  Among soldiers in the Army, 
29 percent of respondents identify with the Republican Party while only 11 
percent identify with the Democratic Party.  Among the civilian population, 31 
percent identify as Republican and 33 percent identify as a Democrat.  Many 
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army personnel (26 percent) remain neutral in their party affiliation while only 9 
percent of the civilian population does so.  Interestingly, however, the author 
noted that in a “virtual army,” where a group of civilians correlated with those in 
the army on the dimensions of gender, race, income, age, and education, the Army 
would differ only slightly from the general population in its party affiliation.  
Results also indicate that there is a strong correlation between rank and increasing 
Republican Party identification.  Indeed, among Majors and above, as well as 
Warrant Officers, over 50 percent identify as Republican.  In contrast, from senior 
NCOs to junior enlisted personnel, those who identify as Republican range from 
36 percent to 18 percent respectively (Dempsey 2010).   
     Party identification by demographic subgroups reveal that white officers (58 
percent) are most likely to identify as Republican while black officers (33 
percent) are most likely to identify as Democrat.  Black enlisted soldiers are more 
than three times more likely to identify as Democrat compared to white enlisted 
soldiers, while being three times less likely to identify as Republican.  Hispanic 
soldiers are more like black soldiers with respect to their party affiliation.  
However, Hispanic officers are in between white and black officers with 34 
percent identifying as Republican and 17 percent as Democrat (Dempsey 2010).  
In sum, being male, having a higher income, and having a bachelor’s degree lead 
to a greater likelihood of Republican Party affiliation. 
     Political Ideology 
     One of the long-standing controversies about the social-psychological impacts 
of military experience cross-nationally has focused on the connection between 
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military service and conservatism or authoritarianism (Segal et al. 2001).  While 
authoritarian personalities have been shown to have preferences for the military 
(Roghmann 1966) and those in the military have been shown to be relatively 
conservative (Abrahamsson 1970), it is not clear whether the causality of the 
relationship is due to self-selection into the military or to military socialization 
itself.  Past research does not provide any strong basis for asserting that military 
service changes attitudes in a conservative direction.  Data on ideological 
orientation of the American public reflect a statistically significant but 
proportionately very small increase in conservative self-identification since the 
1950s (Robinson and Fleishman 1988).  Thus, a shift in conservative 
identification in the military might just reflect a larger overall ideological trend in 
society, rather than a divergence between the military and civilian cultures.    
     With respect to ideological identification, results from the TISS project show 
that 66 percent of military leaders identified themselves as either “somewhat 
conservative” (53 percent) or “very conservative” (13 percent).  In contrast, the 
general public non-veterans were only about 38 percent conservative combining 
both response categories.  Those military leaders who identified as having a 
liberal ideology (i.e. “very liberal” or “somewhat liberal”) comprised only 4 
percent of the population.  On the other hand, the general public non-veterans 
were 28 percent liberal, with about 7 percent identifying as “very liberal” and 21 
percent as “somewhat liberal” (Holsti 2001).  Although a significant gap in 
political affiliation and ideology between the military and civilians existed, it 
must be noted again that this survey focused on the attitudes of the military elites.   
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      Findings from the C&S study also reveal differences from the TISS project 
with respect to political ideology.  The C&S data shows that there are no 
significant differences between the military and civilian populations in ideological 
identification.  For example, 38 percent of army personnel identified as 
conservative, whereas 37 percent of civilians did the same.  Only 21 percent of 
army personnel identified as liberal, whereas 24 percent of civilians did so.  Most 
identified as having a moderate ideology, as 41 percent of army personnel and 39 
percent of civilians identified this way.  Where differences still remained were 
between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks.  About 63 percent of officers and 
69 percent of warrant officers identified as conservative, but only 32 percent of 
enlisted personnel identified this way.  Further, only 14 percent of officers and 12 
percent of warrant officers identified as having a liberal ideology, while 23 
percent of enlisted personnel identified in this manner.  Most enlisted personnel 
identified as moderate (45 percent), while only 23 percent of officers identified 
this way (Dempsey 2010).          
     Political ideology by demographic subgroups reveals that there are still 
significant differences in conservative ideology between officers and enlisted 
personnel even after controlling for race and gender.  The difference between the 
conservative identification of officers and soldiers among whites, Hispanics, men 
and women is a substantial 30 percent.  For blacks, these differences between 
officers and soldiers were reduced to about 6 percent.  Similar to the findings on 
political party, within the army, being male, having a higher income, and having a 
bachelor’s degree contributed to a greater likelihood of possessing a conservative 
 228 
ideology within the army.  Being black significantly contributed to having a more 
liberal ideology.  Compared to civilians, those soldiers in the army were 
significantly more conservative even after controlling for various demographic 
controls.  Most interestingly, those civilians with a college degree were more 
liberal than those in the army with a college degree.   
     Segal (2001) and his colleagues conducted a thorough analysis of military 
attitudes focusing primarily on young enlisted personnel covering most of the 
period of the AVF.  Their analysis was part of the TISS project (Fever and Kohn 
2001), but they utilized data from MTF examining two decades from 1976-1985 
and 1986-1995.  Results showed an overall trend of youth Republican Party 
affiliation increasing in the 1970s up until about 1990, and then decreasing but 
never falling below the levels in 1976.  Republican Party identification rose from 
24 percent in 1976 to 45 percent during the Reagan administration.  Then it fell to 
27 percent in 1993 coinciding with the Clinton administration.  Since 1984, 
Republicans have outnumbered Democrats in this age group (Segal et al. 2001).   
     Results from the MTF study also showed that the military was not as 
politically affiliated as noted in earlier research.  Results indicated that the 
military was significantly less Republican than full-time college students for both 
decades of analysis.  Compared with those young people who did not go to 
college, there were no significant differences between the military with respect to 
Republican Party affiliation during both decades.  Consistent with earlier 
research, however, those high school seniors who expected to join the military 
and become an officer were significantly more Republican than those who did not 
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expect to be an officer, except between 1992-1995 where differences were 
minimal.  With respect to race, the MTF study revealed that white enlistees were 
significantly more Republican than the non-white men.  After controlling for race, 
the same patterns above appeared.  Although white men were consistently 
significantly more Republican than non-white men, those men who went to 
college were still more Republican than those (white and non-white) who entered 
military service.   
     Results from the MTF study also indicated that the military is not as 
conservative in ideology as conventional wisdom predicts.  Between 1976 and 
1995 results reveal an upward trend in conservative ideology among the youth 
population overall.  However, high school seniors who had a high propensity to 
serve were not as conservative in ideology as their counterparts who definitely 
expected to attend a 4-year college, although there were no statistically significant 
differences between both groups.  Interestingly, results revealed that those who 
did enter the military within 1-2 years after high school were significantly less 
conservative than their college-bound peers.  Compared with those who did not 
expect to go to full-time college, in the decade of 1976-1985, those who expected 
to enter the military were significantly more conservative.  However, the 
following decade of 1986-1995 revealed no significant differences between these 
groups.  Perhaps, most importantly, results indicated that those young men 
entering service as enlisted personnel were only about a third as likely to consider 
themselves as conservative as the military officers in Holsti’s (1998) sample 
(Segal et al. 2001).   
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     The Civil-Military Gap During the Post-9/11 Era      
     A possible implication from today’s wars on civil-military relations is the 
continuing (or newly discovered) gap between the armed forces and society.  
Some scholars (e.g., Moskos 2001; Bacevich 2013) argue that the length of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as well as the sole reliance on the AVF, have 
contributed to widening the gap between the military and the general population.  
If so, this gap could have important impacts effecting policy issues with respect to 
military manpower and financing.   
     Many people viewed the Iraq War, in particular, as highly politicized in nature.  
At the beginning of the war in March of 2003, a review of numerous polls 
revealed that overall public support for the war was about 75 percent (Berinsky 
2009).  Contrast that with the Korean War and the Gulf War, where public 
support for both was initially just above 60 percent.  After 9/11, public support for 
the war in Afghanistan initially fluctuated between 80 and 90 percent.  During the 
Iraq War, however, there was significant debate about the motivations for going 
to war, and public support began to dwindle as the war continued.  In October 
2005, at the height of the Iraqi insurgency, support had dropped around 40 percent 
and never recovered completely (Berinsky 2009).  Many analysts began to 
comment on the political aspects of the war, as a significant political divide 
occurred between members of Congress.  Indeed, the Iraq War policy became a 
major topic of debate during the Presidential elections of 2004 and 2008.  
Although there was an initial split between Republicans and Democrats when the 
war began, it exacerbated as the war continued.  In 2003, Republicans 
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overwhelmingly supported the Iraq War with almost 90 percent approval, while 
Democrats were at about 55 percent.  As the insurgency in Iraq grew and U.S. 
casualties spiked, Republican support remained high, never falling below 75 
percent through 2008.  On the other hand, Democratic support dropped 
precipitously to below 20 percent, reflecting over a 50 percent difference in 
support between political parties, lasting almost four years between 2004 and 
2008 (Berinsky 2009).   
     The Pew Research Center (2011a) conducted the most recent study analyzing 
the impact of the recent wars to reassess the nature and extent of a civil-military 
gap since 9/11.  Considering that our armed forces have remained in combat 
longer than any period in our history, the extent and nature of a gap could 
increase.  Researchers at Pew interviewed a representative sample of 1,853 
veterans who served in the U.S. armed forces and are no longer on active duty.  
Of the total sample, 1,134 had separated from service before 9/11 (“pre-9/11 
veterans”) and 712 served after 9/11 (“post-9/11 veterans”), including 336 who 
served either in Afghanistan or Iraq in combat.  The general public survey 
consisted of a national sample of 2,003 adults 18 years or older living in the 
continental United States.   
     Post-9/11 veterans were more likely than the general public to identify with the 
Republican Party and to disapprove of the job that President Obama was doing as 
Commander-in-Chief.  Results from the Pew Study indicated that 36 percent of 
post-9/11 veterans identified as Republican whereas only 23 percent of the public 
identified this way.  Further, 34 percent of the general public identified as 
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Democrat while only 21 percent of the post-9/11 veterans did so.  The pre-9/11 
veterans were more Republican than the general public (30 percent) but not as 
much as the post-9/11 veterans (Pew 2011a).  Equally telling, when the general 
public was asked to consider all costs versus benefits to the U.S. in determining 
whether or not the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were worth fighting, 56 percent 
of Republicans said the war in Afghanistan was worth it while only 34 percent of 
Democrats thought the same.  For the war in Iraq specifically, 59 percent of 
Republicans thought the war was worth fighting, while only 24 percent of 
Democrats agreed (Pew 2011a). 
     With respect to political ideology, results from the Pew study show that nearly 
half of all veterans (48 percent) were politically conservative, compared with 37 
percent of the public.  Pre-9/11 veterans were more conservative than their post-
9/11 peers who have served since the terrorist attacks, with 49 and 40 percent 
identifying as conservative respectively.  At the same time, the general public 
identified as more liberal than all veterans with 22 percent identifying in this 
manner, while less than 15 percent of veterans did the same (Pew 2011a).  
Interestingly, post-9/11 veterans were most likely to be moderate in ideology (43 
percent) and were more moderate than the pre-9/11 veterans or the general public 
(both 34 percent).   
Recent Trends in Republicanism and Conservatism  
     According to a recent Pew study (2013), since 1995, trends in overall 
Republican Party identification have been on the decline, fluctuating between two 
and eleven percent less than those identifying as Democrats.  Meanwhile, 
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Democratic Party identification has been on the rise throughout this period.  Since 
2003, the split between those identifying as Republican or Democrat has grown 
even larger, with Democratic affiliation holding steady while Republican 
affiliation has continued to decline as more people have been identifying as 
Independents.  Interestingly, in 2009, people started identifying as Independents 
more so than Democrats or Republicans (Pew 2013). 
     Since 1999, conservative trends in the U.S. have been on a steady rise and 
have remained consistently above (approximately 15 percent above) those who 
identify as having a liberal political ideology.  Those identifying as having a 
moderate ideology have been slightly above (about 2 percent) conservatives in the 
early to mid-2000s, and slightly below conservatives since 2007.  In 2013, 38 
percent of Americans said they were conservative, 36 percent said they were 
moderate, and 22 percent said they were liberal (Pew 2013).      
     Another recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2011b) revealed 
that Republican Party affiliation has also decreased among the younger 
generation.  Younger people of the “Millennial” generation, between the ages of 
18-30, were more likely to vote Democratic during the last four national elections.  
These people also hold liberal attitudes on most issues, as well as America’s 
approach to foreign policy.  Today, half of Millennials (50 percent) consider 
themselves as Democrats or Democratic-leaning Independents, while only 36 
percent affiliate or lean toward the Republican Party.  Additionally, Millennials 
are far more likely to describe their political views as liberal compared with older 
generations.  In 2011, 26 percent of Millennials identified as liberal, while only 19 
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percent of the “baby-boom” generation did the same.  In contrast, 42 percent of 
the “Boomers” identified as having a conservative ideology, while just 30 percent 
of Millennials did the same.  Since 9/11, conservative trends have generally 
increased across most all generations.  For example, the Boomer generation 
increased from 35 percent to 42 percent while the Millennials remained fairly 
stable at 30 percent (Pew 2011b). 
Parental Attitudes 
     Prior research has shown that political ideology is oftentimes passed down 
generationally from parents to their children.  Indeed, family has been shown to 
be a primary influence on political socialization and the major shaper on basic 
attitudes (Glass et al. 1986).  Other influences include schools, peers, mass media, 
political leaders, and religious institutions.  Thus, it is a reasonable assumption 
that high-school seniors’ stated political attitudes and ideology reflect that of his 
or her parents.  Indeed, parental political attitudes have been shown to 
significantly predict children’s orientations after childhood (Glass et al. 1986).      
Political Party Predictions 
     Trying to predict a youth’s political party affiliation and political ideology is a 
bit tricky given variations in the recent data.  Indeed, Dempsey (2010) and Segal 
and his colleagues (2001) show that those in the military are not as Republican as 
other analysts (e.g., Huntington 1957; Ricks 1997b; Holsti 1998; Holsti 2001) 
have originally argued.  There certainly have been variations in what part of the 
military has been studied, ranging from mid-to-senior level officers of the military 
elite, to junior enlisted personnel and those in high school expecting to enter the 
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military.  Given recent societal trends revealing a decline in Republican Party 
identification (Pew 2013), it is expected that these attitudes will be transferred to 
the youth population by their parents (Glass et al. 1986).  The fact that young 
junior enlisted soldiers have been shown to be less Republican than the officer 
corps (Dempsey 2010; Segal et al. 2001) suggests that this trend will also hold for 
high school youth who are about to enter the armed forces.  However, the 
overwhelmingly large political divide in support of the wars in Afghanistan and, 
especially Iraq, (Berinsky 2009) can lead one to believe that parental attitudes (i.e. 
Republican) may have had a strong impact on shaping the attitudes of those about 
to join the military in the post-9/11 era.  Therefore, I expect that those youth who 
are likely to serve in the armed forces will affiliate with the Republican Party 
more than the Democratic Party.  Prior research (e.g. Dempsey 2010) has shown 
that white men who have a higher income in the military are more likely to be 
Republican.  Additionally, race and ethnicity influence party affiliation in the 
army in the same manner as in the civilian population.  Consistent with earlier 
research, I expect that white youth who expect to serve will be more likely to 
affiliate with the Republican Party compared to blacks or Hispanics.  I also expect 
that men who expect to serve will be more likely to be Republican than their 
women counterparts.     
Hypothesis 7a: Youth who expect to serve in the armed forces 
during the post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the 
Republican Party than other party affiliations. 
 
Hypothesis 7b: White youth who expect to serve in the armed 
forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with 
the Republican Party compared to black or Hispanic youth who 
expect to serve. 
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Hypothesis 7c: Young men who are likely to serve in the armed 
forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with 
the Republican Party compared to their women counterparts. 
 
Political Ideology Predictions 
     Given the recent data on political ideology in the military, it is clearer 
on what to expect.  The preponderance of research (e.g., Holsti 1998; 
Holsti 2001; Dempsey 2010; Pew 2011a) reveals a military that is 
primarily conservative in political ideology.  Therefore, there is no reason 
to expect that youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the 
post-9/11 era will be any different than before.  Although moderate 
ideology has recently increased and the Millennials are less conservative 
and more liberal than previous generations, conservative trends still 
remain high across America (Pew 2013).  Despite the fact that previous 
MTF studies (Segal et al. 2001) have shown that the military is less 
conservative than others have argued, the majority of evidence leads me to 
expect that those youth who have a high propensity to serve will be more 
likely to identify as conservative than liberal.  Although some studies have 
shown (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) that the general military 
population is no more conservative than the civilian population, I expect 
that the impacts of sustained war after 9/11 will result in significant 
differences between the military and civilian populations with respect to 
ideological attitudes, especially given that there are fewer people in the 
U.S. population serving today than during previous wars. 
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Hypothesis 7d: Youth who expect to serve in the armed forces 
during the post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a 
conservative political ideology than other ideological 
orientations. 
 
Hypothesis 7e: White youth who expect to serve in the armed 
forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as 
having a conservative political ideology compared to black or 
Hispanic youth who expect to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 7f: Young men who expect to serve in the armed 
forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as 
having a conservative political ideology compared to their women 
counterparts. 
 
Methods for Deriving Political Party Affiliation and Ideology 
     For identifying a respondent’s political party affiliation, I combine those who 
identify as “Strongly Republican” and “Mildly Republican” and categorize them 
as identifying with the Republican Party.  I keep “Independent” responses as their 
own category.  I combine responses of “Strongly Democratic and “Mildly 
Democratic” and categorize them as identifying with the Democratic Party.  I 
combine other response categories such as “Other,” “No Preference,” and “Don’t 
Know, Haven’t Decided” into a separate category.  The four total categories are 
“Republican,” “Independent,” “Democrat,” and “No Preference/Other/Don’t 
Know.”  This political party classification generally corresponds with recent 
research (e.g. Holsti 1998; Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) for purposes of 
comparison.  For some of my analyses below, I drop the “No 
Preference/Other/Don’t Know” category to compare whether youth with 
propensity lean more toward a Republican or Democratic Party affiliation by 
racial and ethnic background.  In these instances, I highlight the distinction.       
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     For identifying a respondent’s political ideology, I combine those who 
identified as “Conservative” or “Very Conservative” and categorize them as 
identifying as having a conservative political ideology.  I also combine those who 
identify as being “Liberal” or “Very Liberal” as having a liberal political 
ideology.  I keep “Moderate” and “Radical” responses as their own separate 
categories.  I combine “None of the Above, or Don’t Know,” and missing data 
into another separate category.  The five total categories are “Conservative,” 
“Moderate,” “Liberal,” “Radical,” and “None of the Above, Don’t Know, or 
Missing.”  This convention generally corresponds to other studies (e.g. Holsti 
1998; Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010).  For some of my analyses below, I drop 
the “None of the Above, Don’t Know, or Missing” category to compare whether 
youth with propensity lean toward more conservative or liberal ideology by racial 
and ethnic background.  In these instances, I highlight the distinction.    
     First, I examine overall youth trends in Republicanism and Conservatism 
during the post-9/11 era by including all youth who respond to those questions in 
my analysis.  To test hypothesis 7a, I conduct logistic regression analysis using 
propensity as the dependent variable to determine how likely youth with 
propensity will affiliate with the Republican Party compared to other party 
affiliations- Independent, Democrat, or No Preference, Other, or Don’t Know.  To 
test hypothesis 7d, I conduct a similar logistic regression analysis to determine 
how likely youth with propensity will identify with a conservative ideology 
compared to other ideologies- Moderate, Liberal, or None, Don’t Know or 
Missing.  To test hypotheses 7b and 7e, I analyze differences in political party 
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affiliation and ideology by racial and ethnic background.  I also conduct an 
additional logistic regression analysis that combines both of the political 
variables, party affiliation and ideology, into a model to control for one another.   
     As a test to verify that youth know what it means to identify as conservative or 
liberal, I utilize the nationalism index that I created earlier (see Chapter 4) to 
compare a youth’s political ideology identification with their responses on a series 
of questions from MTF Form 2 that are related to conservative or liberal values.  
As noted earlier, my nationalism scale index measure consists of the six following 
questions: 1) The U.S. should begin a gradual program of disarming whether 
other countries do or not (reverse coded); 2) The U.S. should be willing to go to 
war to protect its own economic interests; 3) The U.S. does not need to have 
greater military power than Russia (reverse coded); 4) The U.S. ought to have 
much more military power than any other nation in the world; 5) There may be 
times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries; 6) 
The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on 
our own country (reverse coded).  Higher responses on the index scale indicate a 
greater conservative ideological orientation.  These questions have been used as 
measures of youth attitudes in earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000a/b; Segal 
et al. 2001).  From these questions, I conduct a simple regression model to 





Propensity and Political Attitudes Analysis 
     Descriptive statistics for the analysis of propensity in this chapter by my 
primary predictor variables, political party affiliation and political ideology, are 
reported for men only in Table 7.1 below.  Additional controls used in my earlier 
analyses (i.e. Chapters 4 and 6) are maintained for this analysis for continuity and 
theoretical purposes.  For brevity sake and continuity, I focus the report and 
discussion that follows on the results reported in my full model utilizing all 
controls (i.e. Model 6 for logistic regression analysis and Model 3 for linear 





     Figure 7.1 below depicts the overall average youth trends of political party 
affiliation (men only) between 1976-2013.  Results reveal a general decline in 
Republicanism since the late-1980s, after the heyday of the Reagan 
administration, where youth percentages peaked at just under 40 percent.  During 
the post-9/11 era, it appears that Republicanism among men has remained fairly 
steady at approximately 25 percent, with a peak at over 30 percent in 2005.  
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Young men’s affiliation with the Democratic Party has also remained fairly stable 
during the post-9/11 era, averaging slightly less than Republican affiliation with a 
peak at almost 28 percent in 2009.  There are a high percentage of young men 
who have no preference toward a political party, don’t know, or there is missing 
data, although percentages have declined during the post-9/11 era.       
 
     Figure 7.2 below reveals overall trends of political party affiliation for men 
with military propensity between 1976-2013.  Results show a fairly consistent 
percentage of men with propensity who affiliate with the Republican Party since 
1984.  During the post-9/11 era, however, it appears that the gap between 
affiliating with the Republican Party compared to the Democratic Party has 
increased further among men with propensity.  Overall, results indicate a rise in 
Republican Party affiliation and a slight decline in Democratic Party affiliation 
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among men with propensity, which is not consistent with overall youth trends for 
men.      
 
     Utilizing logistic regression analysis similar to the baseline analysis used in 
previous chapters, results reported in Table 7.2 below indicate the odds ratios of 
propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent 
variables for men only.  The primary predictor variable in Table 7.2 is the 
political party variable.  Consistent with hypothesis 7a, findings indicate that men 
who expect to serve are significantly more likely to affiliate with the Republican 
Party compared to other parties.  Model 6 of Table 7.2 utilizes full control 
measures (e.g. race, SES, educational attainment and goals, urbanicity, and region 
of country) and indicates that men who identify as Democratic are about half as 
likely (OR=0.56***) as Republicans to have the propensity to serve.  Those who 
have no preference, don’t know, or choose other are about a third less likely 
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(OR=0.65***) to expect to serve compared to Republicans.  Independents are a 
quarter less likely (OR=0.75***) to have propensity compared to Republicans.  It 
appears that men who are likely to serve during the post-9/11 era are becoming 
increasingly Republican in party affiliation, even prior to controlling for SES, 
educational attainment, and other factors.   
     The magnitude and direction of these findings are strengthened even further 
when you compare those men who expect that they “definitely will” serve (i.e. 
“high propensity”) versus those men who expect that they “definitely won’t” 
serve (i.e. “low propensity”).  High propensity men have even greater affiliation 
with the Republican Party compared to men with low propensity.  Model 6 of 
Table 7.2.1 utilizes full control measures and indicates that men who identify as 
Democratic are nearly two-thirds less likely (OR=0.42***) than Republicans to 
have high propensity.  Those who have no preference, don’t know or choose other 
are about half as likely (OR=0.52***) to have high propensity compared to 
Republicans.  Independents are a third less likely (OR=0.62***) to have high 
propensity compared to Republicans.  Results from this analysis are located in 





     Figure 7.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
political party affiliation after full controls.  Results indicate that the predicted 
probability of the propensity to serve for Republican men is about 18 percent.  
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Conversely, the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for Democratic 




     Model 7 of Table 7.2 above includes an interaction between political party 
affiliation and racial and ethnic background.  Results indicate that there is a 
significant difference (OR=1.35*) in the propensity to serve between black men 
who affiliate with the Democratic Party compared to white men who affiliate with 
the Republican Party.  Figure 7.4 below indicates that, on average, black men who 
affiliate with the Democratic Party have about a 12 percent predicted probability 
of serving, whereas white men who affiliate with the Republican Party have about 
an 18 percent predicted probability of serving.  Interestingly, the biggest 
difference in the predicted probability of the propensity to serve is between white 
Democratic men and Hispanic Republican men.  White Democratic men have 
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about an 11 percent probability of serving, whereas Hispanic Republican men 
have about an 18 percent probability of serving.  Also of interest, Independents 
have the greatest probability of serving among black men.   
 
     Figure 7.5 below reveals overall average trends of political ideology (men 
only) between 1976-2013.  Results show a fairly consistent percentage of men 
who identify either as conservative or liberal over time.  During the post-9/11 era, 
it appears that men’s trends are becoming slightly more conservative as opposed 
to liberal after 2009, which is consistent with recent research (e.g. Pew 2013).  
Additionally, it appears that men are more moderate in ideology than conservative 
or liberal, although the moderate ideological trends of the male population appear 




     Figure 7.6 below reveals overall average ideological trends of men with 
propensity between 1976-2013.  Results show a fairly consistent percentage of 
men with propensity who identify as conservative as opposed to liberal over time.  
During the post-9/11 era, however, it appears that the gap between conservative 
and liberal attitudes among men with propensity has increased further.  
Additionally, data shows that men with propensity are becoming equally as 
conservative as moderate in ideology since 2005.  Overall, results indicate a rise 
in conservatism and a decline in liberalism among men with propensity, which is 






     It is possible that youth may not fully understand what it means to identify 
with a particular political ideology.  To test this possibility, I compare a 
respondent’s political ideology with various attitudinal questions that are related 
to conservative or liberal values.  Specifically, I utilize the nationalism index that 
I created earlier from questions on the MTF Form 2 survey (see Chapter 3 for 
details on the questions used for the “nationalism” index) and compare attitudes 
toward U.S. supremacy with a respondent’s political ideology identification.  
Greater numbers on the nationalism index indicate more conservative attitudes, 
whereas lower numbers indicate more liberal attitudes toward U.S. supremacy.  A 
simple regression model using a respondent’s score on the nationalism index as 
the dependent variable and political ideology as the predictor variable supports 
the notion that youth have a good understanding of what it means to identify with 
a particular political ideology.  Indeed, results indicate that youth who were most 
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conservative on the index also responded as having a conservative political 
ideology.  Similarly, youth who scored lower on the nationalism index, indicating 
more liberal views, responded as having a liberal ideology.  As expected, 
identification with a moderate ideology fell somewhere in the middle of scores on 
the nationalism index.  In other words, men who identify as liberal score on 
average approximately 3.79 points less (p<.001) on the nationalism scale 
(indicating less conservative attitudes) compared to youth who identify as 
conservative.   
     Figure 7.7 below shows a box plot of a respondent’s score on the nationalism 
scale by political ideology.  As depicted, those who identify as having a 
conservative political ideology score highest on the nationalism scale while those 
who identify as having a liberal ideology score the lowest.  Thus, data show that 
youth were consistent with responding to their attitudes on multiple questions 
measuring conservatism and their stated ideology.   
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     Results from logistic regression analysis reported in Table 7.3 below indicate 
the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the 
independent variables for men only.  The primary predictor variable in Table 7.3 
is the political ideology variable.  Consistent with hypothesis 7d, findings indicate 
that men who expect to serve are significantly more likely to be conservative.  
Model 6 of Table 7.3 utilizes full control measures and indicates that men who 
identify as having a liberal political ideology are about half as likely 
(OR=0.54***) as conservatives to have the propensity to serve.  Those who report 
having no political ideology, they don’t know, or are reported as missing data are 
about a third less likely (OR=0.62***) to expect to serve compared to 
conservatives.  Moderates are a quarter less likely (OR=0.75***) to have 
propensity compared to conservatives.  It appears that men with propensity during 
the post-9/11 era are two times more conservative than liberal in political 
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ideology.   
     The magnitude and direction of these findings are strengthened even further 
when you compare high propensity versus low propensity men.  High propensity 
men have even greater conservative ideologies compared to their low propensity 
counterparts.  Model 6 of Table 7.3.1 utilizes full control measures and indicates 
that youth who identify as having a liberal ideology are nearly two-thirds as likely 
(OR=0.43***) as conservatives to have a high propensity to serve.  Those who 
have no political ideology, don’t know or are missing data are about half as likely 
(OR=0.51***) to have high propensity compared to conservatives.  Moderates are 
about a third less likely (OR=0.70***) to have high propensity compared to 
conservatives.  Results from this analysis are located in Table 7.3.1 of Appendix 




     Figure 7.8 below depicts the predicted probabilities of the propensity to serve 
by political ideology after full controls.  Results indicate that the predicted 
probability of the propensity to serve for conservative men is almost 19 percent.  
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Conversely, the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for liberal men is 
about 11.5 percent.  Moderate and radical men are in between with approximately 




     Model 7 of Table 7.3 includes an interaction between political ideology and 
racial and ethnic background.  Results indicate significant differences (OR=1.32*) 
in the propensity to serve between black liberal men compared to white 
conservative men.  Figure 7.9 below indicates that, on average, black liberal men 
have about a 12 percent predicted probability of serving, whereas white 
conservative men have about an 18 percent probability of serving.  Interestingly, 
the biggest difference in predicted propensity is between white liberal men and 
Hispanic conservative men.  White liberal men have about an 11 percent 
probability of serving, whereas Hispanic conservative men have about a 20 
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percent predicted probability of serving.       
 
     Table 7.4 below combines the political party and ideology variables into a 
model for analysis.  Results reported in Table 7.4 indicate the odds ratios of 
propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent 
variables for men only.  The primary predictor variables in Table 7.4 are both 
political attitudes variables: party affiliation and political ideology.  When 
combining both variables to the model, results do not significantly change in 
magnitude or direction from the results above where only a single political 
variable was in the model.  Consistent with hypotheses 9a and 10a, findings 
indicate that men who expect to serve are significantly more likely to be 
Republican and conservative compared to those who don’t expect to serve.  
Model 6 of Table 7.4 utilizes full control measures, including political ideology as 
a control, indicating that men who affiliate with the Democratic Party are about 
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one third as likely (OR=0.66***) as Republicans to have the propensity to serve.  
Those who have no preference, don’t know or choose other are about a quarter 
less likely (OR=0.77***) to expect to serve compared to Republicans.  
Independents are about one fifth less likely (OR=0.85***) to have propensity 
compared to Republicans.  Similarly, after controlling for political party 
affiliation, Model 6 of Table 7.4 indicates that men who identify as having a 
liberal political ideology are about one third as likely (OR=0.66***) as 
conservatives to have the propensity to serve.  Those who report having no 
political ideology, don’t know, or are reported as missing data are about a third 
less likely (OR=0.71***) to expect to serve compared to conservatives.  
Moderates are about one fifth less likely (OR=0.83***) to have propensity 
compared to conservatives.  
     The magnitude and direction of these findings are strengthened even further 
when you compare high propensity versus low propensity men.  Those men with 
high propensity have even greater Republican Party affiliation and conservative 
ideology compared to men with low propensity.  Results from this analysis are 





     Figure 7.10 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
political party affiliation after controlling for all variables in the model to include 
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political ideology.  Results indicate that the predicted probability of the propensity 
to serve for Republican men is almost 17 percent.  Conversely, the predicted 
probability of the propensity to serve for Democratic men is less than 12 percent.  
Independents remain in between with approximately a 14.5 percent probability of 
serving.   
 
     Figure 7.11 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
political ideology after controlling for all variables in the model to include 
political party affiliation.  Results indicate that the predicted probability of the 
propensity to serve for conservative men is almost 17 percent.  Conversely, the 
predicted probability of the propensity to serve for liberal men is about 12 
percent.  Moderate and radical men remain in between at approximately a 15 
percent probability of serving.   
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     Model 7 of Table 7.4 includes an interaction between political party affiliation 
and racial and ethnic background.  Similarly, Model 8 of Table 7.4 includes an 
interaction between political ideology and racial and ethnic background.  Results 
indicate no significant differences between racial and ethnic background and 
either political party or ideology.   
     Racial/Ethnic Differences in Political Attitudes Among Men with Propensity 
     In a separate but related analysis, Table 7.5 below reports differences in means 
of political party affiliation for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era.  
My dependent variable for analysis is the political party affiliation variable which 
is coded on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Republican, 2=Independent, 3=Democrat), where 
all other responses of “No Preference,” “Other,” or “Don’t Know” are dropped 
from the analysis since they would skew results.  Table 7.5 shows that, on 
average, men with propensity, regardless of racial and ethnic background, lean 
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significantly away from the Democratic Party compared to men of the same 
race/ethnicity without propensity.  However, black and Hispanic men with 
propensity still lean more toward Democratic Party affiliation compared to white 
men, even among youth with propensity.  White men with propensity affiliate 
with the Republican Party significantly more than their black and Hispanic 
counterparts respectively.  Similar results appear between racial and ethnic groups 
when comparing men with high and low propensity.  Results also show that men 
with propensity during the post-9/11 era lean more toward the Republican Party 
than men with propensity prior to 9/11.   
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     Utilizing linear regression analysis, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in 
political party affiliation among men with propensity.  The dependent variable in 
Table 7.6 below is political party affiliation and the primary predictor variable in 
Table 7.6 is the race/ethnicity variable.  After full controls (i.e. SES, educational 
attainment and goals, urbanicity, and region of country), results reported in Model 
3 of Table 7.6 reveal significant differences between political party affiliation and 
racial and ethnic background similar to the results noted above from the 
difference of means test.  Consistent with hypothesis 7b, black men with 
propensity are significantly more Democratic in party affiliation compared to their 
white counterparts.  On average, black men score about .94 higher (p<.001) on the 
scale of 1 to 3.  Similarly, Hispanic men with propensity score about 0.52 higher 
(p<.001) on the same scale compared to their white counterparts.   
     A comparison of racial and ethnic differences in political party affiliation 
among men with high propensity shows that there are no changes in magnitude 
and direction from the results noted above.  Results from this analysis are reported 




     Figure 7.12 below depicts political party affiliation by race and ethnic 
background among men with the propensity to serve after full controls.  On 
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average, white men with propensity score about 1.57 (on a scale of 1 to 3) 
indicating more Republican affiliations compared to black men who score 2.51 
and Hispanic men who score 2.09.  
 
     Not surprisingly, results from Model 3 of Table 7.6 also indicate that higher 
socioeconomic status is related to a greater Republican Party affiliation as 
opposed to identifying as an Independent or affiliating with the Democratic Party.  
Additionally, it appears that greater educational attainment (i.e. G.P.A.) is related 
to greater Republican Party affiliations as well.  Not surprisingly, it appears that 
growing up in a city or the suburbs of a city is related to greater affiliation with 
the Democratic Party.  These results support earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 
2001; Dempsey 2010).  Indeed, my research suggests that men with propensity 
are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and they are more likely to 
be white, of a higher class, have a higher grade point average, and reside outside a 
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small city or in the country in the southern region of the country. 
     Table 7.7 below reports differences in means of political party affiliation for 
my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era.  My dependent variable for this 
analysis is the political ideology variable on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Conservative, 
2=Moderate, 3=Liberal), where all responses of “Radical,” “None,” “Don’t 
Know,” or missing data are dropped from the analysis since they would skew 
results.  Prior to controls, results show that, on average, men with propensity, 
regardless of racial and ethnic background, lean significantly toward a 
conservative ideology compared to men of the same race/ethnicity without 
propensity.  White men with propensity identify closer to a conservative ideology 
than their black and Hispanic counterparts respectively.  Similar results appear 
between racial and ethnic groups when comparing men with high and low 
propensity.  Results also show that men with propensity during the post-9/11 era 




     In a similar analysis to above, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in 
political ideology among men with propensity utilizing linear regression.  The 
dependent variable in Table 7.8 below is political ideology and the primary 
predictor variable in Table 7.8 is the race/ethnicity variable.  After full controls, 
results reported in Model 3 of Table 7.8 reveal significant differences between 
political ideology and racial and ethnic background similar to the results noted 
above from the difference of means test.  Consistent with hypothesis 7e, black 
men with propensity are significantly more liberal compared to their white 
counterparts.  On average, black men are about .14 higher (p<.001) on the scale of 
1 to 3 in the liberal direction.  Similarly, Hispanic men with propensity are about 
.29 higher (p<.001) on the same scale compared to their white counterparts. 
     A comparison of racial and ethnic differences in political ideology among men 
with high propensity shows that there are no changes in magnitude and direction 
from the results noted above.  Results from this analysis are reported in Table 




     Figure 7.13 below depicts political ideology by race and ethnic background 
among men with the propensity to serve after full controls.  On average, white 
men with propensity score about 1.77 (on scale of 1 to 3) indicating a more 
conservative ideology compared to black men who score 1.91 and Hispanic men 
who score 2.06.  
 
     Interestingly, results from Model 3 of Table 7.8 indicate that higher 
socioeconomic status is not significantly related to identification with a 
conservative ideology as opposed to a moderate or liberal ideology.  Additionally, 
it appears that greater educational attainment (i.e. G.P.A.) is related to a greater 
conservative ideology.  Not surprisingly, it appears that growing up in a city or 
the suburb of a city is related to greater affiliation with a liberal ideology.  These 
results support earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010).  Indeed, 
my research suggests that men with propensity are more likely to be conservative, 
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and they are more likely to be white with a higher grade point average and reside 
somewhere outside a major city in the southern or western region of the country. 
Women’s Propensity and Political Attitudes Analysis 
     Descriptive statistics for my analysis of women’s propensity by the primary 
predictor variables, political party affiliation and political ideology, are reported 
in Table 7.9 below.  For brevity sake and continuity, I focus the report and 
discussion that follows on the results reported in my full model (i.e. Model 6) 
utilizing all control variables, to include the political party and ideology variables 
together in the model (similar to Table 7.4 above for men).  Results do not 
significantly change in magnitude or direction when I analyze the relationship 
between women’s propensity and either political party affiliation or ideology 





     Figure 7.14 below depicts the overall average youth trends of political party 
affiliation for women only between 1976-2013 prior to additional controls.  
Results reveal a general pattern of greater Democratic Party affiliation among 
young women.  On average, women tend to affiliate with the Democratic Party 
approximately 5 to 10 percent more than with the Republican Party.  Those 
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women who identify as an Independent are comparatively lower than the two 
parties.  Similar to men, there are a high percentage of young women who have 
no preference toward a political party, don’t know, or there is missing data, 
although percentages have declined during the post-9/11 era.       
 
     Figure 7.15 below reveals the overall average trends of political party 
affiliation for women with military propensity between 1976-2013 prior to 
additional controls.  Similar to the population of young women overall, results 
show a fairly consistent percentage of young women with propensity who affiliate 
with the Democratic Party since the beginning of the AVF.  These trends are not 
consistent with the trends among men with propensity who generally affiliate with 
the Republican Party.  These results support hypothesis 7c.  During the post-9/11 
era, however, it appears that the gap among women with propensity who affiliate 
with the Democratic Party compared to the Republican Party has somewhat 
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decreased.  Interestingly, data show that women with propensity who identify as 
an Independent has slightly increased since 2004.  
 
     Figure 7.16 below reveals the overall average ideological trends of women 
between 1976-2013 prior to additional controls.  Not surprisingly, results show a 
fairly consistent percentage of young women who identify mostly as a moderate 
or a liberal over time.  Although moderate trends remain high among women, 
they have been on a slight decline since the 1990s.  Women are least likely to be 
conservative, although conservative trends appear to be on a slight rise during the 
post-9/11 era.  In comparison, women are much less conservative than men.  
However, results show that both men and women are more moderate than 
conservative or liberal in ideology.   
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     Figure 7.17 below reveals the overall average ideological trends of women 
with propensity between 1976-2013 prior to additional controls.  Trends show a 
fairly consistent percentage of women with propensity who identify most with a 
moderate political ideology.  Unlike men, trends show that women with 
propensity are more liberal than conservative, which is consistent with hypothesis 
7f.  During the post-9/11 era, however, it appears that the gap between liberal and 
conservative attitudes among women with propensity has decreased.  Overall, 
results indicate a rise in conservatism and a decline in liberalism among youth 
with propensity during the post-9/11 era, which is not consistent with overall 
women’s trends.  Moderate ideology remains highest among women with 




     Interestingly, about 45 percent of women with propensity affiliate with the 
either the Republican or Democratic Party.  For men, over 50 percent of youth 
with propensity identify with one of the two major political parties.  In contrast, 
Dempsey (2010) found that only 31 percent of the junior enlisted population 
identified as either a Republican or Democrat.  It appears that both women and 
men with propensity are becoming less apolitical than Dempsey suggested during 
the post-9/11 era.      
     Table 7.10 below combines the political party and ideology variables into a 
model for analysis.  Results reported in Table 7.10 indicate the odds ratios of 
women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the 
independent variables.  The primary predictor variables in Table 7.10 are both 
political attitudes variables: party affiliation and political ideology.  Findings 
indicate that young women who expect to serve are significantly more likely to be 
Republican and conservative compared to those who don’t expect to serve.  
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Model 6 of Table 7.10 utilizes full control measures, including political ideology 
as a control, indicating that women who affiliate with the Democratic Party are 
about one quarter less likely (OR=0.78***) than Republicans to have the 
propensity to serve.  Those who have no preference, don’t know or choose other 
are no more likely (OR=0.88) than Republicans to expect to serve.  Interestingly, 
Independents are about one and a quarter times more likely (OR=1.20*) than 
Republicans to have propensity.  Consistent with hypothesis 7c, results for 
women are different than results for men, suggesting that men with propensity are 
more likely to be Republican than women.  Of note, the percentage of women 
who identify as an Independent is relatively low at about 10 percent compared to 
those who affiliate with the Republican Party (see Table 7.9).   
     Interestingly, it appears that controlling for racial and ethnic background 
changes the magnitude and direction of the political party predictor variable.  
Model 1 of Table 7.10 shows that Republican women are least likely to have 
propensity prior to controlling for race and ethnic background.  However, after 
controlling for race/ethnicity, Model 2 of Table 7.10 shows that Democratic 
women are least likely to have propensity.  This suggests that for women, race is 
the most significant predictor of political party.  This is not the case for men, 
where men who affiliate with the Republican Party are most likely to have 
propensity (see Table 7.4 above), regardless of racial and ethnic background.       
      Similarly, after controlling for political party affiliation, Model 6 of Table 
7.10 indicates that young women who identify as having a liberal political 
ideology are about one quarter as likely (OR=0.78**) as conservatives to have the 
 279 
propensity to serve.  Those who report having no political ideology, don’t know, 
or are reported as missing data are about a fifth less likely (OR=0.81**) to expect 
to serve compared to conservatives.  There are no significant differences in 
women’s propensity between moderates (OR=0.91) and radicals (OR=1.02) 
compared to conservatives.  These results are generally consistent with the results 
for men, suggesting that conservative women are more likely to have propensity 
than liberal women.  
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     Figure 7.18 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by political party affiliation after controlling for all variables in Model 6 to 
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include political ideology.  Results indicate that the predicted probability of the 
propensity to serve for Independent women is almost 6 percent.  Conversely, the 
predicted probability of the propensity to serve for Democratic women is about 4 
percent.  Republican women are in between with an approximate 5 percent 
probability of serving.  As already noted, the preponderance of women identify 
with the Republican or Democratic Party as opposed to identifying as an 
Independent.     
 
     Figure 7.19 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by political ideology after controlling for all variables in Model 6 to include 
political party affiliation.  Results indicate that the predicted probability of the 
propensity to serve for conservative women is about 5.5 percent.  Conversely, the 
predicted probability of the propensity to serve for liberal women is about 4 
percent.  Interestingly, women who identify with a radical ideology have the 
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highest propensity at about 5.5 percent, but standard errors are much higher for 
this group as the percentage of women who identify this way is less than one 
percent (see Table 7.9). 
  
     Racial/Ethnic Differences in Political Attitudes  
     Among Women with Propensity 
     Table 7.11 below reports differences in means of political party affiliation for 
my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era for women only.  Similar to 
men’s analysis, my dependent variable for this analysis is the political party 
variable on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Republican, 2=Independent, 3=Democrat).  
Results show that, on average, white women with propensity, lean significantly 
toward the Republican Party compared to white women without propensity.  
Additionally, results reveal that white women with propensity lean significantly 
more (p<.001) toward the Republican Party than their black and Hispanic 
counterparts.  On average, all black women, regardless of propensity, appear to 
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lean most toward the Democratic Party.  As noted earlier, men with propensity 
lean more toward the Republican Party than their women counterparts.  Of note, 
women with propensity during the post-9/11 era lean significantly farther 
(p<.001) from the Democratic Party compared to years prior to 9/11.       
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     In a separate but related analysis, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in 
political party affiliation and ideology among women with propensity.  Utilizing 
linear regression analysis similar to the men’s analysis above, results reported in 
Model 3 of Table 7.12 below reveal significant differences between political party 
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affiliation and racial and ethnic background among women with propensity after 
full controls.  These results are similar in magnitude and direction to the results 
for men.  Not surprisingly, black women with propensity are significantly more 
Democratic in party affiliation compared to their white counterparts.  On average, 
black women score about .95 higher (p<.001) on the scale of 1 to 3.  Similarly, 
Hispanic women with propensity score about 0.52 higher (p<.001) on the same 
scale compared to their white counterparts.  These findings are generally 




      
 287 
     Figure 7.20 below depicts political party affiliation by race and ethnic 
background among women with the propensity to serve after full controls.  On 
average, white women with propensity score about 1.74 (on a scale of 1 to 3) 
indicating a significantly more Republican affiliation compared to black women 
who score 2.69 and Hispanic women who score 2.27.  Consistent with earlier 
research (e.g. Dempsey 2010), data suggests that, on average, all women with 
propensity lean more toward the Democratic Party than their male counterparts.     
 
     Table 7.13 below reports differences in means of political ideology affiliation 
for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era for women only.  Similar to 
the men’s analysis, my dependent variable for this analysis is the political 
ideology variable on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Conservative, 2=Moderate, 3=Liberal).  
Prior to controls, results show that, on average, women with propensity, 
regardless of racial and ethnic background, lean significantly toward a 
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conservative ideology (p<.001) compared to women of the same race/ethnicity 
without propensity.  Black women with propensity identify closest with a 
conservative ideology compared to their white and Hispanic counterparts.  Results 
also show that women with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly 
more conservative (p<.001) than women with propensity prior to 9/11.  As noted 
earlier, men with propensity are significantly more (p<.001) conservative than 
their women counterparts.      
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     In a similar analysis to above, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in 
political ideology among women with propensity utilizing linear regression.  
After full controls, results reported in Model 3 of Table 7.14 below reveal 
significant differences between political ideology and racial and ethnic 
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background.  It appears that black women with propensity are no more liberal 
compared to their white counterparts.  On average, black women with propensity 
average about .06 less than white women on the scale of 1 to 3 in the more 
conservative direction, although results are insignificant.  On the other hand, 
Hispanic women with propensity average about .14 higher (p<.05) on the same 





     Figure 7.21 below depicts political ideology by racial and ethnic background 
among women with propensity after full controls.  On average, white women with 
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propensity score about 1.97 (on scale of 1 to 3), whereas black women score 1.92.  
These differences are not significant.  Results indicate that white women with 
propensity are significantly more conservative (p<.05) than Hispanic women who 
score 2.11 on the scale.  Black women with propensity appear to be the most 
conservative in ideology.  These findings are different than the findings for men, 
which showed that white men with propensity are significantly more conservative 
than black or Hispanic men.  Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Dempsey 
2010), data suggests that, on average, all women with propensity are more liberal 
than their male counterparts.      
 
     In sum, after controlling for all factors in the model, women who affiliate with 
the Republican Party or identify as Independent, and women who identify with a 
conservative political ideology are most likely to have the propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era.  Similarly, men who affiliate with the Republican Party 
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and who are conservative are most likely to have propensity during the post-9/11 
era.  Both women and men who affiliate with the Democratic Party and who have 
a liberal political ideology are least likely to have the propensity to serve.  Men 
with propensity are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and to 
identify as conservative compared to their women counterparts.   
     Perhaps the most notable difference between men and women is the impact of 
control variables to the model.  Prior to controls, women who affiliate with the 
Republican Party are least likely to expect to serve.  However, after controlling 
for race and ethnic background, women who affiliate with the Democratic Party 
are least likely to expect to serve.  In contrast, men who affiliate with the 
Republican Party are most likely to expect to serve and men who affiliate with the 
Democratic Party are least likely to expect to serve, regardless of race, SES, or 
any other additional controls.  It appears that race is the significant predictor 
variable for the relationship between women’s propensity and party affiliation.  
For political ideology, men and women who are conservative are most likely to 
have propensity and those who are liberal are least likely to have propensity, 
regardless of race, SES, or additional controls.  
     It appears that, prior to and after controls, there are political differences by 
racial and ethnic background among women with propensity that don’t always 
follow the same pattern as for men.  Similar to men, white women with propensity 
are significantly more Republican than their black and Hispanic counterparts.  
However, black women with propensity are no more liberal than their white 
counterparts.  Hispanic women with propensity are the most liberal in political 
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ideology.  In contrast, white men with propensity are more conservative than 
black and Hispanic men respectively.  Hispanic men with propensity are the most 
liberal.          
Discussion 
     For brevity sake, I focus my discussion below on the relationship between 
men’s propensity and political attitudes, unless otherwise specified, since men 
comprise about 85 percent of the total military population (Segal and Segal 2004) 
and results on political attitudes do not differ greatly by gender.  Results suggest 
that young men with the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era are 
becoming increasingly Republican in party affiliation and conservative in 
ideology.  This is particularly noteworthy, as recent studies prior to 9/11 (e.g. 
Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) have suggested otherwise, especially among the 
enlisted population that comprises the majority of the military force.  
Conventional wisdom has held that the upper ranks of the military (i.e. the senior 
officer ranks) are predominantly Republican and conservative.  However, my own 
research reveals that Republican and conservative attitudes may be increasing 
among the lower ranks of the military, especially among men and regardless of 
race or class, given that the majority of youth with propensity will most likely 
enter the military in the enlisted ranks.  My results beg the question: Is the 
military becoming what Janowitz (1975) referred to as an “ideological caste” of 
its own, separating from the society it serves and protects?   
     It is worth comparing my findings with the most recent related research 
conducted in 2004 by Dempsey (2010) to highlight the differences.  One of the 
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starkest differences between both streams of research was in the findings among 
the junior enlisted population.  With respect to political party identification, 
Dempsey found that only about 18 percent of the junior enlisted population 
identified as Republican.  In contrast, my results show that about 28 percent of 
men with propensity identify with the Republican Party in 2004 (see Figure 7.2).  
My results show that these high average trends continue throughout the post-9/11 
era.  Dempsey’s research did reveal, however, that Republican affiliation 
significantly increased by rank.  The overall average percentage of Republican 
affiliation among male soldiers (not including officers) in Dempsey’s sample was 
about 26 percent, which is closer to my results.  In general, Dempsey’s research 
showed that the total Army population (including officers) was almost twice as 
likely to be Republican than Democratic.  My research reveals a similar gap 
between political parties, but my sample primarily consists of future junior 
enlistees as opposed to officers.  Dempsey also noted that a “virtual army”, where 
civilians correlated with those in the army on the dimensions of gender, race, 
income, age, and education, only differed slightly from the general population in 
its Republican Party affiliation.  However, after controlling for essentially the 
same factors as Dempsey, my results reveal stark differences in party affiliation 
between those with and without propensity (i.e. the military vs. civilians).  Indeed, 
young men with propensity are significantly more Republican in party affiliation 
(p<.001) compared to men without propensity (see Table 7.5).   
     Dempsey also found similar differences in political party affiliation among 
various racial and ethnic subgroups as I found in my research.  Indeed, white men 
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with propensity are more Republican than Hispanic and black men respectively.  
Similarly, men with propensity are more likely to affiliate with the Republican 
Party compared to women with propensity, although both are more likely than 
their civilian counterparts to affiliate with the Republican Party.        
     With respect to political ideology, findings from my research also differ from 
Dempsey’s research.  Dempsey found that there were no significant differences 
between the military and civilian population in political ideological identification.  
Between 2002-2004, my results generally support that finding.  For example, in 
2004, about 19 percent of young men overall identified as conservative, while 
almost 22 percent of men with propensity did the same (see Figures 7.5 and 7.6).  
However, in 2005, 21 percent of men overall identified as conservative, whereas 
over 27 percent of men with propensity did the same.  After 2004, there was 
approximately a 4 percent average difference between men overall and men with 
propensity who identified as conservative.  With respect to liberal identification, 
my results do not support Dempsey’s findings.  In 2004, about 19 percent of men 
overall identified as liberal, while only about 14 percent of men with propensity 
did so.  On average, there was approximately a 5 percent difference between men 
overall and men with propensity who identified as liberal throughout the post-
9/11 era.  Although Dempsey found that the Army was significantly more 
conservative than liberal in ideology, he noted that the main differences lie in the 
upper ranks, where officers were more than two times more likely to be 
conservative than liberal.  In contrast, he found that the enlisted population was 
only about one and half times more likely to identify as conservative than liberal.  
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He noted that the enlisted population was most likely to identify as moderate.  My 
results from logistic regression analysis reveal that men with propensity are two 
times more likely to be conservative than liberal, even after full controls.  
Additionally, men with propensity are about 1.5 times more likely to be 
conservative than moderate.   
     Dempsey found similar differences in political ideology among racial and 
ethnic subgroups as I found in my research.  Indeed, white men are more 
conservative than black or Hispanic men respectively.  Additionally, men with 
propensity are more conservative than their women counterparts.             
     The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have, indeed, become politically polarizing.  
Recent research shows that public support for the wars indicated major variations 
by political party, with the majority of support stemming from Republicans 
(Berinsky 2009).  Further, data reveal that political polarization is not the result of 
general trends within the youth population.  Figure 7.1 shows that youth overall 
are about equal with respect to their Republican and Democratic affiliation, 
revealing only small gaps in attitudes slightly in the Republican’s favor during the 
post-9/11 era.  However, among youth with propensity, Figure 7.2 reveals a 
significant split in party affiliation much more in the Republican direction.  
Similar results are found with respect to political ideology as depicted in Figures 
7.5 and 7.6 respectively.  It appears that youth with propensity are more 
conservative and less liberal in ideology than the overall youth population.  After 
controlling for a host of various factors, results from logistic regression analysis 
overwhelmingly support this assertion.   
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     The gap between Republican and Democratic Party affiliation among youth 
with propensity during the Persian Gulf War period (1990-1991) serves well for 
comparison purposes during a period of war.  For example, in 1991, the 
percentage of youth with propensity who affiliated with the Republican Party was 
34.16 percent.  In contrast, the percentage of Democratic youth with propensity 
was half as much at 17.52 percent (see Figure 7.2).  During years prior to and 
after the Gulf War, the gap in political party affiliation among youth with 
propensity was not nearly as significant.  Similar gaps between conservative and 
liberal ideologies among youth with propensity appear during the Gulf War 
period as well (see Figure 7.6).  It appears that a period of war, whether during the 
Gulf War or the post-9/11 era, is associated with greater Republican and 
conservative attitudes among youth with propensity.        
     Interestingly, it appears that youth with propensity may be influenced by the 
party affiliation of their Commander-in-Chief.  Results reveal fluctuations in the 
Republican and Democratic affiliations of men with propensity that correspond in 
the same direction as the party of the current Commander-in-Chief (see Figure 
7.2).  For example, from 2000-2008, results show an increase in Republican Party 
affiliation among men with propensity while President George W. Bush was in 
office.  Similarly, from 2008-2010, men with propensity appear to decrease in 
Republican affiliation and increase in Democratic affiliation while President 
Barrack Obama is in office.  However, trends of Republicanism among men with 
propensity continue to increase a few years into President Obama’s 
administration.  These results, in part, suggest a valuable contribution to the 
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literature discussing the “rally ‘round the flag” phenomenon (e.g. Mueller 1970), 
yet a more in-depth analysis would be required to analyze these relationships 
completely. 
     The fact that political polarization appears to be influencing the propensity of 
youth to enter the armed forces (i.e. future recruits) could be a bit troubling for 
some.  The military prides itself on being a subset of society, diverse and 
representative of the population at large.  Diversity and representation are 
important for many reasons to include military effectiveness, shared 
responsibility, and the involvement of society at large- the latter reason arguably 
being the most important for better civil-military relations (Janowitz 1960; Armor 
1996).  For scholars such as Morris Janowitz (1960), a military that is convergent 
with society is paramount for military effectiveness and professionalism.  If 
military participation is becoming increasingly politically polarizing, where 
Republican and conservative attitudes are represented much more than 
Democratic and liberal attitudes, this could be to the detriment of civil-military 
relations and military professionalism overall.  It is believed that an apolitical 
military is considered to be a key attribute of military professionalism, which 
fosters better civil-military relations (Janowitz 1960).  Indeed, it is reasonable that 
relations could be negatively impacted by a military that is primarily Republican 
and conservative and a civilian government that is Democratic and liberal.   
     Political polarization could also lead to racial and ethnic diversity issues within 
the military.    A plethora of prior research (e.g. Holsti 2001; Segal et al 2001; 
Dempsey 2010) has already shown that white men are more Republican and 
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conservative than black men, to include those among the military population.  My 
own research supports these findings among youth with the propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era.  The lack of representative political attitudes among 
youth with propensity could be indicative of a lack of representation among racial 
and ethnic groups within the military population.  Indeed, my research shows a 
decline in black propensity during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years (see 
Figure 4.11).  Again, a lack of diversity and inclusion in the military could be 
troubling for military effectiveness as well as civil-military relations. 
     A politically polarizing war could have serious ramifications to recruitment 
and retention during a time when precious military resources are most in demand.  
It is vitally important for political leaders to understand the consequences of a 
politically divided country at war, especially in an all-volunteer era.  Strong 
efforts should be made by politicians and the Commander-in-Chief to rally the 
country under a common cause for sending our nation into war.  If not, one of the 
unintended consequences will be that future recruits will represent the division 
among our politicians and society.  Certainly, I am not insinuating that there 
should not be a healthy debate among politicians and the people prior to going to 
war.  However, once the decision is made, we should make every effort to unite 
under the cause much larger than politics- the cause for national security. 
Summary 
     My research on political attitudes related to military propensity is important in 
a few notable ways.  First, this is the most thorough analysis of political attitudes 
among the expected military population throughout the duration of the post-9/11 
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era.  In comparison, Dempsey’s (2010) research was conducted in 2004 and only 
analyzed attitudes within the Army population.  As noted earlier, the TISS project 
(e.g. Holsti 2001) was an extensive body of research on political attitudes in the 
military, but it was conducted prior to 9/11 between 1998 and 1999.  Further, the 
focus of the TISS analysis was on the military elite (i.e. officers).  Segal and his 
colleagues (2001) conducted a related analysis of political attitudes of the 
expected enlisted population using MTF data, but it was also conducted prior to 
9/11, between1976 and 1995.  The single most recent related study conducted by 
Pew (2011a) analyzed post-9/11 veterans, but did not analyze the current or 
expected military population.  Also of note, Dempsey’s research was the only 
study that analyzed the political attitudes of women since 9/11.  My research 
serves as the first thorough analysis of the relationship between women’s 
propensity and political attitudes.  
     Second, my research extends Dempsey’s research drawing conclusions that are 
generally contrary to his findings.  Dempsey’s main claim was that the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have not resulted in significant differences in political party 
affiliation or ideology between the Army and civilians, especially among the 
lower enlisted ranks.  However, my research suggests otherwise, highlighting a 
gap in political attitudes between the military and civilians that is larger than 
others have suggested (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) during the post-9/11 
era.  Overall, my findings are more in line with findings from the TISS project 
(e.g. Holsti 2001).  My research suggests that the junior ranks are becoming 
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increasingly Republican and conservative in nature more like the senior ranks of 
the military analyzed in the TISS project.  
     Third, my research also compares to recent studies conducted by the Pew 
Research Center (e.g. 2011a; 2013) in a few ways.  My overall findings are 
consistent with Pew’s study (2011a), revealing that the military population during 
the post-9/11 era is becoming increasingly Republican and conservative in 
political attitudes.  However, results from the Pew study noted that post-9/11 
veterans are more moderate (43 percent of those surveyed) than conservative (40 
percent) in ideological identification.  My study of future recruits found that they 
are more likely to be conservative than moderate or liberal.  Another Pew study 
(2013) found that Millennials are most likely to be liberal in ideology.  However, 
my study shows that overall youth during the post-9/11 era are more moderate 
than liberal.            
     Fourth, my findings support earlier research (e.g. Holsti 2001; Segal et al. 
2001; Dempsey 2010) suggesting that white men with propensity are significantly 
more Republican and conservative than their black or Hispanic counterparts.  One 
could infer that an increasing gap in political attitudes in the military could lead to 
a lack of racial and ethnic diversity within the military population. 
     Last, my research provides invaluable insight to politicians, military 
leadership, and scholars who are interested in the broad domain of civil-military 
relations, which transcends various academic disciplines such as history, political 
science, and sociology.  The fact that my research suggests that the military is 
becoming more politically divided from the society it serves is potentially 
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troublesome, especially during wartime.  After all, a military that stands divided 
from its population could lead to issues standing united under a common cause.  
The slogan, “United We Stand- Divided We Fall” shouldn’t be a distant memory 
from the World War II days.  It can still be a reminder of how it’s supposed to be, 
especially during the post-9/11 era- an era of persistent war.  As the war on terror 
continues against threats such as ISIS and Al Qaeda into the unknown future, 
perhaps more debate will occur concerning the reinstatement of some form of a 




Chapter 8: Motivations to Serve-  
Institutional/Occupational Analysis 
Background 
     Motivations for military service can range from tangible reasons such as pay, 
education benefits, job skills training, health care, and retirement to more 
intangible reasons such as family traditions, defending freedom and serving 
society, seeing the world, and increasing one’s structure and self-discipline.  John 
Faris (1981) proposed a useful way for thinking about major recruitment 
techniques by splitting the military’s eligible population into two groups.  The 
first group responds primarily to “marketplace factors” and can be expected to 
join for the aforementioned tangible benefits.  The second group is driven by 
more intangible benefits such as family tradition and service to country.  These 
tangible versus intangible benefits can be conceptualized as ranging between 
Moskos’ (1977) formulation of the occupational and institutional models of 
military organization.  As highlighted earlier, Moskos viewed military service as a 
“calling” in the institutional model, whereas military service was viewed as more 
of “just a job” in the occupational model.  Although Moskos’ and Faris’ 
categories of distinction may not be mutually exclusive, they are a good way to 
understand the different perspectives from which those who join the military 
approach service.   
     Interestingly, when writing about professional soldiers of the conscription era, 
Janowitz had already observed Moskos’ notion that the military was becoming 
more and more similar to an occupation.  He noted that, “those who see the 
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military as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by the greater 
concentration from whom the military is just another job” (1960:117).  Was the 
conscription-era institutional soldier that Moskos celebrated just a romantic 
idealization that represented only a minority of personnel instead of the norm for 
that period?  Has the AVF really changed motivations of service in the way that 
Moskos hypothesized (Segal et al. 2001)?  Although I cannot tap into soldier 
motivations prior to the AVF, my research addresses these questions in part using 
MTF data from 1976 through the post-9/11 era.     
     The major components of the institutional and occupational models can be 
summarized using Moskos’ model of military social organization depicted in 
Table 8.1 below (Moskos 1988).  The I/O thesis originally assumed a continuum 
ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one 
highly convergent with civilian structures (Moskos 1988).  Of course, the military 
can never be entirely separate from the society it protects, but the model, in the 
form of a scale in which the military more or less overlaps with civilian society, 
shows the ever-changing relationship between the armed forces and society.  
Table 8.1 depicts the variables of interest and the general trends associated with 
each that Moskos utilized in formulating his I/O dichotomy.         
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     I briefly describe the main components of these variables that distinguish 
between the institutional and occupational formats of military organization.  For 
Moskos (1988), an institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms that 
provide a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a higher good.  
In contrast, an occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace.  Society 
generally regards institutional members with esteem, whereas prestige is based on 
levels of compensation for an occupation.  Members of an institution usually have 
diffuse roles that are more general in nature.  Members of an occupational 
military organization have more specific roles and are considered specialists in 
their particular area of expertise.  In an institution, reference groups are more 
vertical as subordinates aspire to be like their leaders.  In an occupation, members 
look to other occupations outside the military for reference groups of comparison.  
In an institution, recruiting appeals to character qualities and values, promoting a 
lifestyle that is separate and distinct from society and one that is full of adventure 
and challenge.  Recruiting in an occupational military organization focuses on 
benefits in the form of pay and job skill training that is easily transferrable to 
civilian work later.  Performance evaluations for members of an institution are 
more qualitative and holistic as opposed to quantitative and segmented.  Rank and 
seniority take precedence for the basis of compensation in an institution, whereas 
skill level and manpower needs dictate compensation in an occupation.  Members 
of an institution receive much of their compensation in the form of noncash or 
deferments such as educational, medical, and retirement benefits.  Members of the 
occupational format receive their compensation in the form of a salary and 
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bonuses.  Members of the institutional format have a military justice system that 
has broad purview.  Members of an occupational military organization have 
civilian jurisprudence with limited purview.  Female roles within an institutional 
military are limited and restricted, whereas they are more available and 
unrestricted in an occupational military.  Spouses within an institution are 
expected to play an integral part within the military community, whereas they are 
more removed from the military community in an occupational organization.  
Members of an institution work and reside in close proximity to each other, 
usually on-post.  Members of an occupational military organization separate work 
and off-duty time, usually residing within civilian communities.  In an 
institutional military, veterans usually receive more benefits and preferences than 
their non-veteran peers, whereas there is little to no difference between veterans 
and civilians in an occupational military organization.  In sum, members of an 
institution are primarily value-driven, motivated by factors that contrast with the 
calculative workings assumed to exist in the marketplace.  An occupational model 
implies a priority for self-interest rather than that of the employing organization 
(Moskos and Wood 1988).  
     It must be highlighted that the institutional and occupational models may 
imply a one or the other choice on the spectrum of analysis.  However, these two 
models simply offer a frame of reference for analysis.  Beyond military sociology, 
polarities of social structures have been prevalent in mainstream macrosociology.  
One need only consider Max Weber’s traditional versus legal-rational authority, 
Emile Durkheim’s organic versus mechanical solidarity, or Talcott Parsons’ shift 
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from collective to individualistic pattern variables to see how societal trends have 
been described as dichotomies.  Moskos’ posited shift from an institutional to an 
occupational military is nothing more than an application of the master trend of 
polarities describing Western societies (Moskos 1988).  Specifically, his 
formulation is fundamentally rooted in society’s general overall trend toward 
rationalization (Segal 1986).  Contrary to popular belief, Moskos’ differing 
models do not necessarily suggest a zero-sum game when describing models of 
military organization or individual attitudes of military members.  Indeed, Segal 
(1986) suggested that there can be a mixture of institutional and occupational 
orientations among members of the military- a form he referred to as “pragmatic 
professionalism.”     
     Segal (1986) also emphasized that Moskos’ model could have different units 
of analysis for research purposes: 1) Organizational- to examine the military as an 
institution versus the military as a workplace; 2) Individual- to examine attitudes 
of military service as a calling versus military service as a job; and, perhaps 3) 
The nation-state as another level of analysis.  For Segal, Moskos’ I/O model 
required measurement and analysis at all levels.  He emphasized using different 
methodologies to analyze Moskos’ I/O thesis- both quantitative methods utilizing 
direct or indirect inquiry (e.g. surveys using single-item questions and multiple-
item indices), as well as qualitative methods (e.g. ethnography of military 
organizations)-to examine soldier attitudes toward institutional or occupational 
motivations of service and changes to military organization.  He also highlighted 
the importance of longitudinal studies utilizing quantitative and qualitative 
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techniques to assess changes in motivations of service and military organization 
over time.  He even challenged researchers to re-examine the plethora of survey 
questions from Samuel Stouffer’s WWII studies (1949) to retrospectively 
measure I/O trends during this time period, despite the fact that they were not 
originally intended for this purpose.  For example, The American Soldier studies 
showed support for a soldier’s motivation in combat that was primarily based on 
“ending the task,” “solidarity with group” (i.e. cohesion/team), and a “sense of 
duty and self-respect” (i.e. a calling) (Stouffer et al. 1949:109).  These 
motivations in combat during WWII could reasonably fit into the institutional 
model of military service.  Of note, Segal (1986) also emphasized that although 
Moskos’ I/O formulation was originally intended to study the military, it could be 
extended to examine civilian attitudes as well as other civilian organizations.  
     For purposes of my research, I incorporate Segal’s advice utilizing survey 
methods, both single item questions and a multiple-item index, to analyze 
individual motivations and attitudes toward military service.  Due to the 
secondary nature of my analysis of the MTF data, I take advantage of indirect 
inquiry that is related to Moskos’ I/O construct to determine I/O motivations of 
youth who are likely to serve since there are not direct questions that inquire 
about these motivations.  I also utilize the longitudinal nature of the cross-
sectional surveys from 1976-2013 to assess changes in youth attitudes and 
motivations toward service over time.  Further, I compare differences in attitudes 
toward work between the military (i.e. those with “high” propensity) and civilians 
(i.e. those with “low” propensity).   
 310 
     My research examining I/O attitudes is unique compared to other related 
research in a few notable ways.  First, insofar as one is willing to make 
longitudinal inferences using cross-sectional surveys over time, it allows for the 
analysis of long-term I/O secular trends throughout the duration of the AVF (with 
the exception of 1973-75).  This allows for the empirical testing of Moskos’ 
hypothesis that the military has become increasingly occupational in nature over 
time.  Indeed, this is the type of testing that few researchers have been able to 
effectively conduct methodologically.  Second, there are multiple measures within 
the dataset that can be combined to assess the I/O orientations of those who are 
likely to enter the military.  Furthermore, the nature of indirect questioning via 
secondary analysis allows for a better assessment of actual individual motivations 
by minimizing the social desirability bias (to be discussed in greater detail later) 
that often influences individuals to reason why they joined the military for more 
altruistic purposes.  Third, the data allows for the examination of I/O differences 
between racial and ethnic groups, which has been lacking to some extent in prior 
research.  Lastly, there are ways to examine attitudinal differences between the 
military and civilian population by considering those with high propensity (i.e. 
“Definitely Will” serve) as a proxy for the military and those with low propensity 
(i.e. “Definitely Won’t” serve) as a proxy for civilians.  This type of analysis 
contributes to the extensive amount of literature on civil-military relations, studies 
of American values and beliefs, and other areas of research such as public service 
motivation (PSM), which I will discuss in greater detail later.  
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Prior Research on I/O Motivations 
     Many researchers exploring various individual-level motivations for joining 
the military have used Moskos’ I/O model for analysis.  Scholars exploring these 
issues have classified various motivations, such as “patriotic duty” or “job 
training”, as institutionally- or occupationally-related influences.  Understanding 
these motivations can have important implications for both recruitment and 
retention in the military.  For example, Griffith (2008) found that institutionally 
motivated reservists were more likely to reenlist than their occupationally 
motivated peers.  Griffith (2009) argued that the importance of institutional 
motivations was particularly apparent in an era where the military places more 
demands on reservists.  Griffith’s (2008) research also revealed that younger, non-
white, and lower ranking reservists were more associated with having joined the 
reserves for occupational reasons.  Another study conducted by Eighmey (2006) 
in the early 2000s found that a mixture of institutional and occupational 
motivations influenced American youth to serve in the military.  This finding was 
consistent with Segal’s (1986) assertion of “pragmatic professionalism.”  Stahl, 
McNichols, and Manley (1980) argued that institutional and occupational 
motivators are not at opposite ends of the same spectrum, but are separate 
constructs.  They found that, while both I/O motivators can be active in 
individuals, job satisfaction and career orientation among Air Force personnel 
were positively associated with institutional motivations and negatively correlated 
with occupational motivations.  This is consistent with Griffith’s finding that 
reservists “who were institutionally motivated reported greater levels of 
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commitment (in terms of reenlistment intentions and reasons for reporting), 
acceptance of the demands of military service, and combat readiness” (2008:252).       
     While Moskos’ I/O model has been a useful analytical framework for the study 
of individual-level enlistment and retention decisions, there may be differences in 
its applicability across the services (e.g. Mastroianni 2005), across military 
occupational specialties (i.e. combat vs. support) within the same service (e.g. 
Burland and Lundquist 2013), between sexes (e.g. Eighmey 2006), between ranks 
(e.g. Boene 1988), and among other areas of analysis.  Mastroianni (2005) noted 
that Army officers might have fewer occupational motivators compared to flight 
qualified Air Force officers.  This could occur because there are attractive 
opportunities for flying positions in the civilian sector, whereas there are 
comparatively less attractive civilian opportunities for “soldiering.”  Additionally, 
Stahl and colleagues (1980) found that Marine officers were less occupationally 
motivated than those in other services.  They attribute the difference to the Marine 
Corps placing greater emphasis on their role as combat soldiers.  With respect to 
intra-service differences, Burland and Lundquist (2013) found that occupational 
motivations existed more in support functions, while institutional motivations 
were prevalent in combat specialties.  Eighmey (2006) found that institutional 
motivations such as fidelity to goals (i.e. leadership, self-discipline, duty to 
country, respect for others and pride in one’s accomplishments) were more 
important for men than women.  In a study of the French Armed Forces, Bernard 
Boene (1988) found differences in all objects of analysis noted above.  With 
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respect to rank, he found that officers and draftees were more institutionally 
motivated than non-commissioned officers and volunteers. 
     Most recently, Dempsey (2010) studied the general military population in 2004 
and assessed their reasons for joining.  He found that officers were most likely to 
choose the category “Desire to serve my country” as their most important reason 
for joining.  Thirty-four percent of officers listed this as their primary motivation 
compared with 20 percent of the enlisted and warrant officer ranks.  Officers were 
also most likely to choose “Educational benefits” as their primary reason for 
joining.  Twenty-five percent of officers listed this as their primary motivation 
compared with only 13 percent of the rest of the army.  This may seem 
counterintuitive at first, but it reveals the officer-recruiting power of ROTC 
programs and the military service academies (Dempsey 2010).  On the other hand, 
enlisted soldiers were most likely to list a reason related to pay and benefits as 
their primary reason for joining.  Thirty percent of enlisted soldiers and warrant 
officers chose one of the six following occupational reasons as their primary 
motivation for joining, compared with only 12 percent of officers: 1) earn more 
money than previous job(s); 2) family support services; 3) lack of civilian 
employment opportunities; 4) medical care benefits; 5) retirement pay and 
benefits; 6) security and stability of a job (Dempsey 2010).   
     Dempsey’s statistics are certainly informative, although they may reflect a 
degree of military indoctrination as well, given that over 50 percent of 
respondents were beyond their tenth year in the Army at the time of the survey.  
After limiting the analysis to the 326 respondents with five or fewer years of 
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service, “Educational benefits” was the most popular reason given by young 
soldiers and officers.  Thirty-six percent of new officers and 19 percent of new 
soldiers and warrant officers listed this as their primary motivation for joining the 
military.  “Desire to serve my country” fell to second as 26 percent of new 
officers listed this and 17 percent of enlisted soldiers and warrant officers chose 
this as their first choice.  The dynamic for pay and benefits as an incentive for 
joining remained the same as the overall sample.  Thirteen percent of officers 
indicated this as their primary reason for joining compared with 28 percent of 
enlisted soldiers and warrant officers (Dempsey 2010).  Interestingly, Moskos 
regarded educational benefits as an institutional orientation because they were 
viewed as deferred benefits of the institution (as noted earlier in Table 8.1).  Since 
then, some researchers (e.g. Woodruff et al. 2006) have regarded educational 
benefits as more occupational in nature since education is typically viewed as 
leading to more job skills which leads to increased pay- an occupational 
consideration (D. Segal conversation 2015).  Dempsey’s examination of reasons 
to join the military is one of the most comprehensive to date during the post-9/11 
era and serves as a good model for comparison purposes.   
     During the summer of 2002, Woodruff and his colleagues (2006) conducted 
another study to examine motivations to serve drawing from a sample of first-
term soldiers in two infantry battalions (sample size 257) at Fort Lewis, 
Washington who were preparing for a combat deployment.  Motivation to serve 
was measured by asking respondents to answer from a list of fifteen items which 
items were important in their decision to join the Army.  The items included were 
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developed based on components of the institutional/occupational model and the 
different approaches, incentives, and programs that the military uses to attract 
recruits.  Overall, results indicated that respondents had strong institutional 
motivations to serve.  Over 73 percent of respondents indicated that 
“adventure/challenge” was a reason to join and over 65 percent indicated to 
“serve country” was another important reason for joining.  Other top reasons for 
joining included “patriotism” (55 percent) and “desire to be a soldier” (46 
percent)-all clearly institutional orientations.  “Money for college” was third 
overall (61 percent) in respondent’s motivations to serve- a reason the authors 
considered occupational in nature.  Economic motivations, as described by 
Moskos, such as the “enlistment bonus,” “a lack of better options,” “best job 
available,” and “need to support a family” were less important to these 
respondents.  Three decades since the AVF, the major motivations to serve 
appeared to be institutional, contrary to Moskos’ expectations.  Further, findings 
indicated that those with “high” propensity (i.e. those who “Definitely” expected 
to serve) were significantly more likely to express institutional motivations to 
enlist than those with “low” propensity (i.e. those who definitely did not expect to 
serve) (Woodruff et al. 2006).  It should be noted that the majority of respondents 
were infantrymen who have typically been considered to be more institutionally 
motivated compared to other military occupational specialties (Moskos and Wood 
1988; Burland and Lundquist 2013).  Further, the respondents in the sample were 
men only, as a result of the army’s policy of excluding women from ground 
combat units, and they were predominantly white soldiers as black soldiers tend 
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to enlist in noncombat support specialties (Segal and Segal 2004; Kleykamp 
2009). 
     Most recently, the study conducted at Pew Research Center (2011a) revealed 
that the main reason to join the military for post-9/11 era veterans (sample size of 
697) was “to serve your country” (88 percent).  The next reason was “to receive 
education benefits” (75 percent), and then “to see more of the world” (65 
percent).  More occupational motivations such as “to learn skills for civilian jobs” 
and “because jobs were hard to find” were less cited as reasons for joining (57 
and 28 percent respectively).  As mentioned earlier, education benefits could be 
viewed as either institutional or occupational in nature.  Taken as a whole, data 
from Pew reveals that soldiers are more institutionally motivated to serve during 
the post-9/11 era, although occupational motivations continue to exist.  
     As highlighted by the significant research above, the I/O analytical framework 
has been used extensively to examine motivations to serve.  However, there are 
still gaps in the research.  My research seeks to fill these gaps and add to the 
existing literature by uncovering I/O differences of youth who expect to serve 
between key racial and ethnic groups and the civilians versus the military, 
primarily during the post-9/11 era- a period that has been mostly understudied.  
Additionally, I examine I/O trends of the military over time, which has yet to be 
fully analyzed throughout the AVF. 
I/O Predictions  
     To test Moskos’ (1977) hypothesis of a shift in the military from institutional 
to occupational orientations, I analyze differences in I/O motivations of youth 
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with propensity over time between 1976-2013.  I analyze differences by 
comparing group means between those who are likely to join the military and 
those who are not during the post-9/11 era and the pre-9/11 era (i.e. 1976-2001).  
Given that military service has been in a time of war during the post-9/11 era, I 
expect to see greater institutional orientations among youth with propensity 
compared to youth without propensity.  For the same reasons, I expect that those 
youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era will have greater institutional 
orientations than those expecting to serve during the pre-9/11 era.  However, I 
expect that youth with propensity will also display both institutional and 
occupational orientations (i.e. a form of “pragmatic professionalism”) during the 
post- 9/11 era, as Segal (1986) suggested.  
Hypothesis 8a: There will be a positive relationship between 
youth with propensity and institutional orientations during the 
post-9/11 era.  
 
Hypothesis 8b: Youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era 
will display both institutional and occupational orientations to 
serve (i.e. “pragmatic professional” orientations). 
 
Hypothesis 8c: Youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era 
will have greater institutional orientations compared to youth 
with propensity during the pre-9/11 era. 
 
     During the post-9/11 era specifically, I expect that those who say they are 
likely to serve immediately following the 9/11 attacks will have greater 
institutional orientations compared to other years.  Naturally, it is reasonable to 
believe that those who say they are likely to serve immediately following the 
attacks will be more motivated by institutional reasons such as service as a 
calling.  Similarly, I expect that those who say they are likely to serve during the 
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period marked by high casualties during the “Iraqi surge” timeframe, between 
2004-2007, will also have greater institutional orientations compared to other 
years since the costs of military service during this particular period are 
exacerbated by a greater number of U.S. casualties.  On the other hand, I expect 
that those who expect to serve during the economic recession period, between 
2008-2010, will have greater occupational orientations, as the military may be 
considered the best job option in a constrained economy.  Similar to my analysis 
in Chapter 4, I examine the general relationship between casualties and 
unemployment versus the I/O orientations of youth with propensity during the 
post-9/11 era.  I expect that there will be a positive relationship between casualties 
and the institutional orientations of youth with propensity.  Likewise, I expect that 
there will be a negative relationship between unemployment and the institutional 
orientations of youth with propensity.     
Hypothesis 8d: There will be a positive relationship between 
casualties and institutional orientations for those youth with the 
propensity to serve. 
 
Hypothesis 8e: There will be a negative relationship between 
unemployment and institutional orientations for those youth with 
the propensity to serve.   
 
     Results from my earlier analyses in previous chapters and prior research (e.g. 
Griffith 2008; Burland and Lundquist 2013) suggest that there may be differences 
in motivations to serve between various racial and ethnic groups during the post-
9/11 era.  Indeed, the fact that black youth propensity has generally declined 
during the post-9/11 era suggests the possibility of a decrease in institutional 
motivations.  Possible differences in motivations of service between various 
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subgroups within the military could have policy implications for recruitment and 
retention.  I expect to see differences in motivations to serve between racial and 
ethnic groups as described in the logic explained in my earlier predictions.  For 
example, white men are more likely than black men to serve in combat 
specialties, which have been typically more institutional in nature.  Additionally, 
non-white men have been shown to join the military for more occupational 
reasons (Griffith 2008).  In accordance with the bridging hypothesis, I expect that 
black youth with propensity will be more occupationally motivated than their 
white youth counterparts.  However, given the increase in the propensity of 
Hispanic youth during the post-9/11 era (see Chapter 4), I do not expect to see I/O 
differences between white and Hispanic youth with propensity.   
Hypothesis 8f:  White youth with propensity during the post-9/11 
era will have greater institutional orientations compared to their 
black youth counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 8g: Hispanic youth with propensity during the post-
9/11 era will have similar institutional/occupational orientations 
as their white youth counterparts.   
 
     To determine if there are different value orientations with respect to job 
preferences between those who expect to serve in the military and civilians, I also 
utilize the I/O index measure, along with the single-item questions, for analysis.  I 
examine differences between those who say they “definitely will” join the armed 
forces versus those who say they “definitely will not” (i.e. military vs. civilians).  
I also analyze these differences between the post- and pre-9/11 eras.  This analysis 
is a proxy measure of differences between the military and civilians to determine 
the extent of a gap in attitudes/values with respect to job preferences.  Results will 
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provide insight into possible differences in value orientations between the military 
and civilians, which could have implications for civil-military relations.  Given 
the trends toward individualistic attitudes among members of society (e.g. Billig 
2000), I expect that those who say they definitely expect to enter the military (i.e. 
“high” propensity) will have greater institutional orientations than those who say 
they definitely do not expect to join (i.e. “low” propensity) during the post-9/11 
era.  
Hypothesis 8h: Youth with high propensity during the post-9/11 
era are likely to have greater institutional orientations compared 
to youth with low propensity. 
 
I/O Analysis 
     Methods      
     Segal noted that “in addition to direct questions regarding institutional and 
occupational orientations, Moskos’ conceptualization lends itself to inference 
based on measures not originally intended for this purpose but reflecting 
components of the 
conceptualization…components can then be combined into multiple-item scales 
or analyzed individually” (1986:358-359).  Researchers (e.g. Trainor 2004) have 
used these types of techniques to conduct I/O analysis.  Unfortunately, the MTF 
dataset does not directly ask young men and women why they want to enter the 
armed forces.  Instead, I created an index of questions that include both 
institutional and occupational embedded themes, as a proxy measure for 
examining motivations to serve.  In Form 4 only, the MTF questionnaire asks a 
series of questions that are related to job preferences and what youth look for in 
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their work.  Questions ask respondents to identify how important a particular 
subject area is to them with responses ranging on a scale from 1 to 4 as “Not 
Important,” “Little Important,” “Pretty Important,” and “Very Important.”  There 
are twenty-three total questions related to the amount of importance a respondent 
places on job preferences.  I utilize 11 of these questions to create a multi-item 
index measure for institutional/occupational orientations, as the following 
questions are the most closely related to I/O motivations of service in accordance 
with Moskos’ (1977) original formulation and the extensive amount of prior 
research (e.g. Segal 1986; Trainor 2004; Griffith 2008; Woodruff et al. 2006; 
Taylor et al. 2015).  I attribute the institutional measures that I selected to be most 
associated with selflessness and a greater concern for the employing organization, 
service as a calling, intangible benefits, and a lifestyle orientation toward 
adventure, challenge, and a team/relationships approach toward work.  I attribute 
the occupational measures I selected to be most associated with 
individual/egoistic concerns, and a greater concern for tangible benefits like pay, 
job skills, and prestige.  These I/O conceptualizations are consistent with earlier 
research.   
     As discussed earlier, researchers have used either a combined index scale or 
two separate scales to measure I/O orientations.  Those who have used separate 
scales have argued that I/O concepts are not at opposite ends of the same 
spectrum, but rather they are separate and distinct (e.g. Stahl et al. 1980).  On the 
other hand, others have shown that I/O concepts can be measured together on a 
single scale (e.g. Cotton 1981).  After testing both options to determine the best 
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construct, I chose to analyze a combined multi-item index where both institutional 
and occupational orientations are measured as opposite ends of a single scale.  A 
discussion of the rationale is addressed below. 
     For my I/O index measure, I combine job-related questions that have both 
institutional and occupational themes.  I combine the four following questions that 
correspond most with various institutional values that I highlight in parentheses: 
1) A job that gives you an opportunity to be directly helpful to others (i.e. 
selflessness); 2) A job that is worthwhile to society (i.e. selflessness/calling);  
3) A job that permits contact with a lot of people (i.e. teamwork and 
relationships); and 4) A job where most problems are quite difficult and 
challenging (i.e. challenging environment).  
     I also combine the seven following questions that correspond most with 
various occupational values that I highlight in parentheses: 1) A job that is high in 
status and prestige (i.e. self-interest- prestige based on money); 2) A job where 
the chances of advancement and promotion are good (i.e. extrinsic 
rewards/benefits); 3) A job which provides you with a chance to earn a good deal 
of money (i.e. extrinsic reward/benefits); 4) A job where the skills you learn will 
not go out of date (i.e. job skills/transferability); 5) A job where you have more 
than two weeks vacation (i.e. self-interest/leisure); 6) A job which leaves a lot of 
time for other things in your life (i.e. self-interest/leisure); 7) A job that offers a 
reasonably predictable, secure future (i.e. self-interest/ non-adventure).  Of note, a 
job that is high in status and prestige was fairly highly correlated with a job which 
provides you a chance to make a good deal of money (r=.47).   
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     To highlight again, the measures used for my I/O index were selected based on 
theory from Moskos’ (1977) original I/O formulation and are similar to various 
institutional and occupational measures that have been used in an extensive 
amount of prior research (e.g., Segal 1986; Trainor 2004; Griffith 2008; Woodruff 
et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2015).  Additionally, I conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) to confirm that the variables used for my I/O index measure the 
same things conceptually and to confirm the number of dimensions that the 
variables measure in my index (Torres-Reyna 2010).  The extraction method was 
principal-components analysis, with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization 
(Abdi 2003).  Results of initial CFA revealed three distinct factors with 
eigenvalues above 1.0- 3.24, 1.68, and 1.03 respectively.  Following initial CFA, 
Factors 1 and 2 fit as theorized into two groups that I categorized as institutional 
and occupational.  I deemed the two items that were distinctly categorized as 
“Factor 3,” “a job where you have more than two weeks vacation” and “a job 
which leaves a lot of time for other things in your life”, to be most associated with 
occupational orientations (i.e. self-interest/leisure) based on theory and prior 
research.  Therefore, I condensed the three original factors into two and conducted 
another factor analysis.  Results from my final CFA are reported in Table 8.2 
below.  Items with a factor loading greater than .40 were retained in each factor, 
occupational or institutional.    
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     As noted above, I chose to combine both the institutional measures and the 
occupational measures into one multi-item index.  After constructing a separate 
institutional scale from the institutional measures noted above, Cronbach’s alpha 
was only equal to 0.68, which falls into the “questionable” category for most 
social science research according to George and Mallory (2003).  After 
constructing a separate occupational scale from the occupational measures above, 
Cronbach’s alpha was equal to 0.74.  However, after combining both indexes into 
a single I/O scale, Cronbach’s alpha increased to 0.76, which is “acceptable” for 
most social science research.  Furthermore, items in the index scale were selected 
in such a manner that if they were not occupational, then they could be considered 
more institutional and vice versa.  For example, the question that asks a 
respondent’s importance placed on having a job in which they “can earn a good 
deal of money” indicates more of an occupational orientation if the respondent 
answers with a “4- Very Important.”  On the other hand, if the respondent answers 
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with a “1- Not Important,” this indicates more of an institutional orientation 
toward work.  All items within the index scale have similar dichotomous 
relationships.  CFA verifies this logic as well.  Thus, I reverse coded the 
institutional questions so that greater numbers indicate less institutional and more 
occupational orientations.  Response values are summed, yielding a scale with a 
minimum response score of 11 and a maximum response of 44.  Higher number 
responses are considered to be more occupational in orientation towards work.  
The mean inter-item correlation was 0.22 and the reliability (Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha with unstandardized items) for the I/O scale is 0.76, indicating 
an acceptable degree of internal consistency for a scale of this type (Cronbach 
1951).   
     Additionally, there is a separate question on the MTF Form 4 that asks a 
respondent, “If YOU felt that it was necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future 
war, how likely is it that you would volunteer for military service in that war?”  
Responses include: 1) "I'm sure that I would volunteer;” 2) "I would very likely 
volunteer;" 3) "I would probably volunteer;" 4) "I would probably NOT 
volunteer;" 5) "I would very likely NOT volunteer;" 6) "I would definitely NOT 
volunteer;" 7) "In my opinion, there is no such thing as a 'necessary' war."  
Clearly, responses 1-3 indicate a strong institutional orientation while responses 
4-7 do not.  Arguably, response category number 7, “In my opinion, there is no 
such thing as a ‘necessary’ war,” should not be a response category within the 
same question.  Indeed, whether or not someone believes that there is such a thing 
as a necessary or just war could be considered a separate question altogether (D. 
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Segal conversation 2015).  Thus, I choose to drop those respondents who 
answered #7 from the analysis entirely.  By doing so, I only examine differences 
in who would volunteer for a necessary war between those who believe that a just 
war can actually exist altogether.  I coded this institutional measure into a 
categorical variable (0/1) where “No- Will Not Volunteer” includes respondent’s 
answers between 4-6, and “Yes- Will Volunteer” includes respondent’s answers 
between 1-3. “Yes- Will Volunteer” indicates that a respondent is “Likely to 
Volunteer for a Future War that is Necessary.”  I use this question as an additional 
method to determine the extent of institutional motivations of youth with 
propensity.   
     Similarly, there is a separate question on the MTF Form 1 that is 
unquestionably related to occupational orientations.  The question asks a 
respondent how important “having lots of money” is to them as one of their life 
goals.  Response categories include: 1= “Not Important;” 2= “Somewhat 
Important;” 3= “Quite Important;” 4= “Extremely Important.”   I use this question 
as an additional measure to determine the extent of occupational motivations of 
youth with propensity.   
     Research has shown that it is better to measure multiple items as opposed to a 
single item, since it reduces the likelihood of measurement error in estimates, 
increasing overall reliability (Segal 1986; Gliem and Gliem 2003).  Thus, I use 
both the multi-item I/O index measure as my primary measure in addition to the 
single-item institutional (“Volunteer for War”) and occupational (“Having Lots of 
Money”) measures to best assess youth I/O orientations toward service in the 
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armed forces, to analyze differences by racial and ethnic groups among youth 
with propensity, and to analyze differences in value orientations between the 
military and civilians.  I analyze trends over time between 1976-2013 to test 
Moskos’ hypothesis.  I also conduct difference of means tests and utilize logistic 
and linear regression analysis to examine group differences.  
     Results 
     Table 8.3 shows differences in mean I/O scale scores for my key analysis 
groups during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013), revealing average differences 
between youth with and without the propensity to serve and between racial and 
ethnic groups.  For the overall sample during the post-9/11 era, the mean scale 
value is 31.17 with a standard deviation of 3.74 and a range of response scores 
from 11 to 44.  The average overall scale score is greater than 27.5, the mid-point 
of the scale, suggesting relatively greater occupational orientations of youth.  The 
mean scale score for men with propensity is 31.16, indicating no significant 
differences between those with or without propensity.  As a reminder, youth with 
and without propensity represent the two basic categories of the propensity scale- 
that is, those who say that they “definitely will” and “probably will” serve 
compared to those who say that they “probably won’t” and “definitely won’t” 
serve.  However, mean scale scores indicate significant differences (p<.05) 
between those with “high” propensity (30.86) and those with “low” propensity 
(31.25), suggesting that men with high propensity are significantly more 
institutional in their orientations toward work than men with low propensity.  
Again, youth with “high” versus “low” propensity represent the most extreme 
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categories on each end of the propensity scale.   
     Mean scale scores also indicate significant differences (p<.001) between white 
and black men with the propensity to serve.  White men with propensity have a 
mean scale score of 30.95 whereas black men with propensity have a mean scale 
score of 32.36, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black men.  There 
are no significant differences in mean scale scores (30.95 and 31.12) between 
white and Hispanic men.  However, there are significant differences (p<.01) 
between Hispanic and black men with propensity, suggesting greater occupational 
orientations among black men.  Of note, there are no significant I/O differences 
between racial and ethnic groups for men with “high” propensity during the post-
9/11 era.  However, there are significant differences (p<.01) in mean scale scores 
between white (31.25) and black men with high propensity (32.07) during the pre-
9/11 era.  
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      Figure 8.1 below depicts the overall average I/O trends by year of men who 
are likely to enter the military between 1976-2013.  Consistent with Moskos’ 
predictions, results show that average scores generally increase between 1976-
2001, indicating increasing occupational orientations toward work among men 
with propensity, with an overall mean of 31.62.   
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     Figure 8.2 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average I/O 
trends of men likely to enter the military between 2002-2013.  During the post-
9/11 era, average I/O scores generally decrease indicating significantly greater 
institutional orientations within the military, with an overall mean of 31.16.  This 
supports hypothesis 8c and suggests that Moskos’ prediction does not hold as true 
during the post-9/11 era since the orientations of men with propensity have 
become significantly less occupational (p<.001) compared to years prior to 9/11.  
Interestingly, there is a significant drop in occupational orientations for men with 
the propensity to serve in 2003, the year following the attacks of 9/11.  Mean 
scores significantly dropped from 32.19 in 2002 down to 31.29 in 2003 and 
continued to decline to 30.69 in 2008.  These results suggest that those with the 
propensity to serve had greater institutional orientations between 2003-2008, 
which provides some support for hypothesis 8d.  Indeed, these were the years 
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most likely to be marked by service as a calling (i.e. institutional orientations) 
immediately following 9/11 and during the Iraqi surge (2004-2007) period, which 
encompassed high casualties.  Equally notable, there was a significant spike in 
occupational orientations among men with propensity in 2009 (mean of 31.64), 
the year after the economic recession.  Results suggest that men with the 
propensity to serve had greater occupational orientations between 2009-2010, 
which provides some support for hypothesis 8e.  Indeed, this timeframe was 
marked by a period of economic instability in the civilian labor market, thereby 
possibly attracting youth with greater occupational orientations toward military 
service.  There are similar I/O trends among men with “high” propensity (i.e. 
“Definitely Will” enter the armed forces) with lower overall index scores, 
indicating even greater institutional orientations among this group.  I/O trends of 
men who definitely expect to serve are depicted in Figures 8.1.1 and 8.2.1 of 
Appendix A.  Additionally, I/O trends of youth with “low” propensity (i.e. those 
who definitely do not expect to serve- civilians) are depicted in Figures 8.2.2 and 
8.2.3 of Appendix A.     
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     Utilizing logistic regression analysis similar to the baseline analysis used in 
previous chapters, results reported in Table 8.4 below indicate the odds ratios of 
propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent 
variables for men only.  The primary predictor variable in Table 8.4 is the I/O 
index variable (i.e. job-related attitudes of youth) where greater numbers indicate 
more of an occupational orientation toward work.  Consistent with hypotheses 8a 
and 13, findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between youth with 
propensity and greater institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era.  As 
occupational orientations increase, men are significantly less likely (OR=0.98**) 
to have the propensity to serve, after controlling for various factors such as race, 
SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence.  
In other words, men who are likely to serve have significantly greater institutional 





     Figure 8.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
the I/O index scale after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 
8.4.  The predicted probability of serving decreases by about one-third of a 
percent for every unit increase in the occupational direction on the I/O index scale 
from 11-44.  In other words, a respondent who scores 4 points higher (indicating 
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greater occupational orientations) on the I/O index scale (consisting of eleven 
questions with responses from 1-4), the predicted probability of serving decreases 
by more than one percent.  A one percent decrease in the predicted probability to 
serve is a substantial difference since it equates to about a loss of 22,000 possible 
male recruits the age of 18 according to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 
2015).     
    
     The magnitude and direction of this finding is strengthened even further when 
you compare men who expect that they “definitely will” serve versus men who 
expect that they “definitely won’t” serve.  As occupational orientations increase, 
men are significantly less likely (OR=0.95***) to have high propensity compared 
to men with low propensity.  The predicted probability of serving decreases by 
almost one-half of a percent for every unit increase in the occupational direction 
on the I/O index scale.  Results from this analysis are located in Table 8.4.1 of 
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Appendix A. 
      Analysis of the single-item institutional measure overwhelmingly supports 
hypothesis 8a. Table 8.5 below shows the difference in mean scores of the 
variable, “Volunteer for War,” for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 
era (2002-2013).  Results reveal significant differences between men with and 
without propensity and between racial and ethnic groups.  For the overall sample 
during the post-9/11 era, the mean score value is 3.78 with a standard deviation of 
1.74 and a range from 1 to 6.  Responses between 1-3 indicate a likelihood that a 
youth would volunteer in a necessary future war while responses between 4-6 
indicate that a youth would not volunteer.  The mean score for men with 
propensity is 2.14 and for men without propensity is 4.05, indicating significant 
differences (p<.001) between groups suggesting that men with propensity have 
greater institutional orientations.  These results support hypothesis 8h.  Average 
differences are increased even further between men with high (1.69) and low 
propensity (4.42).  Mean scores also indicate significant differences (p<.001) 
between white and black men with propensity.  White men with propensity have 
an average score of 1.96 whereas black men with propensity score an average of 
3.24, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black men.  There are no 
significant differences between white and Hispanic men (2.18) with propensity.  
However there are significant differences (p<.001) between Hispanic and black 
men with propensity, suggesting Hispanic men have greater institutional 
orientations.  Of note, on average men with propensity, regardless of racial and 
ethnic background, have significantly greater institutional orientations than men 
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without propensity.  
 
     Utilizing logistic regression, results reported in Table 8.6 below indicate the 
odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the 
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independent variables for men only.  The primary predictor variable in Table 8.6 
is the institutional measure variable, “Volunteer for War.”  Men who say that they 
would volunteer to serve during a time that is “necessary for the U.S. to fight in 
some future war” are over ten times more likely (OR=10.36***) than their 
civilian counterparts to have the propensity to serve- an inclination that clearly 
leans toward institutional motivations to serve.  
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     Additionally, analysis of the single-item occupational measure, “Having Lots 
of Money,” using Form 1 data also supports hypothesis 8a.  Table 8.7 below 
depicts difference of mean scores of the life goal variable, “Having Lots of 
Money,” for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013).  
Results reveal significant differences between men with and without propensity 
and between racial and ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era.  For the overall 
sample during the post-9/11 era, the mean score value is 2.84 with a standard 
deviation of 0.89 and a range of 1 to 4, with higher responses indicating greater 
importance toward having lots of money.  Of note, a score of 1 corresponds to 
“not important,” a score of 2 corresponds to a response of “somewhat important,” 
a score of 3 corresponds to a response of “pretty important,” and a score of 4 
corresponds to a response of “very important.”  The mean score for men with 
propensity is 2.84 and for men without propensity is 2.85, indicating no 
significant difference between groups and suggesting that men with propensity 
have similar occupational orientations as their civilian counterparts.  However, 
men with high propensity score 2.75 while men with low propensity score 2.86, 
indicating significant differences (p<.01) and suggesting men with high 
propensity are less occupational.  Mean scores also indicate significant 
differences (p<.001) between white and black men with propensity.  White men 
with propensity have an average score of 2.74 whereas black men with propensity 
score an average of 3.25, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black 
men.  There are also significant differences (p<.001) between white and Hispanic 
men (3.14) with propensity, suggesting greater occupational orientations for 
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Hispanic men.  Significant differences between racial and ethnic groups remain 
for men with high propensity as well.  Similar trends remain between black and 
white men with propensity during the pre-9/11 era.  Interestingly, there are 
significant differences (p<.001) among men with propensity between the post and 
pre-9/11 eras.  Men with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly less 
occupational compared to their counterparts prior to 9/11.  These results remain 
true among men with high propensity as well.  Interestingly, there was no 
difference between men with high and low propensity in the amount of 
importance placed on having lots of money during the pre-9/11 era, suggesting 
that men with high propensity during this timeframe were as occupational as their 
civilian counterparts and were also more occupational than men with propensity 
during the post-9/11 era. 
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     Figure 8.4 below depicts the overall average trends of importance placed on a 
life goal of having lots of money for men with propensity between 1976-2013.  
Results show that average scores generally increase between 1976-1997, and then 
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decrease afterwards into the post-9/11 era, indicating less occupational 
orientations since 9/11.  Again, this suggests that Moskos’ prediction of an 
increasingly occupational military holds true over the first two decades of the 
AVF.  However, it appears that support for his prediction is reduced after 1997 as 
trends reverse.  Men with propensity appear to have become less occupational, 
especially after 9/11.  There are similar trends among men with high propensity 
depicted in Figure 8.4.1 of Appendix A, although men with high propensity are 
less occupational overall.       
 
     Utilizing linear regression analysis, results reported in Table 8.8 below 
indicate significant differences between youth with and without propensity (men 
only) during the post-9/11 era using the life goal of “having lots of money” as the 
dependent variable.  After controlling for SES and various other factors, Model 3 
of Table 8.8 below reveals that there are significant differences between men with 
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and without propensity concerning the importance placed on “having lots of 
money” as a life goal.  Consistent with hypotheses 8a and 13, men with 
propensity place significantly less (p<.05) importance than their civilian 
counterparts on a life goal of having lots of money-an inclination that steers away 




     Figure 8.5 below shows that, on average, men with propensity score 2.79 on a 
scale from 1 to 4 where higher numbers indicate greater importance placed on a 
life goal of having lots of money.  Men who do not expect to serve score an 
average of 2.85 on the same scale, indicating greater occupational orientations.  
The differences between groups increase in magnitude in opposite directions 
when comparing men with high and low propensity.  Results are reported in Table 
8.8.1 of Appendix A.   
     Despite differences between men with and without propensity, it is clear that 
men who are likely to serve place fairly high importance on a life goal of having 
lots of money- clearly an occupational orientation.  Indeed, this suggests that men 
with propensity have “pragmatic professional” orientations- a mixture of both 




          Racial/Ethnic Differences in I/O Orientations 
     There are also significant I/O differences between racial and ethnic groups in 
job related attitudes among men with the propensity to serve.  Figure 8.6 below 
depicts actual I/O differences in mean index scores between racial and ethnic 
groups with propensity by year during the post-9/11 era.  Results reveal that black 
men with propensity generally have greater occupational orientations than their 
white counterparts during this period.   
 
     Results from linear regression analysis reported in Table 8.9 below indicate 
significant differences in I/O orientations by racial and ethnic groups using the 
I/O index measure as the dependent variable.  Model 1 of Table 8.9 reveals that 
white men who expect to serve have significantly greater institutional orientations 
toward work compared to their black counterparts.  On average, black men with 
propensity score 1.39 greater on the I/O index scale than their white counterparts, 
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indicating significantly (p<.001) more occupational orientations toward work.  
There are no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic men.  
Consistent with hypothesis 8f, after controlling for SES and additional factors, 
significant differences (p<.01) in job related attitudes by race remain as 
highlighted in Model 3 of Table 8.9.  On average, black men with propensity 
score 1.01 greater on the I/O index scale than their white counterparts.  Of note, 
there are no significant racial and ethnic group I/O differences among men with 
high propensity (i.e. “Definitely Will” serve).  These results are reported in Table 





     Results reported in Table 8.9 above reveal that there is a significant positive 
relationship (p<.10) between casualties and greater institutional orientations for 
men with propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era.  In other words, as 
casualties rise, men with propensity have greater institutional orientations.  These 
results support my hypothesis 8d and are consistent with I/O trends depicted in 
Figure 8.2 above.   
     Results reported in Table 8.9 also show a positive relationship between 
unemployment and institutional orientations for those men with propensity.  
These results do not support my hypothesis 8e.  From Figure 8.2, it appears that 
there is only a significant spike in occupational orientations from 2009-2010 
when unemployment was at it’s highest.  However, this relationship does not hold 
true for the duration of the post-9/11 era.  It appears that greater institutional 
orientations exist among youth with propensity regardless of unemployment rates.   
     Results reported in Table 8.9 also indicate significant I/O differences between 
SES categories, as measured by a father’s education level, among men with 
propensity.  As SES increases, men have greater institutional orientations toward 
work.  This would seem to make sense as those with higher SES, typically 
measured by income, would likely be able to focus on more altruistic or intangible 
preferences for work, instead of focusing on the tangible aspects of pay and 
benefits.  Put simply, those with higher economic status have more of a “luxury” 
to choose or prefer a “dream” job as opposed to a job where high pay is an 
important consideration.  Interestingly, those men who expect to serve and who 
expect to attend vocational training have significantly (p<.01) greater 
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occupational orientations toward work.  This also makes sense since those 
interested in vocational education are generally “blue-collar” type workers who 
may be more interested in acquiring job skills- an occupational consideration.     
     Additionally, it appears that white men who expect to serve are more 
institutional than black men by analyzing the single-item institutional measure- 
“Volunteer for War” variable.  Results from logistic regression reported in Table 
8.10 below indicate institutional differences by racial and ethnic groups using the 
variable, “Volunteer for War,” as the dependent variable.  After controlling for 
SES and additional factors, there are significant differences between white and 
black men who have the propensity to serve concerning their likelihood to 
volunteer during a time that is “necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future 
war.”  Model 6 of Table 8.10 indicates that black men with propensity are more 
than 3 times less likely (OR=0.18***) to say they would volunteer to serve in 
some future war, suggesting less institutional orientations than their white 
counterparts and providing additional support for hypothesis 8f.  
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     After full controls, Figure 8.7 below reveals that, on average, for white men 
who expect to serve, there is about a 90% probability that they would likely 
volunteer for a future war that is necessary.  In contrast, for black men who expect 
to serve, there is about a 60% probability that they would likely volunteer.  There 
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are no significant differences between white and Hispanic men on this 
institutional measure, which is consistent with hypothesis 8g.    
 
     In a similar analysis that clearly measures occupational orientations using 
MTF Form 1 data, it appears that white men who expect to serve are less 
occupational than their black counterparts.  Results reported in Table 8.11 below 
indicate occupational orientations by racial and ethnic groups using the variable, 
“having lots of money,” as the dependent variable.  After controlling for SES and 
additional factors, Model 3 of Table 8.11 below reveals that there are significant 
differences between white and black men with the propensity to serve concerning 
their importance placed on “having lots of money” as a life goal.  Consistent with 
hypothesis 8f, black men place significantly higher importance (p<.001) than 
white men on a life goal of having lots of money.  Similarly, Hispanic men place 
significantly more importance (p<.01) than white men on a life goal of having lots 
 352 
of money, which does not support hypothesis 8g.  Racial and ethnic group 
differences continue in the same direction and magnitude between white and 
black men with high propensity.  However, there is not a significant difference 
between white and Hispanic men with high propensity.  These results are reported 






     After full controls, Figure 8.8 below shows that, on average, white men with 
propensity score 2.75 on a scale from 1 to 4 where higher numbers indicate 
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greater importance placed on a life goal of having lots of money.  Black men with 
propensity score an average of 3.22 on the same scale, indicating greater 
occupational orientations.  Hispanic men with propensity score about 3.04 and are 
also significantly different than their white counterparts.  Despite racial and ethnic 
group differences, it appears that all youth with propensity, on average, place 
fairly high importance on a life goal of having lots of money- clearly an 
occupational orientation.      
 
 
Women’s Propensity and I/O Orientations Analysis 
     I report the I/O analysis for women below.  For brevity sake and continuity, I 
condense the amount of tables and figures I use below for women compared to the 
amount I used above for my analysis of men.  In general, the results for the 
analyses of the relationships between women’s propensity and the additional 
single-item variables (i.e. “volunteer for war” and “have lots of money”) are 
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consistent with the analysis of women’s propensity and the I/O index.  Therefore, 
I only display the results of the relationship between women’s propensity and the 
I/O index.  As noted earlier, I do not compare differences in I/O orientations 
between high and low propensity women since sample sizes for women with high 
propensity would produce unreliable results.     
     Table 8.12 shows differences in mean I/O scale scores for my key analysis 
groups for women during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013), revealing average 
differences between women with and without the propensity to serve and between 
racial and ethnic groups.  For the overall sample during the post-9/11 era, the 
mean scale value is 30.10 with a standard deviation of 3.73 and a range of 
response scores from 11 to 44.  The average overall scale score is greater than 
27.5, the mid-point of the scale, suggesting relatively greater occupational 
orientations of women.  The mean scale score for women with propensity is 
30.28, indicating no significant differences between those with or without 
propensity.  
     Mean scale scores indicate significant differences (p<.05) between white and 
black women with the propensity to serve.  White women with propensity have a 
mean scale score of 29.96 whereas black women with propensity have a mean 
scale score of 30.76, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black 
women.  There are no significant differences in mean scale scores between white 
and Hispanic women.  
     Interestingly, women with propensity during the post-9/11 era appear to be 
significantly (p<.001) more institutional than men with propensity.  Women with 
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propensity average a score of 30.28, whereas men with propensity average a score 
of 31.16.  These results are consistent with literature that suggests that women are 
motivated by more intangible benefits of work as compared to men (e.g. Beutel 
and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011).  These results also support previous 
work highlighting that women in the military are motivated for institutional 
reasons (e.g. Shields 1988).    
      
     Figure 8.9 below depicts the overall average I/O trends by year of women who 
are likely to enter the military between 1976-2013.  Similar to the results for men, 
results show that average scores generally increase between 1976-2001, 
suggesting increasing occupational orientations toward work among women with 
propensity, with an overall mean of 30.06.  
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     Figure 8.10 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average I/O 
trends of women likely to enter the military between 2002-2013.  During the post-
9/11 era, average I/O scores generally remain the same with an overall mean of 
30.28.  This suggests that Moskos’ prediction does not hold as true during the 
post-9/11 era as the orientations of women with propensity are not any more 
occupational compared to years prior to 9/11.  This is slightly different than the 
results for men, which indicated significantly less occupational orientations 
during the post-9/11 era.     
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     Utilizing logistic regression analysis similar to the baseline analysis used in 
previous chapters, results reported in Table 8.13 below indicate the odds ratios of 
women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the 
independent variables for men only.  The primary predictor variable in Table 8.13 
is the I/O scale index variable (i.e. job-related attitudes of youth) where higher 
numbers (i.e. numbers above 1.0) indicate more of an occupational orientation 
toward work.  Consistent with hypotheses 8a and 8h, findings indicate that there 
is a positive relationship between women with propensity and higher institutional 
orientations during the post-9/11 era.  Women who are likely to serve are 
significantly less likely (OR=0.96*) to have greater occupational orientations 
toward work compared to women who are not likely to serve, after controlling for 
various factors such as race, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of 
country and type of residence.  In other words, women who are likely to serve 
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have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work.  
 
      
     Figure 8.11 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by the I/O index scale after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 
of Table 8.13.  The predicted probability of serving decreases by about one-third 
of a percent for every unit increase in the occupational direction on the I/O index 
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scale from 11-44.  In other words, for a woman who scores 4 points higher 
(indicating more occupational orientations) on the I/O index scale, the predicted 
probability of serving decreases by more than one percent.  A one percent 
decrease in the predicted probability to serve is a substantial difference since it 
equates to about a loss of 21,000 possible female recruits the age of 18 according 
to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).   
 
     It should be noted that similar results held constant when analyzing the 
institutional measure, “volunteer for war” variable, and the occupational measure 
of a life goal to “have lots of money.”  For both measures, women with propensity 
were significantly more institutional compared to their civilian counterparts 
without propensity.  These results were similar to the results for men.  Overall, 
results show that women with propensity during the post-9/11 era are more 
institutional than their civilian counterparts.   
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     Racial/Ethnic Differences in I/O Orientations Among Women with Propensity      
     Results from regression analysis reported in Table 8.14 below indicate 
significant differences in I/O orientations among women with propensity by racial 
and ethnic groups using the I/O scale index measure as the dependent variable.  
Model 1 of Table 8.14 reveals that white women who expect to serve have 
significantly greater institutional orientations toward work compared to their 
black counterparts.  On average, among women with propensity, black women 
score an average of 0.82 greater on the I/O index scale than white women, 
indicating significantly (p<.05) more occupational orientations toward work.  
There are no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic women.  
However, after controlling for SES and additional factors, differences in job 
related attitudes by race and ethnicity are no longer significant as highlighted in 
Model 3 of Table 8.14.  
     It should be noted that similar results held constant when analyzing the 
institutional measure, “volunteer for war” variable, and the occupational measure 
of a life goal to “have lots of money.”  For both measures, black women with 
propensity were significantly (p<.001) more occupational compared to their white 
counterparts.  There were no significant differences between white and Hispanic 






     For brevity sake, I focus the discussion below on the relationship between 
men’s propensity and I/O attitudes toward work.  I highlight key differences by 
gender where relevant, which is consistent with previous chapters.   
     Taking all the I/O measures into consideration, it appears that youth who are 
likely to serve during the post-9/11 era have more institutional and less 
occupational orientations than youth who do not expect to serve.  This makes 
sense given that the post-9/11 era has been marked by sustained war.  It is 
reasonable that those who desire to serve during wartime would have fairly high 
institutional motivations overall such as serving for “patriotism” or as a “calling.”  
Certainly it is not surprising that youth who expect to serve during this era are 
looking for something “more than just a job.”  Colonel Dandridge Malone’s 
narration of a “Soldier’s Story” during the 1960s, quoted in James Fallows’ 
National Defense, dramatically expresses the institutional nature of military 
service prior to the AVF. 
“Malone tells the soldier’s story, from the time he leaves home, a 
young recruit, on his way to boot camp…the anxiety and confusion 
at the training schools; the friendships, the coarseness, the constant 
reassignments and promotions; the compromises and satisfactions 
of military marriage; and on to Vietnam, through the fire fights, the 
fear again, the deaths of friends; survival and return; the first 
glimpse of children he has not seen for a year, the first embrace of 
his wife…  
“- and if all these wondrous things,” Malone draws at the end… 
“which thousands of us share in whole or part, can, by the mindless 
logic of a soulless computer, programmed by a witless pissant 
ignorant of affect, be called, just another job… then, by God, I’m a 
sorry, suck-egg mule” (Fallows 1981).    
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     Indeed, it appears that the sentiment expressed in Colonel Malone’s “Soldier’s 
Story,” during the conscription-based military era, has, perhaps, withstood the test 
of time and that the occupational trends of the military may not hold as true as 
Moskos predicted during the post-9/11 era- an era marked by sustained war.  The 
increasing trends of occupational orientations during the 1980s and 90s, as 
depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.1.1, have reversed direction toward greater 
institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era.  These results support and 
strengthen findings in recent research (e.g. Woodruff et al. 2006; Griffith 2008; 
Pew 2011a).  However, these findings appear to contradict Dempsey’s (2010) 
research.  Dempsey found that U.S. enlistees were primarily motivated to join by 
a list of occupational reasons related to pay and benefits.  On the contrary, these 
findings suggest that the future enlisted population, who comprise the majority of 
the respondents with propensity in the MTF study, are motivated by more 
institutional motivations such as patriotism (i.e. likely to volunteer in a 
“necessary” war in the future) as opposed to occupational motivations such as pay 
and benefits (i.e. having a life goal of “making lots of money”).  Although 
Dempsey’s research only captured a snapshot of soldier attitudes within the U.S. 
Army in 2004, one might have expected that those attitudes would be more in line 
with institutional orientations since 9/11 had just occurred.  However, it is 
possible that greater institutional orientations of soldiers did not occur until after 
2004, as the MTF data suggests.  Indeed, only the most junior soldiers surveyed in 
Dempsey’s research would have been from the post-9/11 cohort.  In contrast to 
Dempsey’s research covering the attitudes of those in the Army, my results reveal 
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a more complete picture of attitudes across the entire military formation, 
regardless of MOS or branch of service, and primarily comprising the attitudes of 
the enlisted ranks during the post-9/11 era.     
     It should not be forgotten, however, that both institutional and occupational 
orientations continue to exist for youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 
era.  For example, the fact that the mean scale score on the I/O index for youth 
with propensity does not fall below 29.90 for any key group of analysis (see 
Tables 8.3 and 8.12) indicates fairly high occupational orientations overall, as the 
midpoint of the scale is 27.5.  Although there are significant differences between 
youth with and without propensity in the importance placed on having a life goal 
of “making lots of money,” youth who expect to serve still score an average of 
2.79, which is beyond the mid-point of 2.5 on a scale from 1-4, indicating that this 
goal is still “pretty important” to them.  Additionally, as noted in earlier analysis, 
the fact that a dwindling economy is positively related to military propensity and 
that high casualties are negatively related to propensity, also suggests that some 
occupational motivations of service persist during this era.   
     Taken together, these data suggest that Segal’s (1986) hypothesis of 
“pragmatic professionalism” is supported during the post-9/11 era.  These 
findings also support earlier research (e.g. Eighmey 2006; Burland and Lundquist 
2013; Dempsey 2010).  That a young man is concerned about pay, benefits, and 
the economic well being of his family does not mean that he is a bad soldier.  
Indeed, prior evidence suggests that a mixture of orientations can coexist and is 
the modal type (Segal 1986).  This is important to understand for policy makers in 
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Congress who are making defense budgetary decisions, as well as for military 
practitioners who are basing personnel decisions on Congressional funding or a 
lack thereof.  As the military continues to undergo sequestration, and seeks to find 
ways to survive in a constrained environment by reducing service members’ 
retirement benefits, annual pay raises, and other tangible benefits, it is possible 
that military recruitment and retention could be negatively impacted given the 
pragmatic orientations of service members and recruits.   
     In large part, researchers have neglected to examine differences in I/O attitudes 
between racial and ethnic groups.  I have attempted to fill this void through my 
analysis.  As a whole, data suggests that white youth who expect to serve have 
more institutional orientations than their black youth counterparts.  These results 
support the findings of earlier research as well (e.g. DoD 2000; Woodruff et al. 
2006; Griffith 2008).  Generally, there are no significant I/O differences between 
white and Hispanic youth with propensity.  However, for the occupational 
measure of having lots of money as a life goal, Hispanic men with propensity 
place greater importance than their white counterparts.  It must be emphasized 
that these data do not suggest that black youth who expect to serve are not at all 
institutionally motivated.  As noted earlier, there were no significant differences 
in I/O orientations between racial and ethnic groups among those with high 
propensity using the I/O index scale measure.  Nor does it suggest that white 
youth with propensity are not at all occupationally motivated.  Simply, data 
reveals that, on average, white youth who expect to serve are more institutionally 
oriented and less occupationally oriented than their black youth counterparts.  As 
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highlighted earlier, however, there are certainly institutional and occupational 
orientations among all youth (i.e. “pragmatic professionals”) who expect to serve 
in the armed forces, regardless of racial and ethnic background. 
     I/O differences between racial and ethnic groups are consistent with the 
bridging hypothesis.  That is, those youth who are economically disadvantaged 
(e.g. minorities) may be motivated to join the military by more occupational 
reasons such as pay, benefits, and job security.  This helps explain the average 
differences in occupational orientations between white and black youth with 
propensity.  It appears that minority youth are active agents in making the best 
decisions for their pathway to adulthood- not merely victims of their 
socioeconomic standing as some have suggested by arguing that the volunteer 
military is nothing but a “poor man’s draft” (Bica 2011). Indeed, the military’s 
ability to increase human capital through job training, pay and benefits, and 
education assistance may still present an attractive option for minority youth, 
despite it being a time of war where the risks of military service are increased and 
possibly outweigh the benefits.  
     However, the bridging hypothesis does not fully explain the fact that there are 
generally no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic youth.  It is 
possible that other, more institutional motivations of service could be attracting 
Hispanic youth to serve during the post-9/11 era.  Hispanic representation of men 
and women has been the highest among minorities within the Marine Corps, 
which is typically considered the most institutional branch of service.  Indeed, 
research has shown that the large Hispanic representation within the Marine 
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Corps has been attributed to how well the institutional nature of the service 
intermeshed with the cultural values of Hispanics (De Angelis 2012).  Perhaps, 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could be appealing to Hispanic individual 
institutional values, attracting Hispanic youth to serve their country and fulfill 
their sense of citizenship, regardless of their actual legal status, especially during 
a period in which immigration issues have been at the forefront of political and 
social debate (Segal et al. 2007).  Certainly, the idea that those willing to fight for 
the United States are worthy of equal status is not a new one.  Service during 
wartime has always been a way for all individuals to prove their merit and claim 
their equal stake in citizenship- especially for minorities (e.g. black service during 
WWII) (Leo Bogart 1969; Kestnbaum 2000; 2002; Clever and Segal 2012).                
     My findings also suggest that there may be differences in values between the 
military (i.e. those with propensity) and civilians (i.e. those without propensity).  
The starkest contrast in I/O orientations is between those who say they definitely 
will serve versus those who say they definitely will not.  Results suggest that 
military members are more institutionally oriented than civilians.  This suggests 
that civilians value more tangible personal rewards such as money and benefits 
than those in the military.  This gap in values and attitudes between the military 
and civilian population contributes to the extensive body of research on civil-
military relations as discussed extensively in Chapter 7.  Indeed, there has been a 
large body of literature in business management that has grappled with I/O 
tensions in the business world and applying techniques to instill more institutional 
values in the private sector (Faris 1988).  
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     The fact that there are I/O differences in attitudes toward work between the 
military and civilians is not necessarily surprising.  Certainly, one would expect 
that those expecting to enter the armed forces after 9/11 would have relatively 
high institutional orientations.  Indeed, the military has attempted to recruit these 
types of individuals through various institutional recruiting themes.  The fact that 
those youth without propensity (i.e. civilians) have greater occupational 
orientations does not necessarily mean that they are bad or ill intentioned.  
Research has shown that civilians may also have both “occupational” and 
“institutional” orientations, similar to the concept of “pragmatic professionalism” 
(Segal 1986).  Even in the public sector realm, workers can mix altruistic motives 
while still satisfying their individual needs (Taylor et al. 2015).  Additionally, my 
research shows that general I/O trends for civilians (i.e. youth with low 
propensity) have also reversed direction from increasingly occupational 
orientations to slightly more institutional orientations during the 2000s (see 
Figures 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 in Appendix A), suggesting that American youth values 
may be becoming less individualistic in nature.  Indeed, these findings could be 
representative of the service-based learning programs established within school 
systems over the past few decades.  A good amount of research (e.g. Billig 2000) 
has focused on the service ethic (i.e. community service) put into place within K-
12 schools from the perceived need to reform youth and education resulting from 
the belief that young people seemed to be growing increasingly alienated from 
their communities and from society as a whole.  Service-learning systems were 
explicitly aimed at achieving the end state of decreasing the individualistic trends 
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within society overall (Conrad and Hedin 1991).  My research contributes to this 
stem of research by indirectly analyzing the impact of the service ethic in schools 
over time, suggesting that youth overall are becoming less individualistic or 
occupational in nature.  However, the main emphasis of my research is that youth 
who expect to serve have also become increasingly institutional in nature, even 
more so than their civilian counterparts, during the post-9/11 era.    
     What is perhaps most important to highlight from my research is that findings 
suggest that institutional orientations, reminiscent of the conscription-era days, 
steadfastly remain within all youth groups who have the propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era, regardless of racial and ethnic background, and 
especially among those with “high” propensity.  As prior research (e.g. Faris 
1988; Griffin 2008) has suggested, this bodes well for the effectiveness of our 
military in a time of war into the unknown future.   
     A possible limitation to my analysis is that the MTF study does not directly 
inquire about a respondent’s motivation to serve.  Although the measures used for 
my analysis are a proxy for I/O orientations and individual motivations to serve, 
they provide additional benefits that could not be found otherwise.  It is well 
known that a basic human tendency is to present oneself in the most positive light, 
and, unfortunately, this can distort information gained on self-report 
questionnaires.  Even in anonymous surveys, respondents are unable to report 
accurately on certain topics for “ego-defensive or impression management 
reasons” (Fisher 1993:303).  The result is data that are systematically biased 
toward respondents’ perceptions of what is “correct” or socially acceptable 
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(Maccoby and Maccoby 1954).  This phenomenon is called “social desirability 
bias” and has been found to occur in virtually all types of self-report measures and 
across nearly all social science literatures (Fisher 1993).  The MTF dataset is 
unique in that it captures individual attitudes prior to actual enlistment, thereby 
effectively reducing the social desirability bias that could be present when a 
respondent is directly asked what motivates him or her to serve.   
     Oftentimes, service members are apt to cite more altruistic reasons for serving 
such as a desire to serve the country as opposed to individual reasons such as pay 
and benefits.  Indeed, it is often the case for enlistees to nostalgically reflect on 
their motivations to serve as being romantic and selfless in nature.  These 
responses typically become primarily altruistic the longer the enlistee serves in 
the military (Dempsey 2010).  Research (e.g. Fisher 1993) has shown that indirect 
questioning has been employed to effectively reduce the social desirability bias.  
By indirectly examining youth attitudes about their work preferences in general, 
as a proxy for determining motivations to serve, instead of directly asking 
questions of why they expect to serve, we may better tap into the actual psyche of 
individuals without biasing responses with socially desirable answers such as 
stating that they serve for a “higher calling” or for “patriotism,” which have been 
typical respondent options on surveys.  For this reason, results from my research 
may underestimate the actual extent of overall institutional orientations of youth 
with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  However, my data is useful for drawing 
comparisons between key groups such as white/black/Hispanics, 
military/civilians, and pre/post-9/11 eras.  Since the MTF survey does not directly 
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ask these questions, results should allow recruiters and military practitioners to 
more accurately assess youth motivations to serve.  
Summary 
     My research is unique compared to other research on I/O attitudes in a few 
notable ways.  First, if one is willing to make longitudinal assessments using 
repeated cross-sectional data, I am able to depict I/O trends of youth with 
propensity over time during the AVF era.  My data suggests that Moskos’ 
prediction of an increasingly occupational military may not hold as true during the 
post-9/11 era.  Utilizing a combination of single-item questions and a multi-item 
index to strengthen findings, my research suggests that on average, youth with the 
propensity to serve, regardless of race and ethnicity, are becoming increasingly 
institutional in nature during the post-9/11 era.  In fact, given the secondary nature 
of the MTF data in which I utilize indirect inquiry, I am better able to eliminate 
social desirability bias.  Thus, the institutional orientations of youth with 
propensity may be underestimated since youth are more likely to indicate 
altruistic motivations of service when directly asked.  Furthermore, my analysis of 
the MTF data allows for a more complete examination of the attitudes of future 
enlistees across services and military occupational specialties.  Indeed, prior 
research has largely been limited to the analysis of attitudes within specific 
branches of service or by MOS, typically finding greater institutional orientations 
in the combat arms specialties and in the Marine Corps or the Army.   
     Second, I am able to assess key group differences between racial and ethnic 
background.  Data suggests that white and Hispanic youth with propensity 
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generally have greater institutional orientations than their black youth 
counterparts.  Further, data suggest that a higher level of socioeconomic status, as 
measured by a parent’s level of education, is also associated with greater 
institutional orientations among youth with propensity.   
     Third, by considering youth with high propensity as the best proxy for military 
attitudes and youth with low propensity as the best proxy for civilian attitudes, I 
am able to assess civil-military attitudinal differences.  Data suggests that youth 
with high propensity have greater institutional orientations than their civilian 
counterparts.  However, it is important to note that youth with high propensity 
have fairly high occupational orientations as well.  Indeed, Segal’s concept of 
“pragmatic professionalism” appears to be present during the post-9/11 era- an era 
marked by the surprise attacks of 9/11, a period of sustained war with fairly high 
casualties, and a period in which the stability of the economy has fluctuated from 
a recession.  As such, the I/O orientations of those likely to serve in the military 
have fluctuated in predictable ways.   
     Data from my research is fruitful for the examination of I/O attitudes using 
individuals as the unit of analysis, to evaluate whether those youth with military 
propensity view their service as a calling, a job, or some combination of the two.  
However, it does not allow for the analysis at the organizational level to compare 
the military as an institution with the military as a workplace, nor at the nation-
state level (Segal 1986).  To better examine all applicable units of analysis, 
ethnographic research, complemented by survey analysis and organizational data, 
would be best to assess the I/O trends of the military overall.  However, inasmuch 
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as institutional orientations are positively related to increased military 
effectiveness, job satisfaction, and commitment to the organization, data suggests 
that the AVF of the military is in solid shape with institutional values of service 





Chapter 9: Gender Role Attitudes and Military Propensity 
Background and Prior Research 
     An individual’s gender role attitudes consists of one’s set of beliefs about the 
appropriate role for men and women in society.  Beliefs on gender roles have 
been described as ranging from traditional to non-traditional, or as being part of 
the conservative/liberal spectrum.  Traditionally, men have been expected to 
assume the role as “provider” or “breadwinner” for the family, while women have 
been expected to assume the “homemaker” and “caregiver” roles.  On the other 
hand, non-traditional, or egalitarian, attitudes favor more equal distribution of 
professional and family responsibilities between men and women.   
     From 1970 to 2000, women’s participation in the labor force increased by 40 
percent, while men experienced a 7 percent decrease (Ray 2008).  Indeed, the 
provider role normally associated with men has been challenged in recent times 
by an increased attention to women’s ability to work outside the home and a 
man’s ability to serve as a caregiver and to share more of the work inside the 
house.  As a result of the expansion of women’s participation in the workforce, 
attitudes toward appropriate gender roles have changed over time.      
     Previous research on gender roles (e.g. Thornton and Young-Demarco 2001) 
has shown a substantial increase in trends toward support for women’s equality in 
the workplace between the 1960s through the 1990s.  By the 1980s, a significant 
majority of Americans had egalitarian attitudes on most dimensions of gender 
roles, including equality in decision-making, the involvement of women in 
previously male roles, and the impacts of a working mother on children and 
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families.  These trends have continued into the mid-1990s.  Further, these patterns 
of increasing egalitarian attitudes have held true for women as well as for men, 
and for high school seniors as well as the general adult population.  However, 
research has shown that egalitarian trends in attitudes towards gender roles have 
leveled off since the mid-1990s.  Regardless, current levels of egalitarianism 
toward gender roles are dramatically higher than those of the middle of the 20th 
century.   
     Research has also shown that there are racial and ethnic differences in attitudes 
toward gender roles.  Black men are more liberal than men in other racial and 
ethnic groups in their attitudes toward gender roles.  This has largely been 
attributed to the fact that black women have had to work as the provider more 
than women in other racial and ethnic groups (Ray 2008).  Some (e.g. Konrad and 
Harris 2002) have attributed these differences in attitudes due to the fact that 
African-Americans have adapted to slavery, discrimination and racism by 
developing multiple roles for men and women, which has assisted them in 
functioning as a family unit.  Since traditional gender roles are based on a 
definitive division of labor, blacks and other racial and ethnic groups, who depend 
on the economic contributions of both men and women, may develop more 
egalitarian views towards gender role norms (Millham and Smith 1986).  
Although research has shown that black men are more supportive of working 
wives compared to white men, research has also shown that black men have more 
conservative attitudes about a range of other gender roles (e.g. responsibility for 
housework and achievement outside the home). 
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      Research on the gender role attitudes of Hispanics has been limited compared 
to blacks and results are generally inconclusive (Kane 2000).  One of the earliest 
views of Hispanic culture is that Hispanic men and women have been labeled as 
very traditional, with men classified as “machismo” and women classified as 
“marianismo” (McLoyd et al. 2000).  “Marianismo” is based on the Catholic ideal 
of the Virgin Mary, emphasizing the woman’s role as mother and celebrating her 
self-sacrifice and suffering for her children.  “Machismo,” on the other hand, 
stresses the man’s role more as head of the household than as father.  Taken 
together, these values have painted the picture of the ideal Latino family type as 
the self-sacrificing mother and the dominant, tyrannical man (McLoyd et al. 
2000).  More recently, however, studies have begun to explode the myth of the 
macho man and submissive woman as the norm in Latino culture.  Indeed, studies 
have shown that Hispanic men who held traditional values about gender roles 
have counted on their wives’ income from outside the home to increase their 
families’ standard of living and upward mobility (McLoyd et al. 2000).      
     Despite the increasing trends of egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles 
among society, attitudes among men in the military have significantly lagged 
behind.  Research has shown that women’s performance evaluations in military 
roles have been significantly negatively influenced by gender stereotypes that 
have led to discrimination by others against women in these roles (Boldry et al. 
2001).  Indeed, the stereotypes of women do not necessarily fit nicely with the 
perception of masculinity required to perform and lead within the military.       
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Gender Role Attitudes in the Military During the Post-9/11 Era 
     Women’s roles and participation levels in the military have continued to 
increase over time as a result of various social and institutional factors to include 
but not limited to: manpower shortages within the military; an increase in 
women’s participation in the overall labor force; the overall delay of marriage and 
childbearing in society; a continual increase in the military’s occupational 
specialties available to women; and a widening acceptance and appreciation for 
women’s performances in the military (Segal 1995; Sandhoff and Segal 2013).  
See Chapter 6 for more detailed background information on women’s military 
service.  Attitudes toward gender roles are of particular interest during the post-
9/11 era as women’s participation in the military continues to increase during a 
period of sustained combat operations.  The removal of the combat exclusion ban 
and DoD’s recent decision to open all combat specialties to women makes it 
especially worthy to analyze youth attitudes toward gender-roles, especially 
among young men with the propensity to serve.  These institutional changes beg 
the question: will men’s predispositions toward gender roles make them more or 
less likely to accept new combat roles for women?   
     With women’s success during combat operations throughout the post-9/11 era 
as highlighted earlier in Chapter 6, it is reasonable to believe that egalitarian 
attitudes toward gender-roles may be increasing among young men interested in 
the military.  Indeed, the barrier-breaking trends of women in society (see Chapter 
6) continue to challenge gender norms.  However, the military has long been 
viewed as a traditionally male, war-fighting institution with a hyper-masculine 
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culture.  Thus, it is possible that attitudes toward gender roles are more traditional 
among men in the military compared to the rest of society (Dempsey 2010).  
Indeed, these attitudes could be strong enough to resist the changes within the 
military institution.        
     Dempsey’s (2010) recent study of the Army in 2004 included an analysis of 
attitudes toward issues of gender.  Respondents were asked to agree or disagree 
on a scale of one to seven on the following statement: “Women should have an 
equal role with men in running business, industry and government.”  Dempsey 
found that 60 percent of the civilian population fully agreed with this statement, 
whereas just 49 percent of Army respondents did so, indicating significant 
differences between the military and civilians.  There were no significant 
differences in opinion by rank as 48 percent of soldiers and 51 percent of officers 
agreed with the statement.  However, there were significant differences between 
men and women, particularly among the officer corps.  Within the officer ranks, 
46 percent of male officers agreed with the idea of full equality for women in the 
workplace, whereas 81 percent of female officers felt the same.  The same pattern 
existed among the enlisted ranks, but to a lesser degree.  Male soldiers essentially 
had the same opinions (45 percent) as their officer counterparts.  However, female 
soldiers were significantly less (65 percent) than their officer counterparts.  
Differences in attitudes between male and female enlisted soldiers were still 
significant, but not as large as differences between male and female officers.  
     Perhaps most interestingly, there was a relative lack of differences in opinion 
on gender equality between men and women in the civilian population, despite 
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significant differences by gender among those in the army.  Across all ranks, the 
study found that the difference in attitudes toward gender equality between men 
and women was 23 percent (45 percent of men and 68 percent of women agreed 
with full gender equality in the workplace).  These patterns differed markedly 
from civilian attitudes.  The difference in attitudes by gender among the civilian 
population was only 6 percent.  Fifty-seven percent of male civilian respondents 
agreed with the idea of full gender equality in the workplace, compared with 63 
percent of women.  Taken together, Dempsey’s research suggests that men in the 
military are more traditional in gender role attitudes than their civilian 
counterparts, while women in the military are more egalitarian than their civilian 
counterparts.  It is possible that these stark differences could lead to problems 
with women’s integration into combat roles.            
Propensity Predictions  
     Despite societal trends of increasing egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles, 
women’s expansion of roles in the military, and their recent success in combat 
during the post-9/11 era, I do not expect to see a positive influence on egalitarian 
attitudes among young men with propensity.  Given the traditional, hyper-
masculine culture of the military and consistent with Dempsey’s recent research 
(2010), I expect that men’s propensity will be negatively related to greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles.  Consistent with prior research (e.g. 
McLoyd et al. 2000) that analyzes the differences of gender role attitudes by race 
and ethnicity, I expect that minority men with propensity will have greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts.  
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Hypothesis 9a: Men’s propensity will be negatively related to 
greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles during the post-
9/11 era.  
 
Hypothesis 9b: Black and Hispanic men with propensity will 
have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared 
to their white counterparts. 
 
     Consistent with prior research (e.g. Dempsey 2010), I expect that men with 
propensity will have less egalitarian gender role attitudes compared to women 
with propensity.  In contrast to my prediction for men, I expect that women’s 
propensity will be positively related to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender 
roles, which is consistent with Dempsey’s (2010) recent research.  Indeed, it is 
reasonable that the barrier-breaking trends of women within society, as well as 
their recent successes in combat, are likely to attract young women with greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles into the military.  Consistent with prior 
research, I expect that minority women with propensity will have greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts.            
Hypothesis 9c: Women with propensity will have greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to men with 
propensity during the post-9/11 era.    
 
Hypothesis 9d: Women’s propensity will be positively related to 
greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles during the post-
9/11 era. 
 
Hypothesis 9e: Black and Hispanic women with propensity will 
have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared 
to their white counterparts. 
 
Analysis of Gender Role Attitudes 
     Methods 
     A series of questions on Form 3 of the MTF survey ask respondents how much 
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they agree or disagree with each of the following statements related to gender 
roles.  Response categories range between 1= “Disagree”; 2= “Mostly Disagree”; 
3= “Neither”; 4= “Mostly Agree”; 5= “Agree.”  I created a “gender roles” index 
measure that consists of the seven following questions: 1) Men and women should 
be paid the same money if they do the same work; 2) Women should be 
considered as seriously as men for jobs as executives or politicians; 3) A woman 
should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man; 4) A woman should 
have exactly the same educational opportunities as a man; 5) It is usually better 
for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman 
takes care of the home and family (reverse coded); 6) A preschool child is likely 
to suffer if the mother works (reverse coded); and 7) A working mother can 
establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who 
does not work.  
     I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to confirm that the variables 
used for my gender roles index measure the same things conceptually and to 
confirm the number of dimensions that the variables measure in my index 
(Torres-Reyna 2010).  The extraction method was principal components analysis, 
with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi 2003).  Results of initial 
CFA revealed two distinct factors with eigenvalues above 1.0- 3.08 and 1.35 
respectively.  Following CFA, Factors 1 and 2 fit into two groups which I 
categorized as: 1) “Equality for Women,” and 2) “Gender Roles.”  Results from 
my CFA are reported in Table 9.1 below. 
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     After constructing a separate scale from the “Equality for Women” measures 
noted above, Cronbach’s alpha was equal to 0.80, which falls into the “good” 
category for most social science research according to George and Mallory 
(2003).  After constructing a separate scale from the “Gender Roles” measures 
above, Cronbach’s alpha was equal to 0.65, which is considered to be 
“questionable.”  After combining both indexes into a single gender roles index 
scale, the mean inter-item correlation was 0.34 and the reliability (Cronbach’s 
coefficient alpha with unstandardized items) was 0.74, which is “acceptable” for 
most social science research (Cronbach 1951; George and Mallory 2003).  I chose 
to combine both factors into one multi-item gender roles index measure since both 
factors are related with respect to attitudes toward women at work and at home.  
Response values were summed, yielding a scale with a minimum response score 
of 7 and a maximum score of 35, with a midpoint of 21.  Higher number 
responses are considered to be greater support for women’s roles in the workplace 
and at home.  Put another way, higher responses indicate more egalitarian 
attitudes toward gender roles.  Of note, I conducted an analysis of men and 
women’s propensity using the two separate index measures noted above, but 
results did not significantly change in magnitude or direction from the results 
reported below which utilizes one index scale measure.   
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     Results 
    Table 9.2 below depicts the difference of means in attitudes toward gender 
roles for key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era.  Not surprisingly, results 
reveal that men with propensity are significantly more traditional (p<.001) in their 
attitudes toward gender roles compared to men without propensity.  Despite 
significant differences, it is worth noting that men with propensity score above the 
midpoint of the scale (i.e. 21), suggesting fairly high egalitarian attitudes toward 
gender roles.  On average, men with propensity score 26.33, while men without 
propensity score an average of 27.35.  On average, white and black men with 
propensity are more traditional in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to 
their civilian counterparts.  However, results indicate that Hispanic men with 
propensity are no more traditional in their gender attitudes than their civilian 
counterparts.  Not surprisingly, white men with propensity are significantly 
(p<.001) more traditional in gender role attitudes compared to their black or 
Hispanic counterparts.  There are no significant differences between black or 
Hispanic men with propensity.       
     Surprisingly, men with propensity during the post-9/11 era are no more 
egalitarian in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to men with propensity 
prior to 9/11.  Men with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of 
26.33, whereas their male counterparts average a score of 26.06 prior to 9/11.  Not 
surprisingly, results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in gender role 
attitudes between men and women with propensity, which supports hypothesis 9c.  
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Men with propensity score an average of 26.33, while women with propensity 
average a score of 30.63.  
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     Figure 9.1 below indicates overall gender role attitudes of men between 1976-
2013, prior to controls.  Results indicate a general incline in men’s gender role 
attitudes indicating greater egalitarian attitudes toward women in the workplace 
over the first few decades of the AVF. However, attitudes appear to have 
generally leveled off since the 1990s.  These findings are consistent with previous 
research and correspond to the timeframe of the women’s liberation movement 
(Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001).     
 
     Figure 9.2 below depicts the gender role attitudes of men with propensity 
between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables.  Overall, the gender role 
attitudes of men with propensity appear to mirror trends for all men.  Most 
strikingly, however, results indicate a significant decline in gender role attitudes 
during the post-9/11 era, suggesting more traditional attitudes toward gender 
roles.  It appears that men with propensity have significantly greater traditional 
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attitudes toward gender roles during the post-9/11 era compared to men overall.  
Yet, results show that egalitarian attitudes appear to be increasing among men 
with propensity since 2010.  This trend is similar to increasing trends among all 
men as indicated above.  Despite the modest decline in egalitarian attitudes during 
the post-9/11 era, men with propensity still have fairly high egalitarian attitudes 
compared to the 1980s.     
 
     Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis similar to previous analyses, 
results reported in Table 9.3 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only.  
The primary predictor variable in Table 9.3 is the gender-role attitudes index 
measure.  After controls, results indicate that there is a negative relationship 
between egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles and men’s propensity to serve 
during the post-9/11 era, which supports hypothesis 9a.  As egalitarian attitudes 
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increase, men are significantly less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.96***), even 
after controlling for all factors in Model 6 of Table 9.3.  Model 7 of Table 9.3 
depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background and attitudes toward 
gender-roles, indicating no significant differences.    
     The magnitude of this finding is only slightly reduced when you compare men 
who expect that they “definitely will” serve (i.e. “high” propensity) versus men 
who expect that they “definitely won’t” (i.e. “low” propensity) serve.  However, 
significant differences remain between groups.  Results from this analysis are 




     Figure 9.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
gender role attitudes after controlling for all factors.  On average, the predicted 
probability of serving for men decreases by about one half of a percent for every 
one-point increase on the gender-roles index on a scale from 7-35.  Results 
indicate that greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles are negatively 
 390 
related to men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era.  This suggests that men with 
propensity are more traditional in their views toward gender roles than their 
civilian peer counterparts, even after controls- a finding that is consistent with 
recent research (e.g. Dempsey 2010). 
 
Racial/Ethnic Differences in Gender Role Attitudes  
Among Men With Propensity 
     Results from regression analysis reported in Table 9.4 below indicate 
significant differences in gender-role attitudes by racial and ethnic groups among 
men with propensity using the gender-role index measure as the dependent 
variable.  After full controls, Model 3 of Table 9.4 reveals that white men who 
expect to serve have significantly more traditional attitudes toward gender roles 
compared to their black and Hispanic counterparts, which is consistent with 
hypothesis 9b.  On average, black men with propensity score 1.49 greater on the 
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gender-roles index scale than white men, indicating significantly (p<.01) greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles.  Similarly, Hispanic men with 
propensity score 1.27 more (p<.05) than white men.  Interestingly, results suggest 
that there are cultural differences in gender role attitudes between race and ethnic 
background since SES is not a significant predictor in the model.  These findings 
are contrary to earlier findings that suggested that lower socioeconomic status 
contributes to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles (McLoyd et al. 
2000).  Of note, there are no significant racial and ethnic group differences in 
gender role attitudes among men with high propensity after full controls.  These 
results are reported in Table 9.4.1 in Appendix A.   
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     After full controls, Figure 9.4 below shows that black and Hispanic men have 
significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles.  On average, black 
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men who expect to serve score 27.47 on a scale from 7 to 35, where higher 
numbers indicate more egalitarian views toward gender roles.  Hispanic men who 
expect to serve score an average of 27.25 on the same scale.  In contrast, white 
men who expect to serve score an average of 25.98, indicating more traditional 
views toward gender roles.  
 
Women’s Analysis of Gender Role Attitudes 
     Table 9.5 below depicts the difference of means in women’s attitudes toward 
gender roles for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era.  Interestingly, 
results reveal that women with propensity are significantly more traditional 
(p<.001) in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to women without 
propensity, which does not support hypothesis 9d.  These results also contradict 
Dempsey’s (2010) research.  On average, women with propensity score 30.63 
while women without propensity score an average of 31.19.  On average, black 
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women with propensity are significantly more (p<.001) traditional in their 
attitudes toward gender roles compared to their civilian counterparts.  However, 
results indicate that white and Hispanic women with propensity are no different in 
their gender role attitudes than their civilian counterparts.  Surprisingly, white 
women with propensity are significantly more egalitarian in their attitudes toward 
gender roles compared to their black or Hispanic counterparts, which does not 
support hypothesis 9e. 
     Perhaps most surprisingly, women with propensity during the post-9/11 era are 
no different in their gender role attitudes compared to women with propensity 
prior to 9/11.  Women with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average 
of 30.63, whereas their female counterparts average a score of 30.90 prior to 9/11.  
As noted earlier, results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in gender 
attitudes between men and women with propensity.  Men with propensity score an 
average of 26.33, while women with propensity average a score of 30.63.  
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     Figure 9.5 below indicates the overall gender role attitudes of women between 
1976-2013, prior to controls.  Similar to men, results indicate a general incline in 
women’s attitudes indicating increasing egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles 
over the first few decades of the AVF.  Like men, however, egalitarian attitudes 
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appear to have plateaued since the mid-1990s.  These results are consistent with 
previous research (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001).  
 
     Figure 9.6 below depicts the gender role attitudes of women with propensity 
between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables.  Overall, the gender role 
attitudes of women with propensity appear to mirror trends for all women prior to 
9/11, although they are slightly more egalitarian.  Most strikingly, however, 
results indicate a significant decline in women’s gender role attitudes after the 
attacks of 9/11.  Similar to men, it appears that women with propensity have more 
traditional gender-role attitudes during the post-9/11 era compared to women 
overall. Not surprisingly, results indicate that women with propensity have 
significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to men.  
These results are consistent with Dempsey’s (2010) findings.      
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     Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 9.6 
below indicate the odds ratios of women’s propensity to serve during the post-
9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables.  The primary predictor 
variable in Table 9.6 is the gender-role attitudes index measure.  Interestingly, 
results indicate that there is a negative relationship between egalitarian attitudes 
toward gender roles and women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era, 
which does not support hypothesis 9d.  Prior to controls, results reported in Model 
1 of Table 9.6 reveal that women are significantly less likely to expect to serve 
(OR=0.95***) as egalitarian gender role attitudes increase.  After controlling for 
all factors in Model 6 of Table 9.6, women remain significantly less likely (p<.10) 
to expect to serve (OR=0.97+) as egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles 
increase.   
 398 
      
     Figure 9.7 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by gender role attitudes after controlling for all factors.  On average, the 
predicted probability of serving for women decreases by about one third of a 
percent for every one-point increase on the gender-roles index on a scale from 7-
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35.  Results indicate that greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles are 
negatively related to women’s propensity during the post-9/11 era.  This suggests 
that women with propensity are more traditional in their views toward gender 
roles than their civilian peer counterparts- a finding that is somewhat surprising 
and inconsistent with recent research (e.g. Dempsey 2010). 
 
     Figure 9.8 below depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background 
and attitudes toward gender-roles, indicating significant differences between 
black and white women.  Results are reported in Model 7 of Table 9.6 above.  
Results indicate that black women’s predicted probability of serving declines at a 
significantly greater rate than white women as egalitarian attitudes increase.  In 
other words, the more traditional black women’s attitudes are, the greater 
likelihood they have of serving.  For white women, it appears that gender role 
attitudes are not as significant of a predictor for their propensity to serve.   
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Racial/Ethnic Differences in Gender Role Attitudes  
Among Women with Propensity 
     Results from regression analysis reported in Table 9.7 below indicate 
significant differences in gender-role attitudes by racial and ethnic groups among 
women with propensity using the gender-role index as the dependent variable.  
After full controls, Model 3 of Table 9.7 reveals that white women who expect to 
serve have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles 
compared to their black counterparts.  On average, black women with propensity 
score 1.29 lower on the gender-roles index scale than white women, indicating 
significantly (p<.01) greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles.  There are 
no significant differences in gender role attitudes between white and Hispanic 




     After full controls, Figure 9.9 below reveals that black and Hispanic women 
have significantly greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles.  On average, 
black women who expect to serve score 29.83 on a scale from 7 to 35 where 
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higher numbers indicate more egalitarian views toward gender roles.  Hispanic 
women who expect to serve score an average of 30.26 on the same scale.  In 
contrast, white women who expect to serve score an average of 31.13, indicating 
greater egalitarian views toward gender roles.  These results do not support 
hypothesis 9e.    
 
Discussion 
     My research on the relationship between propensity and youth attitudes toward 
gender roles is important in a few notable ways.  First, this is the first time that 
this type of research has been conducted.  Dempsey’s (2010) research briefly 
touched upon the attitudes among the Army population toward gender equality, 
but it only encompassed one year’s worth of data (i.e. 2004) and it only analyzed 
one question.  Prior research has shown that examining multiple items on an index 
or multiple separate questions increases the reliability of results (Segal 1986; 
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Gliem and Gliem 2003).  Other notable research (e.g. Miller and Williams 2001) 
has examined attitudes toward allowing women into combat positions.  Although 
these studies have undoubtedly contributed to the literature on women in the 
military, they have not thoroughly uncovered youth attitudes toward gender roles 
in the military.     
     Second, a study of these attitudes prior to enlistment can potentially lead to 
more accurate findings by eliminating the social desirability bias discussed earlier 
in Chapter 8.  Of course, there is likely to be some form of bias on responses to 
these questions.  However, asking individuals about their attitudes toward gender 
roles prior to actual military service is likely to result in answers that are more 
authentic compared to asking questions to actual service members.  It is 
reasonable that men in the military would be more likely to state that they support 
greater opportunities for women to be more politically correct.     
     Last, given the recent decision by the DoD to expand combat roles to women, 
this research is especially relevant and important.  As women begin to break 
barriers in the formerly closed, hyper-masculine culture of the combat specialties, 
the potential exists for friction to occur (Miller and Williams 2001; Segal and 
Kestnbaum 2002).  Further, this research is timely given the military’s recent 
attention to sexual assault in the ranks (see Chapter 6 for a more thorough 
discussion).  Examining the gender role attitudes of men with propensity (i.e. 
likely future recruits) will help uncover views in the military that may be overly 
traditional, which could lead to potential problems with insubordination toward 
female superiors, sexual assault, sexual harassment, or gender harassment (Leary-
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Kelly et al. 2009).  An examination of these attitudes will undoubtedly provide 
insight to military leadership at all levels.  This will help leadership understand 
the social-psychological dynamics at play among the junior ranks to better set the 
conditions for a successful integration of women into combat positions.   
     Overall, results indicate that men with greater traditional attitudes toward 
gender roles are more likely to expect to serve during the post-9/11 era.  An 
examination of the gender role attitudes of men with propensity over time 
indicates a significant incline in egalitarian views during the first three decades of 
the AVF (see Figure 9.2).  However, during the post-9/11 era, it appears that these 
attitudes significantly decline, suggesting more traditional views toward gender 
roles among men with propensity.  This may be somewhat surprising for some 
given the fact that women’s participation in the military has continued to expand, 
and that they have performed very well during wartime since 9/11.  However, as 
noted earlier in Chapter 6, fighting wars has traditionally been viewed as a man’s 
duty and responsibility.  Indeed, military service has been considered to be a rite 
of passage for men despite women’s increasing participation throughout (Boldry 
et al. 2001).  Thus, it is reasonable that young men who have the propensity to 
serve during wartime may have more traditional views toward gender roles.  My 
results support some of the findings from Dempsey’s (2010) research.  However, 
it must be highlighted that my research contradicts Dempsey’s in a notable way.  
Dempsey found that among civilians, there were small differences in attitudes 
toward women’s equality between men and women.  However, my research 
shows that differences in gender role attitudes between men and women without 
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propensity is rather large, and significant.  This suggests that young men without 
propensity may be less egalitarian toward gender roles compared to their older 
civilian counterparts.       
     It does appear that there is a slight trend in increasing egalitarian attitudes 
toward gender roles among men with propensity since 2010.  This is somewhat 
promising given the recent removal of the combat exclusion ban and the possible 
friction that could occur as the integration of women into combat positions 
continues into the future.  However, it must be highlighted that service members 
in combat specialties are likely to have even greater traditional views toward 
gender roles compared to the overall military population, especially given the lack 
of contact with women.  Indeed, the fact that traditional attitudes have increased 
since 9/11 suggests that the nature of combat may attract more traditional men 
into service.  Thus, my analysis may underestimate the extent of traditional 
gender role attitudes within the combat specialties.   
     Not surprisingly, results indicate that minority men with propensity have 
greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles than their white counterparts.  
However, some researchers (e.g. Blee and Tickamyer 1995) have noted that black 
men may be more egalitarian with respect to some gender roles (e.g. women 
working outside the home to increase family income), but more traditional with 
respect to other gender roles (e.g. women’s role as caregiver and household 
division of labor).  My own research suggests that black and Hispanic men with 
propensity are more egalitarian toward issues of women’s equality in the 
workplace and their role as a mother and caregiver compared to white men with 
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propensity.  Further, my research suggests that these differences in attitudes are 
not significantly impacted by socioeconomic status as some have argued.  
Overall, my results contribute to the considerable amount of literature (e.g. Kane 
2000) concerning racial and ethnic differences in gender role attitudes.       
     Interestingly, results indicate that women with more traditional attitudes 
toward gender roles are more likely to expect to serve during the post-9/11 era.  
These results are in the same direction as results for men, but with less statistical 
significance.  This may be somewhat surprising since women in the military have 
generally been considered to be pioneering and barrier-breaking in a traditionally 
male-dominated organization.  Indeed, the opportunity for women to break 
barriers during combat has been ripe since 9/11.  Perhaps similar dynamics are at 
play for women as they are for men during wartime, attracting more traditional 
youth to service.  Another possibility for women with propensity having greater 
traditional gender role attitudes is the fact that they are becoming increasingly 
conservative in their ideology as my research highlights in Chapter 7.  Indeed, 
gender role attitudes can be viewed as being a part of the larger 
liberal/conservative spectrum.  However it must be emphasized that all women on 
average have considerably high egalitarian gender role attitudes, regardless of 
propensity differences.  
     Results indicate that black women with propensity have the most traditional 
attitudes toward gender roles, and are significantly different than their civilian 
counterparts.  In contrast, white and Hispanic women with propensity are no 
different in gender role attitudes from their civilian counterparts.  Further, both 
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black and Hispanic women with propensity have greater traditional gender role 
attitudes compared to white women with propensity.  Together, these results 
appear to contradict conventional wisdom (e.g. Kane 2000) regarding minority 
women’s attitudes toward gender roles.   
     Perhaps most telling is that women with propensity have significantly greater 
egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to men with propensity.  
Again, these results are not necessarily surprising.  However, they do highlight 
differences in attitudes by gender within the likely military population that could 
potentially create friction as women begin to access into the military’s combat 
specialties.  Military leadership should understand the cultural attitudes of men 
likely to serve during combat in general, and the attitudes of men in combat 
positions more specifically.  As prior research has shown (e.g. Berdahl 2007), 
men with more traditional attitudes toward gender roles are more likely to 
sexually harass women at work, especially in male-dominated occupations.  
Further, research has attributed issues of sexual harassment to be the result of 
power and dominance relationships, suggesting that sexual harassment occurs 
because of unequal power across men and women in society and at work (e.g. 
Cleveland and Kerst 1993).  The fact that the military has dedicated significant 
time and resources toward confronting issues of sexual assault in the ranks is a 
good sign that it is headed in the right direction.  It is recommended that the 
military continue to emphasize its Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and 
Prevention program (see Chapter 6).  Further, it is recommended that leaders at all 
levels implement deliberate plans to successfully integrate women into combat 
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positions to prevent issues of harassment or assault.    
     Future research should continue to track the gender role attitudes of youth with 
propensity over time.  If the military continues to give significant attention to 
sexual assault and if leadership at all levels incorporates deliberate 
implementation plans for women into combat roles, I expect that men’s traditional 
attitudes toward gender roles will reverse in favor of more egalitarian attitudes.  
Men’s increased contact with women in combat specialties should assist with 
changes in attitudes.  However, it is unlikely that these changes will occur by 
happenstance.  Indeed, contact theory (e.g. Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998), a major 
theory used to improve relations between groups (to be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 10), predicts that interpersonal contact will facilitate a decline in 
prejudice only under certain conditions.  First, the contact must take place in an 
environment that recognizes equal status among participants.  Second, the 
participants must have a common goal that lends itself to intergroup cooperation.  
Last, there must be institutional support for positive integration within the 
organization.  It is paramount for military leadership to continue to spearhead 
efforts toward establishing an egalitarian culture within the ranks for all MOSs.  
Undoubtedly, this will take attention to detail and significant efforts.  My research 
has shown that men with traditional gender role attitudes continue to self-select 
into the military, especially during combat.  In this case, it will take a strong and 
active socialization effort within the military culture to continue to break down 
stereotypes and allow for the successful integration of women into combat roles.                
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Chapter 10: Attitudes Toward Race Relations  
and Military Propensity 
Background and Prior Research 
     From the Civil War through the first half of the 20th century, the Army 
segregated and minimized the service of African Americans, who challenged the 
traditional European composition of the force.  Occupational closure tends to be 
reversed in the face of market demands.  After initial resistance, George 
Washington recruited black soldiers into the Continental Army.  They fought in 
almost every engagement, and contributed to the colonists’ victory.  However, the 
U.S. government imposed closure once again by the end of the war (Segal et al. 
2016).   
     Almost a century later, President Lincoln did not initially want black soldiers 
in the Union Army due to the fear that Border States would move into the 
Confederacy as a result.  When it became clear that the war to preserve the Union 
was not to be short, he accepted the enlistment of black soldiers.  Nearly 200,000 
black soldiers served in 163 “colored” federal regiments and two state regiments.  
Unlike the Revolution, black soldiers were allowed to continue to enlist after the 
war and four black combat units were established: the 9th and 10th Cavalries (the 
Buffalo Soldiers) and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments.  Blacks also served 
among the lowest ranks in the Navy (Segal et al. 2016).     
     The Army remained segregated throughout World War I.  As a result of 
manpower shortages during World War II, President Roosevelt issue an Executive 
Order to the military in 1943 to enlist black soldiers through military conscription.  
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More than one million black men and women served, most in menial jobs.  
Following the war, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948, 
which called for the equality of opportunity in the armed forces regardless of race.  
His order did not call for desegregation, and was interpreted under the then-
current legal doctrine of “separate but equal” (Segal et al. 2106).  Late in WWII, 
black volunteers were sought to form platoons to be inserted into white infantry 
companies to fill manpower shortages.  Black soldiers who volunteered expected 
that after the war, they would remain in their new units, but the Army reverted 
back to segregation.   
     Racial integration began in earnest during the Korean War in 1950.  The Far 
East Command discovered that because a 10 percent limit on black enlistments 
had been lifted, it had excess black replacements for whom there were no 
positions in segregated black units.  The theater command received permission to 
assign black replacements to white units.  Despite integration, the Army 
anticipated that it would segregate after the war, as it had during WWII. 
     Survey research by social scientists came of age during WWII with The 
American Soldier studies by Stouffer and his colleagues (1949).  Early surveys 
found that there was general resistance among white soldiers to the notion of 
serving with black soldiers.  The Army used these surveys as an argument against 
racial integration.  However, the major impact of diversity and relations among 
soldiers was found by analyzing the experience when black platoons were placed 
in white infantry companies.  Over 80 percent of white soldiers surveyed felt that 
black and white soldiers “should be in separate units” (Stouffer et al. 1949).  Yet 
 411 
white soldiers who had more contact with black soldiers were less opposed to 
integration than those who had less contact with black soldiers.  These findings 
served as one basis of Gordon Allport’s (1954) postwar “contact hypothesis” or 
intergroup contact theory.  
     Proponents of contact theory have claimed that interpersonal contact will 
facilitate a decline in prejudice under certain conditions.  First, the contact must 
take place in an environment that recognizes equal status among participants.  
Second, the participants must have a common goal that lends itself to intergroup 
cooperation.  Last, there must be institutional support for positive race relations 
within the organization (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998).  As a result of 
desegregation, the military became a natural environment to test the predictions of 
contact theory.  Indeed, the military’s ability to unite service members under a 
common purpose, its emphasis on the equality of all new recruits, and the 
increasing commitment by military leadership to foster racial equality within the 
military seemed to satisfy the necessary conditions for contact theory (Burk and 
Espinoza 2012).   
     Under the suppositions of contact theory, the Army conducted research 
studying race relations in the newly integrated U.S. Army during the Korean War 
by the Special Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University and 
sociologist, Leo Bogart (1969), a former army intelligence specialist.  The major 
finding was simply that integration “worked.”  Indeed, integrated units were 
perceived to perform better than segregated units.  Research found that white 
veterans of WWII (e.g. Stouffer et al. 1949) and the Korean War (e.g. Bogart 
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1969) had more positive views of blacks overall once they had served alongside 
black soldiers.  The studies concluded that the “enforced contacts” served as the 
catalyst for more positive racial views, referring to military experience, and 
combat experience in particular, as a defining event that triggered more tolerant 
racial attitudes among white soldiers.  These results made segregation of the 
Army impossible after the war.  Despite some resistance within the military and 
Congress, by 1954 the last all-black unit in the armed forces was dismantled, 
paving the way for full racial integration of the U.S. military (Moskos and Butler 
1996).  
     Building upon Stouffer’s significant WWII research (1949), Leo Bogart’s 
study (1969) on race relations spearheaded a significant amount of research on 
racial attitudes both in and out of the military domain that has continued into the 
twenty-first century.  Based on these influential studies and follow-on research, 
the conventional wisdom has been that the military is one of the key American 
institutions to model for socializing its participants to embrace egalitarian racial 
attitudes (Burk and Espinoza 2012).  It is particularly noteworthy to highlight that 
the Army led the way for racial integration over a decade prior to the rest of 
American society, which was marked by the establishment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.  
     Although the military has been racially integrated since the Korean War, the 
Civil Rights Movement and the perceived inequities in the military during the 
Vietnam War brought greater attention back onto race relations within the 
military (e.g. Moskos 1973; Moskos and Butler 1996).  Despite conventional 
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wisdom that suggests the military is more of an egalitarian, meritocratic 
environment with less racial discrimination than the civilian labor force and 
educational system (Moskos and Butler 1996; Segal 1989), more recent studies 
have begun to challenge this notion.  Some studies (e.g. Lawrence and Kane 
1995; Nteta and Tarsi 2015) have shown that white veterans express more hostile 
views of blacks than white non-veterans, thereby questioning the liberal 
socialization within the institution of the military.  The primary rationale for the 
shift in attitudes has been that the change from conscription to an all-volunteer 
force may have had negative impacts on the military’s ability to engender positive 
racial attitudes among its participants.  From this perspective, the differences in 
attitudes between white veterans and non-veterans may reflect the consequences 
of self-selection (Nteta and Tarsi 2015).  The self-selection argument, in its 
simplest form, asserts that whites who volunteer for the armed forces may already 
hold more negative views towards blacks compared to whites who do not 
volunteer to serve.  As a result, the consequences of self-selection with respect to 
more negative racial attitudes will be more pronounced during an AVF period 
than during a period of conscription (Bachman et al 2000).        
     Most recently, researchers (Nteta and Tarsi 2015) examined the impacts of 
military service during the AVF-era on the racial attitudes of veterans.  Findings 
suggested that white veterans of the AVF generation express more negative views 
of blacks relative to white civilians without military experience.  Additionally, the 
authors found that white veterans of the AVF generation were more likely than 
white veterans of older cohorts to support “racial resentment.”  Further, they 
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found no significant differences between the racial attitudes of white veterans and 
non-veterans among older generations prior to the AVF.  These findings appear to 
challenge the conventional wisdom that the military effectively inculcates its 
members to embrace norms of racial egalitarianism (Moskos and Butler 1996).  
Taken together, the authors claim that their findings provide evidence in support 
of the self-selection hypothesis, suggesting that the move to an AVF may have 
had deleterious impacts on the ability of the military to effectively socialize its 
members to support racial equality.  In other words, the authors claim that those 
who volunteer for military service already possess negative racial attitudes which 
are likely to be resistant to the socializing forces of military experience and 
increased contact with minorities.  Of note, the study above did not examine the 
attitudes of veterans from the post-9/11 era cohort.  They examined veterans from 
the WWII and Korean War generation, the Vietnam generation, and veterans of 
the AVF up to 2000.  The two measures used in this study to analyze the concept 
of racial resentment were taken from Henry & Sears’ Symbolic Racism 2000 
Scale.  The first item asked respondents whether they supported the statement, 
“the Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and 
worked their way up.  Blacks should do the same without any special favors.”  
The second item asked respondents if they agreed that, “generations of slavery 
and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to 
work their way out of the lower class.”  
     It is also worthy to mention Dempsey’s (2010) recent research on race 
relations.  Although the most significant contribution to his research was the 
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examination of political attitudes, his study also touched briefly upon the racial 
attitudes among soldiers in the Army.  On the question of racial and ethnic 
integration, his survey asked respondents, “Thinking about society in general: In 
order to make up for past discrimination, do you favor or oppose programs which 
make special efforts to help minorities get ahead?”  Dempsey found that among 
soldiers, 38 percent opposed and 22 percent favored these types of programs.  
Attitudes among officers were significantly different, with 56 percent of officers 
opposing these types of programs and only 18 percent supporting them.  Dempsey 
also found significant differences between racial and ethnic groups.  Whites were 
the most opposed to such programs, followed by Hispanics and blacks.  Despite 
the differences in attitudes among army personnel, he found that soldiers were 
significantly less opposed to these “affirmative action” programs compared to 
civilians who responded to a similar question on a different survey, which focused 
specifically on affirmative action in the workplace: “Some people say that 
because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and 
promotion.  Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is 
wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven’t earned.  What about your 
opinion- are you FOR or AGAINST preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?” 
     Although the racial attitudes among members of the military have not been at 
the forefront of debate during the post-911 era, as issues of war and attitudes 
toward women’s integration in combat positions have been more salient, the 
current state of affairs within society makes an examination of the racial attitudes 
of youth with propensity especially worthy.  Indeed, recent years have witnessed 
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renewed expression of racial tension and conflict.  With the recent “Black Lives 
Matter” movement that has swept across the country in response to multiple 
claims of police injustice against racial minorities, it is timely to reexamine the 
racial attitudes among youth who expect to serve in the military.  Further, given 
the timeliness and findings of the research cited above (e.g. Dempsey 2010; Nteta 
and Tarsi 2015), an examination of racial attitudes is especially relevant.   
Propensity Predictions 
     My research attempts to address the recent claims of racial resentment among 
white veterans in the military as a result of self-selection.  By examining youth 
attitudes among those with the propensity to serve, I am able to directly assess the 
impacts of self-selection.  I expect that there will be no significant relationship 
between men’s propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during 
the post-9/11 era.  I also expect that men with propensity during the post-9/11 era 
will have greater egalitarian attitudes compared to years prior to 9/11.  The 
increase in recruiting initiatives, especially among the Hispanic population, has 
increased minority representation in the military (Clever and Segal 2012).  
Further, the black population of the military continues to be overrepresented 
compared to the black civilian population (Segal and Segal 2004).  It is likely that 
youth understand that the military is, indeed, an organization that continues to 
foster a positive racial environment (Moskos and Butler 1996).  Despite recent 
claims of racial resentment among white veterans (e.g. Nteta and Tarsi 2015), I 
expect that white men with propensity will be no different in their racial attitudes 
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compared to their civilian counterparts.  I expect to see similar relationships as 
men between women’s propensity and racial attitudes.    
Hypothesis 10a: There will be no significant relationship 
between men’s propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race 
relations during the post-9/11 era. 
 
Hypothesis 10b: Men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era will 
be more positively related to egalitarian attitudes toward race 
relations compared to years prior to 9/11.  
 
Hypothesis 10c: Black and Hispanic men with propensity will 
have greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared 
to their white counterparts. 
 
Hypothesis 10d: There will be no significant relationship 
between women’s propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward 
race relations during the post-9/11 era.  
 
Hypothesis 10e: Black and Hispanic women with propensity will 
have greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared 
to their white counterparts. 
              
Analysis of Propensity and Attitudes Toward Race Relations 
     Methods 
     A series of questions on Form 3 of the MTF survey ask respondents how they 
feel about living or working with people of different races.  Respondents were 
asked to rate the statements below using the following terms:  1= “Not at all 
acceptable: I'd avoid this if I possibly could;” 2= “Somewhat acceptable: I could 
live with this, but not be happy about it;” 3= “Acceptable: This would be O.K., or 
I'd be neutral about this;” 4= “Desirable: I'd really like this.” 
     The first group of questions asked respondents how they would feel about:  
1) “Having close friends of another race;” 2) “Having a job with a supervisor of a 
different race;” 3) “Having a family of a different race (but same level of 
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education and income) move next door to you;” 4) “Having your (future) 
children's friends be all of your race (reverse coded);” and 5) “Having some of 
your (future) children's friends be of other races.” 
     The next series of questions asked respondents how they would feel about 
having a job where: 1) “All the employees are of your race” (reverse coded);  
2) Some employees are of a different race;” and 3) “Most employees are of a 
different race.” 
     The following series of questions asked respondents how they would feel 
about living in an area where: 1) “All the neighbors are of your race (reverse 
coded);” 2) “Some of the neighbors are of other races;” and 3) “Most of the 
neighbors are of other races.” 
     The last set of questions asked respondents how they would feel about having 
their (future) children go to schools where: 1) “All the children are of your race 
(reverse coded);” 2) “Some of the children are of other races;” 3) “Most of the 
children are of other races.”   
     From the four questions and fourteen variables noted above, I created an index 
titled, “Race Relations” index.  I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
to confirm that the variables used for my race relations index measure the same 
things conceptually and to confirm the number of dimensions that the variables 
measure (Torres-Reyna 2010).  The extraction method was principal components 
analysis, with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi 2003).  Results of 
initial CFA revealed three distinct factors with eigenvalues above 1.0- 6.00, 2.33, 
and 1.44 respectively.  Following initial CFA, I deemed Factor 1 to be the best 
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overall measure to conceptually capture youth attitudes toward race relations.  
Further, the relatively high eigenvalue for Factor 1 of 6.29 supports the idea to 
retain only one factor for my index measure.  The mean inter-item correlation of 
the race relations index was 0.21 and the reliability (Cronbach’s coefficient alpha 
with unstandardized items) was 0.89, which is almost “excellent” for social 
science research (Cronbach 1951; George and Mallory 2003).  Response values 
were summed, yielding a scale with a minimum response score of 14 and a 
maximum score of 56, with a mid-point of 35.  Higher number responses are 
considered to be greater support for racial integration at work and at home.  Put 
another way, higher responses indicate more egalitarian attitudes toward race 
relations, which is consistent with recent naming conventions (e.g. Nteta and 
Tarsi 2015).  Results from my final CFA are reported in Table 10.1 below.  
 
     Results       
     Similar to previous chapters, I report the results for men and women 
separately.  Table 10.2 below depicts the difference of means in attitudes toward 
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race relations at work and at home for key analysis groups during the post-9/11 
era.  It is worth mentioning that I highlight key differences between “high” and 
“low” propensity youth below (i.e. “Definitely Will” vs. “Definitely Won’t”), 
along with the normally reported differences between youth with and without 
propensity.  Results reveal that men with propensity are no different in their 
attitudes toward race relations compared to men without propensity.  On average, 
men with propensity score 38.22 on a scale from 14-56, while men without 
propensity score an average of 38.39.  These results are particularly noteworthy 
since they are prior to controlling for individual-level characteristics that have 
typically been associated with youth with propensity (e.g. from the South, less 
educational attainment, more conservative, and more authoritarian) and greater 
negative racial attitudes (Nteta and Tarsi 2015).  On average, white men with 
propensity are slightly less egalitarian (p<.05) in their attitudes toward race 
relations compared to white men without propensity.  However, results indicate 
that black and Hispanic men with propensity are no different in race attitudes than 
their civilian counterparts.  Not surprisingly, white men with propensity have 
significantly (p<.001) less egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to 
their black or Hispanic counterparts.  There are no significant differences between 
black or Hispanic men with propensity.  Somewhat surprisingly, men with high 
propensity have significantly greater (p<.05) egalitarian attitudes toward race 
relations compared to men with low propensity.  Further, white men with high 
propensity are slightly more egalitarian than white men with low propensity, 
although results are not significant prior to controls.     
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     Interestingly, men with propensity during the post-9/11 era have significantly 
(p<.001) greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to men with 
propensity prior to 9/11, which supports hypothesis 10b.  Men with propensity 
during the post-9/11 era score an average of 38.22 whereas their male 
counterparts average a score of 37.13 prior to 9/11.  Also of note, white men with 
propensity during the post-9/11 era have significantly (p<.01) greater egalitarian 
attitudes toward race relations compared to their counterparts prior to 9/11.  White 
men with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of 37.22 whereas 
their male counterparts average a score of 36.37 prior to 9/11.  Not surprisingly, 
results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in race relation attitudes between 
men and women with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  Men with propensity 





     Using the race relations index measure, Figure 10.1 below indicates overall 
average attitudes toward race relations of men between 1976-2013, prior to 
controls.  Results indicate a general incline in men’s attitudes toward race 
relations, suggesting more tolerant or egalitarian attitudes over the first three 
decades of the AVF.  However, attitudes toward race relations appear to have 
generally leveled off since the 2000s.   
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     Using the race relations index measure, Figure 10.2 below depicts the overall 
attitudes toward race relations of men with propensity between 1976-2013, prior 
to adding control variables.  Overall, results show that the attitudes toward race 
relations of men with propensity appear to mirror attitudes for all men, with 
generally greater egalitarian attitudes among men with propensity throughout the 
AVF.  Similar to all men, results indicate a leveling off of attitudes toward race 
relations during the post-9/11 era.  However, it appears that egalitarian attitudes 
toward race relations during the post-9/11 era are significantly greater than years 
prior to 9/11, which supports hypothesis 10b.  
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     Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 10.3 
below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as 
predicted by the independent variables for men only.  The primary predictor 
variable in Table 10.3 is the race relations index measure.  Consistent with 
hypothesis 10a, results indicate that there is no significant difference in attitudes 
toward race relations between men with and without propensity during the post-
9/11 era.  As egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, men are no more 
or less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.99), even prior to controlling for the 
individual-level characteristics that have been associated with more negative 
racial attitudes and propensity as noted earlier.  After controlling for all factors in 
Model 6 of Table 10.3, results continue to indicate no significant differences 
(OR=1.00) between groups.  Model 7 of Table 10.3 depicts an interaction 
between race and ethnic background and attitudes toward race relations, 
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indicating no significant differences.    
     Interestingly, the magnitude and direction of findings significantly change 
when you compare high and low propensity men.  Results indicate that as 
egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, men are significantly more 
likely to have high propensity (OR=1.03***).  These findings suggest that men 
with high propensity (i.e. the military) are more racially tolerant than men with 
low propensity (i.e. civilian counterparts).  Results from this analysis are reported 
in Table 10.3.1 and Figure 10.3.1 of Appendix A. 
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     Figure 10.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by 
attitudes toward race relations, after controlling for all factors.  Results reveal that 
the predicted probability of having the propensity to serve does not significantly 
increase or decrease based on attitudes toward race relations.  However, Figure 
10.3.1 (see Appendix A), reveals that the predicted probability of having high 
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propensity increases by about one percent for every 4-point increase on the race 
relations index scale in the more egalitarian direction.      
 
          Racial/Ethnic Differences in Race Relations Attitudes  
         Among Men With Propensity 
     Results from regression analysis reported in Table 10.4 below indicate 
significant differences in attitudes toward race relations by racial and ethnic 
groups among men with propensity using the race relations index as the 
dependent variable.  After full controls, Model 3 of Table 10.4 reveals that black 
and Hispanic men who expect to serve have significantly more (p<.001) 
egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts.  
These results support hypothesis 10c.  On average, black men with propensity 
score 4.37 greater on the race relations index scale than white men.  Similarly, 
Hispanic men with propensity average a score of 3.44 greater than white men.  
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Results are similar in magnitude and direction when you compare men with high 
and low propensity after full controls.  These results are reported in Table 10.4.1 
in Appendix A.   
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     After full controls, Figure 10.4 below shows that black and Hispanic men with 
propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations 
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compared to their white counterparts.  On average, black men who expect to serve 
score 41.62 on a scale from 14 to 56 where higher numbers indicate more 
egalitarian attitudes toward race relations.  Hispanic men who expect to serve 
score an average of 40.69 on the same scale.  In contrast, white men who expect 
to serve score an average of 37.25 indicating less egalitarian attitudes toward race 
relations.  
 
     Women’s Propensity and Race Relations Attitudes Analysis 
     Figure 10.5 below indicates the overall attitudes toward race relations of 
women between 1976-2013, prior to controls.  Similar to men, results indicate a 
general incline in women’s attitudes indicating greater egalitarian attitudes toward 
race relations over the first three decades of the AVF.  Also similar to men, 
attitudes appear to have leveled off since the 2000s.  However, women’s attitudes 
are significantly more egalitarian than men’s.     
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     Figure 10.6 below depicts the attitudes toward race relations of women with 
propensity between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables.  Generally, the 
attitudes toward race relations of women with propensity appear to be more 
egalitarian than women overall, and attitudes have been relatively stable over 
time.  It appears that women with propensity have greater egalitarian attitudes 
toward race relations throughout the AVF compared to women overall, although 
results show that women overall have similar attitudes toward race relations as 




     Table 10.5 below depicts the difference of means in women’s attitudes toward 
race relations for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era.  Results reveal 
that women with propensity are no less egalitarian toward race relations than 
women without propensity.  On average, women with propensity score 40.95, 
while women without propensity score an average of 40.75.  Interestingly, black 
women with propensity are significantly less (p<.05) egalitarian in their attitudes 
toward race relations compared to their civilian counterparts.  Not surprisingly, 
black and Hispanic women with propensity are significantly more (p<.01 and 
p<.001 respectively) egalitarian than their white counterparts.  Women’s attitudes 
toward race relations appear to remain stable over time.  Women with propensity 
during the post-9/11 era score an average of 40.95 whereas their female 
counterparts average a score of 41.04 prior to 9/11.  As noted earlier, results 
reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in race relations attitudes between men 
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and women with propensity.  Men with propensity score an average of 38.22, 
while women with propensity average a score of 40.95.  
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     Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 10.6 
below indicate the odds ratios of women’s propensity to serve during the post-
9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables.  The primary predictor 
variable in Table 10.6 is the race relations index measure.  Results from Model 6 
of Table 10.6 indicate that there is no significant relationship between attitudes 
toward race relations and women’s propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era.  
In other words, there is no difference in racial attitudes between women with or 
without propensity, which supports hypothesis 10d.  Model 7 of Table 10.6 
depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background and attitudes toward 
race relations, indicating no significant differences.    
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     Figure 10.7 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women’s propensity to 
serve by attitudes toward race relations after controlling for all factors.  Results 
show a slight decline in the predicted probability of serving for women as 
egalitarian attitudes increase, although results are not significant.   
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Racial/Ethnic Differences in Race Relations Attitudes  
Among Women With Propensity 
     Results from regression analysis reported in Table 10.7 below indicate 
significant differences in attitudes toward race relations by racial and ethnic 
groups among women with propensity using the race relations index as the 
dependent variable.  After full controls, Model 3 of Table 10.7 reveals that 
Hispanic and black women who expect to serve have significantly more 
egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts, 
which supports hypothesis 10e.  On average, Hispanic women with propensity 
score 3.51 greater on the race relations index scale than white women, indicating 
significantly (p<.001) greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations.  Black 
women with propensity score an average of 2.20 more than their white 
counterparts on the scale, which is significant (p<.01).  
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     After full controls, Figure 10.8 below shows that Hispanic and black women 
have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations.  On average, 
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Hispanic women who expect to serve score 43.29 on a scale from 14 to 56 where 
higher numbers indicate more egalitarian views toward race relations.  Black 
women who expect to serve score an average of 41.98 on the same scale.  In 
contrast, white women who expect to serve score an average of 39.77 indicating 
less egalitarian attitudes toward race relations.  
 
     To more directly address recent claims by Nteta and Tarsi (2015), I analyze the 
relationship between white men’s propensity and racial attitudes below.  Utilizing 
binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 10.8 below indicate 
the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the 
independent variables for white men only.  The primary predictor variable in 
Table 10.8 is the race relations index measure.  Results indicate that there is a 
significant difference in attitudes toward race relations between white men with 
and without propensity during the post-9/11 era prior to controlling for various 
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factors.  As egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, white men are less 
likely to expect to serve (OR=0.99*), prior to controlling for individual-level 
characteristics that have been associated with negative racial attitudes and 
propensity as noted earlier.  After controlling for SES, Model 2 of Table 10.8 
reveals that the level of significance disappears on the race index.  This suggests 
that higher levels of SES may be associated with greater egalitarian racial 
attitudes.  Differences in propensity remain insignificant after controlling for 
educational attainment and aspirations, suggesting that higher levels of 
educational attainment may be associated with greater egalitarian racial attitudes.  
After controlling for all factors in Model 5 of Table 10.8, results indicate no 
significant differences (OR=1.00).  Results suggest that white men with 
propensity are no more or less egalitarian in racial attitudes compared to white 
men without propensity.     
     Interestingly, the magnitude and direction of findings significantly change 
when you compare high and low propensity white men.  Prior to controls, results 
indicate that greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations are positively 
related (OR=1.01) to white men’s high propensity.  After full controls, results 
indicate that as egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, white men are 
significantly more likely (OR=1.02*) to have high propensity.  These findings 
suggest that white men with high propensity (i.e. the military) are more racially 
tolerant than their low propensity (i.e. civilian) counterparts.  Findings appear to 
contradict recent assertions made by Nteta and Tarsi (2015) that those who self-
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select into the military have greater negative views toward race relations.  Results 
from this analysis are reported in Table 10.8.1 of Appendix A. 
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     Perceptions of Discrimination Against Blacks in the Military 
     In a separate but related analysis, I analyze attitudes toward the perception of 
discrimination against blacks in the military.  A question on Form 4 of the MTF 
survey asks a respondent: “To what extent do you think there is any 
discrimination against African-American people who are in the armed services?”  
Response categories include: 1="To a Very Little Extent" 2="To a Little Extent" 
3="To Some Extent" 4="To a Great Extent" 5="To a Very Great Extent."  
     Table 10.9 below reports the results from a difference of means test using the 
discrimination variable noted above as the dependent variable on a scale from 1 to 
5.  Results reveal that, on average, men (mean=2.23) believe “to a little extent” 
that there is discrimination against blacks in the military during the post-9/11 era.  
Not surprisingly, men with propensity (mean=2.11) believe that there is 
significantly less (p<.001) discrimination against blacks in the military than men 
without propensity (mean= 2.25).  Interestingly, it appears that the perception of 
the discrimination against blacks in the military among men with propensity has 
not significantly changed during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years in the 
AVF.  Before 9/11, men with propensity score an average of 2.07 compared to an 
average score of 2.11 during the post-9/11 era.  Among men with high propensity, 
there are no significant differences between eras.   
     Results in Table 10.9 also reveal differences between racial and ethnic groups.  
Perhaps most telling, black and Hispanic men with propensity have significantly 
(p<.001) greater perceptions that there is discrimination against blacks in the 
military compared to white men.  Black men with propensity score an average of 
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2.64 and Hispanic men average a score of 2.39, whereas white men have an 
average score of 1.98.  Despite differences, overall average scores of men with 
propensity are relatively low (i.e. less than the mid-point) regardless of racial and 
ethnic background.   
     Not surprisingly, men with propensity have significantly lower (p<.01) 
perceptions that there is discrimination against blacks in the military compared to 
women with propensity during the post-9/11 era.  However, women with 
propensity score an average of 2.33, which is a relatively low perception of the 
discrimination against blacks in the military.  Additional results for women’s 
perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the military are not reported since 






     Figure 10.9 below indicates overall average attitudes toward the perception of 
discrimination against blacks in the military of men between 1976-2013, prior to 
controls.  Results indicate consistently low averages of men’s perceptions of 
discrimination against blacks.  There appears to be a slight increase in these 




     Figure 10.10 below indicates overall average perceptions of discrimination 
against blacks in the military of men with propensity between 1976-2013, prior to 
controls.  Similar to men overall, results indicate consistently low averages 
throughout the AVF.  Further, perceptions appear to be consistently lower than 
men overall.  These results suggest that, on average, men with and without the 
propensity to serve have fairly low perceptions of racial discrimination within the 





     For brevity sake and purposes of comparison with previous research (e.g. 
Dempsey 2010; Nteta and Tarsi 2015), I focus my discussion below on the 
relationship between men’s propensity and racial attitudes.  As noted earlier, 
similar patterns appear in the relationship between women’s propensity and racial 
attitudes as they do for men.  Not surprisingly, women are more racially 
egalitarian than men.   
     My research on the relationship between propensity and youth attitudes toward 
race relations is important in a few notable ways.  First, there has been very 
limited research on the relationship between racial attitudes and the propensity to 
serve.  Most research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1999; Bachman et al. 
2000; DoD 2000; Segal et al. 2001) on propensity has examined youth attitudes 
toward politics, nationalism, trust in government, and reasons to serve and not to 
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serve.  Further, the majority of research on race relations has examined the 
attitudes of individuals after their time in service, not before.  Even the extensive 
number of authors who took part in the in-depth study by the Triangle Institute for 
Security Studies in 2000, which examined the civil-military gap in attitudes, did 
not think it was worthwhile to examine differences in racial attitudes of the 
military compared to civilians (Fever and Kohn 2001).    
     Second, this research is particularly timely given the recent “Black Lives 
Matter” movement occurring throughout the country, which has brought the topic 
of race relations back to the forefront of debate.  Although the “Black Lives 
Matter” movement has occurred more recently than my current data covers, my 
research will serve as a good starting point for future research to examine the 
potential impacts of the racial debate on military propensity. 
     Third, the recent study conducted by Nteta and Tarsi (2015) has challenged the 
conventional wisdom that the military creates an environment that leads to more 
egalitarian racial attitudes among its members.  Further, the authors attribute the 
differences in racial attitudes between white veterans and non-veterans as a result 
of self-selection and the negative impacts of the AVF.  My research is unique 
since it can directly test their theory of self-selection by examining the attitudes of 
youth with the propensity to serve.  Additionally, I can compare my findings with 
Dempsey’s (2010) recent research, which briefly examines the racial attitudes of 
those in the Army in 2004.  It must be emphasized, however, that my analysis of 
the attitudes of men with high propensity is being used as a surrogate for the 
attitudes of men who actually enter military service.   
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     Last, it is particularly interesting to examine the racial attitudes of youth with 
propensity during wartime to see if the dynamics of war have any influence on 
these attitudes.  As mentioned earlier in previous chapters, the Vietnam War, and 
to some extent, the Gulf War, brought the topic of race relations to the forefront 
of the political debate.  Indeed, scholars have noted that the black community was 
particularly concerned with the unfair utilization of black soldiers on the front 
lines, arguing that they were more in harms way (i.e. the “cannon fodder” 
argument) than white soldiers (Armor 1996).  Will these negative perceptions 
among the black community continue and will they heighten racial tensions 
between members of the military during the post-9/11 era?  Bogart’s (1969) 
research argued that the increased contact between white and black soldiers, 
during combat specifically, was a main reason for positive racial attitudes 
between whites and blacks.  Thus, it is reasonable that soldiers, on average, 
regardless of race and ethnicity, who have served side-by-side during the post-
9/11 era for longer than any other war in our nation’s history, would have 
increased trust between each other and positive racial attitudes as a result.  It is 
interesting to see how these dynamics may influence attitudes toward race 
relations among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era.     
     Overall, results suggest that the military’s views toward race relations are a 
reflection of American society- at least among America’s youth.  Youth with 
propensity are no more likely to have more or less egalitarian attitudes toward 
race relations than their civilian counterparts.  In fact, youth with high propensity 
have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to 
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youth with low propensity after controls.  Further, it appears that the racial 
attitudes of youth with the propensity to serve have become increasingly more 
egalitarian since the beginning of the AVF (see Figure 10.2).  Indeed, attitudes 
among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly more 
egalitarian compared to earlier years (see Table 10.2).   
     However, it should be noted that there is a significant difference, albeit small, 
between white men with and without the propensity to serve prior to controlling 
for any factors, suggesting less egalitarian racial attitudes among white men with 
propensity.  This finding offers some support to Nteta and Tarsi’s (2015) claim 
that white veterans have more negative racial views than white non-veterans as a 
result of the negative racial attitudes among those who self-select into the military 
during the AVF.  As highlighted earlier, differences in racial attitudes between 
white men with and without propensity are only observed prior to controlling for 
various individual-level factors that have been associated with more negative 
racial attitudes (Nteta and Tarsi 2015).  My own analysis reveals that after 
controlling for SES, differences in racial attitudes between white men with and 
without propensity disappear.  Further, when comparing white men with high 
propensity to white men with low propensity, there are no significant differences 
in racial attitudes prior to controls.  In fact, it appears that white men with high 
propensity are significantly more racially egalitarian after controlling for SES and 
education.  Given that prior research (Bachman et al. 1997) has shown that 70 
percent of men with high propensity go on to enlist in the military within 5 to 6 
years after graduation, it is most likely that youth entering military service do not 
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hold more negative racial attitudes than their civilian counterparts.   
     Although minorities with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian 
attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts, all youth 
with propensity, on average, score relatively high on the race relations index, well 
above the mid-point of the scale.  Although this should not be alarming, the 
significant differences in attitudes toward race relations between racial and ethnic 
groups should not be understated.  Differences in attitudes should be monitored 
and understood by military leadership.  Indeed, this could be a point of contention 
in efforts to increase diversity in the military (Dempsey 2010).  The military must 
continue to work hard to ensure that there is no discrimination in its ranks.     
     Considering the question pertaining to the perception of discrimination against 
blacks in the military, there appears to be significantly less of a perception of 
discrimination among youth with propensity compared to their civilian 
counterparts.  Although minorities with propensity have significantly greater 
perceptions of discrimination compared to their white counterparts, all youth with 
propensity, on average, score relatively low on the question, suggesting that there 
is discrimination against blacks only to a “little extent.”  Further, differences in 
perceptions of discrimination based on racial and ethnic background among youth 
with high propensity essentially disappear.  This suggests that those most likely to 
serve have similar positive perceptions of a lack of discrimination against blacks 
in the military, regardless of racial and ethnic background.  Most telling is that 
youth without propensity, on average, perceive that there is only a “little extent” 
of discrimination against blacks in the military.  This supports the conventional 
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wisdom that the military remains to be perceived as an egalitarian and 
meritocratic environment, even during wartime.  Additionally, white men with 
propensity have the lowest perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the 
military.  Although this may not be surprising, it is unlikely that youth with 
negative preexisting racial views would be attracted to an organization that is 
perceived to have little discrimination.  Despite the relatively low perceptions, the 
military must continue to work hard to minimize the perceptions of discrimination 
within its ranks.  
      Taken together, my results appear to partially contradict the recent study by 
Nteta and Tarsi (2015), who argue that white veterans have less racially 
egalitarian attitudes compared to their civilian counterparts as a result of the 
negative racial attitudes of those who self-select into the military.  Indeed, my 
research suggests that there are no attitudinal differences with respect to race 
relations between youth with propensity (i.e. the military) and without propensity 
(i.e. civilians) during the post-9/11 era.  In fact, it appears that youth with high 
propensity have greater egalitarian attitudes compared to their civilian 
counterparts.  Although I find some support for their argument that white men 
with propensity are less racially egalitarian than their civilian counterparts, 
differences are very small.  Further, significant differences disappear among white 
men with high propensity who are the most likely to enter the military.  I find 
similar results among white men with propensity prior to 9/11 (between 1976-
2001) as well, which was Nteta and Tarsi’s primary period of analysis.  In fact, 
there were no significant differences in racial attitudes between white men with 
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and without propensity (OR=0.99) or between white men with high and low 
propensity (OR=1.00) between 1976-2001, even prior to controls (results not 
shown).  If Nteta and Tarsi’s findings are accurate (i.e. that white veterans are 
indeed less racially tolerant than white non-veterans during the AVF era), it is 
doubtful that it is the result of differences in attitudes among those who self-select 
into the military compared to those who do not.  Indeed, my results reveal that the 
racial attitudes among youth with propensity have been consistently significantly 
higher than youth without propensity throughout the duration of the AVF (See 
Figures 10.1 and 10.2).  It is my own hypothesis that the two measures used in 
Nteta and Tarsi’s analysis noted earlier are not the best predictors of racial 
attitudes.  Indeed, it is unlikely that conventional wisdom is incorrect and white 
veterans’ racial attitudes are less egalitarian after their increased contact with 
blacks in the military.        
     Future research should continue to assess the racial attitudes of youth with 
propensity and the attitudes among veterans of the post-9/11 era.  Specifically, 
researchers should compare attitudes using the same measures.  If white veterans 
are indeed becoming less egalitarian and more negative toward blacks, then it 
could be indicative of a problem with the military’s ability to effectively socialize 
its participants to support racial equality as opposed to a problem with the 
preexisting attitudes of those who self-select into the military.  This will be 
especially important for military practitioners to discover.  Perhaps greater 
attention and emphasis will be required by military leadership to better foster a 
climate that promotes racial equality.  Indeed, the potential exists that there could 
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be differences in racial attitudes among different populations within the military 
due to the de facto segregation by military occupational specialties, which limits 
opportunities for intergroup contact.  Thus, future research should also examine 
the racial attitudes among the military population by branch of service, rank, and 
MOS.  I challenge researchers to compare attitudes toward race relations between 
youth with propensity and veterans following their military service utilizing the 
same survey questions that the MTF study employs.  This would produce more 
accurate and reliable results to test the self-selection hypothesis and to see if 
veterans are indeed becoming less racially intolerant.      
However, to achieve the gold standard of the most accurate and reliable results to 
test the self-selection versus organizational socialization hypotheses, I challenge 
researchers to study a cohort of enlistees through their service and into retirement 
to compare their attitudes toward race relations.   
     Nteta and Tarsi’s recent research is limited since it does not cover the attitudes 
of veterans of the post-9/11 generation.  After a generation of soldiers who have 
served in combat longer than any other period, I expect that the military and 
combat environments have fostered a strong sense of trust between all of its 
members, regardless of race and ethnicity.  Indeed, the element of trust between 
soldiers is the bedrock of the Army Profession (The Army Profession 2015).  It is 
likely that the military experience during the post-9/11 era has promoted an 
atmosphere that has led to even greater positive racial attitudes among its 
members in a similar fashion as Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) found during 
WWII and Bogart (1969) found during the Korean War after the increased and 
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cooperative contact between whites and black soldiers during combat.  
     In the book, Colin Powell and the American Dream, the former Secretary of 
State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked about his thoughts of 
potentially leaving the Army after his first three years in service:  
"I was in a profession that would allow me to go as far as my 
talents would take me.  And for a black, no other avenue in 
American society offered so much opportunity.  But nothing 
counted so much as the fact that I loved what I was doing.  And so, 
much to my family's bewilderment, I told them I was not coming 
home" (Cummins and Rudnicki 1995:100).   
 
I expect that the beliefs of racial equality, security, and job satisfaction that a 
young black man felt within the military institution in 1961 will remain as strong 
today and into the future.  Although continuing strides toward racial equality can 
still be made in the military, and perhaps more so within society, I believe that the 
military remains one of America’s best institutions to model as an organization 
that engenders racial egalitarianism.  As the popular saying goes-with a slight 
twist by members of the Army- “we all bleed the same color- the color of green!”    
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Chapter 11: Summary and Conclusion 
     Life Course research examines how individuals work out paths of development 
over time.  The transition to adulthood is an important period that impacts one’s 
development over the life course.  During this transition, there are a few options 
that one can choose from after high school.  Going to college, joining the military, 
attending vocational education, or entering the labor force are the primary 
options.  My research addresses the first three options that an individual has 
during the transition to adulthood, with primary focus on those who are likely to 
enter the military.  A key tenet of life course theory is how lives are shaped and 
embedded by the historical time and place people encounter during their lifetime.  
The horrific attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 have undoubtedly left a 
lasting impact on the lives of most Americans and many others across our world.  
These attacks were the catalyst that created a state of sustained war immediately 
following 9/11, which continues today predominantly against terrorism.  The 
attacks of 9/11 and the post-9/11 period thus far is a historical moment that will 
likely shape how individuals work out their developmental paths.    
     The study of civil-military relations over the past half-century has focused 
primarily on two similar, yet separate streams of research that examine the 
relationship between the armed forces and society.  Those in Samuel Huntington’s 
corner believe that the military should be separate and distinct from the society it 
serves to increase military effectiveness.  However, those in Morris Janowitz’s 
corner believe that the military should be woven into the fabric of society, arguing 
that the military’s representation in demographics, attitudes, and values should be 
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more convergent with the people it protects.  Since the end of conscription and the 
birth of the AVF, researchers have been particularly interested in analyzing 
whether or not there is a civil-military gap in various demographics, attitudes, and 
values.  Many have argued that a gap has widened due to various factors such as 
the lack of conscription, military downsizing and a lack of a military institutional 
presence in communities, increased professionalism, and a reliance on civilian 
contractors.  More recently, scholars have cautioned that the period of sustained 
war could potentially increase the gap between civilians and the military.  My 
research contributes to this body of literature by examining this potential gap 
through the analysis of various demographic and attitudinal factors associated 
with those most likely to enter the military.             
     Since 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have encompassed the longest 
period of sustained war throughout U.S. history.  These wars have been placed 
squarely on the shoulders of the professional All-Volunteer Force.  The costs 
associated with the prolonged wars have taken their toll on the AVF and have 
likely had an influence on whether a young man or woman would want to enter 
the military during a period of wartime.  Similarly, the benefits associated with 
military service are also likely to have had an influence on these decisions.  This 
cost/benefit analysis can be framed within the institutional/occupational model to 
assist with understanding the motivations of youth who expect to serve during a 
period of wartime.   
     There have been numerous studies examining the propensity to serve in the 
armed forces of America’s youth, many of which have uncovered the underlying 
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motivations of those who expect to serve.  However, the extent of how war has 
influenced youth propensity has only been marginally studied in the past.  Given 
the circumstances, with the exception of the Gulf War period, prior research has 
not been able to directly analyze youth propensity during a period of war.  My 
research extends previous work and fills a significant gap in knowledge of how 
war during the post-9/11 era shapes youth propensity to join the military.   
     Throughout the post-9/11 period, there have also been sub-periods (i.e. 
“historical moments”) marked by additional significant events to include but not 
limited to: a period of high patriotic sentiment immediately following the attacks 
of 9/11 (2003); a period of high U.S. casualties during the surge of U.S. forces 
back into Iraq (2004-2008); and a period of an economic recession at home 
(2009-2011).  These events are likely to have had significant influence on 
American youth propensity during the post-9/11 era - a period in total marked by 
sustained war, and in part by additional significant influences.  To address these 
periods, I analyzed the influence of patriotism after 9/11 by examining the 
relationship between public support for war and propensity.  I also analyzed the 
influence of the Iraqi surge period by examining the relationship between U.S. 
casualties and propensity.  Last, I analyzed the impacts of the economic recession 
period by examining the relationship between unemployment on propensity.  For 
the most part, these analyses add to or extend the existing literature on military 
propensity.      
     Additional significant historical events during the post-9/11 era may also 
influence propensity to serve in the future.  The “Black Lives Matter” movement, 
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which began in 2014 and continues today, is a moment that warrants further 
analysis on racial attitudes and by racial analysis groups.  My analysis of attitudes 
toward race relations among youth with propensity provides a good starting point 
to examine the influence of the “Black Lives Matter” movement on those likely to 
serve in the armed forces in the future.  Will youth attitudes toward race relations 
strengthen or weaken among those expecting to serve in the military?  Will these 
attitudes be distinctly different by racial and ethnic sub-groups?  Will these 
attitudes diverge away from the attitudes among society (i.e. those who do not 
expect to serve)?  
     The Department of Defense’s recent decision to open all combat positions to 
women at the end of 2015 is another significant moment likely to have influence 
on youth propensity.  Analysis of the propensity to serve by gender allows for the 
continued examination of the impacts of this decision into the future.  My analysis 
of attitudes toward gender roles among youth with propensity also provides a 
good starting point to analyze the extent of resistance expected among men who 
are likely to serve as a result of this decision.  Further analysis of the perceptions 
of discrimination against women in the military, especially among young women, 
will provide insight to how successful the DoD’s integration of women into 
combat jobs is working.   
Summary of Analysis Results    
     Men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era is related to several macro-social 
factors such as public support for war, casualties, and unemployment.  In general, 
the relationships between these factors and women’s propensity are similar in 
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magnitude and direction as for men.  Below, I highlight the similarities and 
differences between men and women’s propensity.   
• Propensity is higher for men than for women. 
• Propensity during the post-9/11 era is as high as other years during the 
AVF without war; women’s propensity reached its second highest 
percentage in 2013.  Men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era was as 
high as during the 1990s, although it was lower than the 1980s; similar 
overall trends hold for women’s propensity.  
• Propensity decreases as public support for war increases; however, 
propensity increases with greater nationalistic attitudes; the same trends 
hold for women.  
• Propensity decreases as casualties increase; the decrease in propensity is 
greater for women than for men. 
• Men’s propensity increases as unemployment increases; women’s 
propensity does not significantly increase as unemployment rates increase.   
     Men’s propensity during the post-9/11 era is also related to several individual 
demographic and attitudinal factors.  In general, the relationship between 
women’s propensity and these factors are similar in magnitude and direction as 
they are for men.  
• Propensity levels differ by racial and ethnic background.  Propensity is 
highest among black men; followed by Hispanic men; then white men.  
For men, these relationships do not hold true after controlling for SES; 
Hispanic men have the highest propensity after controlling for SES; Black 
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men have the lowest propensity after all controls.  These relationships are 
similar for women and hold true even after controlling for all factors, 
including SES.  Black men’s propensity is generally the lowest during the 
post-9/11 era compared to black propensity during the years prior to 9/11.     
• Propensity decreases with higher socioeconomic status as measured by 
parent’s education, the number of parents in a household, and the number 
of siblings.  Men of college-educated fathers have lower propensity than 
men whose parents did not attend college.  Mother’s education level is not 
a significant predictor for men’s propensity, but is a significant predictor 
for women.     
• Propensity decreases with educational achievement in high school; the 
same trend holds for women. 
• Propensity varies by region: propensity is higher in the South and West, 
lower in the Northeast and North Central regions.  The same general 
trends hold for women, although women’s propensity is the lowest in the 
Northeast.   
• Propensity decreases in suburban and urban areas of the country; the same 
trends hold for women.   
• Propensity decreases with expectations to graduate from a 4-year college; 
men who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational 
education have higher propensity.  Minority men who expect to graduate 
from a 2-year college or attend vocational school have greater propensity 
than white men; the same trends hold for women.   
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• Among women with propensity, perceptions of discrimination against 
women in the military have increased during the post-9/11 era, although 
these perceptions are less than the perceptions among women without 
propensity.  Men with propensity have lower perceptions of discrimination 
against women in the military.   
• Propensity is highest among those who affiliate with the Republican Party.  
Men with propensity affiliate with the Republican Party more than women 
with propensity.    
• Propensity is highest among those who identify as having a conservative 
political ideology.  Men with propensity are more conservative than 
women with propensity. 
• Propensity increases with greater institutional motivations to serve.  
However, youth with propensity have a mixture of institutional and 
occupational orientations- a form of “pragmatic professionalism.”  On 
average, white men with propensity appear to have greater institutional 
orientations than their black counterparts.  Hispanic men with propensity 
have similar institutional orientations as their white counterparts.  Men 
with high propensity (i.e. “Definitely Will” serve) appear to have the 
greatest institutional orientations while men with low propensity (i.e. 
“Definitely Will Not” serve) have the least.  Institutional orientations are 
generally among the highest of the AVF during the post-9/11 era.   
• Propensity increases with greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles.  
Women with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes 
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toward gender roles than men.  However, women’s propensity also 
increases with greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles.  Men with 
propensity have greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles during the 
post-9/11 era compared to the decade prior to 9/11.  
• There is no significant relationship between propensity and attitudes 
toward race relations.  After full controls, men with high propensity have 
greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations than men with low 
propensity.  Men and women with propensity during the post-9/11 era 
have increasing egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to 
years prior to 9/11.  
• Perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the military among men 
and women with propensity are relatively low and stable throughout the 
duration of the AVF.  
Major Contributions of Research 
    Findings from my research contribute to Life Course studies by examining data 
in the “historical time and place” of the post-9/11 era, which is likely to influence 
various attitudes, decisions, and outcomes of America’s youth.  Examining the 
factors associated with military service compared to other options that young 
adults encounter during their transition to adulthood provides insight to 
sociologists interested in examining changes in motivations during a period 
marked by domestic and foreign turbulence.  Sociologists who fail to examine the 
military in studies of youth transitions to adulthood could overlook important 
findings, as the military may be an important route to higher education and 
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upward mobility (Kleykamp 2006).  My examination of the entry point into the 
military through the Life Course theoretical framework could direct the research 
agenda to examine impacts at other points along the life course (e.g. the time to 
reenlist or exit the military and retirement) that could influence different 
outcomes.  Future research should examine the influence that the post-9/11 era 
may have on various other academic domains of study.  Studies that examine the 
effects from the 9/11 era are likely to discover unique findings that parallel earlier 
life course studies of notable historical moments such as the Great Depression or 
the World War II era.    
     According to the tenets of Life Course theory, individuals have agency when 
making a decision on which pathway to adulthood they choose.  Weighing the 
pros and cons of one particular pathway compared to another is one method for 
making an informed and rational decision.  The military certainly has a lot of 
advantages such as increasing human capital through educational benefits, pay 
and health care, and technical training that translates to the civilian labor market, 
especially for those less advantaged in mainstream society.  For many 
underprivileged individuals the military can serve as a “turning point” in one’s 
life that helps bridge the gap to facilitate a better transition to adulthood by 
increasing socioeconomic status (Elder 1986; Sampson and Laub 1996).  The 
occupational model best depicts this rationale of military service.  Those young 
men and women who desire to gain access to college could be a viable target for 
recruitment as the military seeks to attract the best and brightest.  Additionally, 
those who seek a specific skillset or trade may find better opportunities through 
 465 
on-the-job training in the military with direct pay benefits and other opportunities 
to expand their horizons through travel and experiences.  There are also 
motivations to serve that are more in line with institutional orientations of service.  
For example, youth may be influenced to serve by a notion of patriotism- to rally 
‘round the flag in support of our country at war.  Furthermore, some youth may be 
motivated to serve as a call of duty to serve as a citizen of the United States- 
especially during this critical period of war during the post-9/11 era.  
     Despite the many advantages of military service, the post-9/11 era has 
highlighted one major disadvantage- the increased risk of injury due to combat.  
Although fatalities during the wars since 9/11 pale in comparison to earlier wars, 
soldiers today are more at risk of becoming both a physical and a mental casualty 
from the prolonged wars.  The nature of the conflict (e.g. small-scale, 
asymmetrical threats- IEDs, suicide bombers), coupled with the improvements in 
medical evacuation and treatment during this era, has kept soldiers alive, often as 
amputees or with mental and emotional scars invisible to the eye.  Visions of our 
wounded warriors symbolize the costs of war and leave a lasting impression on 
our youth.  It is likely that these factors influence a youth’s decision on whether or 
not he or she will join the military.  Indeed, my research suggests that propensity 
is negatively related to an increase in casualties.  Youth who are more oriented to 
military service by the occupational model as opposed to the institutional model 
may be less likely to serve during this era compared to earlier times without war, 
as the perceived risks outweigh the benefits.       
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     Findings from my research add to the overall literature on propensity to serve 
in the armed forces by extending analysis into the post-9/11 era.  This research 
could have important policy implications with respect to recruitment and retention 
in the armed forces for both military and civilian leadership.  As the military 
continues to undergo significant personnel and budget cuts, we must ensure that 
the quality and quantity of future recruits continues to improve as military 
missions become increasingly complex and diverse.  Uncovering the macro-
social, social-psychological, and demographic influences on propensity will 
facilitate a better understanding of the motivations of youth to serve in the 
military, which will improve recruitment strategies in the future.  Continued 
knowledge of these factors will assist in the efficiency and effectiveness of future 
recruiting efforts to ensure that we continue to target the “highest” quality 
individuals, who are representative of the population at large, as the military 
continues to compete with the civilian labor market and college campuses.   
     My research examining the differences in propensity by gender is particularly 
important as the majority of prior research has neglected this analysis and the 
topic of women in the military has resurfaced as debate since the rescission of the 
combat exclusion ban in 2011 and the DoD’s recent decision to open all combat 
positions to women.  It is likely that women’s success in combat since 9/11, along 
with the recent structural changes, should have a positive influence on women’s 
propensity to serve into the future.  However, I do not expect that women’s 
propensity will increase by large percentages as the military continues to be 
perceived as a masculine and traditional culture.  Future research must continue to 
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examine the various factors related to women’s propensity and its trends over 
time.       
     The results from my I/O analysis suggest that recruitment techniques that focus 
on institutional messages and themes such as patriotism, adventure, leadership, 
and teamwork will be useful in attracting America’s next generation of warriors.  
Indeed, the Marine Corps’ institutional motto of “The Few, The Proud, The 
Marines” and their recent commercial “Which Way Would You Run,” (2012) 
should continue to positively influence young men and women into the Marine 
Corps.  The Army’s new promotional campaign “The Team That Makes a 
Difference,” (2015) is evidence that Army recruiters are also trying to tap into an 
individual’s “institutional psyche.”  My findings support that that these types of 
institutional themes will continue to attract new recruits during an era of sustained 
war.  Previous research suggests that individuals that are attracted to these types 
of recruitment appeals will be more committed to the institution overall, more 
likely to fulfill their initial enlistment obligations, and more likely to reenlist 
(Faris 1988; Griffith 2008).  Youth who enter the military with greater 
occupational orientations similar to those of their civilian counterparts could risk 
disappointment upon entering the military institution.  Indeed, attracting youth 
who already have a fair amount of institutional orientations will certainly reduce 
the culture shock from the institutional socialization that occurs within the 
military itself after initial enlistment (Faris 1988).  To the extent that 
organizational functioning is affected by the goodness of fit between the values of 
the organization and those of its work force, it appears that military effectiveness 
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during the post-9/11 era will be strengthened as a result of the institutional 
orientations of youth who are likely to enlist (Segal 1986).   
     Despite evidence revealing strong institutional orientations among youth with 
propensity, it is clear that a mixture of institutional and occupational motivations 
to serve (the hybrid model) persist during the post-9/11 era.  The military must 
ensure that incentive packages remain attractive to the “college-bound” youth 
amidst looming budget cuts to maintain the overall readiness of the force.  My 
results reveal that young men and women are likely to also be attracted to 
educational benefits as well as monetary incentives as propensity increases during 
periods of economic instability in the labor market.    
     Results regarding racial and ethnic group differences in I/O orientations will 
further assist recruiters in focusing on various target audiences with appropriate 
recruitment techniques.  Data suggests that recruitment techniques that focus on 
more tangible, occupational incentives such as pay and benefits may better attract 
black youth into the military.  Conversely, those techniques that focus on more 
intangible, institutional incentives may better attract white and Hispanic youth.  
The fact that there were no significant I/O differences (using the I/O index scale 
measure) between racial and ethnic groups with high propensity suggests that the 
significant differences lie in the population who claim that they “probably will” 
enter the armed forces.  Indeed, this is the target audience that recruiters could 
best influence to join the military with appropriate I/O incentives.  Those with 
high propensity are the most institutional in orientation regardless of race and 
ethnicity.   
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     My research comparing civilian and military attitudes toward work contributes 
to parallel research in the civilian sector on public service motivation (PSM) 
(Taylor et al. 2015).  PSM is “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives 
grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations.”  PSM is 
a construct that is “animated by specific dispositions and values arising from 
public institutions and missions” (Perry et al. 2010: 682).  PSM is primarily 
associated with altruism although it satisfies individual needs at the same time 
that the community interest is being served.  Recently, researchers have shown 
that the dimensions of PSM (i.e. Commitment to Public Values, Self-sacrifice, 
Attraction to Public Service, and Compassion) are positively correlated with 
institutional values, which address the notion of serving the greater good (Taylor 
et al. 2015).  Much research on PSM has compared the differences in the 
motivations of workers between the public and the private sector, and has been 
extended to address the motivations of nonprofit workers and volunteers as well.  
In general, research on PSM shows that people who work or volunteer in 
government agencies and nonprofit organizations have higher levels of PSM than 
private sector employees.  In other words, those who work in the public sector 
have greater institutional orientations than those in the private sector.  Indeed, the 
true essence of PSM is “a willingness to provide service to others without 
receiving tangible personal rewards in return” (Taylor et al. 2015:146).  These 
findings support my findings as well in that those people likely to join the military 
(i.e. the public sector) have greater institutional orientations than those people 
who likely will not enter the military (i.e. a large portion that comprises the 
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private sector).  It would be interesting for future research to examine if there are 
I/O differences between those who join the military and those who join the public 
sector for work.   
     Despite the considerable amount of contributions from my research, a 
limitation to my study is the difficulty in determining causal mechanisms 
associated with military propensity from the secondary nature of the survey 
questions asked in the MTF project.  Findings can only suggest factors that may 
be directly or indirectly influencing a youth’s expectation to serve.  Further, I am 
not directly able to uncover youth motivations to serve.  A combination of 
quantitative and qualitative analysis is required to best determine the direct 
mechanisms influencing our youth along a particular pathway to adulthood.  
Nevertheless, my findings provide a solid, unbiased foundation as a springboard 
for more directed research into the future.        
Potential Impacts on Civil-Military Relations 
     Is the military becoming an “ideological caste” of its own as Janowitz (1975) 
inquired?  Extensive research has been done on the civilian-military “gap” with 
primary focus on distinctive attitudes within the military that either converge or 
diverge with society at large as well as with civilian leadership.  Researchers (e.g. 
Fever and Kohn 2001) have previously compared values, attitudes, and the 
representativeness of the military with the civilian population to determine the 
extent and nature of a gap.  Some theorists argue that the length of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as well as the sole reliance on the All-Volunteer 
Force, have contributed to widening the “gap” between the military and the 
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general population.  Protégées of Morris Janowitz (1960), contend that relations 
between the military and the civilians should be more convergent than divergent, 
whereas protégées of Samuel Huntington (1957) believe the opposite.     
    My research suggests that there are different value orientations between those 
with and without propensity.  Results show that youth with propensity have 
greater institutional orientations, are more likely to affiliate with the Republican 
Party and identify as having a conservative ideology, and are more traditional in 
attitudes toward gender roles.  Results also show that black propensity has 
decreased during this period compared to earlier periods, which could create 
issues with diversity in the military.  Of note, there are no differences in attitudes 
toward race relations between youth with and without propensity.  The fact that 
those who expect to serve in the armed forces have different attitudes from the 
society it protects is not surprising in and of itself.  Indeed, many organizations 
adopt a culture of their own that attracts individuals with unique personalities and 
attitudes that may be different than those outside the organization.  From this 
point of view, the military is no different than any other organization.  In fact, 
those in Huntington’s corner would argue that this is a necessary condition for 
military effectiveness.  Huntington argued that it is important that the military 
does not fall into society’s liberal and individualistic trends.  However, insofar as 
one believes that the military should be a microcosm of the society it serves and 
protects, as Janowitz did, these differences may bring cause for alarm.  Perhaps 
the most glaring differences are in the political attitudes of youth with propensity 
during the post-9/11 era.     
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     Differences in political attitudes between the military and society could signify 
differences in values, which could ultimately lead to a lack of trust between the 
two.  Trust is an essential element for civil-military relations (Dempsey 2010).  
Indeed, trust is a mutual relationship between the military and the American 
people.  It is a trust that the military has in its civilian leaders to provide the 
necessary resources and clear strategic objectives to carry out its assigned 
missions.  It is also a trust that society and civilian leadership have in the military 
to remain the most effective and efficient fighting force in the world while 
remaining grounded with a solid moral and ethical foundation that is firmly rooted 
in American values, laws, and regulations.   
     If an appearance of a gap between American values and military values exists, 
as evidenced by a gap in political attitudes, the impacts to our national security 
could be harmful.  As recently stated in The Army Profession, “Trust is the 
bedrock of the Army’s relationship with the American people…Within the Army 
Profession, mutual trust is the organizing principle necessary to build cohesive 
teams...[trust] depends on- trust between Soldiers, trust between Soldiers, their 
Families, and the Army, and trust between the Army and the American people” 
(The Army Profession 2015:1).  If the military loses trust with the American 
people or its civilian leadership, it is possible that issues of insubordination could 
arise or there could be a reduction in the supply of volunteers willing to serve and 
protect.  If the people lose trust in the American military, it is possible that we 
could have another Vietnam era of chaos and division on our hands.  The military 
has done well digging itself out from the trenches during the days of Vietnam, 
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regaining its prestige and status as one of the most trusted institutions in 
government (Pew 2011).  It is essential to maintain this element of trust between 
the armed forces and society.  If one political party is viewed as considerably 
more pro-military than the other, trust between the military and the government 
could possibly crumble when that party does not represent the Commander-in-
Chief.  
     The fact that the military may be becoming increasingly politically polarizing 
is especially troubling during a time of war.  Ideally, the entire country should be 
engaged and shouldering the burdens of war, regardless of political affiliation or 
beliefs.  Carl Von Clausewitz’s “trinity” of relationships (i.e. the military, 
government, and society) does not imply that each leg of the triad operates 
autonomously without overlap of goals, ideas, and values.  Quite the contrary, 
attitudes and values should intersect among the various groups of the triad to 
achieve balance and to successfully accomplish its military and political goals 
during war to protect society.  A military that is separate and distinct in attitudes 
and values from the society and government it serves could create issues with 
military effectiveness- certainly not an ideal situation during wartime.  Does 
Clausewitz’s famous phrase, “war is merely the continuation of politics by other 
means,” necessarily mean that those who fight for political objectives should be 
politically polarized (Clausewitz 1976:87)?  Shouldn’t war transcend political 
partisanship for the greater good of the entire country?  Does “Bush’s War” or 
“Obama’s War” really insinuate that only those similar in political views should 
carry out that war?  Shouldn’t the Commander-in-Chief and our entire political 
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apparatus unite under a common cause to accomplish its political and military 
objectives as one indivisible nation- united we stand?       
     Questions such as these have caused some to argue for the reinstatement of a 
draft during the post-9/11 era.  After all, one of the primary purposes of imposing 
a draft during earlier wars was to equalize the burdens of war throughout all of 
society and unite the country under a common purpose, regardless of race, class, 
or politics.  That wasn’t necessarily always the case, such as during the Vietnam 
War, but that was certainly one of the intentions of conscription (Armor 1996).  
Indeed, the prolonged nature of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars caused some senior 
military leaders to call upon the President to initiate the draft.  Most notably, 
former U.S. and International Security Assistance Force Commander in 
Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, recently broke ranks to argue for 
reinstating the draft.  McChrystal remarked at the Aspen Ideas Festival, “I think if 
a nation goes to war, every town, every city needs to be at risk” (Ricks 2012).  
This is the first time in years that a senior military officer has argued that the All-
Volunteer Force may not necessarily be good for the country or the military 
(Ricks 2012).  McChrystal offered the following reasons for reinstating the draft: 
1) “the draft prevents the military from being unrepresentative of the population;” 
2) the burden of war should be felt broadly across society;” and 3) “the all-
volunteer military divorces public opinion about war from its human costs, and- 
as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown- too great a burden is placed on a small 
group of service members, doomed to multiple combat tours” (Hatfield 2013).  
Since then, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin 
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Dempsey, and former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, 
have also spoken about the potential need to return to the draft.      
     Is the military becoming a warrior-class with its own distinctive values and 
attitudes?  Anecdotally, many believe that the military has become more separated 
from the society it serves after a decade and a half of war.  An article highlighting 
the tenth anniversary of 9/11 captured these sentiments:   
“The U.S. Army now begins its 10th continuous year in combat, 
the first time in its history the United States has excused the vast 
majority of its citizens from service and engaged in a major, 
decade-long conflict instead with an Army manned entirely by 
professional warriors.  This is an Army that, under the pressure of 
combat, has turned inward, leaving civilian America behind, 
reduced to the role of a well-wishing but impatient spectator.  A 
decade of fighting has hardened soldiers in ways that civilians can't 
share.  America respects its warriors, but from a distance.  ‘They 
don't know what we do,' said Col. Dan Williams, who commands 
an Army aviation brigade in Afghanistan.  The consequences of 
this unique milestone in American history are many- the rise of a 
new warrior class, the declining number of Americans in public 
life with the sobering experience of war, the fading ideal of public 
service as a civic responsibility.  But above all, I think, is a 
perilous shrinking of common ground, the shared values and 
knowledge and beliefs that have shaped the way Americans think 
about war. Without it, how will soldiers and civilians ever see this 
war and its outcome in the same way” (Wood 2010)?  
 
     As we continue to prosecute a war against known and unknown threats with 
our professional all-volunteer military, it begs the question: What will be the 
unintended consequences from these wars?  Fever and Kohn’s assertion (prior to 
9/11) that the “gap between the military and society in values, attitudes, opinions, 
and perspectives presents no compelling need to act to avert an immediate 
emergency” may, indeed, be outdated (2001:11).  My own research supports 
anecdotal evidence, suggesting that the civil-military gap may have increased 
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since 9/11.  If left unaddressed, this could undermine civil-military cooperation 
and hamper military effectiveness.  As Fever and Kohn warned, “the result might 
well harm the national security of the United States.”  I charge researchers to 
extend the research agenda into the post-9/11 era in similar fashion as Fever and 
Kohn’s (2001) extensive study.  My research suggests that the civil-military gap 
has increased since 9/11 for a few different measures- in political attitudes, job-
related attitudes, gender-role attitudes, and diversity- an unintended, yet 
potentially harmful consequence of the prolonged wars of 9/11 waged by a small 
population of professional warriors.  It is my prediction that this gap will continue 
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